

A REVIEW

OF THE

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA

BY DIRECTION

OF

THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT

OF

THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

A REVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA

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BY DIRECTION OF THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT
OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AND NAVY WHO LOST THEIR LIVES WHILE SERVING WITH THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA STRIVING TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE INHABITANTS OF A TROUBLED NATION.

THE ROLL OF HONOR

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PREFACE

The story of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is one of moving interest not only to the officers and men of the Marine Corps, but also to the general reader. It is full of important lessons to the naval and military services, and to the statesman as well. It furnishes a perfect illustration of the fact that the officers of the naval and military services do not make, but only carry out the policies of their Government; and of the effect of economics on military operations.

When the Guardia was organized the Republic of Nicaragua was prosperous and there was a surplus of revenue over expenditures in the National Treasury; while the Government of the United States was apparently committed to the policy of maintaining a military force in Nicaragua until the country was completely pacified, and until a corps of officers had grown up and been trained to take over the responsibilities of the administration of the Guardia, and the maintenance of law and order throughout the Republic.

Within two years the worldwide depression had descended upon Nicaragua, leaving the country with insufficient income to meet its ordinary expenditures, precluding the maintenance of a military organization of sufficient size and strength to restore and maintain peace and security to the inhabitants; while at the same time, due to a change in the administration in the United States, the American policy changed from one of lending military assistance, to the withdrawal at the earliest possible moment of all armed forces, leaving Nicaragua to cope unaided with its internal disorders and revolts.

Neither these policies nor the economic depression were the making of the officers assigned to duty with the Guardia, and their methods of executing the policies were subject to the constant supervision of the State Department of the United States.

Since the President of Nicaragua was the Commander in Chief of the Guardia, except during the electoral periods when the Chairman of the Electoral Commission assumed full control, the Jefe Director often found it necessary to regulate his actions to meet the wishes of the President without running counter to the policies of his own Government.

It was necessary for the Guardia to conduct a continuous savage guerilla war against forces, which if they were not greater than the total strength of the Guardia, were so situated that they were superior in the areas where they operated, and whose ranks were filled with seasoned troops and capable leaders, veterans of revolutionary wars from the Rio Grande to the Isthmus of Panama. At the same time it was required to build from the beginning, an organization that would stand alone, officered by men of mature judgement, capable of administering its affairs, and maintaining it as an efficient military organization, all of this in the short space of a little more than five years.

Only the general outline of its accomplishments under command of officers and men of the United States Marine Corps and Navy has been attempted. It would be impossible within the scope of this work to recount the many incidents of heroism, hardship, and self-sacrifice of those who fearlessly led their men through the almost trackless, but always bandit infested wildernesses of northern and central Nicaragua; or to more than mention the wholehearted support and coöperation received from the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Special Service Squadron, the Second Brigade of Marines, and particu-

larly, the members of the Aircraft Squadrons, always so willing to come to the assistance of their brothers-at-arms, and ever ready to risk a life to save the life of a Guardia.

The work has been divided into two parts, Volume I, the text, and Volume II, the appendices. In this manner it is the hope of the Board that the interests of both the military student and the general reader will be served. Where it was believed necessary to quote documents to sustain statements made in the text, the quotations have been included in the appendices. The student of small wars will be fully repaid for the time he may spend in a perusal of the contents of Volume II, as they contain first hand accounts of a number of typical contacts between the guardia and bandit forces as well as copies of the original orders and correspondence concerning matters pertinent to the situation confronting the Guardia.

Every effort has been made to verify all the statements appearing in the text, and all matter has been presented without comment.

The members of the Board submit this work with the hope that it will not only preserve a record of the splendid self-sacrificing performance of duty of the officers of the Marine Corps and Navy, attached to the National Guard of Nicaragua, but will also be of assistance to those who may be required to organize and command similar organizations in the future.

The contributions of Captain E. L. Burwell, Jr., and Sergeant Major Charles Davis, consisting in the preparation of chapters, searching records for data and in the general compilation of the work, have been invaluable. Lieutenant Edward J. Trumble, though not a member of the Board kindly contributed the chapter on the Military Academy.

The appreciation of the Board is due to Brigadier General J. C. Breckinridge, Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools; and the members of his staff, who coöperated in every way possible, furnishing office space, clerical assistance, and their sympathetic support to the members of the Board; and to the Reproduction Department for reproducing maps and sketches.

Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Matthews merits the thanks of the Board for his helpful comments when reading the chapters in draft form.

JULIAN C. SMITH,
Major, U.S.M.C.,
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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

At the time of the formation of the Guardia Nacional under command of officers of the United States Marine Corps, Nicaragua had completed a little more than a century of national independence, having, together with the other four Central American Republics, thrown off the yoke of Spain in 1821. Prior to that date the history of the country consisted of three centuries of despotism, during which the people had been kept isolated from the rest of the world, allowed to trade only with Spain, and held in ignorance and poverty.

The separation of the Central American colonies from Spain was practically unopposed, as the mother country was too much occupied in trying to save the far more valuable colonies of South America to spare troops to hold these less important possessions. The revolt was easily accomplished, but the task of organizing a government composed of the five Central American colonies proved beyond the capabilities of a people untrained in administering their affairs, and lacking in the traditions and experience of self government.

Nicaragua, like the rest of the Latin American Republics, adopted a constitution and system of government modeled after that of the United States. The government consists of a President, a Congress of two houses, and a Supreme Court. While completely democratic in theory, the government in fact has consisted of a series of dictatorships, in which the President has exercised arbitrary power, bending both the Congress and the Courts to his will. National elections have been a farce, and the party in power has never failed to turn in a majority of the votes counted for its candidate, and with the exception of the supervised elections of 1928 and 1932, a complete change of government has never come about except through revolution.

Geographically, Nicaragua is the largest of the Central American Republics. It contains Lakes Nicaragua and Managua, which occupy substantially 3000 square miles of its territory and have had a great influence upon the history of the country. The depression containing the basins of these lakes and of the San Juan River, their outlet to the Atlantic, extends across the Isthmus. Lake Nicaragua, which is only 110 feet above sea level, is separated from the Pacific by a range of low hills, and is distant from it only 13 miles at the narrowest point of the separating land. Lake Managua lies to the north and is distant from the Pacific only about 30 miles across the low plain of Leon. In colonial times, the route across the isthmus through Leon to Granada on Lake Nicaragua and thence by water, was commonly used for the transportation of products from all parts of Central America to Spain; and much more recently was one of the most popular lanes of travel between California and the east coast of the United States. It was considered by many the most practicable route for an interoceanic water-way. Diplomatic controversies for the possession of the canal route, and the machinations of corporations endeavoring to gain control of its existing facilities for transisthmian transportation have played a large part in the international relations of the Republic, and at times have disturbed her internal political conditions. The construction of the Panama Canal and the ratification of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, whereby the United

States purchased the sole right to a canal by the Nicaraguan route put an end to the difficulties from this source.

Since obtaining her independence the history of Nicaragua has been a record of almost uninterrupted internal discord, revolt and revolution, and the condition of her people with regard to ignorance and poverty has but little improved; some seventy percent of her inhabitants are illiterate, and many live in isolated regions with only the most primitive means of communication with each other or with the outside world. With an area of 49,200 square miles, greater than that of the State of New York, there are only 171 miles of railroad. Highways, in our sense of the word, are unknown except between some of the larger cities of the Pacific coastal plain. The roads consist only of beaten paths over mountain and through jungle, some passable for the two-wheeled bull-carts of the country during the dry season, and in the rainy season impassable to anything more modern than a pack train. Communication between the east and west coasts is by mule pack and small boat, difficult and slow in the dry season, and impossible, or at least extremely dangerous, during the rains.

When the Spaniards conquered the country they enslaved the inhabitants, and intermarried with their women, and the present population is the result of that mingling. According to the census of 1920, the population was 638,119. Of this number, 17 per cent is classed as white, 3 per cent as pure Indian, 9 per cent as Negro, and 71 per cent as mixed —mainly Spanish and Indian. About 72 per cent of this population is illiterate. The negroes are mainly confined to the Atlantic coast, having migrated from the West Indies. Spanish laws, customs and language prevail through the country.

The people of Nicaragua more than the people of the other countries of Central America, are dwellers in cities. About one-fourth of all her inhabitants live in six important towns in the lake plains. The concentration of the population in a few cities has intensified the conditions that have worked against peace and made Nicaragua the most turbulent of the Central American Republics. The Mestizo artisans, especially those of the larger cities, are always ready to drop their work and take up arms in the interests of their faction or of their patron, and even the ordinary laborers are Liberals or Conservatives and followers of this or that chief. The common people are little interested in principles, but follow their leaders partly from devotion and partly because they are united to them by the old local hatreds that have kept the parties alive. Granada and Leon, the respective centers of Conservatism and Liberalism, have been bitter rivals since their foundation, and this rivalry and the inherited hatred between these two most important cities, has been the cause of many revolts and uprisings. The other cities are divided in their sympathies. Those dependent geographically upon one of the rivals have naturally followed it in politics. Others are split within themselves by fueds between their leading citizens and between different elements in their population.

The country has been dominated politically by the Conservative and Liberal parties, the leaders of which are intelligent and usually well educated men. Unfortunately in the past, they have been more interested in exploiting the people and maintaining themselves or their friends in power than in advancing the interests of their country and its inhabitants.

The events leading up to the interventions by the United States which culminated in the supervision of the elections of 1928 and 1932, and the formation of the Guardia began with the régime of Zelaya, who obtained the Presidency as a result of the Liberal revolution of 1893.

Jose Santos Zelaya was the absolute ruler of Nicaragua for sixteen years. During his administration, the railway system and the steamer service on the lakes was extended and improved, the development of the coffee districts was stimulated by generous subsidies, and the capital, Zelaya's birthplace, was transformed from a rather primitive small town to the most progressive city of the Republic. Marked progress was made in the matter of public instruction, schools were opened in all parts of the country, and many young men of special ability were sent abroad to study.

Despite his progressive policy, however, Zelaya was a brutal and unscrupulous tyrant, who exploited the country for his own personal profit on a scale unprecedented in the history of the isthmus. He violated personal and private property rights, inflicting the most brutal treatment on his enemies. He fomented revolutions in all the other Central American Republics and kept the whole isthmus in a state of turmoil. His warlike activities, his systematic opposition to American influence and his propensity for entering into entanglements with foreign governments finally brought about an open rupture with the United States, and did much to cause his downfall.

In October, 1909, a revolt broke out in Bluefields against Zelaya. General Juan Estrada was named provisional president and Adolfo Diaz, a local official of an American mining company, financed the revolt. As the conflict grew intense, the United States unmistakably showed that its sympathies were with the revolutionists. Early in November, two Americans, Cannon and Groce, holding commissions in the revolutionary army, were captured. Zelaya had these two men tried by court-martial and they were sentenced to be shot, which sentence was duly executed November 17, 1909, in spite of protests by the American Minister in Managua.

When it became known in Washington that Cannon and Groce had been shot, Secretary of State Knox broke off relations with Nicaragua and handed the Chargé d'Affaires his passports.

Zelaya resigned on December 15, 1909, and left the country. The Nicaraguan Congress elected Dr. Jose Madriz to succeed Zelaya. With the moral support of the United States the revolutionists defeated Madriz and he resigned August 20, 1910.

The United States appointed Thomas C. Dawson, the American Minister in Panama, as special agent to Nicaragua, to arrange for free elections and liberal constitution, a loan to restore Nicaraguan finances, the liquidation of all mixed claims, and an indemnity for Cannon and Groce. The arrangements made came to be called the Dawson agreement, which lost most of its effect when the Senate of the United States refused to ratify the Knox-Castrillo convention to carry out the loan provision. However, Estrada was elected President and Diaz Vice President on December 31, 1910. Estrada's rule lasted only a short time, terminating on May 9, 1911. He caused General Mena, Minister of War, to be arrested for "contemplated treason." The commotion caused by this incident forced him to resign and Diaz succeeded to the Presidency, releasing Mena at once.

Although the convention was not ratified, yet a loan was made by the bankers, Brown Bros. and J. and W. Seligman, at the instance of Secretary Knox, for $1,500,000, and an American, Clifford D. Ham, was appointed Collector of Customs on the nomination of the bankers and Secretary Knox. A mixed Claims Commission was appointed, consisting of two Americans and one Nicaraguan. A total of $13,808,161 came before the Commission, and awards were made amounting to $1,840,432.31. The greatest number of claimants were Nicaraguans, but the 66 American claimants asked for $7,576,564.13. They received only $538,749.71, as their claims were based mostly on illegal concessions and on estimated future profits.

On July 29, 1912, the Liberals proclaimed a revolution, seized considerable stores of war material, most of the custom houses, and part of the railroad. President Diaz then asked that the "United States guarantee with its forces security for the property of its citizens in Nicaragua and that it extend its protection to all the inhabitants of the Republic."

The United States was not slow to act. On August 5, Secretary Knox asked President Taft for authority to use the marines then in Panama to protect American life and property in Nicaragua. Authority was immediately granted and on August 15th, the advance force under Major Butler landed in Nicaragua. The situation assumed greater proportions than was expected and more troops were sent. Altogether 125 officers and 2600 sailors and marines were landed. They participated in the bombardment of Managua, a night ambuscade in Masaya, the surrender of General Mena and his rebel army at Granada, the surrender of the rebel gunboats Victoria and Ninety-three, the assault and capture of Coyotepe, the defense of Paso Caballos Bridge, and performed garrison and other duty at Corinto, Chinandega and elsewhere. Under such circumstances the rebellion was soon ended, an election was held, guarded by the marines, and on November 12, 1912, Diaz was re-elected President. The leader of the revolt, General Mena, was sent to Panama as a quasi-prisoner of war.

Upon the withdrawal of the marines, a legation guard was left in Managua. Nicaragua finances were in a sad plight by the end of 1912. This difficulty was met by the sale to the United States of the sole right to construct a canal through Nicaraguan territory, for the sum of $3,000,000. A treaty to this effect was drawn up, and finally ratified February 16, 1916. It is known as the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.

The Conservative party remained in power until 1924, when the moderate Conservatives and the Liberals united upon a coalition ticket composed of Carlos Solorzano, a Conservative, as candidate for President, and Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, Liberal, as candidate for Vice-President. The extreme Conservative faction presented a ticket headed by Emiliano Chamorro. The coalition ticket was declared elected by a large majority. Though the election had been comparatively free from violence, it was not without charges of wholesale fraud.

Prior to the 1924 election the United States had given notice that the Legation Guard would be withdrawn on January 1, 1925, immediately after the inauguration of the new President. On the urgent request of President Solorzano the withdrawal was postponed until August 4, 1925, when the new administration was supposed to have become steady in the saddle.

Order lasted just three weeks thereafter. On August 25, the friends of General Emiliano Chamorro, the defeated Conservative candidate, seized the Liberal cabinet officers while they were attending a banquet, and locked them up. On October 25, Chamorro seized the Loma, the fortress that overlooked Managua, and dominated the capital. Vice-President Sacasa, and subsequently President Solorzano, left the country in fear of their lives. The membership of Congress was reconstituted by expelling eighteen Liberal and moderate Conservative members and filling their places by adherents of Chamorro. He was then elected by Congress as First Designate, who, in accordance with the Nicaraguan Constitution assumes the Office of President in the absence of the President and Vice-President. Chamorro assumed the functions of the Presidency on January 16, 1926.

All this was done over the protest of the United States which claimed it was in violation of the Treaties of 1907 and 1923, whereby the Central American Republics had agreed not to recognize anyone as President who came into power by revolution or by coup d'état. The first Liberal revolution against Chamorro broke out in May. By October, having spent all the money in the Treasury, and unable to borrow abroad, Chamorro yielded to the pressure against him and turned the reins of government over to Senator Uriza, who had been appointed Second Designate by Congress. The United States refused to recognize Uriza as President on the grounds that he had been elected by the same illegal Congress that had elected Chamorro. Thereupon a new extraordinary session of Congress was called. The eighteen Senators and Deputies who had been expelled by Chamorro from the previous Congress were invited to return and resume their seats. Of these, three returned to their seats and six others were represented by duly qualified alternates who had been legally elected in 1924. This Congress, on November 10, elected Adolfo Diaz as First Designate.

At the time of this election President Solorzano was in California and Vice-President Sacasa in Guatemala. Thereupon the United States Government extended recognition to President Diaz.

The Liberals did not accept the election of Diaz to the Presidency but made plans to set up a rival government. On December 1, 1926, Doctor Sacasa, accompanied by 45 followers, landed at Puerto Cabezas, where he proclaimed himself "Constitutional President of Nicaragua." He named a cabinet, which included General Moncada as Minister of War and Navy. On December 2, 1926, he formally asked recognition of the United States, on which request the Department of State took no action. Doctor Sacasa also solicited recognition from the other Latin American countries; Mexico alone accorded it.

Even before Chamorro had left office, on notice not only from our own citizens, but from many foreign governments that American and foreign lives and property were in danger, the United States had sent naval forces to Nicaragua to protect them.

President Diaz, soon after he came into office, formally notified our government that owing to the assistance given the revolutionists by Mexico, it would be impossible for the Nicaraguan Government to protect the lives and interests of American citizens and other foreigners residing in Nicaragua. Shortly afterward the British, Belgian and Italian governments sent the United States formal notice to the same effect and requested us to extend protection to their citizens in Nicara-

gua. In February, 1927, the British Ambassador in Washington notified our Secretary of State that the safety of British lives and property was threatened in Corinto, Leon, Managua, Granada, and Matagalpa. He further stated that while the British Government looked to us for the protection of their subjects, they had decided to send a man-of-war to the west coast of Nicaragua, for its moral effect and to serve as a base of refuge for British subjects.

As a result of these requests, marines were again landed in Nicaragua. Admiral Latimer, the senior naval officer present, proceeded to place a legation guard in Managua, and garrisons in the railroad and seaport towns in which neutral zones were established where there should be no fighting and where foreign lives and property might be safe.

On March 31, 1927, Mr. Henry L. Stimson was requested by President Coolidge to go to Nicaragua as his personal representative to investigate and report conditions, and see if he could find a way to straighten out the situation.

At that time Diaz, the Conservative President, was in complete possession of the populous western portion of Nicaragua, including the capital, Managua, and the principal cities of Granada, Leon, Chinandega and Corinto. The revolutionists, partly because of the skill of their commander, Moncada, and partly by reason of the arms, munitions and money furnished from Mexico, had captured many of the smaller towns on the Atlantic seaboard and had made their way through the mountainous interior until they were in contact with Diaz' main forces, not far from the town of Matagalpa. Fighting had been stubborn and losses extremely heavy.

The long continued disorder and violence had produced a general disintegration of the social fabric of the country; semi-independent bands of marauders were taking advantage of the situation to plunder even in the settled districts. Our Minister reported to Washington that a general condition of anarchy was probably approaching.

Mr. Stimson arrived at Corinto on the U.S.S. TRENTON. From Corinto he proceeded by rail to Managua. He describes his first impressions of Nicaragua as follows: "That the country was in the grip of war was apparent even from the car windows. The portion of the land through which we passed was evidently of great fertility. There were long stretches of open farming country interspersed with park-like vistas of beautiful trees, but the fields were uncultivated and little farming was going on. A large portion of the city of Chinandega was in ashes. Almost every man or boy whom one met either in the country or cities was armed. It was a common sight to see a farmer driving his cattle or leading his pack horse with a military rifle strapped on his back, while the butt ends of revolvers and automatics produced telltale creases in the garments of such male Nicaraguans as one met or did business with in town."

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CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GUARDIA

Colonel Henry L. Stimson arrived in Managua on April 17, 1927, where, after conferring with the American officials, he held conferences with President Adolfo Diaz and other members of the Nicaraguan government as well as with various leaders of the Liberal party with a view to terminating the civil war. Colonel Stimson reported, that without exception, everyone with whom he conferred stressed the necessity for supervision of the elections of 1928 by the United States, as in view of past experiences, it was felt that whichever party controlled the electoral machinery in 1928 would determine the result of the election at that time in its own favor, unless a free election could be assured through American supervision.

President Diaz proposed the creation by Nicaraguan law of an electoral commission to be controlled by Americans, nominated by the President of the United States, and offered to turn over to this board the entire police power of the state. The organization of a non-partisan constabulary under the instruction and command of American officers was further suggested by President Diaz, who, in this connection, asked for the continuance in Nicaragua of a sufficient portion of the American Naval Forces to insure order pending the organization of the constabulary.

On April 22nd, President Diaz proposed the following peace terms to the revolutionists:

a. Immediate general peace and delivery of arms simultaneously by both parties into American custody.

b. General amnesty and return of exiles, and return of confiscated property.

c. Participation in the Diaz cabinet by representative Liberals.

d. The organization of a Nicaraguan constabulary on a non-partisan basis, to be commanded by American officers.

e. Supervision of 1928 and subsequent elections by Americans who would have police power to make effective such supervision.

f. A temporary continuance of a sufficient force of American Marines to secure the enforcement of peace terms.

The Liberal leaders in Managua transmitted the above proposal to Doctor Juan B. Sacasa at Puerto Cabezas, who, while declining to proceed to Managua himself, appointed representatives to confer with Colonel Stimson. These representatives, after conferring with Colonel Stimson, announced their acquiescence to all the propositions discussed except that for the continuance of President Diaz in office during the remainder of his term. Colonel Stimson, though appreciating the desire of the Liberal representatives for a new President acceptable to both parties, was unable to agree to their proposal. As a practicable matter, it was not considered possible under the circumstances then existing to find any government which would be supported by both sides, and on this subject Colonel Stimson reported to the State Department.

"..... I am quite clear that in the present crisis no neutral or impartial Nicaraguan exists..... Moreover, any attempt by the Nicaraguan Congress to elect a substitute for Diaz under the forms of Nicaraguan law would almost certainly in the present situation become the occasion for further bitter factional strife....."

The Liberal representatives reserved making any commitments until after they had communicated with Doctor Sacasa and General Jose Maria Moncada, the leader of the Liberal Army. A truce was thereupon arranged, and on May 4th Colonel Stimson conferred with Liberal representatives and General Moncada at Tipitapa. General Moncada, while stating that he believed he could eventually defeat the Government forces, admitted that neither he nor any Nicaraguan could, without American help, pacify the country, which was becoming rapidly filled with groups of armed men responsible neither to himself nor to the Diaz Government; and that while in accord with the plan of supervision of the 1928 elections as the best method to save the country, he urged the immediate substitution for Diaz of some other man as President, chiefly as a point of honor to pacify his Army; but also stated that he would not oppose the United States troops if the United States had determined to insist on the Diaz issue. General Moncada was informed by Colonel Stimson that the United States government intended to accept the request of the Nicaraguan government to supervise the elections of 1928; that the retention of President Diaz during the remainder of his term was regarded as essential to that plan and would be insisted upon; that a general disarmament was also necessary for the proper conduct of such an election; and that American forces would be authorized to accept the custody of the arms of the government and those others willing to lay them down, and to disarm the rest. (1). The Liberal representatives then announced that they would recommend to Doctor Sacasa that no resistance be offered to the American forces.

The advent of the rainy season, which made communication with Doctor Sacasa and other Liberal generals slow and difficult, delayed the acceptance of the disarmament for eight days. During that time a truce was declared between the Government and Liberal forces, and upon withdrawal of the Government Army from the Tipitapa River, American Marines were stationed between the opposing troops and in a position where the arms of both sides would be received if an agreement were reached.

On May 5th, President Diaz issued a proclamation of general amnesty to political exiles and prisoners. He also announced that the freedom of the press would be restored as soon as actual disarmament occurred. On May 6th, President Diaz took steps towards the restoration of the legal Constitution of the Supreme Court as it stood prior to the illegal changes which had been made by Chamorro. He further agreed to appoint Liberal Politicos in six Liberal provinces.

At the second conference in Tipitapa on May 11th, General Moncada informed Colonel Stimson that his army had voted confidence in the propositions advanced at the various conferences; and on that date the terms of the amnesty were agreed upon. (2). At the same time General Moncada issued the following statement:

"The Liberals cannot believe that the United States Government, through the personal representatives of President Coolidge, will give a promise which it will not fulfill. Once again the Liberals place their confidence in the United States. The leaders of the army will try to con-

1. Appendix 1—Chapter 2.
2. Appendix 2—Chapter 2.

vince their men that this promise of fair elections will be fulfilled. The central point which the army wished to be assured of is that the United States will do its best to give Nicaragua a fair election in 1928."

The following day, May 12th, Colonel Stimson received the following telegram signed by General Moncada and eleven of his generals including all his prominent leaders except Sandino:

"The military chiefs of the Constitutionalist Army assembled in session today have agreed to accept the terms of the declaration made by General Henry L. Stimson, personal representative of President Coolidge of the United States, and consequently have resolved to lay down their arms. They hope that there will be immediately sent to receive these arms sufficient forces to guarantee order, liberty and property."

The Diaz Government having agreed to pay the soldiers of both sides ten dollars for each rifle or machine gun turned in, a general disarmament of both the Government and Liberal Armies began, resulting by May 26th, in the delivery to the American forces of 11,600 rifles, 303 machine guns, and 5,500,000 cartridges.

While the Tipitapa agreement was never reduced to one single document and signed by both parties, it is the fundamental agreement on which the Guardia Nacional was organized, and provided, among other things, for the disbanding of the Nicaraguan National Army, its functions to be assumed by the Guardia Nacional to be organized under the direction of American officers. In his letter to General Moncada, written at Tipitapa on 11 May, 1927, which letter forms part of the Tipitapa agreement, Colonel Stimson stated in part:

"He (President Coolidge) has also consented to assign American officers to train and command a non-partisan National Constabulary for Nicaragua which will have the duty of securing such a fair election, and of preventing any fraud or intimidation of voters. He is willing also to leave in Nicaragua until after the election a sufficient force of Marines to support the work of the Constabulary and insure peace and freedom at the election. (1)."

During the latter part of 1925 an attempt had been made to organize a so-called Guardia Nacional under a Major Carter (American), consisting of some three hundred men. This attempt met with little or no success, and the remnant of this organization then existing (1927), was practically without any power and of negligible value to the government as a military organization. President Diaz on May 8, 1927, requested the appointment of an American officer to instruct and command the Guardia Nacional, and on May 12, 1927, the reorganization of the Guardia was started under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel R. Y. Rhea, U. S. Marine Corps. (2). The first man was enlisted in the reorganized Guardia on 24 May, 1927, and between the dates of 18 to 25 June, 1927, the First Company, Recruit Company, and Headquarters Company were organized at Campo de Marte, Managua.

The First Company, consisting of three officers and fifty enlisted, cleared Managua on July 1, 1927 for Ocotal, Nueva Segovia, and on

1. Appendix 2—Chapter 2.
2. Appendix 3—Chapter 2.

16 July, 1927, in conjunction with Marine forces, participated in the defense of Ocotal against a bandit attack directed by Sandino.

On 11 July, 1927, Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Beadle, U. S. Marine Corps, was appointed Jefe Director and assumed command of the Guardia Nacional vice Lieutenant Colonel R. Y. Rhea, U. S. Marine Corps.

President Diaz, on 13 July, 1927, authorized the strength of the Guardia to be increased to six hundred enlisted and the appointment of Marine Corps and Naval personnel as officers of the Guardia up to six and one half per cent of the authorized enlisted strength. (1). On 8 September, 1927, the complement for officers was raised by President Diaz to ten per cent of the authorized enlisted strength. (2).

On 29 July, 1927, President Diaz directed the Jefe Director to take over the police service of the Republic as soon as the enlisted strength of the Guardia would permit, and that this service be started in the Department of Chinandega, then one of the most disturbed and lawless departments of the Republic. (3).

The early organization of the Guardia was divided into a General Headquarters, Areas, Divisions and Sub-Divisions. The Division ordinarily included one political department, garrisoned by one company under the Division Commander usually of the rank of Captain. The Division was divided into Sub-Divisions which included one or more towns of importance, commanded by the Sub-Division Commander, usually of the rank of Lieutenant. The Sub-Divisions were further divided into sub-Stations known as Posts and usually commanded by a non commissioned officer. An Area included two or more Divisions commanded by a Colonel known as the Area Commander. This organization continued in effect until 1 May, 1929, when the designations Division and Sub-Division were changed to Department and District.

The Second Company on 4 August, 1927, established the Division of Chinandega with headquarters in Chinandega, and between the dates of 7 August, 1927 and 15 Novemebr, 1927, various sub-stations were established throughout the department.

The Division of Nueva Segovia, with headquarters in Ocotal, was established between the dates of 31 July, 1927 and 7 August, 1927, to which was assigned the First Company then on duty in Ocotal.

On 22 August, 1927, the Third Company, consisting of four officers and eighty-seven enlisted, cleared Managua and established headquarters at Pueblo Nuevo, Esteli, with sub-stations at Pataste and Telpaneca, Nueva Segovia.

Enlistments in the Guardia Nacional during the first few months of reorganization were necessarily slow due to the fact that few Nicaraguans belived the Government would actually pay good wages to soldiers, and that if the money should be supplied by the Government that it would not be stolen by the officers as had been the custom in the past; the coffee picking season intervened when good wages in the coffee areas made men reluctant to enlist; and the approaching elections caused political leaders to discourage volunteers, who on enlistment

1. Appendix 4—Chapter 2.
2. Appendix 5—Chapter 2.
3. Appendices 6 & 7—Chapter 2.

were sworn not to engage in political activities. On 1 October, 1927, approximately four and one half months after reorganization was started, the Guardia numbered forty-six officers and four hundred thirty-eight enlisted distributed in the Departments of Nueva Segovia, Chinandega, Esteli and Managua.

The Fourth Company, three officers and fifty enlisted, took over control of the National Penitentiary at Managua on 1 November, 1927, and established the Division of the National Penitentiary.

The Division of Leon was established on 21 November, 1927, by the Fifth Company, six officers and sixty-two enlisted, with headquarters at Leon.

The terms of an agreement for the establishment and maintenance of the Guardia Nacional were drawn up and the agreement was signed in Managua on 22 December, 1927, by the American Chargé d'Affaires at Managua and the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs. This agreement provided for:

(1) The creation of a Guardia Nacional of 93 officers and 1136 enlisted men, or a total of 1229 officers and men, at a cost of $689,132 per annum, with provisions that both personnel and expenses could be increased as finances permitted, upon recommendation of the Jefe Director and approval by the President of Nicaragua.

(2) The Guardia to be considered the sole military and police force of the Republic, and to have control of all arms, ammunition, and military supplies, forts, prisons, etc., throughout the Republic subject only to the direction of the President. (1).

The Guardia agreement was approved by the Nicaraguan Senate on 10 January, 1928, but the Chamber of Deputies delayed approval of the bill for more than a year. The agreement was amended and finally passed by both houses of the Nicaraguan Congress on 19 February, 1929, and was signed by President Moncada. The original agreement, however, was changed by the Nicaraguan Congress to such an extent as to render it unacceptable to the United States, and the Guardia continued to function and expand under Presidential Decrees.

Under dates of 9 December, 1927, and 28 January, 1928, instructions were received from the Secretary of the Navy of the United States and the Commander, Special Service Squadron, U. S. Navy, setting forth the principles governing the relations between the Second Marine Brigade and the Guardia Nacional, (2), and stated as the basic principles:

"The Second Brigade constitutes the force of the United States responsible to the President of the United States. The Guardia Nacional constitutes the force of Nicaragua responsible to the President of Nicaragua. These two forces should operate independently of each other except in an emergency requiring joint action."

The Guardia Nacional on 31 December, 1927, or approximately six and one-half months after reorganization was started, consisted of eighty-two officers and five hundred and seventy-four enlisted assigned to the following organizations:

1. Appendix 8—Chapter 2.
2. Appendices 9 & 10—Chapter 2.

General Headquarters,
Division of General Headquarters,
Division of National Penitentiary,
Division of Chinandega,
Division of Leon,
Division of Nueva Segovia (including Third Company in Department of Esteli)

and distributed in five political departments as shown below:

	OFFICERS:	ENLISTED:	TOTAL:
Department of Nueva Segovia.....	12	124	136
Department of Esteli (Pueblo Nuevo).....	3	20	23
Department of Chinandega.....	10	114	124
Department of Leon.....	6	82	88
Department of Managua.....	51	234	285
	82	574	656

Seven officers arrived in Bluefields from Managua on 27 February, 1928, and established the Area of the East, with headquarters in Bluefields. Men were recruited and trained on the Atlantic Coast and activities were extended as soon as men were available.

The Third Company, on duty in Pueblo Nuevo, (Esteli), Pataste, and Telpaneca (Nueva Segovia), was consolidated with the First Company, Division of Nueva Segovia, on 31 December, 1927, and a new organization known as the Third Company took over the police duties of the city of Managua on 16 March, 1928, in accordance with instructions of the President of Nicaragua dated 21 February, 1928. (1).

The Sixth Company, consisting of three officers and twenty-three enlisted, cleared Managua on 13 April, 1928, and established the Division of Jinotega with headquarters in Jinotega.

The Division of Carazo, with headquarters in Jinotepe, was established on 17 April, 1928, by the Seventh Company.

On 4 May, 1928, the Guardia Nacional band of 35 pieces was organized at Headquarters, Managua.

The Eighth Company, four officers and forty enlisted, established the Division of Matagalpa on 18 May, 1928, with headquarters at Matagalpa.

On June 6, 1928, the Ninth Company, consisting of four officers and twenty-one enlisted, established the Division of Masaya with headquarters at Masaya.

The strength of the Guardia Nacional, as determined upon in the Guardia agreement of 22 December, 1927, was based upon the belief that after the termination of the civil war, peace would follow in Nicaragua. However, with the continued activity of Sandino and other armed bandit groups in the remote sections of the country it soon became apparent that an increased strength over the original number of 1229 officers and enlisted men was necessary to cope with the situation, and on 10 June, 1928, President Diaz authorized the strength of the Guardia to be increased to 246 officers and 2000 enlisted men. (2).

On 12 July, 1928, the Tenth Company, four officers and forty enlisted, cleared Managua and established the Division of Esteli with headquarters at Esteli, on 18 July, 1928.

1. Appendix 11—Chapter 2.
2. Appendix 12—Chapter 2.

The Division of Chontales, with headquarters at Juigalpa, was established on 27 July, 1928, by the Eleventh Company.

The Division of Granada was opened by the Twelfth Company on 20 August, 1928 with headquarters in Granada.

The Thirteenth Company, three officers and ten enlisted, established the Division of Rivas with headquarters at Rivas on 21 August, 1928.

The Guardia Nacional on 1 October, 1928, numbered 145 officers and 1597 enlisted line, and 28 officers and 40 enlisted medical corps, or a total of 1810 officers and enlisted men, the majority of whom were stationed in the southern and western departments.

On October, 1928, the Division of the Guardia Nacional Hospital was established at Managua.

The Divisions of Granada and Masaya were combined into one Division on 8 January, 1929, known as the Division of Granada and Masaya with headquarters in Granada.

On 11 March, 1929, Colonel Douglas C. McDougal, U. S. Marine Corps, was appointed Jefe Director and assumed command of the Guardia vice Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Beadle, U. S. Marine Corps.

The Division of the Presidential Guard was established on 15 March, 1929, to which was assigned the Sixteenth Company consisting of three officers and seventy-five enlisted men.

The Divisions of Managua and Carazo were combined into one Division on 20 March, 1929, known as the Division of Managua and Carazo with headquarters in Managua.

During the latter part of May, 1929, a complete reorganization of the Guardia was decided upon to better permit the conducting of operations in the field and to decentralize the organization in Managua. Five Areas, the Northern with headquarters in Ocotal, the Southern with headquarters at Granada, the Eastern with headquarters at Bluefields, the Western with headquarters at Leon and the Central with headquarters at Jinotega, were provided for in the plan of reorganization.

Following this plan of reorganization, the Central Area was organized on 1 June, 1929, the Northern Area on 11 June, 1929, and the Western Area on 1 August, 1929, in accordance with the general plan of organization as set forth in the following extracts from Guardia General Order Number 150—1929:

"----------The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is commanded by the Chief of the Guardia who has general control and supervision of the organization. He is charged with its instruction, discipline, interior economy and administration.

The following are members of the Staff of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional: Chief of Staff; GN–1; GN–2; GN–3; and GN–4 (Quartermaster); Medical Director; Paymaster, and Law Officer.

For purposes of administration, discipline, training, supply and disbursement of funds, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is divided into a General Headquarters, which is located in the city of Managua; Areas, Departments, Districts, and Posts.

The Areas, and Departments embraced in each Area, are as follows:

a. NORTHERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Nueva Segovia and Esteli, with headquarters in the town of Ocotal.

b. SOUTHERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Coraza, Chontales, Granada, Masaya, and Rivas and the Comarca of San Juan del Norte, with headquarters in the city of Granada.

c. EASTERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Bluefields and the Comarcas of Cabo Gracias a Dios, Princapolca, Rio Grande and Siquia, with headquarters in the city of Bluefields.

d. WESTERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Chinandega and Leon, with headquarters in the city of Leon.

e. CENTRAL AREA: Comprises the Departments of Matagalpa and Jinotega, with headquarters of the area located in the city of Jinotega.

A Department corresponds with the geographical departments of the Republic of Nicaragua.

a. For purposes of administration, the Department of Bluefields is divided into two sections known as follows:

Department of Southern Bluefields with headquarters in the city of Bluefields.

The Department of Northern Bluefields with headquarters in the town of Puerto Cabezas.

b. The Department of Managua is not included in an Area, but is under the jurisdiction of General Headquarters.

The following separate companies serving in the city of Managua are not included in any Area or Department, but are directly under the jurisdiction of General Headquarters:

1st Company (Police Company in the city of Managua).
4th Company (National Penitentiary Guard).
16th Company (Presidential Guard).

Guardia Headquarters was finally established with a modified General Staff organization. Due to the ever existing shortage of experienced officer personnel, the majority of the officers on the staff of the Jefe Director were required to act in a dual capacity and the resulting organization consisted of:

JEFE DIRECTOR	with rank of	Major General
CHIEF OF STAFF	" " "	Brigadier General
GN–1 and ADJUTANT	" " "	Captain
GN–2 and GN–3	" " "	Colonel
GN–4 and QUARTERMASTER	" " "	Major
PAYMASTER, FINANCE & BUDGET OFFICER	" " "	Major
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND LAW OFFICER	" " "	Colonel
MEDICAL DIRECTOR	" " "	Colonel (MC)

The organization of the Central and Northern Areas materially reduced the Guardia strength in the Southern Departments, as over four hundred officers and enlisted men were placed in the Departments of Jinotega and Matagalpa and over five hundred officers and enlisted men in the Departments of Nueva Segovia and Esteli. This organization, with minor changes, continued in effect during the remainder of the time the American officers controlled the Guardia; with the exception that the Southern Area was never organized due to lack of personnel, and on May 3, 1930, the Western Area ceased to function as an Area, the Departments included in the Southern and Western Areas operating as separate commands.

On 31 December, 1929, the strength of the Guardia totalled 2219 officers and men distributed as indicated in the following table:

	OFFICERS:			ENLISTED:			
	Line	Medical	Radio	Line	Medical	Radio	Total
NORTHERN AREA	40	5	2	478	12	6	543
CENTRAL AREA	31	4	3	398	7	4	447
WESTERN AREA	18	2		209	6		235
SOUTHERN AREA	25	4		299	9		337
EASTERN AREA	13	3		191	7		214
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGUA	4			78			82
FIRST COMPANY	4			60	1		65
16TH COMPANY	3			49	1		53
FOURTH COMPANY	5	1		65	1		72
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY	32	7		90	13		142
CASUALS	16			12	1		29
TOTALS.....	191	26	5	1929	58	10	2219

On April 1, 1930, the Military Academy was established at Managua for the purpose of training Nicaraguan officers.

During September, 1930, all Jueces de la Mesta and Jefes de Canton were placed jointly under the control of the Guardia and Jefes Politicos in accordance with a Presidential Decree. These men served without pay, except for a percentage of certain fines which they were authorized to impose by Nicaraguan law, and their services were utilized by the Guardia for minor police functions in the districts they represented.

Lieutenant Colonel Calvin B. Matthews, U. S. Marine Corps, was appointed Jefe Director and assumed command of the Guardia on 6 February, 1931, relieving Colonel D. C. McDougal, U. S. Marine Corps, detached to the United States upon completion of his tour of foreign duty.

During the years 1931 and 1932, the officer and enlisted strength of the Guardia varied considerably due to the financial difficulties of the country, and the number of towns garrisoned and troops assigned to the different areas and departments, likewise varied with the changing bandit situations.

The authorized distribution of the Guardia on 1 July, 1932, was as indicated below, which general distribution continued in effect until 31 December, 1932: (1).

1. Appendix 13—Chapter 2.

	LINE		MEDICAL		TOTAL	
	Officers	Enl.	Officers	Enl.	Officers	Enl.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS	32	31	7	9	39	40
DEPT. MANAGUA—CARAZO	6	68	–	–	6	68
POLICE COMPANY	5	59	–	1	5	60
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD	3	59	–	1	3	60
BAND	1	30	–	–	1	30
MILITARY ACADEMY	10	4	–	–	10	4
DEPT. CHONTALES	9	115	1	3	10	118
DEPT. GRANADA—MASAYA	7	48	1	2	8	50
DEPT. LEON	18	152	2	4	20	156
DEPT. CHINANDEGA	7	58	–	1	7	59
DEPT. RIVAS	5	32	–	1	5	33
NORTHERN AREA	58	616	6	19	64	635
CENTRAL AREA	53	615	6	12	59	627
EASTERN AREA	27	291	3	9	30	300
TOTALS.....	241	2178	26	62	267	2240

As previously stated, the continued activity of Sandino and other bandit leaders necessitated an increase in the Guardia over the original strength specified in the agreement, which same conditions later led to the creation of the Guardia Municipal, in order to relieve the regular Guardia from purely local police duties in the larger cities, and the enrollment of civicos and auxiliares from time to time to reinforce the regular Guardia in the field and in holding defensive positions in the bandit areas.

GUARDIA MUNICIPAL

The enlistment of Guardia Municipal or municipal policemen, under control of the Guardia, and supported by their respective municipalities, was authorized for the purpose of releasing regular enlisted Guardia from purely municipal police duties within towns and thereby making additional men available for patrol duty and the garrisoning of outlying posts. This arrangement, while making the support of the municipal police dependent upon the municipalities, incorporated them as an integral part of the Guardia Nacional, and subject to the control of that organization. The members of the municipal police, or Guardia Municipal, were recruited, trained and controlled by the Guardia. They were enlisted for a period of one year for duty in the town in which they were enlisted, and were subject to punishment under the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional. They wore the Guardia uniform which was purchased for them by the respective municipalities from the Guardia Nacional. Although the municipalities met the expenses of the Guardia Municipal, they paid the necessary funds directly to a designated officer of the Guardia, who in turn made the required payments to the police. (1) A Presidential Decree authorized a tax of ten percent per liter on all aguardiente sold within the municipalities supporting municipal police, the proceeds from which were used to defray the expense of the police. This arrangement for the enlistment

1. Appendix 14—Chapter 2.

and maintenance of the municipal police had the dual advantage of making the municipalities financially responsible for their own police protection and at the same time making the Guardia Municipal an integral part of the Guardia Nacional, thereby keeping it removed from partisan control.

CIVICOS

Two classes of armed civilians, or civicos, enlisted as such and under the control of the Guardia, developed through force of circumstances and as the result of experience.

The first class consisted of volunteer groups of citizens who became civicos for the purpose of forming local defense units to be called to defend their respective localities or stand guard duty therein in case of emergency when the Guardia took the field or remained in insufficient numbers to guarantee the safety of the respective localities. Arms for this class of civico were kept in the Guardia storerooms and issued only when the civicos were actually called into service. The services of this class of civico were utilized to advantage at numerous stations in the bandit areas to reinforce the regular Guardia garrisons during emergencies, and on many occasions they accompanied Guardia combat patrols in the field.

The second class of civico, called civicos en fincas, consisted of individuals employed by private parties such as hacienda owners, mining companies, etc., as guards for their property. This class of civico amounted to private watchmen, but were enlisted as civicos to bring them under the control of the Guardia, and in case of emergency they were subject to call for duty with the Guardia in the same manner as the first class of civico. Civicos en fincas were issued rifles which they were allowed to keep in their possession during the existence of their contracts of enlistments, for the purpose of guarding the particular property concerned. This class of civico, or watchman, was not, however, employed by many large property owners due to the agreement made by certain Government officials that on withdrawal of Marines stationed on private haciendas they would be replaced by an equal number of Guardia Nacional, which agreement necessitated, at a time when the Guardia was handicapped by lack of sufficient personnel, the establishment and continuance of Guardia stations at points where the services of the personnel involved were of little value other than the safeguarding of the private property on which they were stationed.

All civicos served without pay, except those employed as civicos en fincas, which expense was borne by the owner of the property concerned. All personnel enrolled as civicos were regularly enlisted as such and required to sign a contract form. (1). This contract placed the first class of civicos under the jurisdiction of the Guardia rules and regulations when actually called into service in conjunction with and serving under the immediate control of the Guardia, while the civicos en fincas were likewise placed under the Guardia rules and regulations when actually serving with the Guardia, but a special provision placed them under the jurisdiction of civil tribunals in cases of legal proceedings resulting from their official acts when performed solely in their capacity as private guards.

1. Appendices 15 & 16—Chapter 2.

AUXILIARES

A force of auxiliares was created late in November, 1931, when a strong bandit movement towards the railroad in the Departments of Chinandega and Leon was in progress, and additional fighting men were required to reinforce the Guardia troops in that section.

The President of the Republic authorized the enlistment of three hundred auxiliares on a basis of three months service, subject to discharge at any time during that period at the convenience of the Government. (1). The assistence of the Jefe Politicos, and other civil government officials was obtained in securing auxiliares and character recommendations of one government official or two reputable citizens were required. After enlistment they were wholly under the control of the Guardia and in the same status as regular Guardia in regard to freedom from interference by the civil authorities. The men were recruited mostly from the rural districts and contracts were effected, without formal medical examination, with about one hundred fifty men of the following authorized complement:

From the Department of	Leon	100 men
" " " "	Chinandega	100 "
" " " "	Masaya	50 "
" " " "	Carazo	50 "
	Total complement	300 "

A copy of the contract is appended. (2).

These auxiliares were paid twelve dollars monthly, had a ration allowance of $0.20 daily and a clothing allowance of $0.20 a day during the first month and $0.07 daily thereafter. Each man was issued one regulation Guardia shirt, trousers, and a pair of shoes; hats were not provided, and the men usually wore straw hats of the native high-crown, broad-brimmed type. They were entitled to medical treatment while in active service only.

They were subject to the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional, and to all orders and regulations of the Guardia, and were available for such patrol duty, including combat patrols, as they might be assigned by the Guardia Commanding Officer.

Much hard and arduous service was experienced by the auxiliares during December, 1931, and the greater part of the year, 1932, during which some two hundred fifty additional auxiliares were enlisted, and their services were of considerable value in the combat operations conducted by the Guardia, not only early in 1932 when the second bandit threat against the railroad departments was in progress, but later during the registration and election period. They usually operated as part of a Guardia patrol, or in close conjunction with such patrol, but at times operated independently with success. They were officered by regular Guardia officers and were furnished arms, ammunition and equipment by the Guardia. To all intents and purposes they were considered and employed as a part of the Guardia complement of the section of the country in which they served.

A number of American companies doing business in Nicaragua, and the Pacific Railroad Company of Nicaragua, desired the establishment of Guardia posts on certain of their properties, and as there were no

1. Appendix 17—Chapter 2.
2. Appendix 18—Chapter 2.

regular Guardia available for the purpose they met the situation by furnishing the money necessary to support the number of Guardia required. Each company concerned was required to make a written contract covering the following points:

"1. The detachments of Guardia will be composed of men regularly enlisted in the Guardia Nacional under the terms of the contract of the Guardia Nacional, and thereby come under complete control of the Guardia and subject to all the rules and regulations for the government and discipline of the Guardia.

2. The money for the maintenance of the detachments must be deposited with or to the order of the Guardia by the 25th of each and every month preceding the month for which its use is designated.

3. The.....Company will be required to give one month's advance notice in case it is desired to discontinue the Guardia on any property, in order that the Guardia Nacional may have time to make the necessary adjustments in its enlisted strength.

4. The Guardia on its part will agree to maintain the detachments and furnish them with arms and ammunition, and to utilize their services for the sole protection of the properties of the .....Company and to employ them only on such limited offensive operations as may be required for the protection of the.....properties.

5. .....In addition, the company will be expected to furnish satisfactory quarters for any officer who may be assigned to command the detachments, and suitable barracks for the enlisted personnel."

The Standard Fruit Company, on the East Coast, furnished 50 Guardia under such a contract, and the San Antonio Sugar Estates and the Pacific Railroad Company of Nicaragua, 20 men each in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega.



NICARAGUA

Scale

0 10 20 30 40 MILES

PREPARED BY
U.S. MARINE CORPS
DIVISION OF
OPERATIONS & TRAINING
HDQTRS.
24 MARCH 1933

CHAPTER III

MILITARY OPERATIONS

At the signing of the Tipatapa agreement, with a background of a century of internal struggles and armed revolts, Nicaragua offered the most favorable possible situation for the conduct of a guerrilla war. The country was filled with disorganized, but armed bands who had found it easier to live on the country than to work, while the possession of weapons and the disorganization of authority gave them abundant opportunity to do so. Among these bands were many typical Central American professional revolutionists, experienced soldiers, and adept in the ways of guerrilla warfare, who travel from country to country, wherever fighting is going on, and, undisturbed by principles, join the side that offers the greatest opportunity for profit or loot.

In accordance with the Tipitapa agreement, the forces under the control of the leaders on both sides laid down their arms; at the beginning of the intervention it was contrary to American policy for the Marines to take up aggressive operations against these armed bands of marauders; the Guardia had not been formed; hence there were no forces of law and order capable of coping with the situation. Sandino, who with his followers, had refused to lay down his arms, furnished both the leadership and the nucleus about which these groups eventually rallied to carry on a revolt against the constituted authorities of the government.

Among the leaders who joined Sandino were Pedro Altamirano, a notorious cattle chief, outlaw and smuggler; Colindres, Salgado and Ortez, all Nicaraguans, the latter of whom became one of the most energetic and aggressive of the bandit leaders; Plata, a Mexican; Giron, a Guatamalan; Montyoa, Umanzor and Jose Leon Diaz, Honduranians, as well as many others of the professional revolutionist type.

BANDIT OBJECTIVES

While there is much conjecture as to Sandino's motives, his stated military objectives were at first to set up a separate government in the Segovias with himself at its head. (1). Failing in this he stated that he would remain in revolt until all American assistance, financial and military, had been withdrawn from the country. (2). After all the Marines were concentrated in Managua and the American Government had announced that its military forces would be withdrawn on January 2, 1933, he published statements to the effect that he would not recognize any government that came into power with American assistance. (3).

His agreement with the Sacasa government in February, 1933, a government that had come into power as the result of an election supervised by representatives of the United States, proves the insincerety of this statement. (4).

In view of the fact that, after the Tipitapa agreement, he repeatedly refused to confer with the representatives of either Moncada or of the United States, or to state his aims, and the further fact that, but for the

1. Appendices 1, 2 & 3 Chapter 3.
2. Appendix 4 Chapter 3.
3. Appendix 5 Chapter 3.
4. Appendix 24 Chapter 3.

insurrection led by himself, the American Marines would have been withdrawn, or at least concentrated in Managua soon after the election of 1928, the sincerity of Sandino's patriotism and the unselfishness of his motives may well be questioned.

It is entirely possible, that in the beginning, Sandino believed himself able to set up some form of government in the fastnesses of the Segovias, and that he could maintain himself there against all the troops that could be brought against him. He had just seen Sacasa and Moncada (with Mexican assistence) successfully maintain themselves on the East Coast, and he was in touch with certain elements in Mexico and Central America, antagonistic to the United States, and with other elements in Europe and America, antagonistic to law and order, capitalism and the democratic form of government. Without doubt these elements encouraged him and not only promised him support, but especially in the beginning rendered him most substantial aid in equipping and outfitting his forces, and many individuals from the countries south of the Rio Grande joined his colors. Honduras was at all times friendly to Sandino. (1).

The belief that he felt competent to maintain himself in the Segovias is borne out by his assumption of the offensive with attacks on the small Marine and Guardia garrisons at Ocotal, and later on Livingston's and Richal's columns near Quilali, and concentration of Marines in the Segovia's and the rapid, demoralizing defeats of his forces, it soon became clear that Sandino could not maintain even the semblance of a government in that area. In fact, he soon found himself deserted by his followers and driven from the country. He knew, however, that his forces had not been destroyed, but merely dispersed, that the American government was anxious to withdraw its troops, and at the first sign of such withdrawal, his followers would again spring to arms at his call.

It was then that his objective changed, and, as later events show, it not to be in accord with his published statements and proclamations, it can only be deduced from his actions.

For the period beginning with the summer of 1930, when the Marines as such ceased active operations against the armed forces of banditry, and the Guardia assumed them, the objective of his sub-chiefs and their followers was unquestionably pillage and loot; while to Sandino himself, the most logical objective than can be assigned, is that of posing as the heroic deliverer of his country from foreign control, and maintaining himself in command of an armed force of sufficient strength to overthrow, or at least to compel concessions from, the government in power after American Military support was withdrawn.

In order to maintain this position, he had to justify himself in the eyes of a large number of his countrymen, and in the eyes of his supporters outside of the country, as well as retain a considerable body of followers loyal to his standard. This first he attempted to accomplish by raising the false standard of patriotism, issuing deceiving and bombastic proclamations, and by establishing agents in Tegucigalpa, Mexico City and other capitals none too friendly to the United States, who spread propaganda and collected funds for his support. The second he accomplished by permitting and encouraging his followers (under the guise of

1. Appendices 4, 6, 7 & 8—Chapter 3.

levying contributions for the support of his cause), to systematically blackmail, pillage, and loot the peaceful inhabitants of the country.

The ambition on the part of Sandino to set himself up as a hero and patriot, as well as to make himself an object of fear by the government and people of Nicaragua made his operations different from those of the ordinary bandit encountered in the West Indies and Central America, who avoids contact with the forces of law and order and fights only when combat is unavoidable; and who can usually be persuaded to cease operations with an offer of amnesty accompanied with some sort of financial inducement. The Nicaraguan bandits did not value the amnesty offered by their government, and no financial inducement was possible because of the impoverished condition of the treasury. They were well organized and well armed and were perfectly willing to fight either the Marines or the Guardia if the odds were long enough in their favor. While they avoided combat on anything like even terms, the bandit groups of Nicaragua, when the odds were sufficiently great and other conditions to their liking, would fight in defense of their camps, would ambush Guardia patrols and would attack Guardia detachments. They did not hesitate to attack garrisoned towns when the prospects for loot were commensurate with the risks involved.

Hence the military objectives of the bandits were all points that afforded opportunity to loot, namely: towns, haciendas, stores, commissaries, plantations, mines, railroad stations and labor camps, and Guardia detachments when the opportunity was favorable.

TERRAIN

The Northern and Central sections of Nicaragua furnish ideal terrain for guerilla warfare. Vast in extent, they consist of almost unbroken chains of mountains, whose rugged peaks afford ideal lookouts and whose densely forested slopes and secluded valleys furnish numerous hiding places secure from observation and attack by airplanes, and inaccessible to all but the most lightly equipped of ground troops. These sections are covered in the main with dense tropical jungle, impenetrable except by the few narrow trails, crossed by numerous rivers, passable only at certain seasons; interspersed here and there with small towns, portreros where cattle, often wild, graze at will; and patches of corn, beans, rice or sugarcane, cultivated by the widely scattered rural inhabitants, friendly or at least neutral toward the insurrectos. This country affords ample food for roving bands of outlaws, but will not support troops in sufficient numbers to overrun the country and stamp out banditry. It borders on the one side the settled sections which are close enough, if unprotected, to be raided with impunity; and on the other, a country to which the forces in revolt could safely repair when hard pressed, which furnished an outlet for their loot and a source of supply for arms and ammunition, and at the same time denied the use of its territory to the government forces, and refused them the information and coöperation that could normally be expected from a friendly neutral state.

The central section not only possesses the above charateristics, but lies between the settled portions of the East and West coasts rendering communication and the transfer of troops and supplies impossible to the government, while giving the bandits the advantage of a centrally located rendezvous in a vast inaccessible area, from which they could deliver sudden blows in any direction and retire to its fastnesses before a force could be concentrated to cut them off.

Although isolated and sparsely settled the interior and northern border sections on Nicaragua are of great economic importance to the Republic. In addition to the food raised for consumption within the country, they are the source of the bulk of coffee, bananas, lumber, and gold, the export products upon which Nicaragua depends for the maintenance of her foreign trade and credit, as well as for a considerable portion of the revenue necessary to support the central government.

Nueva Segovia, Esteli, Jinotega and Matagalpa produce coffee and cattle and before the beginning of the bandit depredations, produced considerable quantities of mahogany and gold. In northern Chinandega, sugar is raised. Chontales produces gold, coffee, and cattle; while on the rivers flowing into the Carribean are many banana plantations as well as lumber camps with their commissaries. Farther inland are a number of producing gold mines with their labor camps and stores that have grown up to supply the needs of the miners.

In the Department of Leon, the construction of a road and an extension of the railroad were being undertaken with the double purpose of opening up the country and giving employment to a portion of the population to save them from being driven by poverty into banditry.

BANDIT INTELLIGENCE

The bandits had a most effective intelligence and security system. Every town was filled with their adherents, whose identity was usually unknown to the officers of the Guardia, and in many cases not even suspected. The rural sections were filled with bandit sympathizers who were only too glad to report the movements of Guardia patrols. Their camps were usually covered by pickets, and the trails to the larger camps were watched by scouts or spies, who reported any movements along them to the bandit leaders. It was seldom indeed that a group of any size was surprised, and the Guardia, when seeking combat, usually had to comb the country from several directions, or send out patrols which proceeded rapidly along the trails in the formation best suited to the terrain and which invited ambush, depending upon their superior fighting qualities, better training and discipline to compensate for the disadvantages of position and loss of initiative inherent to this method of seeking combat.

The efficiency of the bandit intelligence system is pretty accurately described in the following quotation:

"There seems to be but little doubt that Sandino and the chiefs operating with him are reliably informed of our every movement. Their knowledge is pretty complete and enables them to avoid us. Sandino's information is obtained from spies mostly, and not from any well regulated reconnaissance or intelligence service. (GN–2 REPORT, JUNE 1931)"

BANDIT ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

The bandits were organized in 1929 and 1930 into two main groups, one in Nueva Segovia, under Ortez, the other in the Central section of Nicaragua under Pedro Altamirano, who raided the Jinotega, Matagalpa and Bluefields areas. After the death of Ortez, his group was divided, one part continuing to operate in Nueva Segovia under Colindres, the other in the departments of Leon and Chinandega under Umanzor. These groups varied in strength from 150 to 300 men each, and each had from three to five automatic weapons. They secured their ammunition in Honduras in exchange for goods and livestock stolen in Nicaragua, and their food from the country through which they moved.

In addition to these main groups whose operations were more or less intermittent, but always a potential threat, there were small bands of marauders which infested the countryside, making constant forays and carrying on a continuous campaign of murder, rapine and robbery. There was also another type of troublesome citizen, to be reckoned with, who came to be known as a "part time bandit." He was a "good citizen" most of the time, but a bandit when it suited his purpose. He was always ready to furnish food and information or to join the regulars for an opportunity to loot, or for an especially important raid. It was the bandit of this type that made the information system of the bandits so reliable, as they were able to come and go at will, and to keep track of the dispositions and movements of the Guardia.

All of these various types acknowledged at least a nominal allegiance to Sandino and operated under color of his authority.

The objective of loot and pillage and the maintenance of an armed force of sufficient strength to enable Sandino and his marauders to be a real menace to the peace of the land and a threat to the government in power after the withdrawal of American military support, caused bandit operations to be conducted with a view to spreading terror throughout the land, looting towns, compelling property owners to purchase protection, with money in the case of the more wealthy, and by contributions of food, clothing and medicines, in the case of the smaller land holders; and raiding, burning and destroying the properties and even taking the lives of those who failed to contribute. (1).

While carrying on their operations the bandits carefully conserved their forces, especially their arms and the lives of their leaders. In their fights with the Guardia, the bandit leaders, with possibly the single exception of Ortez, kept well to the rear and were always the first to leave the scene of action. In their camps and on the march their security measures were based on the principle of protecting the Jefes. Sandino himself was never known to have been in a contact after being wounded by an airplane bomb, in his camp at Saraguasca in June, 1930. Similar precautions were taken to protect their automatic weapons. As a result during all their operations the bandits lost only three of their important leaders (Giron, Ortez, and Blandon), and not a single automatic weapon was captured by the Marines or Guardia.

(1) Appendix 12—Chapter 3.

These methods while serving to conserve their arms and forces intact, at the same time were absolutely fatal to the prospects of obtaining decisive victories. The bandits never rushed even the smallest Guardia patrols, and seldom stood their ground against a determined Guardia rush. The moment their automatic weapons or their leaders were in danger the withdrawal began. These tactics saved many Guardia patrols from destruction at the hands of superior forces of bandits, but they also prevented the destruction of the bandit organizations whose operations were always conducted in territory that afforded a safe line of retreat, where their ability to scatter and reassemble at a prearranged rendezvous rendered pursuit fruitless. Even their selected and prepared ambushes were placed with a view, not to accomplish the destruction of their enemies, but rather for the purpose of inflicting as much damage as possible without risking a decisive engagement, and the line of withdrawal was always the most important feature of any position deliberately occupied by a bandit group. (1).

To understand how they could maintain an organization that would survive so many tactical defeats and indecisive actions requires a knowledge of the economic and social conditions of the country and their racial psychology. After the prosperous period that reached its climax in 1928, Nicaragua suffered a great loss of wealth in the world depression that followed. Her main export crop, coffee, was a drug on the markets of the world and hardly brought a price that made it worth harvesting. The lumber export business dropped to almost nothing; a disease got into the banana groves on the east coast which in addition to the falling off of the world market for bananas, threw thousands out of employment. Then came the serious drought of 1930, when corn and beans were burned up in the fields for lack of water, leaving a large portion of the population without food. These unsatisfactory economic conditions threw large numbers of people into a state of enforced idleness, poverty and want.

This state of affairs bore most heavily upon the poorer classes of Nicaraguans who have been oppressed and down-trodden for more than four centuries, are poverty stricken in the best of times and densly ignorant, but have learned to look up to their leaders with a loyalty and confidence that to an American is beyond understanding. Naturally brave and inured to hardships, of phlegmatic temperment, though capable of being aroused to acts of extreme violence, they have fought for one party or the other without considering causes since time immemorial; and until a state of war is to them a normal condition. Then the unusual poverty of their country, the low wages for which they are accustomed to work, the primitive conditions under which they live, made their lot as bandits certainly no worse, and probably easier than that of the ordinary mozo, living on the verge of starvation in a grass covered hut in the hills.

In all of their revolutionary battles the fire fight decides the issue. Both sides form a line and shoot it out until one side or the other begins to run short of ammunition or from some other cause loses heart and withdraws. The charge and hand to hand fight have never been a part of their military doctrine. The Nicaraguan bandits expected nothing more than a surprise attack, with a short fight and a clean getaway. Decisive success was not necessary to give them the moral uplift of

(1) Appendices 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17—Chapter 3.

victory. That they were demoralized by decisive defeats is true. Vigorous pursuits when the bandit groups were caught out, so to speak, and unable to shake off the Guardia patrols were also demoralizing and were most effective in breaking up their organizations. But so long as they escaped with their lives and were able to rejoin their companions, their morale was not permanently impaired nor their confidence in their leaders shaken.

GUARDIA STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION

The Tipitapa Agreement provided for the disbanding of the Nicaraguan National Army, its functions to be assumed by a Guardia Nacional to be organized under the direction of American officers. On May 8, 1927, President Diaz requested the appointment of an American officer to command and instruct the Guardia. On May 12, 1927, a Colonel of the Marine Corps was appointed as Jefe Director of the Guardia. The work of organization and training immediately began. In July, the first newly trained detachment of the Guardia entered upon active duties outside of Managua.

An agreement for the establishment and maintenance of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua was signed at Managua on December 22, 1927, by the American Charge d'Affaires at Managua and the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs. It provided for:

"The creation of a Guardia Nacional of 93 officers and 1136 enlisted men, or a total of 1229 officers and men at a cost of $689,132 per annum."

This agreement was modified by the Nicaraguan Congress, but the modifications were not accepted by the American Department of State, and the Guardia functioned under the agreement as at first written. This proved to be quite a handicap to the officers in command, as the legal status of the organization was always in doubt.

The strength of the Guardia, as determined upon in the agreement of December 22, 1927, was based upon the belief that after the termination of the civil war, peace would follow in Nicaragua. When Sandino began his career of banditry a new and unforseen situation arose. In order to meet the situation created by his depredations, and assist in the supervision of the congressional elections of 1930, the Guardia was increased until on October 1, 1930, its total personnel numbered 2256, an increase of about 85% over the number provided for in the original agreement. Furthermore, the annual cost had grown to a total of $1,116,000.

The economic depression and the resulting decrease in revenue forced a reduction in November, 1930 to 160 officers and 1,650 enlisted. At the same time, provision was made for establishment of local police to relieve a part of the Guardia performing police duties in the various municipalities. These Municipal Police while paid by the municipalities were under the complete control of the Guardia, but their numbers were never sufficient to wholly relieve the regular Guardia from Municipal duties. In January, 1931, funds were made available to the Government as the result of a revolving credit from the reserves of the National Bank on deposit in New York, and the strength of the Guardia was increased to an average of 200 officers and 2,150 men.

As the Guardia increased in strength the active operations of the Marines of the 2d Brigade were curtailed so that by the summer of 1930, all offensive operations had been turned over to the Guardia and the Marines were concentrated either in the towns or as guards on the properties of American or foreign residents. In May, 1931, the number of Marines was greatly reduced and those remaining were concentrated in Managua. Marine Corps aviation continued to coöperate with the Guardia, rendering the same transportation, information and combat service that it had rendered to the Marine Brigade.

In the summer of 1930, there were two main groups of bandits carrying on active operations, Ortez in the Northern Area and Altamirano in the Central Area, in addition there were innumerable small bands committing depredations all through the north and along the rivers of the East Coast. The Departments of Leon and Chinandega and Chontales which later became subject to bandit attacks were at that time relatively quiet and safe. The remainder of the Republic was in its normal state of peace secured by the presence of Marines and Guardia in the larger towns.

As the situation appeared then it was a matter of combating organized banditry in the Segovias and a peace time police job in the remainder of the country. Hence, in November of 1931 of the 1650 enlisted Guardia, 1000 were stationed in the Segovias, and 650 in the remainder of the country, and when this number was found insufficient to suppress banditry in the north, and President Moncada arranged to finance a larger number, 1500 were stationed in the Segovias. This left certain towns, and sections of the East Coast with insufficient protection and when the activities of the Guardia became too strenuous for the bandits in the north they transferred their operations to points not so well covered by Guardia patrols. In November 1931, President Moncada authorized the enlistment of 300 auxiliares, 150 of whom were recruited in the Departments of Chinandega and Leon. There were also a total of 90 regular Guardia paid by the railroad and by fruit companies of the East Coast, while for the electoral period of 1932, the number of auxiliares was increased to 400 distributed throughout all the Departments of the Republic. These latter were utilized to guard the electoral mesas.

GUARDIA MISSIONS

The missions of the Guardia Nacional as defined in the Guardia Agreement were:

"To preserve domestic peace and security of individual rights;

To control arms and ammunition, military supplies, and supervise the traffic therein throughout the Republic;

To control all fortification, barracks, buildings, grounds, prisons, penitentiaries, vessels, and other Government property used by the forces of the Republic;

To furnish a guard of honor for the Palace of the President;

To train Nicaraguan officers to replace the officers of the United States Marine Corps and Navy detailed by the President of the United States to assist the Government of Nicaragua in the organization and training of the Guardia."

During the Electoral period of 1932, there devolved on the Guardia the additional mission of preserving law and order at the electoral mesas, protecting the electoral personnel, and preventing the interruption of the registrations and elections by the bandits.

Due to the situation created by Sandino and organized banditry, the Guardia, upon its organization, found itself confronted with a state of civil war throughout an area covering more than half of the Republic. Martial Law was in effect in the Departments of Nueva Segovia, Esteli, Jinotega, Matagalpa and parts of Leon and Chinandega.

This situation, not contemplated when the plans for the organization of the Guardia were made, was at first met by the troops of the 2d Marine Brigade, but was gradually turned over to the Guardia.

The mission of the Guardia in and bordering on the zone of bandit activities became:

The protection of lives and property, the security of crops, the protection of public works and the suppression of banditry

As banditry was the principal menace to lives and property, and law and order, the principal mission of the Guardia in the bandit infested zone was:

The suppression of banditry.

Four possible plans suggested themselves for the accomplishment of this mission:

1. Closing the Border.
2. Concentration of all Guardia forces for a determined offensive with a view to destroying the main bandit groups;
3. Garrisoning all towns and valuable properties, public and private, thereby denying access to them by the bandits;
4. A combination of some form of the two above plans: i.e., guarding the most vital points with a part of the available forces, while conducting offensive operations with the remainder.

CLOSING THE BORDER

The project of closing the border and so creating a rear for the bandits, was the subject of much thought and consideration at Guardia Headquarters. Its desirability was never questioned, but its practicability was beyond the limited resources of the Guardia Nacional. There were three main lines of bandit communications into Honduras from western and central Nicaragua, the Bocay River and the trail that ran through its valley to Bocay, located on the Honduras border at the junction of the Bocay and Coco Rivers, the sector from Poteca to Caca Mayor, which gave access to Danli, and the sector from Saca Mayor to the Gulf of Fonseca and the Pacific Coast which gave access to Choluteca. There were also routes north of the border by means of which the bandit groups were able to move from one sector to another without entering Nicaraguan territory. From the East Coast to Poteca, approximately 200 miles, the Coco River forms the boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua. Many shipments of munitions were made into Honduras from the Carribean seaboard, by way of the Patuco River to points on the Coco as far west as Bocay. From there they found their way to the headquarters of the various bandit groups. From Poteca to the Pacific Coast the ill defined boundary ran through some two hundred miles of mountain, morass and jungle. There were several main trails crossing it leading to the towns of Danli, San Marcos, Yuscaran and Choluteca. Danli and Choluteca were notorious as rendezvous for gun runners and collection points for ammunition supplies for the bandits. In addition to the main trails, there were innumerable by-paths known to the bandits and their sympathizers on both sides of the border. The inhabitants of the adjoining sections of Honduras were practically allies

of the bandits. They were doing a profitable business in stolen cattle and goods from Nicaragua, which they were able to purchase at bottom prices, and sell at the market in their own country. While at the same time they were carrying on a lucrative trade in ammunition. The Honduranian government appeared to be powerless to stop this trade, even had it been so inclined.

Hence the problem of the Guardia was not to be solved by closing a few main trails, or by coöperation with the authorities of Honduras, but was one that required the practically continuous occupation of the whole border line. On the face of it, this was an impossibility with the limited resources of the Guardia.

CONCENTRATION OF ALL GUARDIA FORCES FOR AN OFFENSIVE

This plan at once appeals to the soldier's mind, it complies with the principles of The Objective and The Offensive, and if successful, would have accomplished the destruction of the main bandit groups, and made an end to banditry. Its weakness lay in the fact that due to the character of the terrain a large force could not live in the bandit country without carrying supplies and hence was limited to the main trails and was out of communication with its base. The bandits could not be compelled to fight for any terrain feature or other objective. They could only be forced into action when surprised. Large bodies of troops had not the mobility necessary to overtake bandit groups and force them to decisive action. The main groups never operated far from the Honduran border, except in the case of Pedro Altamirano, whose movements never carried him far from his refuges in the unexplored jungles of central and northern Nicaragua. If hard pressed they could always quickly withdraw across the border or scatter in the jungles.

Then it was necessary to consider the fact that banditry as practiced in Nicaragua was not conducted according to the rules of civilized warfare. The bandit objectives were not the armed forces of the Republic, but murder and robbery and rapine, the destruction of property, driving of laborers away from the plantations and preventing the collection of the crops so necessary to the economic stability of the country. The Republic of Niaragua was without credit at home and abroad; it was compelled to do business on a cash basis. The arms, equipment and clothing of the Guardia were all purchased for cash. The firms of both the United States and Europe required that cash be produced before making deliveries of supplies, hence it was imperative that sufficient protection be afforded the coffee planters of Matagalpa, and the Segovias, the miners of Chontales and the interior, and the exporters of bananas and lumber from the East Coast, to enable them to produce commodities for export and get them to the sea-coast. Otherwise, the Government would have been bankrupt for the lack of income derived from the export of these important products. Exports were also necessary to maintain the value of the Nicaraguan Cordoba, (dollar) and to enable the population to purchase manufactured goods from abroad. Many foreigners living in the country appealed to their governments for protection, and the American State Department laid the burden of this protection on the Guardia immobilizing large numbers of its force as defensive garrisons and precluding their concentration for offensive purposes. In the departments of Matagalpa and Jinotega alone, there

were nine haciendas belonging to foreigners, Americans and Europeans, furnished with garrisons of Guardia. These guards were so placed in accordance with American policy of extending the fullest possible protection to all foreign residents of the country, which was continued until the withdrawal of American armed forces from Nicaragua. Nine Officers and one hundred twenty-five enlisted men of the Guardia were utilized for this purpose in the two departments.

Had Sandino and his followers been able to prevent the harvesting of the coffee crop alone, or its transportation to the seacoast, the economic pressure created thereby would have brought the government to terms in a short time.

The bandits, however, did not seem to appreciate the advantage of cutting off the revenues of the government and there is no evidence of that being one of their primary military objectives. It was, however, such a vital point to the Republic that the Guardia was always under the necessity of so disposing its forces as to prevent such a possibility.

Moreover, the main bandit groups with their superior means of information were able to take quick and decisive advantage of the weakening of the defenses of any section of the country, as was conclusively shown by their action in December, 1930, when all available Guardia patrols were concentrated for an offensive in the vicinity of Pena Blanca. Scarcely had the patrols left their bases and moved into the jungles, out of reach of all communication, when Altamirano's group began a raid of the Central Area, entering it from the northwest, moving south of Muy Muy, thence west, passing completely around Matagalpa and north through the Colon valley, and was only prevented from looting the countryside for miles by the extraordinary efforts of the depleted forces of the Guardia assisted by Marines stationed in Matagalpa. At the same time Ortez in Nueva Segovia, was enabled to operate undisturbed and lay an ambush that cost the lives of eight Marines. Returning secretly from the East Coast, Pedro Altamirano made an attack on a patrol commanded by Captain Power, on 14 June 1931, at Embocoderas, which drew all the available Central Area patrols into the Pena Blanca country, north of the Tuma River, he then disappeared from the scene of his usual activities and was next heard from on 19 July, when he raided the undefended town of Santo Domingo, 100 miles to the southeast, in the Department of Chontales. Santo Domingo was a town of special economic importance because it was the site of the Javali gold mine, which, in addition to the gold it produced, furnished employment for an average of two hundred men, enabling them to support themselves and their families. Many of these men were, if idle, potential Sandinistas. In fact it was considered so important to keep this mine in operation, that the Government of Nicaragua loaned the proprietor $25,000, using the Guardia Nacional as its agent in making the loan. While not desirous of becoming involved in the financial transactions of the Republic other than those relating to Guardia funds, the emergency was considered so great that it was reluctantly agreed to permit the Guardia to act in this case, with the understanding that payments on the loan, if not met when due, were not to become charges against the Guardia appropriations. Nor was the Guardia to be responsible for the collection of the loan or of the interest thereon.

As the mine employees refused to return to work after the raid without the presence of a Guardia garrison, it became necessary to establish a post of one officer and thirty men at Santo Domingo.

In the summer and early fall of 1931, after a series of strong Guardia offensives in the Northern and Central Areas, which followed in point of time close upon the death of Ortez, the most aggressive of the bandit leaders, and which procuded many contacts with excellent results in the Northen Area (the Central Area patrols obtained very few contacts), bandit activities subsided in the Northern and Central Areas and it was believed for a time that real progress was being made in the suppression of banditry. It was found later that Altamirano's group had transferred its activities to the Eastern Area and the group that had been operating in Nueva Segovia, under its new leaders, Colindres and Umanzor, deserting their old haunts, suddenly appeared in the Department of Chinandega, announcing their arrival on November 22, 1931, by raiding the undefended railroad town of Chichigalpa, looting and robbing at will until the arrival of a patrol of four enlisted Guardia and 23 volunteer civilians from the town of Chinandega, when they rapidly withdrew. While the loss to civilians was of property only, this raid caused panic in all the exposed railroad towns which extended even as far as Managua, causing the President to repair to Chinandega ostensibly to take personal charge of operations, and restore the confidence of the people. Its final result was beneficial to the Guardia, as it caused the President to authorize the enlistment and maintenance of 150 AUXILIARIES, to serve as Guardia in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega.

After his raid on Santo Domingo, Pedro Altamirano returned to his old haunts in the vicinity of Pena Blanca, but in crossing the Central Area, he was so hotly pursued by the combined patrols of Sajonia and Navarro, under command of Captain Bourne, that he saved his command from destruction only by dispersing it in the wilderness north of the Tuma River. Having found the settled portions of the Central and Northern Areas untenable even for a short stay because of the number and aggressiveness of Guardia patrols, and even his haunts in the fastnesses of the north being continually patrolled, "Pedron" removed the scene of his labors to the mining centers on the rivers emptying into the Carribean Sea, which were almost without protection, and to the commissaries of the fruit and lumber companies of the East Coast, where the Guardia garrisons were not so numerous nor so strong as in the western portions of the Republic.

As these incidents serve to show, the necessity of protecting the lives and property of foreign residents, of saving the towns from destruction and pillage, of preserving the confidence of the population so that they would remain at the mines and on the plantations, as well as the necessity for keeping open the roads and rivers over which the crops were moved, and the railroad from Managua to Corinto, many points of which were exposed to bandit attacks and destruction, absolutely precluded even the temporary abandonment of these critical points for the concentration of a purely offensive force with little probability of its being able to obtain a final decision.

The plan to garrison all points of tactical and economic importance, thus denying them to the bandits, had certain advantages in the peculiar situation created by the tactics of the bandits and their allied bands

of local marauders. It furnished a very real security at critical points, the presence of the Guardia inspired confidence in the local inhabitants, and kept them at work, it permitted the merchants of the towns to carry on their business without fear of bandit raids, and it was the only kind of protection that satisfied the foreign residents, who almost invariably took an extremely selfish view of the situation and protested continually through the diplomatic representatives of their countries unless their properties were safeguarded by the actual presence of Guardia garrisons. It also gave the necessary police protection to the towns. It supplied satisfactory security for the mine owners, the labor camps, and the strategic points along the railroad. Then the garrisons which were strong enough for defensive purposes were usually of sufficient strength to permit local patrolling, which kept under control the small local bands. Excellent illustrations of the advantages of garrisoning a town are shown in the following extracts:

"Report of Captain W. S. Fellers, G. N. (1st Lieut, U.S.M.C.)—Commanding the District of Santa Maria, in Nueva Segovia, from where many inhabitants had abandoned their homes and moved across the Honduran border—quote:– "The Guardia post at Santa Maria has done much to produce confidence, and bring back to this part of the country, those who left to avoid uncertain futures during the period of banditry—there are listed some 205 persons in the District whereas a year ago there were some 20 who were known to have good intentions. In concluding this little bit of personal information, I might add, that whereas the sections of Zapotal, Las Bricas, Agua Caliente, Guanral, are returning, the sections of the extreme northwest corner, are doing likewise, the promise of the inhabitants to return after November and December crops are gathered on Honduran soil, have been met by the assurance of peace at the protection offered by the Guardia." (GUARDIA NEWS LETTER NO. 21), and Captain Holdahl's report from the same district: "The school is now in full swing, and has increased from 14 to 28. Don't know where they have appeared from—nephews and neices of local people have come into town from all sides. Have had to send to Managua for more books, slates, etc. Will have to put a limit on the thing as I can't afford to educate any more. At Present there is a boy's class, and a girl's class, and the Guardia class is held in the evening. The teacher is a very intelligent woman from Honduras and seems to be holding a good school." (GUARDIA NEWS LETTER NO. 35).

"The Guardia commander at La Fundadora reports that at the request of the Administrator of La Fundadora, during the period 3 June to 13 June, a guard of six enlisted was furnished a surveying party at Chimborroza. The guard enabled the survey of a finca, owned by Mr. Charles Potter, to be made in safety in a country over-run with local bandits. Without the protection of the Guardia, this work would not have been carried on."

"The following is quoted from "EL ESFUERZO," a Jinotega newspaper dated July 5th, 1931, under the heading, "There is a real vigilance in the Population."—With great satisfaction we have come to see that the commander of the Guardia has taken a real interest in the Vigilance of the Population. Municipal police and Guardias remain on duty on

the roads leading into the city and in other streets at all hours during the day as well as at night to control order." (GUARDIA NEWS LETTER NO. 56).

The chief fault of this plan lay in the inherent weakness of the passive defensive. It left the initiative entirely in the hands of the bandits who were able to concentrate as high as 300 men in one group, and so dispersed the Guardia that with the strength available it would have been weak at all points. Many of the valuable properties were isolated beyond supporting distances of each other, and without communication except by runner and their garrisons would have been wiped out piecemeal by the larger bandit groups. There were 32 towns in the Segovias alone that would have required garrisons of from 15 to 30 men each. It was, therefore, obvious that a complete defense of the entire country by this means, was not only, not the best method of combating banditry, but was an impossibility with the forces that the Nicaraguan Government was able to put in the field. The following is quoted from an Estimate of the situation in the Central Area as typical of the situation existing throughout the whole country:

"There are in this area, besides Matagalpa and Jinotega, twelve towns that now have Guardia garrisons. There are south of the Tuma River not less than forty haciendas with a tax value of from $10,000 to $60,000 each. The present garrisons of the towns total one hundred and ninety men, with Muy Muy, Matiguas and San Isidro very weakly held. An average garrison of ten men for each of the forty haciendas south of the Tuma would require four hundred men, implying the reduction of the present garrisons at Corinto, Finca, Las Camelias and Navarro. There are at least four valuable properties north of the Tuma River whose garrisons could not well be less than one officer and twenty men each, otherwise they would be useless for protection, and being beyond supporting distance of other posts and without communication would be wiped out whenever the bandits decided to attack in force. This would require a total of eighty men. With the withdrawal of the Marines a garrison of ninety men each will be required for Matagalpa and Jinotega, as the Guardia will be responsible for the defense and police of the towns, and these numbers will have to include all casualties (for the area) and bear the shortages due to discharges, transfers, etc., as well as furnish the administrative patrols for supply, pay, communication and inspection purposes and will constitute the Area reserve. This makes a total of eight hundred and fifty men with only four posts, Matagalpa, Jinotega, San Rafael and Yali capable of operating combat patrols. After the withdrawal of the Marines, the only means of communication in this area will be the telegraph lines between the principal towns and by runner. Hence, the possibility of mutual support between outlying posts is precluded. The difficulties of supply, administration and inspection are believed to be insuperable. This plan, in addition to the administrative difficulties involved, disperses the forces of the Guardia making them weak everywhere, and gives up all idea of offensive operations, without which banditry can never be suppressed. The number of men required for this sort of passive defense limits the operations of the Guardia to the area south of the Tuma, and surrenders to the bandits a rich and fertile and partially developed country."

Note.—This extract is part of an estimate based on a proposed strength for the Central Area of 683 enlisted. It was later found impossible to bring the Area up to that strength.

COMBINING AN ACTIVE DEFENSE WITH OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The system of combating banditry finally put into effect by the Guardia, was a combination of the two plans just discussed. It consisted of guarding as many as possible of the critical points, and at the same time, maintaining vigorous local offensive campaigns against bandit groups large and small wherever they were located.

This system was partly a natural growth forced on the Guardia by circumstances, and partly the result of deliberate planning. It was found that both American and Nicaraguan governmental policies called for a certain amount of passive defense, that there were some things that could not be left undefended even temporarily without serious injury to the economic and social structure of the Republic; it was also clearly seen that banditry could never be suppressed by military forces without the assumption of the offensive. Hence, the problem of the Guardia became the limitation of the necessary defensive forces to an irreducible minimum and concentrating as many as possible for offensive operations. As the country was extensive and communications were poor, it was impossible to direct all operations from Managua, and the policy of dividing the country into Military Departments and Areas, with a responsible commander in each, was adopted. The geography of the country, its division into political departments, and location of the main bandit group which each had a separate field of activity and a separate line of communications into Honduras, all went to make this organization suitable to meet the situation. In general, an active defense was established along the railroad; the towns, which were usually the critical points, were garrisoned with detachments strong enough to send out combat patrols capable of taking the offensive against any ordinary bandit group. Civicos were enlisted, who could be used only for local defense, but could be called into service whenever an attack threatened or when it became necessary to send out a full strength combat patrol. The civico system was extended to the whole zone of bandit operations.

In the Northern Area, the bandits were more numerous than in any other section, and in 1930 operated in many relatively small groups. The number of these groups and their continuous activity in many parts of the Area, as well as the large number of towns to be defended, caused a dispersion of the Guardia forces into numerous small garrisons. These garrisons were, however, of sufficient strength to send out patrols capable of defeating the groups with which they came in contact, and with the help of the civicos were able to successfully defend their towns against the most determined bandit attacks. There were probably more contacts in the Northern Area than in all the other active areas combined. The offensive system at this time in the Northern Area consisted of constant patrolling to keep the small groups on the move, and combined drives from several directions when the bandits were believed to be in force in any particular locality. So long as the bandits remained dispersed this was the proper and most successful method of combating them. During the latter part of 1931 and during the year of 1932, the bandits operating in Nueva Segovia formed into larger groups, and it became necessary for the Guardia to meet them with larger patrols. As a result a district organization was adopted with one strong combat patrol in each district, and as far as practicable, garrisons of sufficient

strength for defensive purposes, and for local patrolling, were kept in the other stations. (1).

During this same period the bandits moved in strength into the Departments of Leon and Chinandega requiring the reinforcement of those Departments. Since few regular Guardia were available for this purpose, the President of Nicaragua authorized the enlistment of 150 auxiliares. These auxiliares were used in the same manner as the regular Guardia, for patrolling, local defense, and as urban police, the only difference being that they were not subject to transfer to any part of the Republic, and were not available for promotion above the rank of private. They were found very useful and some became the equal of the regular guardia. With their enlistment, the garrisons were strengthened in the outlying towns of the two departments, especially near the Honduran border. There was also an additional defensive force in the Department of Leon. A number of the laborers doing road work were enlisted as civicos, armed with rifles, and organized under command of General Escamilla, lately of the revolutionary army under Moncada, for the defense of their camps. Every precaution was taken to prevent these armed laborers from becoming an independent force, and operating without authority of the Jefe Director of the Guardia. Their rifles were kept under lock and key except when actually in use and under no circumstances were they permitted to carry arms at a distance of more than one half-mile from their camps. When under arms they automatically came under the command of the nearest Guardia officer.

The situation in the Central Area differed somewhat from that in the other parts of the zone of bandit activities. It contained a rich stretch of coffee land lying east of the Colon Valley and south of the Tuma River, which was relatively thickly populated, and occupied by numerous hacienda and coffee fincas, many of which were owned by foreigners, either Americans or Europeans. This section, due to some extent to the activities of the Marines and the Guardia, but more to its distance from the border, was not the permanent habitat of any of the larger bandit groups. The Colon Valley, however, was a famous bandit runway and was filled with bandit sympathizers. While north of the Tuma River lay Pena Blanca, the Pantasma Valley, the Cua Valley and other bandit rendezvous, as well as the El Silencio and Chipote sections of the Northern Area, also well known bandit concentration points. The Pantasma, Cua and Bocay Rivers, all bandit highways, have their sources in the mountain range lying just north of the Tuma River. A trail to the Pis Pis mines and the east coast runs through this unsettled territory. The Guardia mission was the protection of this rich well populated salient projecting into the wilderness of Northern and Central Nicaragua. The method adopted was the establishment of a line of strong combat patrol posts in a semi-circle stretching from Yali to Muy Muy, covering the border of the settled section. Patrol posts were established at each end of the Colon Valley, and garrisons were placed at Matagalpa and Jinotega, which served the double purpose of defending and policing those municipalities, and as the reserves of the area. There were nine posts established on foreign haciendas, and three on native fincas. Three of these were made to do double duty as combat patrol posts, but nine were solely defensive posts, and of little use for

(1) Appendix 25—Chapter 3.

offensive purposes, beyond furnishing rural police patrols, ridding their neighborhood of local bad men and controlling the depredations of part time bandits. (1). The combat patrol posts were prepared to clear combat patrols to any part of the Central Area either for independent action or to participate in combined operations under the direction of the Area Commander. Under orders from the Area Commander, these combat patrols operated in the wild area bordering on the settled sections for the purpose of locating and destroying any bandit groups that might be found. And they also participated in frequent combined operations into the bandit country to the east and north, either carried on by the patrols of the Central Area alone or in coöperation with the Northern Area. As, once outside of the settled areas they were beyond communication, all of the combat patrols were not employed in this manner at the same time, but some were held available to meet unexpected bandit movements. A unique and important feature in the Central Area was the "roving patrol" Company "M." This company was based on Jinotega, but had no defensive responsibilities, and was used for offensive work only. It was often absent for weeks at a time on missions assigned to it, and in its travels covered the territory as far east as Yousca, as far south as Santo Domingo, Chontales, and far west as El Sauce in Leon, and scoured the jungles from the Tuma River north beyond the mouth of the Cua and the northern slopes of Pena Blanca. Its average strength was two officers and thirty men. Its armament consisted of six automatic weapons, four grenades dischargers, and twenty rifles. It became the terror of Pedron's group against whom it conducted most of its operations, and was effective wherever used. Its morale and confidence were always high, it was well drilled, its members took great pride in its accomplishments and in the Central Area where it was of course best known, it was looked up to by the Guardia of other organizations. The fact that it had no defensive responsibilities gave it its chief value as it could always be used aggressively in any sector without weakening the defenses elsewhere.

On the East Coast the Eastern Area was divided into two Departments.

As there were never sufficient Guardia available to attempt a general offensive in the enormous territory that had to be covered, an active defense system was worked out. Bluefields, and Puerto Cabezas, the respective department headquarters were assigned relatively large garrisons so that from those points reinforcements could be sent to any post attacked or threatened, and combat patrols cleared on short notice to meet bandit movements. Posts were established at Cabo Gracios a Dios and at the settlements of the large American fruit and lumber companies. Where possible these posts were strong enough to assume the offensive against bandit raiding parties. A base was established at Puerto Cabezas for airplanes which rendered invaluable service, carrying supplies and pay to the isolated posts of the interior, reconnoitering, locating and attacking bandit groups. It is extermely doubtful if any interior posts could have been maintained without the assistance of Marine Corps Aviation.

The successes of Company "M" in its footloose operations in many parts of western Nicaragua led to the conclusion that with limited resources the best method of combating banditry and revolt under the

(1) Appendix 26—Chapter 3.

conditions encountered by the Guardia Nacional, would have been to carry on the combined scheme of locally controlled defensive and offensive operations, but in addition to have a number of roving patrols with no defensive missions, each capable of waging constant aggressive warfare against the organized groups. A total of eight such patrols, would have required an additional 14 officers and 210 men actually in ranks, with possibly 3 officers and 30 men to allow for casualties and replacements. These patrols would have been distributed, two each to the Northern, Central and Eastern Areas, and one each to the Departments of Leon and Chinandega. This would have been the system, most economical of men and money that could have been devised. However, the funds, $8,900 a month, (and hence the men), were not available, and it was never practicable to put this plan into execution. (1).

GUARDIA OPERATIONS

Under the plan of defending critical points, and leaving as large a number of troops as possible free for offensive purposes, with the country divided into Military Areas and Departments, and the commanders of each charged with the responsibility of carrying out the necessary measures for both the local defense and the offensive operations in the territory under his command, there were many interesting and instructive small wars campaigns. In these miniature wars there were many hotly contested combats, and acts of heroism were almost of daily occurance. Though the bandits had the advantage of being footloose while the majority of the Guardia were tied to their bases and to the towns that needed their protection, the bandits by no means always had the initiative. Their camps were subject to attack and destruction by the Guardia, and when moving about the country they were never free from the fear of encountering a Guardia patrol eager to fight and always ready to attack no matter what the odds were against it. While it is true that bandits seldom were willing to fight decisive battles for their camps, they were sometimes surprised in them and suffered heavy losses in men and property. Much loot was recaptured in these combats and no large bandit group could take the field for any length of time without information of its movements reaching the Guardia and drawing upon itself concentration of patrols from all sides. While under ordinary circumstances each military subdivision was self supporting and handled its own problems, nevertheless there was constant coöperation between the neighboring Areas and a healthful rivalry between them as to which would have the most contacts and inflict the greatest damage to the enemy. There was also a number of combined offensive movements, directed from Guardia Headquarters, in which patrols from the different Departments and Areas participated. During the Fall of 1931, patrols from both the Northern and Central Areas operated extensively in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega, to the discomfiture of the bandit groups who had moved down there to obtain relatively easy pickings, after having been roughly handled in the Northern Area.

An excellent illustration of the operations of the Guardia as finally organized is the manner in which it met the bandit threat to interfere with the holding of the presidential election of 1932, which was supervised by an American Electoral Mission, under command of Rear

(1) Appendices 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 & 23—Chapter 3.

Admiral C. H. Woodward, U. S. Navy.

At the beginning of the electoral period there were many reports and rumors that the bandits intended to interrupt the elections. These reports coincided in point of time with information that the bandits were receiving large shipments of ammunition from various points in Honduras. During the months of September and October, signs of increased activity were noticed in all the usual fields of bandit operations. In order to meet this situation vigorous offensive action was taken by the guardia, with the result that Company "M" administered a severe defeat to "Pedron's" group north of the Tuma River on 26 September. The combined patrols from El Sauce and Somotillo defeated decisively a large group under Colindres, Salgado, Jose Leon Diaz, Peralta and Quintera, in Northern Leon on 25 October, and a Chichigalpa patrol consisting of regular guardia, auxiliares and civicos under command of native officers fought a long drawn-out battle with a group under Umanzor at La Pelona in the Department of Chinandega on 28 October, which resulted in severe losses on both sides. In addition there were numerous smaller and less decisive contacts throughout the whole zone of bandit operations, with the result that when the time came for the election, the bandit groups had been dispersed, and compelled to expend the greater part of their ammunition, and as a consequence, were unable to prevent the voting in even a single mesa.

This was a clear demonstration of the ability of the Guardia Nacional to meet any aggressive move on the part of the bandits, and defeat them in the field. It also showed that the Guardia as finally organized and equipped was capable of making a general offensive without leaving any important bandit objective unguarded, but as past experience had shown, the most successful offensives only served to disperse the bandit groups and drive them across the border, where it was impossible for the guardia to follow up its advantages, and that the bandits would after a time return to their old haunts and renew their careers of loot and pillage.

GUARDIA MORALE

The morale of the Guardia was always high. Patrols of twenty guardia led by Americans or trained Nicaraguan officers and armed with automatic weapons, rifles and rifle grenades, repeatedly demonstrated their ability to cope with the largest groups, but were not sufficiently powerful to effect their destruction, nor always able to defeat them. However, the officers and men of the Guardia had no hesitation in attacking forces of from five to ten times their numerical strength, and in most cases succeeded even against such odds in driving the bandits from the field. There was no case of a guardia patrol of more than twenty men, commanded by American officers being decisively defeated by any group of bandits, however large. The enlisted guardia were on the whole very loyal to their officers, both American and Nicaraguan, and fought exceedingly well when properly trained and led. They marched great distances and endured hardships with a spirit equaled only by the best of seasoned troops. They were able to live on the simple food that the country afforded and never complained so long as it was sufficient in quantity. While few of them never became really good rifle shots, many were possessed of the ability to shoot accurately in battle to a very high degree. They also rapidly developed a remarkable accuracy in the use of rifle grenades. Many of them who came from the hills had been hunters, and cowboys and could follow a trail and read the signs of the woods with uncanny skill.

GUARDIA INTELLIGENCE

Guardia intelligence was divided into two distinct classes, information of the strength dispositions and movements of the bandits and what might be termed political intelligence. The former was obtained by the forces in the field and the latter came to Guardia Headquarters from various sources. It consisted of reports of plots against the Government in power, of revolutions which were to start in the University of Leon, Communist uprisings, and many other dire happenings. The information from this source that was of most value proved to be the rumors of arms and ammunition smuggling from Honduras. It was usually found that a series of persistent rumors of the accumulation of ammunition at Choluteca, even though they were never verified, was followed by activity of Umanzor in Northern Leon and Chinandega. The same was true of similar reports from Danli, which were usually followed by activity in the Segovias. These reports came partly from the Naval Attaché in Tegucigalpa, but principally from spies in Danli and Chouluteca. The information acquired by forces in the field came principally from natives suffering from bandit depredations, hired agents bandit prisoners and deserters, and the information picked up by operating patrols, partly by questioning natives, and partly from inspecting old camp sites, reading the signs on the trails, etc

Weekly intelligence reports were required of all Department and Area Commanders. These included information of all bandit groups reported, their movements, the names of the Jefes, the number of men and arms of the group, the source and reliability of the information; and an estimate of probable bandit activities during the coming week. Other important information was reported as received.

While one individual report was often of little value the combined reports presented a surprisingly accurate picture of the military situation. Pertinent important information was promptly forwarded to the units concerned by Guardia Headquarters, or by the responsible commander receiving it, and weekly combined intelligence reports were issued by Headquarters to the various Guardia units, a more complete monthly intelligence report was compiled for the information of all concerned, copies of which were sent to the Major General Commandant, Commanding General, 2d Brigade, the American Minister and the Marine Corps Schools. (1).

Commencing July 1, 1930, a Guardia News Letter was published weekly and distributed to all stations and to the Second Brigade, U. S. Marine Corps offices. It was printed by mimeograph, and, at first, was composed of two pages and contained news items of general interest, such as contacts with bandits, important patrol operation accomplishments of the Guardia, and movements of officers traveling without troops.

It soon became evident that the news letter was being received with wide-spread interest, and that it was a convenient vehicle for the recording and dissemination of data that would increase the effectiveness of coöperative action of, and between areas and smaller units by reason of increased knowledge of each other's movements, contacts, information, etc. Accordingly, all patrol movements were included, with a brief summary of the results of information gained, and complete contact and

(1) Appendix 27—Chapter 3.

patrol reports, letters relating to conditions at stations, and miscellaneous material of general interest. Contact reports often contained diagrams illustrating the important terrain features and the disposition of our own and the bandit forces, during successive stages of the contact; these diagrams or sketches were mimeographed and included in the news letter along with the detailed report.

In this manner, the news letter soon was increased in size, and became correspondingly more valuable. Patrol leaders were encouraged to write reports, by seeing them in print, knowing that they would be read by many other people, and this doubtless influenced them to exercise a greater degree of care in their preparation than might otherwise have been the case. It was also a morale booster.

Until the final turn-over of the Guardia to the control of Nicaraguan officers, publication of the news letter was continued, employing for each issue, the items received at Guardia Headquarters during the preceding week. Some issues contained as many as 27–28 pages.

AVIATION SUPPORT OF THE GUARDIA

The part that the Marine Corps aviation played in Guardia military operations is difficult to describe. Without its assistance in transporting supplies and troops, the Guardia would never have been able to accomplish what it did. Its potential power was always recognized. For instance, it was well known that no group of bandits, however large, could continue its attacks on a town after the arrival of the planes. A seige was impossible to the bandits, for sooner or later the planes would be sure to arrive and no bandit group would stand a bombing attack from the air without scattering and taking cover. Hence, it was possible to leave exposed towns with small garrisons, which were safe so long as they did not permit themselves to be surprised, as because of the planes, the bandits were unable to continue their attacks for more than a few hours during daylight. The planes were also useful in slowing down bandit groups on the march as they would invariably scatter and take cover from air observation. They were also useful in denying certain sections to the bandits who avoided locations where the planes were operating, and fear of the planes kept them generally clear of the open country.

For reconnaissance they were of less value in thick country as it was an impossibility for an observer to pick up troops on the ground, in the impenetrable jungles that covered the greater part of the zone of bandit operations. Where the country was relatively open they were often useful for liaison purposes, locating and dropping information and orders to patrols. But in many cases they were unable to locate patrols, even though the latter set off smoke bombs and made every effort to be seen. The effect of much flying in territory where it was hoped to encounter hostile groups with ground patrols was to give the enemy warning of the approach of the patrols and enable him to take measures to escape them.

There were in spite of these difficulties a number of successful attacks from the air. Sandino with a large force was driven from camp on Saraguasca Mountain in what he apparently believed to be a position, impregnable against ground attack, and was himself wounded. This happened in June, 1930, and was the last appearance of Sandino on the field of battle in Nicaragua while American Marines remained in the Guardia Nacional. (See inclosure for aviation's part in contacts near Neptune Mines). (1).

In the Eastern Area where the country was less dense aviation was more valuable for attack purposes than in the heavily forested sections of western Nicaragua. Without its assistance and coöperation the problem of the Guardia on the East Coast would have been infinitely more difficult, if not impossible of accomplishment.

(1) Appendix 21—Chapter 3.

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES ATTAINED BY THE GUARDIA

1. It kept the Departments of Carazo, Chontales, Managua and Rivas and the District of San Juan del Sur, large parts of the Departments of Leon, Chinandega, Matagalpa, and Bluefields, and the District of Cabo Gracias, with a combined area of 25,000 square miles, and a population of 400,000 free from banditry, and preserved in them a state of peace, law and order, more secure then had existed for many years.(1).

2. It assisted in the preservation of law and order during the elections of 1928 and 1930, and through its efforts alone preserved order during the Presidential election of 1932. (See footnote).

3. It kept the railroad from Corinto to Granada open at all times.

4. It secured the collection and exportation of the coffee and banana crops.

5. It secured the operation of the mines at Pis Pis, Neptune and Santo Domingo.

6. It participated in 510 contacts with bandits, in which there were 1,115 known bandits killed, 526 wounded, and 76 captured, itself suffering losses of 75 killed, 122 wounded, and none captured.

7. It did not capture Sandino, but did force him to spend most of his time across the Honduran border, and did kill two of his most important leaders.

8. It did not suppress banditry, but did limit its activities to the sparsely inhabited sections near the Honduran border.

9. It maintained in office, a legally elected President for a full term of four years.

10. It assured the lawful election of the successor of the President, and his peaceful installation into office.

11. It became an effective military organization, so organized and officered that it was capable of being turned over to Nicaraguan control, and possessed, even after the withdrawal of the American personnel, sufficient power to prevent Sandino, and his bandit hordes from overthrowing the Government, and to compel him to accept peace on terms that gave him no voice in the Government of the Republic.

Footnote:

(Par. 2) Some Marine Detachments were stationed in the larger towns during the 1932 elections, but were in reserve only, and did not take an active part in operations against banditry. Their presence and readiness to act in emergency however, was of great value and released Guardia that would have otherwise been compelled to remain in reserve.

(1) Appendix 28—Chapter 3.

CHAPTER IV
PUBLIC RELATIONS
The Civil Government of Nicaragua

The Government of Nicaragua is republican in form and is divided into three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial.

The executive power is vested in a President elected for four years. He may not succeed himself. He, as well as the Vice-President, must be a native of Nicaragua and shall be a citizen in the exercise of his full rights of citizenship. The President cannot leave the country during his term of office without permission from Congress, nor after his term is ended if there is a suit pending against him for any official or common offense.

The attributes and powers of the President affecting the military service of the Republic are:

(1) The President of the Republic is the commanding general of the land and sea forces.

(2) To confer rank, in time of peace, to include the rank of colonel and in time of war, to include the rank of general of a division.

(3) To organize the land and sea forces and to distribute them according to the law and the needs of the Republic.

(4) To declare martial law and to suspend the constitution in the case the public peace is threatened.

(5) To care for the interior security and the exterior defense of the country.

(6) To declare war with the sanction of Congress and to make peace when the national interests require it.

(7) To direct war operations as Commanding General of the National Army and Navy. When he personally takes command of the Army, he turns over the presidential duties to the vice-president or first designate, if there be no vice-president, and remains vested only with the character of Commanding General.

(8) To raise the necessary forces to repel any invasion or to subdue rebellions.

(9) To dispose of sea and land forces for the security of and defense of the Republic; to maintain order and peace in the Republic.

The Executive Authority in Nicaragua is administered by the President, members of his official cabinet, the jefe politicos of departments, the administradores de rentas of departments, the alcaldes of incorporated cities and towns, jefes de sanidad of departments, agentes fiscales, jueces de la mesta, jefes de canton and capitanes de canada. All of the officials of the executive department of the government were generally adherents of the party in power in the national and departmental governments. The results of the election of president vested the exercise of executive authority in the national and departmental government in the hands of the President and his personal official appointees. The only local self-government found in Nicaragua is that vested in incorporated towns and cities.

The local government of municipalities is vested in an alcalde and a municipal council elected by public and direct vote of the citizens of the respective municipality.

The members of the President's Cabinet must be natural born citizens of Nicaragua in full rights, laymen, and over twenty-five years of age.

Cabinet ministers must promulgate within their respective departments, the decrees, resolutions and ordnances of the President of the Republic. They may be present without voting during the deliberations of Congress and shall attend whenever they are so requested and must answer any questions that any member of Congress may make to them, regarding matters of administration, except those matters concerning war and foreign relations, when they deem it advisable to keep such matters secret, unless the Chamber decides to the contrary.

The President's Cabinet is composed of five members:

(1) Minister of Government, Police, Justice and Charities.
(2) Minister of Foreign Relations and Public Instruction.
(3) Minister of Treasury and Public Credit.
(4) Minister of War and Marine, and
(5) Minister of Promotion and Public Works.

The Jefe Politico is the chief executive officer of each of the thirteen departments into which the Republic of Nicaragua is divided, and is appointed by the President. He corresponds generally, to a governor of a state or territory. He exercises considerable power over the people and all local officials within the department. He is the political representative of the president and is responsible to the national government. He is usually appointed from the party in control of the national government. In zones of active operations Jefes Politicos issued passes for the movements of the population from one point to another. His powers are generally enlarged under martial law.

The Administrador de Rentas of a department is appointed by the president and has charge of:

(1) Sale of stamps for legal documents, arms permits, aguardiente, contraband, matches, etc., and control over all matters relating to collection of revenue and enforcement of revenue laws in the department.

His quasi-judicial functions are given under the judiciary .

The Jefe de Sanidad of the department has charge over the enforcement of the sanitary regulations. He is appointed by the President usually from among the adherents of the party to which the President belonged.

The Alcalde of a municipality corresponds generally to a mayor of an American city. He is the chief executive of a municipality and is elected by popular suffrage.

The Legislative Authority of the government is vested in the national congress composed of two chambers: (1) Chamber of Senators, and (2) Chamber of Deputies. The senators are elected for six years, one third being elected every two years. A senator must be over forty years of age, be a citizen of Nicaragua and be a layman. The senate consists of one senator for each two deputies from each department. If the number of deputies be odd, another senator is elected. A substitute senator is elected for each senator.

The deputies are elected for four years, and must be citizens of Nicaragua, laymen, and over twenty-five years of age. The deputies are apportioned to the departments according to the population. Each department is divided into electoral districts, one for each 15,000 of population, adding another district for any fraction exceeding 8,000 Each district elects a deputy and a substitute deputy.



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The Judicial Department of the Government of Nicaragua consists of:

Judiciary Proper

(1) The Supreme Court of Justice.
(2) The Courts of Appeal.
(3) The District Courts.
(4) The Local Courts.

Government Accounting

(5) The Tribunal of Accounts.

Settlement of Claims

(6) The Claims Commission.

Civil Officials Exercising Judicial Functions

(7) Directores de Policia.
(8) Jefes Politicos.
(9) Administradores de Rentas.
(10) Alcaldes.
(11) Jueces de la Mesta.
(12) Jefes de Canton.
(13) Capitanes de Canada.

Military Tribunals

(14) Consejo de Guerra General.
(15) Consejo de Guerra Ordinario.
(16) Consejo de Guerra Sumario.
(17) Consejo de Guerra Extraordinario.

The civil judicial tribunals are authorized to demand the assistance of the armed forces to enforce their decisions, and if this be denied them, or there are not armed forces available, they can demand the assistance of private citizens. The official or private citizen who improperly denies his assistance shall be held liable.

The Supreme Court of Justice consists of five magistrates and two substitute magistrates. These are selected by Congress in joint session and serve for a six year term. The magistrates must be over thirty years of age, be citizens of Nicaragua in the exercise of the full rights of citizenship, be laymen and attorneys at law.

The attributes of the Supreme Court of Justice are:

(1) To appoint and remove judges of the district and local courts.
(2) To appoint and remove the court physicians (Medical forensos).
(3) To appoint and remove the recorders of deeds.
(4) To hear and determine appeals from the decisions of inferior courts.
(5) To hear and determine appeals from the resolutions of the Tribunal of Accounts.
(6) Original jurisdiction in cases involving Admiralty Law.

The Supreme Court of Justice sits in Managua, the capital.

Courts of Appeals

The Courts of Appeals are located in the following cities of Nicaragua:

(1) Leon
(2) Granada
(3) Matagalpa
(4) Bluefields

The magistrates and substitute magistrates of the Courts of Appeals are elected in joint session of Congress, must be over thirty years of age, citizens in the exercise of the full rights of citizenship, laymen and attorneys at law. The Court of Appeals exercises control over the District and Local Courts within its jurisdiction. It hears and determines civil and criminal appeals from the decisions of the District Courts. The Courts of Appeals are not courts of original jurisdiction. The term of office of a magistrate is four years.

The Supreme Court of Justice and the Courts of Appeals are presided over by competent magistrates of experience and who are well grounded in the law.

The District Courts

Nicaragua is divided into twenty judicial districts. Managua, Leon, Matagalpa, Granada, and Bluefields districts each have two judges, one for criminal and one for civil cases. The other districts have one judge who hears and determines both civil and criminal cases in the district. For each judge there is also appointed a substitute judge. The judges and substitute judges are appointed and removed by the Supreme Court of Justice.

The District Court is a court of both first and second instance. It is a court of record. It supervises and reviews the actions of the local courts in the district. It, also, tries such cases as are transferred to it from the Local Court.

In many cases the appointees to the office of district judge are young men who have just graduated from law schools, lacking legal experience and judgment and who in some cases have not yet been admitted to the practice of law. The same situation obtains in reference to the local courts. The great weakness in the administration of justice in Nicaragua seems to lie in the fact that the trial judges are not necessarily men learned in the law and experienced in procedure.

The Local Courts

Nicaragua is divided into one hundred and seventeen Local Court Districts. The local jurisdictions of Managua, Leon, Chinandega, Chichigalpa, Matagalps, Jinotega, Masaya, Jinotepe, Granada, each have two judges assigned, one for criminal cases and the other for civil cases. In all other local jurisdictions the same judge hears and determines both civil and criminal cases. For each local judge there is appointed a substitute local judge. Appointments and removals of the local judges and substitutes are made by the Supreme Court of Justice. The Local Court is a court of first instance and is a court of record. There are one hundred twenty-six local judges in Nicaragua.

The Tribunal of Accounts

The Tribunal of Accounts really appertains to the executive department of the government, but exercises quasi-judicial functions. The members of this tribunal are appointed by the President. The functions of the Tribunal des Cuentas are:

(1) The examination, audit and closing of the accounts of the administrators of public funds.

(2) Hears appeals and adjudicates cases arising out of the disbursement of government funds.

(3) The decisions of this tribunal are subject only to review by the Supreme Court of Justice.

The Claims Commission

The Claims Commission consists of three members. The presiding member is an American citizen nominated by the State Department of the United States. The other two members are Nicaraguan citizens, one from each of the two historic political parties. The function of the claims commission is to hear and determine all claims against the Government of Nicaragua either from the citizens of Nicaragua or the citizens of foreign nations. It fulfills in Nicaragua the function of a court of claims. The commission came into existence for the purpose, largely, of settling claims arising incident to the destruction of property during the recent revolutions and the loss sustained by property owners from the depredations of organized banditry. Its decisions are final and are not subject to review by any judicial tribunal.

Directores de Policia

The Directors of Police are appointed by the President, one from each department. The director of Police hears and determines cases involving the following offenses:

(a) Violations of the Arms Law.

(b) Stealing or embezzling of government funds or property.

(c) Violations of Police Regulations.

(d) Violations of Sanitary Regulations, provided the case would not involve a greater than a correctional sentence. In the event any offense involves a more than correctional sentence the Director of Police transfers the case to either the Local or District Court for action and trial. Appeals from his decisions must be made within twenty-four hours. In cases involving hygiene or sanitation, appeals are made to the departmental Jefe de Sanidad. In cases involving violations of the Arms Law, the stealing or embezzling of government funds or property, or infractions of the Police Regulations, appeals are made to the Departmental Jefe Politico. The Director of Police largely functions as a police judge.

The Jefes Politicos

The Jefes Politicos are appointed and removed by the President. In addition to their executive duties they exercise the following quasi-judicial functions: Hear and determine appeals from the decisions of the Director de Policia.

Administrador de Rentas

The Administradors de Rentas are appointed by the President. The Administrador de Rentas tries and determines cases arising out of violations of the revenue laws and the seizure of contraband. Cases involving a more then correctional sentence are transferred to the Local or District Courts.

Alcaldes

Alcaldes are elected by popular vote in incorporated municipalities. They try and determine cases arising out of the violation of local ordnances; cases involving a more then correctional sentence are transferred to Local or District Courts.

Jueces de la Mesta

The Jueces de la Mesta are appointed by the President, one for each canton in Nicaragua. They correspond very closely to our justices of the peace. The court of a Juez de la Mesta is not a court of record. They are authorized to award fines of not to exceed two dollars ($2.00), or confinement of not to exceed five days. They are required to submit a monthly report of the amount of fines imposed. They receive one-half of the value of the fines imposed by them. They receive no other remuneration.

The Jefes de Canton

The Jefes de Canton are appointed by the President, two for each canton in Nicaragua. They are assistant to the Jueces de la Mesta. They are authorized to impose fines of not to exceed two dollars. They submit a report to the Jueces de la Mesta of the amount of fines imposed and are entitled to one-half of the amount of the fines imposed. They receive no other remuneration.

Capitanes de Canada

The Capitanes de Canada are Indian Chiefs appointed as such by the President in outlying districts where there is predominent Indian population. They exercise both police and judicial functions.

Military Tribunals

Military tribunals have jurisdiction only over the personnel of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and over the members of the auxiliary arms of the Guardia Nacional for offenses committed in line of duty while in the actual performance of military service. The military tribunals are:

Consejos de Guerra General; Consejos de Guerra Ordinario; Consejos de Guerra Sumario.

For further information see Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

Extraordinary Military Tribunals

Extraordinary military tribunals have jurisdiction over persons not in the military service of the Republic who in time of war or complete martial law are guilty of rebellion, sedition, treason, or conspiracy against the Government.

THE POLICE MISSION

Under the terms of the Tipitapa Agreement (Guardia Agreement), the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua constituted the sole military and police force of the Republic of Nicaragua. The designating of the Guardia Nacional as the sole police force in Nicaragua materially affected its development and employment throughout its history, and was far reaching in its effect.

There devolved upon the Guardia Nacional two distinct missions: (1) police, and (2) military. The performance of the police mission involved the entire territory of Nicaragua; the accomplishment of the military mission involved only the so-called combat areas of the Republic and therein comprised the conduct of active combat operations and defensive measures against organized banditry

As a military organization the Guardia Nacional was charged with:

1) The training of officers and men in the art of war applicable to conditions existing in Nicaragua.

(2) The conduct of aggressive offensive operations against organized banditry.

(3) The taking of such defensive measures against threatened raids of large organized bandit groups as were essential to the protection of lives and property.

(4) The national security.

(5) The maintenance of the Guardia Nacional as a non-partisan organization.

As a police force, the Guardia Nacional was charged with:

(1) The enforcement of law and order throughout the Republic.

(2) The enforcement of the arms law.

(3) The control of the traffic in arms ammunition and explosives.

(4) The suppression of contraband activities.

(5) The importation of arms, ammunition and explosives.

(6) The control and administration of all government prisons and the subsistence of the prisoners therein.

(7) The suppression of the illicit manufacture of intoxicants.

(8) The enforcement of the police, traffic and sanitary regulations.

(9 The security of life and property throughout the Republic.

(10) The control over the Jueces de la Mesta, Jefes de Canton and Capitanes de Canada.

1. Appendix 1—Chapter IV.

(11) The compilation of a monthly report of all fines awarded by the civil judiciary for violations of the penal code or police, traffic and sanitary regulations, and its submission to the Supreme Court of Justice as a means for checking the reports of the various subordinate members of the judiciary.

(12) The compilation of a monthly report of contraband seized and its submission to the Director General de Rentas for his use in checking the operations of the Administradores de Rentas and Agentes Fiscales.

(13) During the electoral period the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua by executive decree assumed full control over the sale, transportation, and possession of aguardiente in Nicaragua.

Factors Entering into and Affecting the Police Mission

The American officers of the Guardia Nacional were immediately confronted upon their assignment to duty in Nicaragua with the problem of personal adjustment to a situation requiring a sympathetic understanding of a people who had originated from different racial strains and who had developed under entirely different conditions of environment and who were animated by different ideals. In western Nicaragua the people were generally derived from Spanish and Indian strains in various degrees of mixture of these strains; in eastern Nicaragua the population was derived from Spanish, Indian and African strains. Each strain had its corresponding effect upon the psychology of the people. The influence of environment materially affected the development of ideals animating the people of the different parts of the Republic.

An innate courtesy, love of intrigue, love of politics and a strong feeling of personal allegiance to a personal leader rather than to abstract ideals and principles were among the marked and fundamental traits of the Nicaraguan people. The lack of adequate communications had materially retarded the development of a strong spirit of patriotism and nationalism.

The fundamental differences between Latin and Anglo-Saxon ideals and characteristics is well expressed in the following quotation from Henry Ward Beecher:

"There are two dominant races in modern history; the Germanic and the Romanic races. The Germanic races tend to personal liberty, to a sturdy individualism, to civil and political liberty. The Romanic race tends to absolutism in government; it is clannish; it loves chieftans: it develops a people that crave strong and showy governments to support and plan for them."

In Nicaragua a large proportion of the population is illiterate. This is due to the lack of compulsory education and inadequacy of school facilities. The country districts are almost entirely without facilities for even the most elementary instruction. In the large cities and towns there are a few public schools. These are inadequate for the instruction of the children of the lower social classes. Only children of the monied class are able to attend the private schools and colleges.

The economic conditions in Nicaragua have prevented the development of an adequate public school system. The lack of public schools has deprived the lower social classes of an opportunity to obtain an education and has operated to prevent the development of a strong middle class in Nicaragua, so necessary and essential to stability of a republican government.

The wealthy class are generally well educated as they have available private schools and colleges. Many members of this class have been educated in the United States or Europe. This monopoly of education by the wealthy class has operated to retain in this one social class all of the learned professions and the financial and political control of the country.

Party organizations play a most important role in the social, political and economic life of the Republic. Here, party affiliations assume an importance unknown or unequalled in the United States. The bitterness engendered through political strife and rivalries has done much to delay the economic development of the country. Had the interest and time devoted to politics and political intrigue been more wisely devoted to the advancement of the national welfare, business, agriculture or mining, there would have been a greater development of the country's rich natural resources with the increased wealth and prosperity incident thereto. There would be less personal animosity and fewer family feuds. The lives of the people would be happier and more contented

The Liberal and Conservative parties are usually referred to as the two historic parties. So strong are party ties among the aristocraticos that usually the members of a family adhere to the same party generation after generation. So strong is the party spirit that it permeates the social life of the Republic. It is not customary for the adherents of one political party to be invited to or to attend a social function sponsored by the adherents of the opposite party.

The practice of the American officers on duty in the Guardia Nacional of inviting the members of both parties to all social functions without regard to their political affiliations has done something toward bringing about a better understanding between the adherents of the two parties. The maintenance of the Guardia Nacional as a strictly non-partisan organization has further contributed to the allaying of some of the partisan bitterness. It is difficult, however, to allay a bitterness that has its origin so deeply imbedded in the past and so thoroughly interwoven into the conciousness of a people. Party feeling has been literally bred into the people from their mother's breasts.

There is lack of local government and civil service such as exists in the United States. As a result the election of supreme authorities assumes rightfully a great importance in the eyes of the people. It gives to the winning party an absolute control over the machinery of government for four years and means to the losing party a complete elimination from participation in the government of the country.

The establishment of an efficient civil service based on merit, the development of a better system of communications, and the granting of local self-government to departments would, perhaps, in time accomplish the elimination of the present political bitterness and build up a strong national feeling in the country.

The geographical features of Nicaragua have materially affected the development of the country. They have influenced the location of the centers of population along the railroad in western Nicaragua. The mountainous condition of the country has so far hindered the building of adequate railroads and roads by reason of the excessive costs that such railroads or roads would entail. The inadequacy of means of communication has prevented the development of the large natural resources. The geographical features have, by denying ready means of communication, retarded the growth of a strong national spirit of patriotism.

The principal occupations of the people are agriculture, coffee growing, mining and cattle raising. The principal export item is coffee. The

price received for the coffee crop determines to a large extent the prosperity and financial condition of the country.

The revenues of the country are principally derived from import taxes, the government sale of aguardiente, stamp taxes on commercial papers, stamp taxes on legal documents and high rates of postage. The system of taxation is indirect. As a result commodities grown locally are cheap and articles imported are very high.

The wealth of the country is concentrated in the hands of the aristocraticos, who constitute a relatively small proportion of the population. The abject poverty of the major portion of the population and their lack of education has reduced the poorer classes to a condition of economic slavery (to the aristocraticos.) (The wealthy upper class exhibits an unwillingness to permit the economic independence of the poorer classes)

The fall in the price of coffee has reduced the country to a straitened financial condition. The inadequacy of transportation facilities and the activities of banditry have prevented the gathering and sale of a full crop of coffee.

The poor sanitary conditions have increased the death rate and have operated to reduce the available supply of labor.

The insecurity of life and property due to recent revolutions and to the activity of the bandits has prevented the wealthy class from making further investments involving the development of their properties. The same condition has resulted in a number of the wealthy class leaving the country temporarily to reside abroad.

The following distinct divisions of society obtain in Nicaragua:

(1) The Aristocraticos (Alta).
(2) The Aristocraticos (Baja).
(3) The Artesanos.
(4) The Melganos.
(5) The Mozos.

The first two classes are known as the "class social." The financial position and education possessed by a family determines to a large extent whether it is classed as "alta" or "baja." The acquisition of wealth by a family in the "baja" section of the "clase social" operates to transfer it to the "alta" section and, vice versa, a family in the "alta" section losing its wealth in a generation or two drops into the "baja" section.

The three lower classes are the industrial classes of Nicaragua. The artesanos stand at the top of these classes and include the skilled workmen, small shopkeepers, etc. The melganos stand midway between the artesanos and the mozos and includes the upper class of servants, house-servants, etc., while the mozos stand at the bottom of the social scale. They are the lowest class of servants, and include field hands, herders, etc.

The marks of each of the three classes is exhibited in their dress. The mozos wear neither coat nor shoes; the melganos wear shoes, but no coats, and the artesanos wear both coat and shoes. No man of the clase social (aristocraticos) would appear in public without his coat. The wearing of a coat is truly a mark of social position in Nicaragua.

There is a great gap between the clase social (aristocraticos) and the three industrial classes in Nicaragua. This gap is present in the relative financial position, the relative educational opportunities enjoyed, and in the relative political influence. There does not exist in Nicaragua a strong middle class. The fact that Nicaragua lacks such

a strong bulwark of Republican institutions probably accounts to a large extent for the instability of its government. History has abundantly proven that it is essential to the development and preservation of Republican institutions that a strong middle class be developed in any country aspiring to the adoption of such institutions and ideals. The artesanos and the present enlisted personnel of the Guardia Nacional will probably in time become the nucleus of a middle class.

The political control of the country lies in the hands of the aristocraticos. The artesanos have some influence and are accorded some consideration. The melganos and the mozos are in a practical state of economic peonage, lack education and accordingly are ready to vote as their landlord dictates. They are easily bribed by a few drinks of cususa or aguardiente or a meal. In actuality we find in Nicaragua an oligarchical government masquerading in the guise of a Republic.

COOPERATION WITH THE CIVIL OFFICIALS OF THE REPUBLIC

The Guardia policy in dealing with civil officials may be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Maintenance of non-partisan character of the Guardia Nacional.

(b) To give the fullest coöperation to the civil authorities and to insist upon a reciprocal action on their part toward the Guardia.

(c) To avoid interference with the civil officials' performance of the functions of their office.

(d) To demand non-interference on the part of the civil officials with the interior administration of the Guardia.

(e) To require all requests for coöperation on the part of the civil officials to be made to the commanding officer of the Guardia and not to permit any civil official to deal direct with the enlisted personnel of the Guardia.

(f) To require all Guardia complaints against civil officials to be couched in temperate language and confined strictly to a statement of facts based upon a full and complete investigation.

(g) To cultivate a feeling of mutual respect and coöperation between the officers of the Guardia and the civil officials of the Government on a basis of mutual independence of each other.

The actual coöperation with civil officials of the Government of Nicaragua constituted one of the most difficult problems which confronted the Guardia Nacional. It constituted a problem requiring firmness, poise, tact, an understanding of the psychology of the Nicaraguan people, and a consistent adherence to an adopted policy. There was a constant attempt on the part of the local officials to reduce the Guardia Nacional to the same position of subordination to themselves as was occupied by the old national army. The principles under which the Guardia Nacional operated were an innovation in the political and military life of the Republic, hence it is not strange that there should be some misunderstanding and that a considerable period of time was required for the new principles and ideas to permeate the conciousness of the people. Another factor was the necessity for the American officer serving in the Guardia to become adjusted to the local conditions and

to acquire an understanding of the civil government and the functions of its various agencies and officials. There was a necessity for a personal adjustment to new conditions to be accomplished by both the civil official and the Guardia officer before perfect coöperation between them could become an accomplished fact.

The fact that in the end an almost perfect understanding and a spirit of mutual coöperation existed between the local officers of the Guardia and the local civil officials throughout Nicaragua reflects great credit upon the officers of the Guardia Nacional in having accomplished the police mission in the face of great difficulties. It won for the Guardia Nacional the esteem, confidence and the ever increasing support of the people of Nicaragua.

The adherents of the party in power looked to the Guardia Nacional to maintain the sovereignty of the National Government, the party out of power looked to the Guardia Nacional as being its best guaranty against oppression by the party in power. The result was the evolution of a new conception of the functions of the Government as something apart from a party. This conception constituted a distinct contribution toward a stabilized Government in Nicaragua.

The Guardia Nacional constituted the principal bulwark of the National Government. The maintenance of it as a non-partisan organization gave to the people a new conception of loyalty to the Government rather than a loyalty to party. The example set by the Guardia in its ceremonies of raising and lowering the flag created a new pride in the national flag and the national sovereignty of the country. The maintenance of peace and order gave increased security to person and property and encouraged more intermingling of the people of one section with other sections. Public officials were given an example in the honest administration of government funds and in a fairness to all citizens without respect to party affiliations in the administration of the law of the nation. It is highly probable that in the field of the exercise of police power, the influence of the Guardia Nacional will be more potent and lasting in its effect.

The Guardia Nacional gave its fullest coöperation to the civil officials of the government at all times and occasions. One concrete example of such coöperation was its coöperation with the Jefes de Sanidad during the small pox epidemics in effecting the vaccination of the populace. Not only did the Guardia assist in bringing in the people to the sanitary offices for vaccination but the medical officers of the Guardia actually vaccinated many people in the outlying districts. The Guardia were instructed not to use physical force to compel any person to submit to vaccination, but those persons who refused vaccination were taken before the Director of Police for action.

THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Offenses are classified as public and private and are brought to the attention of the authorities by denouncing (reporting) the commission of the offense or by accusing a person or persons of having committed the offense. In making a denouncement there is no obligation to prove the facts reported, but when an accusation is made the person making

it is obligated to prove it. A denouncement is the reporting of the commission of an offense and the name of the delinquent need not be given. An accusation is the request of a person to a judge to punish a delinquent. It may be made personally, or by means of an attorney especially authorized. The accusation must be in writing and must contain complete details concerning the offense alleged to have been committed.

Under the provisions of article 112 of the constitution, the President may order the arrest and retention of any person or persons who constitute a menace to public tranquility and welfare. Individuals so arrested may not be held for a period of more than ten days without being granted a hearing before a properly designated judge.

An "auto de detencion" is a warrant issued by a judge for the purpose of confining a suspect in order to investigate his alleged guilt. This period of confinement should not exceed eight days, plus the time required to prepare and present the case before a competent judge.

An "auto de prision" is issued by judges for the formal confinement in prison of an offender whose case has been duly investigated and where a prima facie case has been established against the offender.

The Jefe Director was authorized to hold prisoners to his order who were guilty of participation in organized banditry or armed rebellion against the government. The participation in organized banditry must meet the legal requirements of the offense of banditry as defined in the Penal Code. Mere participation in robbery, murder, manslaughter, arson, larceny, or other crimes as an individual or as a member of a group smaller than necessary to meet the legal difinition of banditry did not warrant the holding of such to the order of the Jefe Director. In such cases the prisoner would be placed to the order of the local or district judge before the expiration of eight days.

Prisoners in this class could be held for a reasonable time pending investigation and indefinitely if there was sufficient evidence of their participation in organized banditry. In July, 1932, orders were issued to all area and department commanders to submit form reports on all prisoners held to the order of the Jefe Director. These reports included the following information: (a) name, (b) date of confinement, (c) by whom arrested, (d) synopsis of circumstances attending his apprehension, (e) offense charged against the prisoner, (f) names of witnesses and nature of evidence available and, (g) recommendation of area or department commander as to disposition. Subsequently, this report was submitted whenever a prisoner was confined to the order of the Jefe Director. These form reports were referred to the Law Department for further investigation, check with available intelligence data, check with the requirements of the law, and for recommendation as to disposition. The Jefe Director by letter to the area or department commander in dicated the action to be taken in each individual case.

In the event a writ of habeas corpus was served on an area or department commander in the case of a prisoner held to the order of the Jefe Director, the following instructions governed such officer in making reply thereto:

"HEADQUARTERS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA"
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

20 June, 1932.

From: The Jefe Director.

To: All Area and Department Commanders, Guardia Nacional.

Subject: Habeas Corpus in the case of prisoners held to the order of the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional.

1. The following answer will be used in cases of Habeas Corpus of prisoners held to the order of the Jefe Director:

"En la ciudad de....., Departamento de..... ....., Nicaragua, a las.....de la.....del dia.....de mil novecientos trienta y.....Presente el Comandante de Departamento de la Guardia Nacional, Capitan..... .....a quien requeri en la forma..... legal, de acuerdo con lo ordenado por..... ....., y al afecto manifesto que actuando de acuerdo con las ordenes del Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua; manifesta que .....esta detenido como prisionero militar en la prision de....., en virtud de la autoridad del articulo 99, parrafos 1 y 3-sub-parrafos (a) y (b) de los Articulos para el Gobierno y Disciplina de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, asi como, por lo dispuesto en el Decreto Ejecutive de dies y nueva de Noviembre de mil novecientosoeintinueve, de tal manera que la disposicion de dicho caso del referido..... sera de acuerdo con as provisiones de las leyes anteriormente citadas: Que....., esta a a orden de la Guardia Nacional pesde.....de.....de.....segun disposicion del Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua de la misma fecha y que.....esta siendo procesado por su participacion an las actividades del bandolerismo de Nicaragua. Por lo tanto al Comandante de Departamento de la Guardia Nacional, se ve imposibilitado a proceder a la exhibicion personal de .....a como lo ordena..... Se leyo esta acta y firma."

2. The above answer will be written or typed immediately following or on the reverse of the same paper served on you.

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR GENERAL C. B. MATTHEWS, G. N.:

/s/ JULIAN C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional,
Chief of Staff.

In those departments of Nicaragua in which a state of seige (complete martial law) was in effect, the rights of Habeas Corpus proceedings were suspended during such period. Accordingly, officers of the Guardia Nacional did not have to make any replies to writs of Habeas Corpus. Another factor which tended to reduce the number of writs of Habeas

Corpus was the fact that most of the prisoners held by the Jefe Director were not in the exercise of the full rights of citizenship by reason of a past criminal record.

The members of the Guardia Nacional were brought to trial by military tribunals for offenses which were of a purely military nature or which were committed in line of duty in the performance of assigned military or police missions. The policy was adopted of turning over to civil authorities for trial such members of the Guardia Nacional as had committed offenses of a non-military nature and which were not committed in line of duty or when in the actual performance of assigned duties. When a civil judge desired the turn over of a member of the Guardia Nacional for trial for an alleged offense, he submitted a request therefor to the Jefe Director. In no case was a member of the Guardia Nacional turned over to civil authorities without the express order of the Jefe Director. Area and Department commanders were directed to immediately investigate and report to the Jefe Director by radio or telegram the commission of any offense by the members of their command in which they had reason to believe or knew the civil authorities would request a turn over for trial. They were directed to submit a written report by first available mail giving full details, status of complainant, whether or not the Guardia had creditable witnesses to support his version of the affair and a recommendation as to the proper action to be taken in the matter.

The requests of a civil judicial authority for the turn over of a member of the Guardia Nacional for trial were carefully investigated before action was taken. In some cases, the Jefe Director directed that the case be tried by the appropriate military tribunal and so informed the judge requesting the turn over, together with his reasons.

Under the Nicaraguan law a case once opened remains open until the trial is completed. Some of the judges appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice against the decision of the Jefe Director, which court took no action. Other judges upon receipt of a certified transcript of the trial by military tribunal filed such transcript with the record in the case and considered the case closed under the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution

There was growing tendency in 1931 and 1932 on the part of the civil courts of Nicaragua to give full effect to the fact of a trial by a military tribunal as a bar to subsequent trial in civil court for the same offense.

Criminal Procedure

All cases calling for the adjudging of more than a correctional penalty are tried before a jury selected by the prosecution and the defense from those persons who have been duly designated as jurors. A jury is composed of seven members and four deputies who act as substitutes for any members who are legally unable to hear the case. The majority vote (four or more) determine the verdict of the jury. The minority, however, may submit a report which is attached to the record of the proceedings of the case. Without a previous jury verdict on the guilt of the offender, no sentence that is more than a correctional one may be imposed for the commission of an offense.

Contraband

According to Nicaraguan law individuals including Guardia who denounced the presence of contraband are entitled to one-third of the proceeds of the sale of such contraband provided such denouncement results in the capture of the contraband reported. The persons, including the Guardia, who effect the capture of contraband are entitled to one-third of the proceeds from the public sale of the contraband.

Monthly reports of the capture of contraband were submitted by the Department Commanders and Area Commanders to the Jefe Director. A copy of these reports was forwarded by the Jefe Director to the Director General of Revenue (rentas) for his information in checking the reports received from the Departmental Administradores de Rentas.

In view of the dependence of the Government for its revenue collected on government sales of aguardiente and customs receipts, the apprehension of contraband, cususa and tobacco became one of the important duties of the Guardia.

Traffic in Arms, Ammunition and Explosives

In accordance with Presidential Decree No. 175, published in official gazette No. 242, 29 October, 1929, the Guardia took over from licensed arms dealers, all arms, ammunition, explosives, etc., and placed them in Guardia storerooms from where they have since been sold by the Guardia for the account of the dealers, and the money turned over at intervals to the owners. Since taking over the articles in question and placing them in Guardia storerooms, none of the dealers have made any further importations.

Importation of Arms, Explosives, Munitions

When authorization was issued to any person or corporation in Nicaragua to import arms, ammunition, or explosives, a letter was written to the Minister of Foreign Relations and certified copies were sent to the Nicaraguan Consul in the United States at the port of exportation; Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional at Corinto or Bluefields, Nicaragua; Department Commander of the Guardia concerned; the Recaudador General de Aduanas, Managua; the Recaudador de Aduanas, Corinto or Bluefields, and the person to whom authorization to import was granted. Upon receipt of the imported arms, ammunition or explosives at the port of entry such were not released through the customs until the Jefe Director specifically authorized such release.

Martial Law in Nicaragua

In general the zone of active military operations against organized banditry was limited to the Eastern Area, the Central Area, the Northern Area, and the Departments of Chontales, Leon and Chinandega. During the greater portion of the period of the existence of the Guardia Nacional the departments included in the zone of active military operations were under martial law. Accordingly an understanding of what constituted martial law under the law of Nicaragua is essential to a clear and complete understanding of the conditions under which the military and police operations were conducted.

Martial law under Nicaraguan law is a modification of martial law as it exists under American law in that the powers of the military commander are more circumscribed and limited and there is less interference with the conduct of the civil government.

Nicaraguan law recognizes two forms of martial law:

(1) Complete martial law (state of seige).

(2) Martial law in part (preventive state).

Martial law is declared by the Congress when in session; when the Congress is in recess, the President at a council of ministers may declare martial law by issuing a decree. It may be declared in all or any part of the territory of the Republic.

The state of siege (complete martial law) shall be declared in the following cases:

(1) When the Republic is at war with another nation;

(2) When there begins a rebellion, sedition, or there is imminent danger of a disturbance of the public order.

In the first case, the state of siege is extended to all the territory of the Republic; and in the second case, it shall include the town or towns where the state of order is disturbed or where an attempt is being made to alter the state of public security.

When the decree establishing martial law suspends one or more guarantees, it is called preventive state; if it suspends all guarantees, it is called a state of siege. The individual guarantees with the exception of those that establish the inviolability of human life, with their exceptions; that which prohibits the trial by judges who have not been legally appointed; that which prohibits the application of perpetual punishment; that of whipping or flogging with sticks and all kinds of torture; that which prohibits the using of restrictive or confiscatory laws; those stipulated in Articles 56 and 57 of the Constitution; and those regarding the legal immunities of officials, may be suspended totally or partially by the declaration of martial law.

In case of war, guarantees are suspended, except those specified by Article 62 of the Constitution.

The President has the authority to end the state of martial law when the circumstances that caused it no longer to exist. It should be ended by means of a decree which fixes the date on which the state of martial law will end.

If the Congress meets during the state of martial law, the President should submit to it for its information his reasons for declaring it. The Congress in view of these reasons, shall issue a decree ordering its continuation or termination.

The President shall give an account to the Congress at its next meeting of the measures taken during the state of martial law. The authorities and officials shall be responsible for any abuses they might commit during the state of martial law.

The tribunals of justice shall not suspend the exercise of their functions except in those towns in an actual state of war, besieged by

the enemy, or by a decree of the President, he therein determining what places are effected according to the gravity of the circumstances.

When the state of martial law has been ended by any means, the military tribunals shall continue their operations on those cases pending before them, to their termination.

During martial law, military authorities may:

(1) Try cases: (a) involving offenses of treason, rebellion, and sedition; (b) involving offenses against the peace, independence and sovereignty. (1).

(2) Compel a change of residence of those persons who are dangerous to the peace and security, or against whom there exists well founded suspicions of participation in these offenses

(3) During a state of siege, landed property may be occupied temporarily when it is necessary to establish on it a military post or camp; in which case the owner shall be indemnified by the nation as soon as normal conditions are restored

(4) Use of the house and furniture of any person when it becomes a military necessity to do so. In this case the civil administrative authorities shall give a receipt to the owner concerned, fixing as near as possible the price and quality of the thing used so that the owner may be indemnified at the conclusion of the operations. The military authorities may only use the house and furniture, without the intervention of the civil administrative authorities in cases of absolute and urgent necessity, and then giving a receipt for the same and being responsible for any abuses they might commit in accordance with the law.

(5) May break into a house at any hour with the object of arresting or confiscating any war material.

The sentences pronounced by the military tribunals, may not be carried into effect without previous confirmation of the Commanding General of the Republic, except when in the state of war it is absolutely impossible that the case reach that official and the application of the penalty becomes urgent, the confirmation of the General in Chief of Operations or of the nearest division which may be encountered operating against the enemy shall be sufficient.

(1) **Footnote.**— The State Department of the United States prohibited the trial of civilians by the Guardia Nacional as long as there were any American officers on duty with it.

CHAPTER V

BANDIT CHIEFS

Section 1—Augusto Calderon Sandino

Augusto Calderon Sandino, alias Augusto Caesar Sandino, was born about 1895 at the ranch La Victoria, in Niquinohomo, Department of Masaya, Nicaragua, the son of poor Indo-Spanish parents, Gregorio Sandino and Catalina Calderon, and is reputed to have been an illegitimate child. His early education was very limited, although he learned to read and to write poorly. Sandino is of medium height, very slender and weighs about 115 pounds. He is an extreme optimist and possesses unusual ability in convincing others of the feasibility of his most fantastic schemes; is very energetic, extremely vain and sophisticated, fully believing that his wisdom is infallible; he will not tolerate long, a subordinate of outstanding ability; he feigns modesty at all times, but in reality is most vain and selfish.

During his youth he was involved in many difficulties due to his quick temper, lack of control and inconsiderately mean disposition, and was known as an erratic, undependable individual. In 1916, in Managua, during an argument over the price of ten fanegas of beans which he was selling, Sandino shot and wounded in the leg, Dagoberto Rivas, later a member of the House of Deputies from Niquinohomo, and fled to Mexico to avoid prosecution. There he is said to have joined Pancho Villa's revolutionary column and to have served with him for nine years. During this time he became inbued with the doctrines of communism, and early in 1926 returned to Nicaragua, after spending a short time in Guatemala, fired with the fanaticism of the socialistic societies and lodges of Mexico, whose aims are said to be to re-make the world by placing the laboring classes in control, forming a brotherhood of all men in sympathy with their cause, and destroying all who oppose. These ideas became imbedded in his mind, habitual in his speech, characteristic of the military organization which he later developed, and flaunted by the emblem of bolshevism he adopted as the insignia of that organization.

He arrived at the San Albino mine, near Jicaro, Department of Nueva Segovia, about May, 1926, and was given employment by the American owner, Mr. Charles Butters, as a filing clerk in the store at $25.00 monthly, for which position he proved to be inept. At this time a revolution was in progress in Nicaragua, and Sandino, unbeknown to the mining officials, busied himself recruiting miners and other employees of the Company, all Liberals, into a skeleton force of revolutionaries. About three months after his arrival at San Albino, he disappeared with this force of men, and was joined by others and supplied with arms and ammunition in some manner. He attacked the Government troops at Jicaro, and both sides claimed to have been victorious.

Whether as the result of his activities, or for other reasons, is not known, but the Government forces were shortly withdrawn from Nueva Segovia, and Sandino became known as the representative in that department of Doctor Juan Bautista Sacasa, who had set himself up at Puerto Cabezas on the Atlantic Coast, as the Constitutional President of the Republic. He attempted to secure ammunition from General Jose

Maria Moncada, leader of the Constitutional forces, but was unsuccessful owing to the fact that Moncada suspected him of having fanatical and communistic ideas, and also did not have confidence in the men under him, most of whom were native Segovianos. About this time, Sandino made a trip to Puerto Cabezas, and arrived opportunely to secure a supply of arms, ammunition, and other military equipment from Sacasa's Vice-Secretary of War. A neutral zone had been proclaimed that included Puerto Cabezas, and these supplies were furnished to Sandino rather than to allow them to fall into the hands of the United States Naval forces.

With these materials Sandino returned to the Segovias, and stopped at Santa Cruz, Department of Jinotega, where he was joined by Camilo Guillen and a small group from Quilali, Nueva Segovia, and by other recruits from near Santa Cruz. His force now numbered about eighty men, armed with seventy rifles and a few pistols. They marched to Yucapuca, a flat-topped, treeless mountain, where, in March, 1927, they were attacked by a Federal force of about four hundred men armed with rifles and six machine guns, under the command of General F. Gabriel Artola. After a hard fought battle lasting seven hours, the Federal forces were driven off with heavy losses, including many arms, which fell into Sandino's hands.

A period of recruiting followed, during which Sandino moved about in the Department of Jinotega from town to town, although he spent more time in the town of San Rafael del Norte than in others. He also despatched a number of small patrols as far as Quilali, Bocay and Chipote to prevent Federal sympathizers from organizing in his rear. Sandino at this time was filled with a desire to emulate the Mexican leader, Pancho Villa, in military prowess and eagerly grasped the opportunity to establish bolshevism in Nicaragua. The forces which he recruited were apt pupils and wore the bolshevist emblem. They carried a communist red flag, or banner, with a black stripe on the side and across from it a skull and cross-bones device which had painted below it the words, "Liberty or Death." When General Moncada met Sandino near Boeco, he ordered this slogan cut from the flag, an order which Sandino reluctantly obeyed while stating that this insignia was greatly beloved by his troops.

On March 28th, Sandino with two hundred armed men attacked the city of Jinotega, and, after a full day of hard fighting, routed the Federals (Conservatives). His force was badly disorganized as a result of the fighting and promptly set to looting the town, whereupon Sandino ordered a withdrawal to San Rafael del Norte. He returned to Jinotega a few days later and remained there until the arrival of the Liberal Generals Francisco Parajon and Carlos Castro-Wassmer with their force.

From Jinotega, Sandino and Parajon marched in separate and independent columns to join General Moncada at Bejuco, near Mercedes, Department of Chontales, where the two forces arrived about April 28th. This time, Moncada welcomed Sandino's services (probably due to his victory at Yucapuca and capture of Jinotega), issued him 15,000 rounds of rifle ammunition and two machine guns, one of which was a Thompson. It was at this time that Moncada issued the order prohibiting the use of bolshevik emblems and the slogan on the communist

flag carried by Sandino's troops.

Sandino remained with the Moncada army until the commencement of the Tipitapa Conference. He agreed in the following letter to lay down his arms.

"May 9, 1927.

ESTEEMED GENERAL MONCADA:

I take pleasure in informing you that, having arrived at this place, I have found myself in a difficult position due to the fact that all my followers have not joined me, since I have found but a few chiefs, and the rest of my troops having gone to Jinotega, the place from whence they came. For this reason I feel that my remaining at this place will avail me nothing, all of my followers having disbanded.

I have decided to go to Jinotega again to assemble my men, in order to collect all the arms. In this case I shall remain there awaiting your orders.

I likewise delegate my rights in order that you may arrange the matter as may suit you best, informing me of the results at Jinotega, which I shall occupy with my troops.

The disbanding of my men is due to their not finding anything to eat, and for this reason they have left. However, I assure that as soon as I arrive they must all come where I am and then I shall collect all the arms.

A. C. SANDINO."

Instead it appears that he became infuriated because he was not invited to be one of the conferees, and also at the prospect of failure of his socialistic dreams because of the agreements which he learned were expected to be reached at the conference. Thus disappointed that bolshevism could not be saddled on the country through the medium of the Constitutionalist Army, he secretly moved north with about two hundred of his followers to establish it where it had a possibility of flourishing.

Stopping at Yali in the Department of Jinotega, Sandino made a final gesture towards his objective in a letter which he wrote from that place to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Marines, in which he stated that the only condition under which he would lay down his arms was that an American Military Governor be appointed to assume power until it would be possible for the United States Government to supervise an election in an efficient manner. This sentiment does not seem to coincide with Sandino's dream of a communistic country, but it can be explained by the circumstances. Sandino at this time did not consider himself a very important figure, certainly not powerful enough to swing the entire country. He pinned his faith to bigger men who held the same radical desires, such as Doctor Escolastico Lara and Sofonias Salvatierra, and also even Doctor Sacasa himself (the latter probably because of the aid which he accepted from Mexico). He believed that a free election would result in a Liberal victory and with one of these men in power, he could see hope. But as long as Adolfo Diaz remained president he felt that a free election was an impossibility; hence his desire for an American Military Governor. No conditions outlined by Sandino were acceptable under any circumstances, and he was notified that his plan could not be adopted. He continued on his way north with his force, which by this time was dwindling, and entered Nueva Segovia.

Apparently his first intent was merely to assuage himself for the disappointment he had experienced by "killing Conservatives" as he stated in one of his letters. His force became known as the "Wild Beasts of the Mountain," and committed many crimes. On June 6, 1927, Sandino demanded $5,000 from Hipolito Agasse, a French subject who owned property in Telpaneca, on penalty of death of his storekeeper, Guillermo Ardon if he failed to meet the demand; however, Agasse in Ocotal settled with Sandino for $1,358.18 cash and a $60.00 typewriter, and Ardon lived to be a good friend of both the Marines and the Guardia Nacional.

Within a short time Sandino realized that he was an important figure among the people of Nueva Segovia and began to organize the department according to his own ideas, which included the formation of all his followers and sympathizers into a brotherhood and the protection of those loyal to him. As the Conservative forces had been disbanded, Sandino had an "army" but no one with whom to fight or from whom to protect his loyal followers. The only armed force nearby was the recently arrived Marine Corps detachment in Ocotal, so his imagination evolved the concept that since the marines desired the surrender of Sandino's arms, Segovia needed protection from the "invader." He announced military rule over Nueva Segovia, with his headquarters and capitol at Jicara, which he re-named Sandino City, and that he would place garrisons at San Fernando, Ciudad Antiqua, Telpaneca, San Juan del Telpaneca, Quilali, Murra, San Albino Mine and Jalapa, defining his status in the proclamation as "Chief General Defending the National Rights." He also assumed the name Augusto Caesar in place of Augusto Calderon; Augustus Caesar evidently appeared to him to be a fitting name for so powerful and important a figure as he believed himself to be.

Arriving at San Albino Mine with about fifty men, Sandino demanded 500 pounds of dynamite, 1500 dynamite caps and 2,000 feet of fuse, and Mr. Butters, being threatened with death if he refused, delivered these items to him. Sandino stated at this time that all Americans should be killed or driven out of the country, an idea probably based on the refusal of his plan to appoint an American Military Governor in place of President Diaz, and also on various attempts made by the U. S. Marines to cause him to lay down his arms. "Mexico our friend, America our enemy," became a favorite expression with him.

On July 11, 1927, he received a request from the Commanding Officer of Marines at Ocotal to turn in his arms. His reply showed his rising courage and sense of importance, but also denoted that his principal desire was victory for the Liberal party, which he apparently considered to be in accord with his own ideas. His stay in Mexico, and the fact that Mexico had helped the Liberals during the revolution, seem to have prevented it entering his head that Nicaraguan Liberalism was not all radical. His letter stated in part: "When I joined the Coast movement (Sacasa revolution) I did it with the firm resolve to have a free country or die, and, as we have not succeeded in gaining an effective freedom, and neither have I died, we shall continue with our resolve. Also, if the United States wants peace in Nicaragua, they will have to turn the Presidency over to a legitimate Liberal." Captain G. D. Hatfield's answer to this letter seems to have thrown Sandino and his troops into a frenzy, and they proceeded to Telpaneca, where three columns

were formed, totalling 175 men, and an attack was made on Ocotal on July 16th. The following day, after withdrawal from Ocotal without having effected its capture, he issued a statement giving as his reasons for precipitating the attack: (1) to demonstrate that he was still protesting and defending the right of Doctor Sacasa's constitutional authority, (2) to prove to those who thought his men were bandits that they were men of ideals, and (3) to prove that he preferred death to the "slavery" of the peace Moncada had accepted. He suggested in the same document that the intervention must be withdrawn, that the election must be held with candidates selected by the "genuine" Liberal Convention, and that his army would be pleased if that Convention selected Sofonias Salvatierra and Escolastico Lara as candidates. The adjective, "genuine" is the first evidence of his awakening to the fact that all Liberals except a few renegades were not satuated with "red" ideas similar to his own. He considered Moncada a renegade, and could not believe that the Liberal party would succeed by accepting the intervention and maintaining the Conservative in power.

On August 3rd, he issued President Diaz a challenge by telegraph, stating: "I will give up my arms if you will grasp your pistol in hand and battle with me; in this manner you will be able to wash with your blood the black stain that today defaces you." On August 26th, he addressed an open letter to the Liberals of Nicaragua stating in part: "The puritans and honorable Liberals, those who did not sell their arms or recognize Adolfo Diaz in exchange for public posts or join the Yankees to humiliate Nicaragua, will never allow the division of the Liberal party in the next election, because in that event the Conservatives would get the Victory." He did not yet realize what a minority he represented. On October 6th, he denounced Moncada as a traitor.

Failing to receive the expected support and response from what he believed to be his own party, he turned to a foreign country, Honduras. Froilan Turcios, a Honduranian editor and poet, was in Tegucigalpa; he had been an official of some lodge of which Sandino had been a member, and the latter always addressed him as "maestro," that is, master or teacher, a term used by those under them in addressing teachers, professional leaders and the heads of artisan shops. Labor lodges and societies with radical ideas are numerous in Honduras, Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico. Among them is the All-America Anti Imperialistic League, which spreads also through South America and the United States. Turcios was well-connected with these organizations, as were Salamon de la Selva, Toribio Tijerino, Jorge Volio (Costa Rica), and Carleton Beals (author of "Banana Gold," and other incendiary works, and one of the original committee in the United States branch).

Turcios advertised Sandino well. Exaggerated accounts of the battles pompous boasting of high ideals and bitter denunciations of the Nicaraguan occupation by marines spread through the Americas. The radical organizations, each branch having insufficient weight to accomplish much in its own country, seemed to think that the combined weight of all might be able to accomplish its ends in one small country like Nicaragua. Unscrupulous methods were used. Of all the writers praising Sandino and denouncing American foreign policy, not one has based his statements on plain, solid facts; all resorted to sensational distortion. About February—March, 1928, Sandino's prestige was high, but the

foreign countries that had been furnishing at least moral aid began to be occupied with troubles of their own and began withdrawing their support. Sandino's military inability and lawlessness contributed to this loss of faith and he soon found that his prestige was falling, that he could not drive the intervention from the country, and that his support from the interior of the republic was mostly mythical. The Liberals of Nicaragua did not want the radical, pro-Mexican laborist government that Sandino thought they desired. His letters began to sound a slight note of despair; he quieted down in his boasting about his early march to the interior and the getting of the Liberals into power through force of arms. His boast of driving out the invader by defeat in battle changed to a less pompous one, that he would prevent the election. In August, 1928, he addressed a letter to "all honorable Nicaraguans, to the end that they may know what (principles) the Army Defending the Sovereignty of Nicaragua pursues." The letter is an in argumentative vein and seems to be a feeble attempt to justify the existance of his band. He argues that no government imposed by a foreign power can, out of gratitude, help but become a tool to that foreign power. He closes by stating that he will deposit his arms with a Government established without intervention.

Some time during 1929, Sandino left Nicaragua and went to Yucatan, Mexico, where he remained at Merida until about May, 1930. He renewed his relations with the communistic elements of Mexico, and undoubtedly returned to Nicaragua with arrangements perfected for the supply of arms, ammunition and funds. For effective publicity, Doctor Pedro Jose Zepeda of Mexico was employed as an agent, and powerful propaganda emanated from his office and was picked up and published by communist organs throughout the world. Socrates Sandino a brother, who had been living in Brooklyn, New York became interested in the affairs of Sandino and at a meeting of communists held in Union Square, New York, on May Day, 1930, collected a large sum of money to be used for the advancement of the "cause" in Nicaragua.

Shortly after Sandino's return to Nicaragua, he was wounded by a fragment of an aëroplane bomb during a contact on the mountain Saraguasca in the Department of Jinotega. From there he retired to camps located north of Santa Cruz and the Cua, and directed his operations from these mountain fastnesses, surrounded by numerous outposts. He did not personally appear in any contact with either marines or Guardia Nacional after that time. However, he extended his control over certain parts of the Northern and Central territory by appointing civil government officials to represent him and his interests. These included alcaldes, jueces de la mesta, jefes de canton, and communication agents for the handling and forwarding of correspondence. Letters of appointment were issued in each case, signed by Sandino, and sealed with his rubber-stamp seal showing a member of his forces armed with an up-lifted machete, foot on the prostrate body of a marine, and left hand grasping the marine's hair, with the slogan, "Patria y Libertad" below, and a background of the volcanic peaks. This seal was used on all official correspondence of Sandino.

In November, 1931, the supreme effort of organized banditry was made. Careful and lengthy preparation was made, arms and ammuni-

tion were secured, recruits were obtained in Nicaragua and in Honduras, groups were considerably strengthened to three or four times their usual size, and a sudden concentration made in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega. The object of the movement was to cut the lines of communication by capturing the railroad and important towns along it. The initial move was made on November 22nd at Chincigalps, a small town on the railroad some twelve miles southeast of Chinandega. The ungarrisoned town was looted to the extent of about $4,000.00 and the sole municipal policeman killed. Upon arrival of a mixed patrol of guardias and civicos hastily organized and sent from Chinandega, the bandits evacuated the town. During several weeks of campaigning the groups were kept on the move and suffered several severe defeats, which forced them finally to give up the original plans. Sandino's socialistic brother, Socrates, was a member of one of the groups at this time.

In the spring of 1932, another similar movement was attempted, and the bandit groups actually arrived in the Leon-Chinandega area, but were unable to penetrate to the railroad, and again they were forced to flee to Honduras for refuge. Sandino saw that he could not accomplish his aim, that his forces were becoming depleted through disastrous contact with Guardia patrols, and that the latter were stronger, better equipped and more efficiently led than his groups. He realized by this time that his socialistic dreams were doomed to failure, and, although he continued to maintain that he and his forces would prevent the 1932 elections, he must have known that he could not do so. His efforts throughout the summer and fall were weak and without important result. Determined to make a display of his authority, however, Sandino appointed General Juan Gregorio Colindres, one of his leaders, as President of an autonomous government to have jurisdiction over that part of Nicaragua which Sandino controlled.

The elections were held without incident and Sandino's prestige had dropped to a low ebb. The Guardia was becoming stronger and better trained, whereas his forces were deteriorating, and there was dissension among some of the leaders. It was only a question of time, and probably a short time, when he would have had to flee the country. And so it was not at all surprising, in view of the condition of his forces, and his slight prospect of any sort of success in continuing his campaign, that shortly after the departure of the marines from Nicaragua, Sandino negotiated with the Nicaraguan Government, was permitted to proceed to Managua, and there made certain agreements whereby the members of his "army" were granted amnesty and given government lands in an unsettled section of Nueva Segovia, in return for the deposit of their arms and agreement to discontinue fighting. It was the only course remaining to Sandino whereby his "face" might be saved; this he realized and promptly took advantage of. In spite of all the killing, burning, raping, pillaging, extortion, and other crimes of every description that can be proved to have been committed by his troops, Sandino could still maintain that his actions were directed against the United States Marines, and that upon their withdrawal from the country, he, and his forces, considered their aims to have been accomplished. Yet, the whole history of his actions during the five and a half years that he was in the field after his withdrawal from Moncada's Army near Boaca cannot

fail to demonstrate his arch criminality, publicized in a manner to make him appear to be a patriot and a defender of the national sovereignty rather than the insurgent, bandit-communist that he was. And his submission was an open acknowledgement of the failure of his real purpose—to establish and maintain a communistic brotherhood in control of the Government of Nicaragua.

SECTION 2

OTHER LEADERS

Juan Gregorio Colindres was born at Murra, eastern Nueva Segovia, about 1894. He was a nephew of Juan Colindres, a wealthy property owner. His family possessed a gold mine at San Pedro de Colindres, to which they are said to have moved the mining machinery of Mr. Alexander from Murra when, in 1931, that place was almost completely destroyed by bandits and deserted by the inhabitants. In 1927 Colindres offered protection to bandits in the vicinity of Santa Rosa, and kept them informed of the movements of the marines in that area. Up to March, 1928, when it was broken up, San Pedro de Colindres had been a bandit rendezvous and supply depot. Colindres was a close friend of Sandino and contributed nearly all of his wealth to the "cause." He was of material assistance in procuring supplies in Honduras and arranging for their forwarding to bandit groups in Nicaragua. He was active, intelligent, and courteous. He wore a mustache and beard. Late in 1931, following the death of the principal bandit leader in Nueva Segovia, Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen, Colindres was appointed by Sandino as leader of a large group, many of whom are said to have been Honduranians, and proceeded south with his men to actively participate in the concentration and movements in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega. Enroute he suffered severe losses in both men and supplies during contacts with Northern Area patrols. On January 13, 1932, he was reported to have been suffering with dysentery and to have been undergoing treatment at the San Felipe Hospital, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Following his recovery he remained in Honduras for some time, and in September, made another foray south with a group. He was again hit by Northern Area patrols and lost a very large number of animals and supplies of various kinds. On October 23rd, he was named provisional President of Sandino's autonomous republic as related in the preceding section.

Carlos Salgado was approximately six feet in height, light complexioned, with grey eyes, and was born about 1880 in the Valle Talquesal near Somoto, southwestern Nueva Segovia. He was poorly educated and could scarcely read or write; he was said to have been a barefoot mozo before turning his attention to military affairs, but of late years he wore boots. He has two bullet scars on his left leg between the knee and ankle, a scar on the right hand or wrist, and has no use of the little finger of his right hand. He was formerly very stout, but lost considerable weight during active campaigning. In the 1926–1927 revolution he was a general under Camilo Lopez Irias (senator rom Somoto, 1932) and is said to have quarreled with him over the division of the money received from arms turned in; Salgado claimed that Lopez Irias kept all the money, and became a bitter enemy. He drinks considerably

and is quite reckless when drinking. He had many sympathizers scattered along the Honduran border and in the vicinity of Somoto, and became influential among them in support of Sandino, who appointed him a general and gave him important missions from time to time. He usually operated in southwestern Nueva Segovia, territory with which he was familiar, but in the spring of 1932, was assigned in charge of the main supply camp at Guambuco Mountain, on the Honduran border northwest of Apali. He and his forces were involved in the ambush of Guardia patrols at Las Puertas on April 21st of that year, and in a severe engagement fought a few days later at his camp when an attack was made by a strong guardia patrol from Apali.

Jose Leon Diaz was a Honduranian, born about 1980, of dark complexion, short and heavy set, with a thick neck, black mustache and a loud, course voice. He was very energetic and active when not drinking, but was inclined to drink heavily, and during such periods had difficulty in retaining his followers. He had been an active revolutionist in both Honduras and Nicaragua, and had many friends along the border of the two countries and throughout southwest Nueva Segocia. He was commissioned a general by Sandino and operated extensively, although sporadically. During a large part of the time he had charge of the collection of contributions from sympathizers and of forced collections from others.

Juan Pablo Umanzor was an illiterate Honduranian, born about 1904, and a fugitive from justice in Honduras. He was given charge of a part of the group of Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen after the death of the latter in May, 1931, and operated in the Departments of Nueva Segovia, Esteli, Leon and Chinandega. When not in the field he frequented Las Manos and Danli, Honduras, where Sandinista agents were active. For some time his brother was Comandante de Armas at Las Manos, border town, about fifteen miles due noth of Ocotal, capital city of Nueva Segovia.

Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen was one of the most active and successful of Sandino's leaders. He was born in Ocotal about 1895, and was well-known and very popular with Sandinistas throughout Nueva Segovia. He operated constantly, always seeking contact with Marine and Guardia patrols, and was one of the few leaders of bandits who continued a fight after the first burst of fire, who ambushed patrols successfully, and who made valiant attacks on garrisons. In his third attack on Palacaguina on May 15, 1931, he was mortally wounded, and was buried in the Cuje Mine section, where a Palacaguina patrol discovered, exhumed and identified his body, with the aid of one of his former subjefes who had surrendered after the battle of Palacaguina. Many of his men had followed him simply because he was the leader, and not through loyalty to Sandino or to Sandino's cause, and upon his death presented themselves with their arms, asking for amnesty that was granted them, at various nearby Guardia stations.

Pedro (Pedron) Altamirano was a native of the Department of Jinotega, born about 1870, did not know how to read or write, and was one of the most savage, cruel and sanguinary of Sandino's leaders. He was the father of a large family, but having killed a man while both were working on the roads, and being a fugitive from justice on that account, he turned to banditry. He operated in the Departments of

Jinotega, Esteli, Matagalpa and Northern Bluefields with which he was very familiar, and made one successful, and almost disastrous foray into the Department of Chontales. He avoided contact with patrols unless he had a large and certain advantage over them, and occupied himself to a large extent in looting, burning and killing. Operating in the unexplored jungles of Central Nicaragua he made the utmost use of interior lines threatening one point, and withdrawing he would disappear, with Guardia patrols in full pursuit, into the unexplored fastnesses of Central Nicaragua and reappear suddenly, making a devastating raid at a point far distant from where he was last seen. He dispersed his group widely for the purpose of subsisting it on the country, but seemed always able to concentrate it for a raid or for a fight. When Pedron himself fought he always had his entire group with him and many of the most desperate encounters of the Guardia were contacts with the bandits led by Pedron. His one great weakness as a guerilla leader, common among the bandit chiefs, was that he failed to personally lead his men in action and to push home his attacks. He had the arts of ambush, subsisting on the country, subterfuge, surprise, rapidity and secrecy of movement, down to a fine point and his use of interior lines was masterly.

Pedro Blandon, an important leader, born about 1899, usually operated in the Jinotega Area. He was blind in the left eye and wore dark glasses. Early in 1931, was sent by Sandino to command the groups in the Eastern Area, where he conducted an extensive campaign. During severe fighting in Logtown on April 14th, he was killed.

Pedro Irias, a Honduran, was born about 1894, was short, thin, and quite white. He operated with Pedron in Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, Matagalpa and Chontales; his men were mostly from the Jicaro-Murra-Chipote area and numbered about sixty.

CHAPTER VI

THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT

Section 1—Organization and Personnel

The Quartermaster's Department was established on June 3, 1927, under charge of Major Glenn E. Hayes, G. N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.). On July 19, 1927, Colonel Robert W. Voeth, G. N. (Major, U.S.M.C.), relieved Major Hayes and assumed the duties of the Quartermaster. He was relieved on February 28, 1928, by Captain Eli Savage, G. N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.), who continued in his capacity until April 19, 1930, in the meantime being promoted to the rank of Major, Guardia Nacional and Captain, U. S. Marine Corps. Other officers who served as Quartermaster, Guardia Nacional, were Major Maurice C. Gregory, G. N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.), from May 20, 1930 to May 31, 1931; Major Edward G. Huefe, G. N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.), from May 31, 1931 to April 9, 1932, and Major Leonard E. Rea, G. N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.), from April 10, 1932 to January 2, 1933.

Colonel Cyrus S. Radford, U. S. Marine Corps, was designated as Special Disbursing and Purchasing Agent for the Guardia in the United States.

The Quartermaster was assisted by a staff of Lieutenants, one of whom was a Quartermaster Clerk in the Marine Corps, and the balance enlisted men of the Marine Corps, the number varying from time to time with changes in the organization and necessities of the department. Most of these officers had had previous experience in the work of the Quartermaster's Department in the Marine Corps.

Early in 1928, the administration of the office was organized as follows:

A. DISBURSING DIVISION.

1. *Voucher Section.*—The preparation of all vouchers for payment by the Paymaster, Guardia Nacional, for obligations contracted by the Quartermaster and the several units attached to the General Headquarters at Managua; this includes the preparation of payrolls of civilian employees on duty at General Headquarters; the auditing of vouchers submitted by the Division Commanders for credit to their accounts; maintaining records of the Quartermaster Department monetary obligations.

2. *Purchase Section.*—The procurement of clothing and property, either by local purchase or by requisition on the Philadelphia Purchasing Agent; the procurement of subsistence stores for the several units comprising the General Headquarters, exclusive of the National Penitentiary.

3. *Subsistence Section.*—The proper accountability of monetary allowances authorized for the furnishing of rations to the enlisted personnel of the Guardia; the proper accountability of rations purchased by the Purchase Section for the several units of the General Headquarters, exlcusive of the National Penitentiary.

4. *Canteen Section.*—The maintenance of the "Guardia Cantina" at General Headquarters, with a view to furnishing to the enlisted personnel of the entire Guardia establishment, essential canteen articles necessary to their health and comfort, at the least possible cost.

5. *Transportation Section.*—The maintenance, upkeep and repairs to Guardia Nacional motor vehicles, and records pertaining thereto; the procurement of water and land transportation incidental to troop movements and to officers travelling on official business without troops, and records pertaining thereto.

6. *Public Works Section.*—The maintenance and alteration of buildings, upkeep of grounds, sewerage systems, and electrical and telephone systems, of, or pertaining to, those buildings comprising the General Headquarters and the several units centered in Managua.

B. PROPERTY ACCOUNTING DIVISION.

1. *Property Section.*—Maintaining property accountability with all separate units of the Guardia for all property received by local purchase of shipments of property received from the Purchasing Agent in the United States.

2. *Clothing Section.*—Maintaining proper accountability for all clothing received by local purchase, or from other sources. Maintaining proper records incident to the issue of clothing to enlisted personnel.

3. *Receiving and Forwarding Section.*—The proper receipt, storage and shipment of supplies at the Quartermaster storerooms; in coöperation with the Disbursing Division, particular attention was given to the prevention of the accumulation of supplies at posts beyond actual needs due to over-requisition.

4. *Animal Section.*—The maintenance of the corral at General Headquarters, the care of the animals therein, the reconditioning of animals when practicable, and the maintenance of records in connection with the animals of the entire Guardia.

In April, 1929, a Depot of Supplies was organized under a Depot Quartermaster. This office became accountable for all property in store in the Depot and in use at Guardia Headquarters, and had charge of the receipt of all supplies, their shipment to the outlying stations upon requisition, and the issue to organizations in the vicinity of the Headquarters. He also assumed charge of the Armory and of all labor in connection with the upkeep and maintenance at the Headquarters, including the Camp de Marte. Early in 1930 an Armorer's School was established under the direction of the Depot Quartermaster, wherein selected enlisted men were given a course of instruction in the maintenance and repair of all types of weapons in use in the Guardia. The officer detailed as Armorer also was given charge of the maintenance and operation of the Guardia telephone system, and the maintenance and repair of all electrical wiring within the Guardia buildings in the Camp de Marte.

The office of the Quartermaster was reorganized into two sections in April, 1929:

A. PURCHASING.

1. Procurement of clothing, equipment and other supplies, and all services.
2. Allotment of funds to organizations for maintenance.
3. Preparation of requisitions for funds.
4. Vouchering and paperwork.
5. Issue of transportation and supervision of, for the entire Guardia.
6. Vouchering of transportation bills.

B. AUDITING.

1. Property and clothing accounts of all accountable officers.
2. Duplicate property and clothing accounts, and duplicate clothing records of all enlisted men.
3. Ration and forage returns.
4. Paper work in connection with the foregoing.

On May 1, 1930, the Commanding Officer, National Penitentiary, took over from the Quartermaster's Office the carpenter, plumbing, and paint shops, absorbing all expenses incurred in their operation. He furnished all labor and materials necessary for the upkeep and repair of the buildings and grounds of the Camp de Marte (Guardia Section), charging actual cost, plus ten percent, for the performance thereof. Control of expenditures was kept in the Quartermaster's Office by having all work done on job orders issued by that office. A monthly settlement was made through an exchange of authorized allotment of funds.

On June 1, 1930, the corral adjacent to the Campo de Marte was transferred from the Quartermaster to the Commanding Officer, National Penitentiary, who assumed charge of the feeding of the animals, the maintenance of animals and equipment, and the providing of veterinary service.

Early in 1931 the Depot Quartermaster took over from the Commanding Officer, National Penitentiary, the manufacture of all uniforms for the Guardia, and also the operation of the carpenter shop. Following the earthquake on March 31, 1931, and the destruction of the National Penitentiary, all other activities which had heretofore been turned over by the Quartermaster to the Commanding Officer, National Penitentiary, were again brought under the Quartermaster's Office. By 1932, these had been placed under the charge of the Depot Quartermaster.

Section 2—Accountability, Clothing and Property

At first, all Division (later called "Department") Commanders were accountable to the Quartermaster for all Guardia property, including items purchased by them as well as articles furnished by the Quartermaster. Property in use at Headquarters, Guardia Nacional, was issued on memorandum receipts held in the office of the Quartermaster.

When the Depot of Supplies was established in 1929, the Depot Quartermaster became accountable for property in use at Headquarters.

During the spring of 1929, the Northern, Central, Western, and Eastern Areas were organized and Area Quartermasters appointed. The latter became the accountable officer for all property in use and store within their respective area. It was found, however, due to the location of certain departments and the presence, or lack, of suitable regular transportation facilities, that it was more economical and productive of efficient results to change the system of accountability. Accordingly, the Area Quartermaster, Northern Area, was made accountable only for the property in use and store in the Department of Nueva Segovia, and the Department Commander, Esteli, was made an accountable officer; the reason being that plane transportation facilities were available at Esteli as well as at Ocotal, and Esteli was only about one half the distance between Managua and Ocotal, on the direct route. The lack of a suitable landing field for transport planes at Jinotega, and the fact that truck transportation was possible throughout most of the year between Managua and Matagalpa, caused the designation of the Department Commander, Matagalpa, as an accountable officer, in addition to the Central Area Quartermaster, who became accountable only for the property in use and store in the Department of Jinotega. In the Western Area, Leon and Chinandega had equal railroad facilities, hence the separation of accountability from the Area Quartermaster on May 3, 1930, thereby eliminating double handling and paperwork, and saving time. In the Eastern Area an accountable officer was named for the Department of Northern Bluefields in addition to the Area Quartermaster, who was accountable only for the property in use and store in the Department of Southern Bluefields.

The system of accountability employed was identical with that in use in the U. S. Marine Corps, and the same blank forms were used, with the exception that the headings and instructions were printed in Spanish, being translations of the English appearing on the Marine Corps forms. Items of clothing and property were carried under both their Spanish and English names, and semi-annual returns were similarly prepared.

Section 3—Initial Supply

When the Guardia was organized on May 12, 1927, there were practically no materials or supplies on hand with the exception of ordnance.

The U. S. Marine Corps authorized the sale of clothing, equipment, and other supplies required for the Guardia for the immediate needs in outfitting and equipping the recruits, and this assistance was taken advantage of. This policy was continued until January 1, 1928, when the Marine Corps discontinued furnishing supplies as required and stated the policy of furnishing only technical military material.

Such materials as were available, and suitable, were pur hased in local markets. This practice, as well as the manufacture of articles from materials obtained locally, was continued throughout the period of connection of U. S. Marine Corps officers with the Guardia, with a view to the furtherance of business and employment conditions within the country.

Inventories of ordnance materials taken in July, 1927, developed that the amount was sufficient for the initial needs of several thousand men. This, however, did not include an adequate supply of automatic weapons or ammunition, which had to be procured.

Section 4—Uniforms and Clothing

During the latter part of 1927, looking to the eventual manufacture of clothing items locally, various foreign firms were asked to furnish samples and prices of uniform materials. By the spring of 1928, shirts, trousers and field scarfs were being manufactured at the National Penitentiary, employing prison labor, the materials being purchased abroad more economically than they could be obtained locally. Such items as socks, underwear, leggings and hats were purchased abroad at a saving over local prices.

General orders laid stress on the close supervision of issues, the care of clothing by responsible officers, and the education of the enlisted men in the care of the clothing issued to them, as means of keeping the total cost of clothing items at a minimum.

Commencing in 1930, it was found that due to the worldwide economic depression, the prices paid for items of clothing were lower than theretofore had been the case.

Considerable quantities of shoes manufactured in various parts of Nicaragua were purchased and issued in 1930 and succeeding years. At Jinotega, shoes were obtained at a very low figure, in sufficient quantity to care for the needs of the Central Area; likewise, in Esteli, for that Department, thus creating an additional saving on the cost of transportation necessary if furnished from Managua. At Granada, they were obtained at a reasonable figure, and were utilized in that department and in the Department of Rivas. Large amounts were purchased from Managua manufacturers with which to supply the balance of the Guardia.

Tests were conducted during 1930, 1931, and 1932, to ascertain the relative wearing qualities of the various shoes obtained locally and those secured in the United States, and to determine the most economical, and satisfactory, shoe for routine procurement. It was found that the initial cost of a pair of Nicaraguan made shoes was much less (sometimes fifty percent less) than the cost of shoes manufactured in the United States. But the arduous service of the Guardia, especially in the "hill" departments, with their long marches over stony, mountainous country, through rivers and swampy land, played havoc with the native-made shoe, which was poorly constructed and of improperly cured leather. It was found, that under these conditions, a pair of Nicaraguan made shoes lasted only a month or less, and brought on much foot trouble, whereas the United States manufactured shoes would give satisfactory service for three or more months, and at the same time fit better, be more comfortable to the user, and make a much neater appearance when used in cities and towns for garrison duty. Accordingly, in 1932, a contract was made, through the Purchasing Agent in Philadelphia, with the Herman Shoe Company, to supply shoes at a cost but slightly more than the price paid in Managua, but which would outwear several pairs of the local item.

The Depot Quartermaster carried on the manufacture of shirts, trousers and field scarfs during 1931 and 1932, employing female labor to advantage. Another factor in the low cost of these items was the extensive decline of the value of the English pound in relation to dollars and cordobas, which made it possible to obtain the best grade of English khaki as low as slightly less than $0.11 a yard, C.I.F. Corinto, compared with a price of approximately $0.19 a yard when sterling was at par.

Section 5—Arms and Equipment

Due to the fact that a large supply of Springfield, Model 1898, Krag Rifles were on hand when the Guardia was organized, having been turned in to the Government by the revolutionary armies in 1927, this weapon was adopted for use by the Guardia. During succeeding years, large quantities of spare parts were purchased to maintain these rifles in serviceable condition.

A certain number of heavy Browning machine guns were also on hand, and more were purchased, as well as a considerable number of Browning Automatic Rifles, Lewis and Thompson Sub-Machine Guns. Due to intense bandit activity, necessitating constant operations against them, during which over five hundred major contacts were participated in, procurement of ammunition was a matter of constant and compelling necessity. Likewise, an adequate supply of grenades, hand and rifle, were required and obtained.

All ordnance items were procured in the United States, or by purchase from the U. S. Marine Corps.

Section 6—Remounts and Forage

In all departments, and at all stations, animal transportation was essential for the proper patrolling of the departments. In some cases, all-mounted patrols were utilized; in the majority of cases part-mounted and part on foot, and in some cases extensive operations were conducted by foot patrols, but utilizing animals for the transportation of necessary food, medical, ammunition and other supplies.

To meet those conditions large numbers of horses and mules were purchased locally in all sections of the country. Animals captured from bandit groups were also utilized and became Guardia (government) property.

Considerable saddle equipment, both pack and riding, was obtained from the U. S. Marine Corps; some was obtained through capture from bandit groups, and some other amounts were purchased locally, especially during the early period of the Guardia. Later expenditures were largely confined to the repair of existing supplies rather than their replacement.

Animals carried on property accounts that died, or became unserviceable for any reason, were surveyed in the usual manner.

The allowance for forage rations per animal was at first set at $0.20 daily, but ordinarily this amount was not necessary, especially in outlying districts, and the utilization of pasturage at low rates, sometimes free, and timely purchase of feedstuffs when prices were low, made it possible to reduce the allowance to $0.08 per animal daily, which was

done. Even at this rate a saving was effected, taking the Guardia as a whole.

Section 7—Motor Vehicles

In 1928 purchases of motor vehicles were made as follows:

8 Ford touring cars
3 Ford trucks
7 Dodge trucks

This transportation was required for use in Managua, Leon, Granada and Jinotepe, a touring car and Dodge truck being assigned to Leon and Granada, a touring car to Jinotepe, and the balance to Managua. A pool of touring cars was maintained at Guardia Headquarters, under the supervision of the Quartermaster, for the use of the staff officers on official business, when making calls at government offices, inspections, etc., and the truck pool for the handling of freight. The Police Department of Managua utilized a touring car for rapid transportation and for the official use of the Chief of Police, and a truck fitted up to serve as a patrol wagon and for emergency transporting of members of the police force. A touring car was employed in a daily police patrol through the coffee growing sections of the highlands south of Managua. Trucks were utilized in the transportation of troops and supplies between Managua and Matagalpa in the Central Area to advantage, although this was not practicable at times during the rainy season.

By the end of 1930 it was found that additional truck transportation was needed, and it was considered that the trucks in use between Managua and Matagalpa were too light and unsuited for constant road use, which extended at times as far north as Jinotega, as well as to Sebaco, Esteli and Matagalpa.

Accordingly, the following additional motor vehicles were purchased during 1931:

1 General Motors, 5½ ton truck
1 Ford Stake Body, 1½ ton truck
1 Ford, pickup body truck
1 Ford Station Wagon (for police use).

Some spare parts were purchased for the upkeep of the motor transportation purchased in 1928, but the general policy was to place out of commission the oldest car or truck when its further repair became uneconomical, strip it, and use the dissembled parts for the maintenance of the remaining vehicles of the same type.

Extraordinarily heavy service was performed by all Guardia motor vehicles immediately after the earthquake in Managua on March 31, 1931. It was imperative that all available transportation be mobilized to assist in the general effort toward the alleviation of suffering in the city. To this end all automobiles and trucks were constantly in service, and very little opportunity, if any, presented itself for the overhaul of the vehicles. This situation naturally caused a more rapid deterioration of parts, as the result of abnormal wear and tear, than would have obtained under normal conditions.

Section 8—Transportation, Troops and Supplies

In addition to the animal and motor transportation previously described, troops were moved by rail, water and air. Supplies were moved by all of the foregoing means, and also by bull cart, the latter being slow and relatively expensive for long hauls, such as between Leon and Ocotal, where the rate charged was an average of $0.02 per pound in dry weather, and double that amount during the rainy season, when possible to get through at all.

Supplies from the United States arrived by commercial steamers at Corinto on the west coast or at Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas on the east coast, and by U. S. Naval transport at Corinto.

From Corinto the Ferrocarril del Pacifico de Nicaragua passed through Chinandega and Leon to the capital, Managua; thence to Granada via Masaya. A branch line from the latter city led to Jinotepe and Diriamba. Daily, or twice-daily, schedules made the transportation of troops and supplies an easy matter. Tickets were furnished, and shipments made, on transportation requests and shipping orders issued by the Quartermaster or Department Commanders.

Railway service between Leon and El Sauce, the principal town of northern Leon, was not available during the period of service of the Marine Corps officers with the Guardia, but was inaugurated on December 29, 1932. A line was also completed between San Jorge and San Juan del Sur in the Department of Rivas.

At Granada, which lies on the northwestern shore of Lake Nicaragua (102 miles long), a sea-going vessel, caught in the lake when an earthquake destroyed the exit channel via the San Juan River many years before, gave steamer service between Granada and San Jorge, the port of Rivas, and to San Carlos in southern Chontales. From San Carlos small gasolene launches carried passengers and freight via the San Juan River to San Juan del Norte (Greytown) and Bluefields. By this route supplies shipped from Managua to Bluefields, and troops, were carried. The principal item so shipped was rice, which was grown in western Nicaragua, and even plus the transportation charges, was available at a cheaper price than the rice otherwise obtainable in Bluefields. Travel from Granada to Juigalpa, in northern Chontales, was by sailing vessel and lake steamer through the port of Puerto Diaz.

The U. S. Marine Corps aviation service was of the utmost importance and inestimable value to the Guardia, especially after the evacuation of the Marines from the Northern and Central Areas. Without this assistance the transportation of the troops and supplies could not have been so efficiently or expeditiously handled. Landing fields previously in use by the Marine Corps were utilized, and others were constructed in various localities where terrain features permitted.

During the period of intensest bandit activity in the fall of 1931, when the bandits made their major attempt to capture important towns of the Departments of Leon and Chinandega, and to cut the lines of communication by holding the railroad, several large troop movements were made by plane. Reconnaissance missions, evaucation of sick and wounded, and liaison with ground forces were constant and invaluable duties performed by the Marine Corps pilots in connection with the Guardia mission, and materially aided in many successful operations.

For example during the fiscal year 1932, the Aircraft Squadrons made 6316 flights, flew 7193.70 hours, carried 666,454 pounds of freight, carried 4532 passengers and transported $313,717,75. While these figures include services rendered to the Second Marine Brigade and the Electoral Mission, the great majority of them were for the Guardia.

Section 9—Rent, Repairs and Construction of Barracks

In most places Guardia barracks were located in Government or municipal buildings at no rental cost, although in some instances municipal authorities required the payment of rent. In Granada and at San Carlos, previously constructed government forts were utilized. "La Polvora" at Granada, was developed, through alteration, into a most desirable and attractive barracks.

Where no such buildings were available, leases were entered into with civilian owners of suitable structures.

In some parts of the country, especially in the bandit infested sections, where towns were small and suitable buildings were not available, barrack were constructed, employing Guardia, prisoner and volunteer civilian labor and local materials, at surprisingly low cost to the Guardia. For example, the fort, with adequate enclosed structures, developed at Santa Maria in Nueva Segovia, was built at a cost of less than a hundred dollars. And the adobe block barracks and four story adobe block machine-gun tower constructed at Macuelizo in the same department, cost approximately fifty dollars. Both were constructed at such low cost through the ingenuity of the Lieutenants (Marine Corps enlisted men) in command at those places.

The construction of defensive works around barracks and in towns, was essential in the Northern and Central Areas, and in parts of the Eastern and Western Areas. These consisted usually of walls, composed of adobe blocks, or rock, or of double layers of timber, the space between the two layers being filled with earth or sand. Strong points and positions for machine guns, automatic weapons and rifle grenadiers, were especially constructed, as well as towers of various types and sizes, offering both a vantage point for firing on roads, trails and open spaces, and shelter for the defenders. In most places the defensive works were placed in front and rear of the barracks, but in other localities, depending upon the terrain and isolation, the works completely surrounded the interior buildings, or building, such, for example, as the fort at Santa Maria previously referred to, and the stockade developed at Apali in the Northern Area.

Section 10—Rations

The value of the ration was first fixed at $0.30 daily, with a higher allowance authorized for some stations. However, as prices of foodstuffs receded, it was found that food of good quality, and sufficient as to quantity, could be provided at a lower rate, and in 1929, it was reduced to $0.25 daily, and in 1930 to $0.20. Even at this figure a saving was effected.

No difficulties were met with the purchase of components of the ration in cities; in the smaller places, and isolated stations, the matter of transportation of food supplies was a constant burden on both men

and animals, especially in the rainy season. The dry winter of 1930, July to November of that year, caused a serious shortage of corn, beans and rice grown locally, and as a result, during 1931 until the new crops were harvested, prices were very high, and the items became so scarce that the American Red Cross was obliged to come to the relief of the population by shipping grain to various parts of the country. The effect of this situation on the Guardia ration was to raise the average cost of the ration, and to lessen the variety of food available for the men.

It was thought at first that it might be possible to diversify the ration by the introduction of some articles of foreign origin, but this was found not to be feasible, due to the cost of such items and the fact that the enlisted men were not accustomed to such things and preferred the customary diet of the native Nicaraguans of their class.

In some instances, consolidated procurement of food supplies was attempted, in order to gain the benefit of the cheapest prices. But in the main this was not done due to the fact that owing to the Nicaraguan custom of hand-to-mouth purchase of only the day's necessities, large sources of supply of even staple items were not available, and also on account of the transportation charges, and other difficulties. Purchases were made individually, therefore; locally or in nearby districts, by all station commanders, and subsistence stores were not carried in stock for general distribution at the Depot of Supplies.

Section 11—Turnover to Nicaraguan Officers

For the purpose of training, and looking forward to the imminent turn-over of the Guardia to Nicaraguan officers, on June 1, 1932, a Nicaraguan officer was detailed by each organization commander having a Department Quartermaster, to duty under instruction in that office. In practically all cases these officers showed an interest in the work and a certain amount of ability and capacity to assume the duties involved. Reports on their progress were required to be made to the Chief of the Guardia from time to time.

On October 1, 1932, all Nicaraguan Government property in the hands of North American officers was turned over to these Nicaraguan officers, who became accountable therefor. Thereafter, the receipt, care, issue and shipment of property, and all paperwork in connection therewith, was handled by them under the direct supervision of the former. This supervision and instruction was carried up on to the time of the evacuation of all Marine Corps officers and enlisted men from the respective departments. The training and experience thus provided the Nicaraguan officers, and the existence of competent, trained enlisted personnel in all offices, gave promise that the work of the Quartermaster's Department would continue to go on properly and in substantially the same manner as theretofore.

CHAPTER VII

THE PAYMASTER'S DEPARTMENT

Section 1—Organization and Personnel

The Paymaster's Department was organized by Major Leon L. Dye, G. N. (Captain, U. S. Marine Corps), on September 1, 1927. In addition to himself, the personnel consisted of a Marine Corps Pay Clerk, with the rank of Lieutenant, Guardia Nacional, and a civilian clerk-interpreter.

Prior to that date the funds for the pay and maintenance of the Guardia had been disbursed and accounted for by the Quartermaster of the Guardia, who from June 3 to July 19, 1927, was Major Glenn E. Hayes, G. N. (Captain, U.S. Marine Corps), and from July 19 to August 31, 1927, Colonel Robert W. Voeth, G.N. (Major, U.S. Marine Corps).

Major Dye continued as the Paymaster until June 1, 1930, when he was relieved by Major William J. Livingston, G.N. (Captain, U. S. Marine Corps). Major Carl S. Schmidt, G.N. (Captain, U. S. Marine Corps), relieved Major Livingston on May 1, 1932, and performed the duties of the Paymaster, G.N., until December 1, 1932, when, preparatory to the evacuation of Nicaragua by all Marine Corps forces, a Nicaraguan officer assumed the office of Paymaster, under the supervision and instruction of Major Schmidt.

The Paymaster, Guardia Nacional, was also an Assistant Paymaster, U. S. Marine Corps, and as such, carried the accounts of officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps and Navy serving with the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, and, from his disbursing account, made the usual settlements of their pay and allowances, and performed the necessary paperwork in connection therewith, the registration of allotments, etc.

Section 2—Funds, Sources of

The funds provided for the expenses of the Guardia during 1927, and the first three months of 1928, were procured from:

(a) Budget appropriations for the Guardia Nacional; one half turned over semi-annually in January and July.

(b) Budget items appropriated for the Departments of War and Marine, covering certain officers and employees whose positions were suppressed, or extinguished; budget items appropriated for the Department of Police in the cities and towns where these activities had been taken over by the Guardia Nacional; items appropriated for the Department of Justice and for expenses of the National Penitentiary. Corresponding credit for all of these items was made to the Guardia Nacional account monthly, as it accrued.

(c) Sales of condemned Guardia property and sales of equipment, etc., to officers.

(d) Reimbursement from the Department of Justice for rations furnished by the Guardia to permanent prisoners incarcerated in the prisons and penitentiaries taken over by the Guardia.

The funds provided from April 1, 1928 to October 1, 1931, were procured from:

(a) Government loan by the National Bank, April, 1928.

(b) Special taxes, May and June, 1928.
(c) Suppressions from budget items appropriated for other Departments of the Government.
(d) Transfers from the Superavit; up to July 1, 1930, usually made quarterly, thereafter monthly.
(e) Reimbursement for rations of permanent prisoners as previously described.
(f) Sales, transfers, refunds, collections and adjustments.

The funds provided from October 1, 1931 to December 1, 1932, were procured from:

(a) Same sources as for the period April 1, 1928 to October 1, 1931, excepting items (a) and (b).
(b) Interest on deposits, Philadelphia account.
(c) Commercial firms for maintenance of extra guards.

Section 3—Funds, by Whom Disbursed

Payments of troops in Managua, and of dealers for supplies purchased by the Quartermaster in Managua, were effected by the Paymaster personally, or by his deputy.

To secure prompt payment for supplies purchased in the United States by the Purchasing Agent, who was appointed to facilitate the procurement of items not obtainable locally, and to secure the advantage of discounts, an advance of funds was made to this officer by the Paymaster, from time to time as needed. In the disbursement of such funds he acted as an agent for the Paymaster, and accounted for the funds monthly.

Funds for the payment of troops outside of Managua, and for the maintenance of all organizations, including those in Managua, were furnished by the Paymaster to Area Quartermasters, or Department or such other organization commanders, who disbursed the funds as agents of the Paymaster.

Section 4—Funds, Methods of Supplying

Funds for the maintenance and pay of outlying stations were provided by the Paymaster in various ways, depending upon the location of the station and banking and communication facilities.

In the cases of the Departments of Chinandega, Leon, Managua, and Carazo, and Granada and Masaya, checks were furnsihed to the Department (at first called "Division") Commander, who cashed them at the local banks; the Department Commander, Chinandega, cashed his checks in Leon, making a special monthly trip for this purpose.

Due to the uncertain, unsafe and, sometimes, infrequent transportation facilities to Rivas and Matagalpa, and the fact that banks are located in the capital city of each of these departments, arrangements were made whereby telegraphic transfer of funds was made from he Banco Nacional in Managua to the local bank, for the credit of the Department Commander. For the Department of Southern Bluefields, a similar transfer of funds was made by means of radio.

Cash was sent by U. S. Marine Corps planes to the Departments of Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, Esteli, Chontales and Northern Bluefields.

The Disbursing and Purchasing Agent in Philadelphia was furnished U. S. Treasury Checks procured in exchange for cash.

In Managua both checks and cash were provided.

Section 5—Payrolls

Payrolls (a combined pay and muster roll) were submitted to the Paymaster by the respective organization commanders in time to be audited and returned with the requisite funds about the first day of each month.

Officer's accounts were carried on the payroll, and their signatures constituted a receipt for the payment to them of the amounts credited; no separate pay voucher was used. Enlisted men, in addition to signing their names if they could do so, placed a thumbprint alongside. This was made necessary by the fact that large numbers of the men were unable to sign their names and, instead, placed a cross or other mark on the roll, witnessed by an officer, which was a further protection against payment of the wrong person, necessitated by the frequent similarity of and complete duplication of names, and the usual unfamiliarity of new officers with the prevailing system of double surnames among Latin-American people.

Excepting in the Northern and Central Areas, payroll payments were usually made by the Department Commanders in person. In the two areas mentioned, however, due to the ize of the command and scattered location of stations, this was not practicable, and the payments were usually made by the various station commanders. In the Central Area pay and maintenance funds were usually forwarded by patrols, the sheets of the payrolls being prepared separately for each station, so that they could be detached from the entire roll, and only the sheets pertaining to a particular station being forwarded to it. In the Northern Area most of these station rolls and funds were made up into packages, together with the monthly allotment of maintenance funds, and dropped to individual stations from the Marine Corps observation planes which made weekly patrols covering all stations of the area. During the several years that this practice was carried out, the only loss that occured out of the many thousands of dollars so dropped, was a very small one at several stations on the same day, when the fact that paper currency was not available and that pay and maintenance funds were paid in silver caused several of the heavy packages to be broken in the drop and the contents scattered in the tall grass and brush. The loss was less than ten dollars for all stations.

Section 6—Pay, Rates of

Up to December 31, 1927, the officers and enlisted men of the Guardia were paid under a temporary decree, or agreement, of the President of Nicaragua, dated June 18, 1927. The rates of pay under this temporary agreement were as follows:

OFFICERS

Jefe Director	$250.00	per month
Assistant Jefe Director	200.00	" "
Paymaster and Quartermaster	200.00	" "
Medical Director	200.00	" "
Department Inspector	150.00	" "
Medical Inspector	150.00	" "
District Commander	150.00	" "
Sub-district commander, 1st Class	100.00	" "
Sub-district commander, 2nd Class	60.00	" "

ENLISTED MEN:

First Sergeants	18.00	" "
Sergeants	16.00	" "
Corporals	14.00	" "
Privates	12.00	" "

Under a new agreement between the United States and the Government of Nicaragua, signed by the Nicaraguan Government on December 27, 1927, the rates of pay of officers and enlisted men of the Guardia were fixed as follows:

OFFICERS:

Brigadier-General (Jefe Director)	3000.00	per annum
Colonel (Chief of Staff)	2500.00	" "
Colonel (Line and Staff)	2400.00	" "
Major (Line and Staff)	2100.00	" "
Captain (Line and Staff)	1800.00	" "
First Lieutenant (Line and Staff)	1200.00	" "
Second Lieutenant (Line and Staff)	900.00	" "
Student Officers (Line and Staff)	600.00	" "

ENLISTED MEN, Line and Staff:

Sergeant-Major	$40.00	per month
First Sergeant	35.00	" "
Quartermaster Sergeant	30.00	" "
Sergeant	25.00	" "
Corporal	18.00	" "
Field Musician	14.00	" "
Private	12.00	" "

PAY OF THE BAND

Leader	$1200.00	per annum
Assistant Leader	900.00	" "
Musician, 1st Class	30.00	" month
Musician, 2nd Class	25.00	" "
Musician, 3rd Class	20.00	" "

New rates of pay were made effective May 1, 1931, for those officers joining the Guardia on or after that date, or who were promoted subsequent to that date, as follows:

OFFICERS:

Jefe Director	$3000.00	per	annum
Chief of Staff and Colonel	2100.00	"	"
Major	1800.00	"	"
Captain	1500.00	"	"
First Lieutenant	1000.00	"	"
Second Lieutenant (Permanent)	900.00	"	"
Second Lieutenant (Temporary)	600.00	"	"
Acting officers (all grades)	No pay		

Section 7—Maintenance Funds.

Maintenance funds were advanced by the Paymaster about the first of each month, according to the various titles and sub-titles under which their expenditure was authorized, on approved requisitions submitted by the respective Area Quartermasters or Department or other organization commanders. Decision as to the approval, or reduction, or requisitions as submitted, rested with the Quartermaster, under the direct supervision of the Jefe Director.

Vouchers itemizing the services or supplies procured, and giving receipt for their payment, were prepared by the disbursing agent, and submitted monthly to the Paymaster, together with a list of such expenditures by name, amount, date and voucher number, and a grand total thereof, and an Account Current, showing receipts, expenditures, and obligated and unobligated balances. These were audited by the Paymaster without delay and any differences reported by letter to the disbursing agent.

Each disbursing agent maintained a set of books, including a cash book and ledger accounts under the various titles and sub-titles, and kept a copy of all debit and credit vouchers to support the entries made therein. These accounts were audited from time to time by Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, Inspectors and others authorized to do so by proper authority. The Paymaster's monthly report of audit, however, gave the disbursing agent a check on the current status of his accounts regularly, and was, therefore, of great value.

Books were generally kept in the English language until the appearance of Nicaraguan officers in the Guardia made it desirable, for instructional purposes, to change to Spanish. Vouchers were at first drawn up in English, but as they were audited by the Nicaraguan Treasury Department officials, it was soon found that it was essential to have them written in Spanish. Accordingly, this was required of all disbursing agents early in 1928, and continued to be required thereafter.

Section 8—Miscellaneous Activities.

Pursuant to a general order of Headquarters, a Benefit fund was created, and commencing on the first of the following month the accounts of all the officers and enlisted men were debited the amount of ten cents monthly, the total amount so collected being credited to the Benefit Fund. Designated beneficiaries of deceased officers and enlisted men were paid the sum of twenty-five dollars of this fund. On January 1, 1930, this payment was increased to forty dollars, non-retroactie.

In addition to the usual and customary duties of his office, the Guardia Paymaster was required to handle a number of special accounts, and to receive and disburse funds in connection therewith. These included:

(a) Decorations incident to the entertainment of the North American aviator, Charles A. Lindbergh.
(b) Inaugural ceremonies and ball, January 1, 1929.
(c) Second Anniversary party at Tipitapa, May, 1929.
(d) Voluntarios, pay and maintenance.
(e) Contraband collections and payments to enlisted men.
(f) Auxiliares, pay and maintenance.

Section 9—Inspection of Paymaster's Accounts

The accounts of the Paymaster were inspected and audited from time to time by the Brigade Paymaster, Second Marine Brigade, and by Brigadier General George Richards, U. S. Marine Corps, Paymaster of the Marine Corps.

Section 10—Summary

During each year, despite occassional shortage of funds and frequent difficulty met with in the procurement of funds from the Nicaraguan Government, all payments to troops and to dealers for supplies furnished the Guardia, were made promptly and in full.

On December 1, 1932, all funds, accounts and records of the Paymaster's Department were turned over by Major Schmidt, Paymaster, to the Nicaraguan officer detailed as Paymaster, in such condition that a continuation of the established policies and methods of disbursing and accounting for the public funds allotted by the Nicaraguan Government for the pay and maintenance of the Guardia, may be reasonably be expected.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LAW DEPARTMENT

The head of the Law Department was designated as the Law Officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. He was in fact also Public Relations Officer. The functions of the Law Department embraced the following duties:

(1) The conduct of all investigations arising from complaints received from government officials and civilians.

(2) The investigation of the cases and records of prisoners held to the order of the Jefe Director.

(3) The review and filing of all records of proceedings of courts-martial, extraordinary courts-martial, courts of inquiry, boards of investigation and other boards.

(4) The preparation of precepts for courts-martial, courts of inquiry, boards of investigation and other boards convened by the Jefe Director.

(5) The preparation and publication of the necessary court-martial instructions.

(6) The preparation of opinions on points of Nicaraguan law arising throughout the Guardia.

(7) Preparation of legal forms for use in the Guardia; contracts; enlistments contracts for Guardias, Guardias Municipales, Auxiliares, Civicos en Finca, Civicos; contract forms for contract surgeons, etc.

(8) The perusal of all Nicaraguan newspapers and preparation of a synopsis of all items of interest to, or involving, the Guardia.

(9) The study of all governmental decrees and the publication of such as applied to or effected the Guardia and the preparation of the necessary instructions as to their execution by the Guardia.

(10) The enforcement of the arms law and the issue of arms permits.

(11) The preparation of proposed legislation.

(12) During the electoral period when the possession and the control over the sale, transportation and traffic of aguardiente passed to the Guardia Nacional, the Law Department was charged with the preparation of all orders and instructions for the Guardia service and the investigation of all complaints in connection with the Guardia control of aguardiente.

(13) The preparation of orders defining and carrying out the electoral mission of the Guardia Nacional.

(14) The collection and submission of monthly reports of the seizure of contraband to the Director General de Rentas from all departments.

(15) The collection and submission of reports of fines awarded by judicial tribunals for violations penal code and of police and sanitary regulations throughout the Republic to the Supreme Court of Justice.

(16) The collection and preparation of reports of arms confiscated.

(17) The investigation and submission of report and recommendation for disciplinary action in the case of offenses committed by the U. S. Naval and Marine Corps personnel serving with the Guardia.

CHAPTER IX

THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1—Organization and Personnel

From May 12, 1927, date or organization of the Guardia, until October of the same year, one U. S. Naval Medical officer, and two pharmacists mates, U. S. Navy, were assigned to duty with the Guardia, and conducted the medical activities during that time. The officer, Lieutenant John B. O'Neil, (M.C.) U. S. Navy, also participated in field service and was highly commended for bravery in action.

On October 8, 1927, Colonel J. B. Helm, (MC), G.N., (Commander, MC., U. S. Navy) was detailed as Medical Director, and proceeded at once to organize the Medical Department.

Doctor P. J. Cerna of Managua, a Nicaraguan physician and graduate of Georgetown University, who had spent seven years in the United States, was employed from the outset as a contract surgeon, and made the physical examinations of all applicants for enlistment, vaccination, anti-typhoid innoculation and blood-testing of recruits, did other professional work, and also interpreting, translating and instructing in Spanish and English.

Four enlistments for duty as hospital corpsmen were made in June, 1927, the men having had experience as such in the old Guardia.

During the latter part of 1927, three additional medical officers, one Chief Pharmacist, and seventeen chief pharmacists mates and pharmacists mates first class, medical corps, U. S. Navy, were assigned to duty with the Guardia.

Activities of the Medical Department were established as follows:

(a) An administration office at Guardia Headquarters, Managua, where medical regulations and instructions were prepared, medical reports received, compiled and analyzed. A complete Manual for the Medical Department was prepared, translated into Spanish and distributed.

(b) A medical supply depot, to procure and distribute medical supplies and equipment. Medical officers in outlying organizations made requisition on the depot for their requirements.

(c) Training School for medical officers—giving a course of special training lasting several weeks, during which particular attention was paid to the policies of the medical department and the special conditions of this service in the Guardia.

(d) Training School for hospital corpsmen. On December 6, 1927, the Jefe Director authorized the establishment of a Hospital Corps to consist of enlisted men who were then serving as hospital corpsmen, men undergoing training for this detail, and such others who might be enlisted for this purpose, or who might transfer from line duties, from time to time. By October 1, 1928, twenty-nine men had completed the three months course, and seven others were then undergoing training. All men accepted for the hospital corps were required to have had at least a grammar school education; some were college graduates.

(e) General Hospital. At first the hospital was established in a barracks building in the Campo de Marte, but this was found to be inadequate, and a set of buildings at Momotombo Barracks, on the east

side of Managua, was renovated and an excellent general hospital established on October 19, 1928. About May, 1929, the hospital was again moved to Campo de Marte, when all activities at Momotombo Barracks were so removed for reasons of economy. It remained there until the earthquake on March 31, 1931, during which all buildings were either destroyed or badly damaged, and quarters were obtained in a rented building in the city of Managua, about three blocks north of the Campo de Marte, and were utilized continuously thereafter.

(f) Largely due to the initiative and efforts of Second Lieutenant Silas P. Buechlein (MC), G.N. (Pharmacist Mate First Class (MC), USN), a hospital was established in Ocotal, Nueva Segovia. The building, grounds and conveniences were developed by him to an extent that would have been a credit to any organization, and the hospital was one of the show places on the Northern Area for visitors. It cared for the sick and wounded of the area whose condition did not require transfer by plane to Managua.

(g) Infirmaries were established at Somoto (4 beds), Jinotega in the Central Area, and at Bluefields (5 beds), and Puerto Cabezas (20 beds) in the combat areas, and at Leon and Granada.

(h) Dispensaries were established at all stations under charge of a medical officer or hospital corpsmen. In combat areas a medical officer usually had charge of medical activities at several stations, and made regular trips to each when his services were required, or for routine inspection. This was also done by the Area Surgeons, who were regularly stationed at the Area Headquarters, and had charge of all medical department activities within the area.

Section 2—Collateral Activities

On July 3, 1928, by Presidential Decree, the Medical Department of the Guardia assumed control over prostitution and the venereal prophylaxis work throughout the Republic. This involved a very large amount of work on the part of the medical officers, but was highly important due to the prevalence of venereal diseases. The control was very effective, and good results were obtained. However, it was continued only until the Spring of 1929, when for reasons of economy, the work was returned to the civilian sanitary authorities.

During the first several years of existence of the Guardia it was the policy to give medical attention to certain civilians, such charity cases as could not otherwise obtain medical aid for financial reasons. No charge was made for these services, or for the medical supplies used. Up to October 1, 1928, a total of 1147 cases had been so treated, 3241 treatments given and 36 operations performed, in all sections of the country. This was believed to have created much good feeling, favorable to both the Guardia and to American Officers. In later years, due to lack of funds to carry on the work, it was necessary to discontinue the practice, and medical attention was given only to those civilians who served with Guardia patrols in the field, and who became sick or were wounded in action, and to those civilians living in towns where no doctors or offices of the Sanidad were located.

Lectures and demonstrations were given by medical officers to the cadets of the Military Academy during 1931 and 1932, and various pamphlets on minor surgery and first aid were distributed among the cadets and also among the commissioned Nicaraguan officers.

Section 3—Turnover to Nicaraguan Control

Similar to the policy with respect to line officers, a number of native Nicaraguan physicians were commissioned as medical officers in the Guardia. On October 1, 1932, there were five such officers. They had been given a training period of six weeks in Managua in the routine duties and administrative work of the medical department, and then sent to one of the Area Headquarters, where their instruction was continued by the Area Surgeon, followed by assignment to independent duty.

Additional medical officers were commissioned during November and December, 1932, sufficient in number to replace all North American personnel. In some towns, where required and no medical officer was available for assignment, or where it was anticipated that the medical officer might be absent from time to time while carrying out duties in other places, contract surgeons were enlisted for part-time duty, at reduced salaries.

All medical supplies and equipment on hand at stations were carefully inventoried and a turn-over effected prior to the evacuation of North American personnel. The relieving Nicaraguan medical officer signed a receipt for all supplies and equipment on hand, and a statement to the effect that he was completely satisfied with the turnover as made. At each station a three to six months supply of medicines was then on hand.

CHAPTER X

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

Section 1—General

In Nicaragua the telephone and telegraph systems are owned and operated by the Government, and these national lines were available, therefore, for the use of the Guardia without cost, and no exchange of appropriations was required, or limit set as to amount of traffic.

After the beginning of the year 1927, as a result of the revolution, there was no wire communication between the East and West Coasts of Nicaragua, and until 1932, when the Guardia installed its own radio systems, commercial radio service was utilized between these points.

The wire lines gave generally satisfactory service, although it was slow and often irregular, and at no time could be compared with like service in the United States or many other countries.

Section 2—Telegraph

Telegraph lines connected all important cities and towns of the interior (along the railroad) and extended to some places in Rivas, Chontales, Matagalpa, Jinotega, Esteli, and Nueva Segovia. Trunk lines extended south through Rivas into Costa Rica, and north to Honduras through three different Nicaraguan towns, Somotillo, Somoto and Dipilto.

Operators were capable and when actually engaged with traffic, handled it with speed, but in many places were inclined to delay transmission. Unavoidable delays also occurred from time to time in the bandit infested regions when the wires were cut by bandits, or when storms damaged the lines and repairs could be made only under patrol protection or by members of the patrol themselves.

When one considers that for miles these lines extended through forests, jungles and swamps, nailed to trees and often with beer bottles and cow horns for insulators, the service actually performed by the telegraph system was remarkable.

At the Guardia Headquarters in the Campo de Marte, Managua, a special office was opened to handle Guardia Nacional traffic, and an operator was kept on watch at all times.

Section 3—Telephone

Telephonic communication was available between most of the important cities and towns of the interior and also to a limited extent to Juigalpa, capital city of the Department of Chontales. Due to the type of installation (ground return), conversations between towns were carried on with considerable difficulty, a babble of voices and extraneous sounds being heard at all times. Frequent interruptions occurred when heedless operators cut the connections. So it was not practicable to communicate by telephone from Managua as far as Esteli, Matagalpa or Rivas, and at times it was also impossible to carry on an intelligible conversation with Corinto.

A separate exchange was maintained at Guardia Headquarters, Managua, serving the lines connecting the various offices of the Guardia in the Campo de Marte, the National Penitentiary, the Police Station,

Momotombo Barracks, the Presidential House (later the Palace), and the private residences of the Guardia officers. It was connected with the local government exchange, through which calls to out of town points, and in the city of Managua, were made.

In Ocotal, Jinotega and Matagalpa, Guardia switchboards were also used, although mainly for local purposes. During the latter part of 1931, by utilizing the national telegraph line and U. S. Marine Corps field telephones, good service was had between Ocotal and various nearby towns, particularly Somoto and Dipilto. During the telegrapher's strike in September, 1932, telephones were also installed at Totogalpa, Yalaguina, Pueblo Nueva and Palacaguina. These connected with the line which had been installed between Daraili and Condega in 1931. Another line which gave excellent results was that between Ocotal and Macuelizo, built entirely by the Guardia, early in 1932.

In the Central Area in 1932, telephonic communication was established between Navarro, La Isla, Algovia and Buena Vista, also a line between Muy Muy and La Pineda, a combination buzzer-telephone line connecting Matagalpa, Fundadora, Aran Juez and Las Camelias, and a telephone line between Las Cuatros Esquinas and La Cumplida.

In the Department of Leon, in 1932, a line was built between El Sauce and Achuapa by General Escamilla, the Mexican revolutionary leader, in charge of the government road construction then going on in that vicinity. It served his road camp, and the Guardia stations in the two places.

The earthquake at Managua, March 31, 1931, caused considerable damage to the communications system at Guardia Headquarters. The telephone switchboard and most of the telephones were badly damaged, and the wire that was not pulled down and lost, was so broken and tangled that it was necessary to take it down and repair it before using agains.

There was a shortage of wire, and much effort was expended in the recovery of wire, along the streets of Managua, that had been in use and abandoned after the earthquake. Some wire was recovered from the National telegraph lines in Nueva Segovia that had been abandoned after the revolution, and in places occupied by Sandino and his forces in 1927.

Many miles of twisted wire was untwisted so that a greater distance could be covered by a given amount, the earth being used as a return wire instead of another line. About six miles of retrieved wire was used in telephone installations in Managua, and about twice this amount was sent to the Northern Area for telegraph line between Palacaguina and Telpaneca.

Section 4—Radio

When the Guardia Nacional relieved Marine Corps detachments as garrisons of towns in the Northern and Central Areas, the radio equipment in use at many of these places was allowed to remain, as it was the only means of signal communication, and was a vital necessity.

In the Northern Area sets were maintained at Santa Maria, Ocotal, Telpaneca, San Juan de Telpaneca, Quilali, Apali and Jalapa. A buzzer line connected Jicaro with Apali.

In the Central Area radio sets were employed at Jinotega, Matagalpa, Corinto Finca and El Consuelo. In 1932 a medium frequency set was installed at Navarro, working with Matagalpa and giving service to all stations connected by telephone with Navarro.

In the Eastern Area sets were maintained at Kisalaya and Neptune Mines, working with the Standard Fruit Company station at Puerto Cabezas. Constant communication could not be maintained with these sets owing to their low power and the distance over which they worked.

The radio operators were enlisted men of the Marine Corps, holding the rank of second lieutenant, without pay, in the Guardia. Later Guardia enlisted men who had been trained at Managua, were assigned to various stations as assistants, and in some cases as operators.

In 1932 high frequency sets were installed at Ocotal, Esteli, Bluefields, Puerto Cabezas, Cabo Gracias a Dios, Neptune Mines and Wauni, and two at Managua, one for handling traffic and the other for training purposes.

For stations which had no other means of signal communication, and for all stations, even between Area Headquarters and Managua, when the telegraph lines were out of order or not working, for any reason, the radio installations were of the utmost importance and value. Instances of this include the transmission of the news of bandit attacks, sudden bandit movements, arrangements for the transportation of wounded by plane, and forwarding of the results of national elections.

Section 5—Communications Office

The Guardia communications office was established on June 3, 1931, by Captain James M. Smith, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.). It took over the installation and repairing of Guardia telephones and lines, and radio sets; the receiving, clearing and distribution of messages at Guardia Headquarters, and all code and cipher work there.

It served the Second Marine Brigade and the Electoral Mission. Through the use of this system the Nicaraguan Government and the Electoral Mission saved large sums over the cost of commercial messages in traffic in the Eastern Area. It was computed that over the entire Guardia Nacional system, an average of 5,000 messages were handled monthly by radio, telegraph and telephone.

A reconnaissance of the Northern Area communications system was made by Captain Smith from June 18 to July 9, 1931, and of the Central Area from September 19 to 30, 1931, and of the Central Area from September 19 to 30, 1931, resulting in improvements being made in various ways, such as adjustments to sets and aërials, changes in operating procedure, and new installations.

On September 1, 1931, a radio training school was established at Managua. The students were twenty enlisted men picked from various stations, mostly with previous telegraphic experience. The course included code practice, clear and code transmission and reception, operating procedure, simple electricity and theory of radio, radio nomenclature and installation, and practical work. An instruction pamphlet was written in English by Captain Smith and was translated into Spanish for the use of both students and regular operators. The course lasted eight months, at the end of which time fifteen of the original twenty were sufficiently well trained to be assigned to duty at outpost stations.

Their performance of duty, on the whole, exceeded expectations. Some became as proficient as the Marine Corps enlisted personnel, and were entirely competent to be placed in charge of isolated radio stations.

CHAPTER XI

THE GUARDIA POLICE COMPANY, MANAGUA

Prior to the establishment of the Guardia Nacional, the maintenance of order in Managua was in the hands of civilian police, consisting of one (1) Director of Police, one (1) First Comandante of Police (Sub-Director), three (3) Comandantes of Police Stations, eight (8) Inspectors and sixty (60) Policemen. The Policemen were paid $18.00 per month.

On the 15th of March, 1928, these policemen were relieved by the Third Company, Guardia Nacional, which was organized for police duty in the city of Managua. The first Chief of Police was First Lieutenant Herbert S. Keimling, U. S. Marine Corps, who was appointed Comandante General de Policia on April 1, 1928. He was responsible to the division commander of Managua.

Quarters were obtained in Momotomba Barracks, later the site of the Academia Militar de Nicaragua. As these quarters were on the eastern edge of the city, the police had to go into the city, a distance of sixteen blocks to the Police Station, when going on duty. This was necessary, as there were no other places available for quarters at the time. Later the police were quartered in the Police Station.

As no records were avilable of the manner in which the old police force handled routine police matters, file cabinets had to be built, police blotters and index cards printed, and the whole system of operating a modern, efficient police station started.

At this moment it would not be amiss to state what the final organization became, for guidance in the future. Eventually, there were assigned to the police company seven (7) officers, all capable of speaking Spanish. One was the Chief of Police, one assistant to the Chief of Police, handling all administrative duties, one in charge of Traffic, one in charge of finger printing, photography, etc., and three on duty as desk officers. The latter three rotated as follows: twenty-four hours on duty as desk officer, handling all arrest cases, complaints, sending out reliefs, entries in the police blotter, index cards on all arrests and general supervision of the jail. Twenty-four hours liberty followed next for the officer, and then the third day he acted as stand-by, visited posts in the city and handled outside investigations. In this way after losing touch with police affairs on his day of liberty, he became acquainted with all matters before again doing his tour as desk officer. The Chief, his assistant, the finger print officer, and even the traffic officer, also worked on outside cases.

Fingerprinting was carried out in all cases of convictions, but photography was used only for criminal cases. Misdemeanor cases were not photographed, except for the more flagrant cases such as prostitution.

Index cards were made on all persons arrested, record of the punishment, or acquittal, being entered when the case was settled. Thus, eventually, second, third and even up to sixteenth offenses began to appear against certain individuals.

A regular police blotter was kept, showing person arrested, policeman making arrest, offense and final disposition of the case.

To continue the chronological story of the police company. The city was divided into seventeen posts, making the smaller ones in the

center of the city, for better protection of the business houses, and the larger ones on the outskirts. Seventeen posts were all that could be handled with only sixty-five men in the company. A city the size of Managua, reputed to have 50,000 inhabitants, needed a far larger police force. Although it was never attained, a force of 150 men was the minimum estimated as necessary by practically all of the officers who were in charge. The seventeen posts so organized made the smallest post contain 30 city blocks, while the larger ones contained as high as 48. It is unnecessary to point out that one policeman cannot protect 30 blocks.

Schools were immediately instituted to instruct the men in the police laws of the country, and were later used as a means to clarify points of law that were constantly arising. The change from the civilian policemen to Guardias was effected with no disturbance and as time passed on, the new police became far more efficient than the old had ever been.

The original Guardia police system called for a small daytime force and a large night force, doubling almost all the posts during the dangerous hours. This was later discarded when the company became larger having been eventually increased by 30 Municipal Police.

Difficulties immediately arose between the city officials and the Guardia police, but this was to be expected. It required a great deal of moral persuasion in the beginning to induce the police judge to give adequate punishment to offenders. Heretofore graft, friendship and influence had been the prime considerations and only those with no money, or no pull, had been punished. All officers encountered this tendency during their regimes, and only by careful scanning of each day's reports was the judge held in line. Much difficulty was also encountered because policemen making arrests were often strongly prejudiced for or against the defendent and permitted this prejudice to color their testimony.

Later a lawyer was engaged as a secretary to the Chief of Police, who conducted the classes in police law, greatly improving the instruction and efficiency of the police. He also advised the Chief of Police on all points of law, in addition to writing all letters in Spanish.

The police at the outset were armed with rifles and carried whistles, but later this was changed to pistols, clubs and whistles. The services of the policemen immediately improved, as the rifle hampered more than it helped.

In January, 1929, First Lieutenant Julian N. Frisbie, U.S.M.C., became Chief of Police, and during his time in office, the above change was made, that is, pistols and clubs instead of rifles.

In April, 1930, Captain H. M. H. Fleming, U. S. Marine Corps, succeeded First Lieutenant Frisbie and it was at this time that Lieutenant Frisbie's scheme to enlarge the company bore fruit. Thirty men were enlisted as Policias Municipales under a one year contract. The regular Guardia were paid $12.00 per month, with food, clothing and quarters furnished in addition. The Policia Municipales were paid $18.00 per month, twelve for pay and six dollars for food. One outfit of clothing was given to the Policia Municipal each six months consisting of the following:

2 Shirts, khaki
2 Scarfs, field
2 Socks, prs.
2 Trousers, khaki
1 Shoes, russet, pr.
1 Hat, field

If the man ate in the Guardia mess he was obliged to give up his ration money, corresponding to his meals. This helped the mess and did no harm to the man.

The men selected at first for duty as Municipal Policemen, were in 16 cases discharged within three months, as they did not possess the necessary qualifications; but as regular Guardia were discharged, they were accepted in place of the other men, only men with excellent discharges being chosen. This rapidly improved the Municipal Police force.

The force now consisted of 95 enlisted men. This number enabled the police to cover the 17 posts day and night, using one half of the men each day in six hour shifts, six on and six off. In addition a corporal was turnkey in the police station, and assisted the desk officer. The sergeants of whom the company had three, stood duty as outside inspectors, on the same schedule as the desk officers.

Due to the necessity of relieving men in the Northern and Central Areas who had completed their hill tours, the police company was heavily hit by the transfers in the Fall of 1930. This action was considered necessary but seriously effected the efficiency of the police force. A trained policeman cannot be replaced by another man in less than three months. During this time the whole police force suffers. For this reason it is desirable that a police company for a large city should remain intact, except for such transfers as the Commanding Officer may recommend. There are, of course, times when a man should be transferred for the good of the force or for his own good. Among the replacements received for the policemen transferred, were men enlisted in the Central and Northern Areas, many of whom had never been in a large city. The training of this type as a city policeman was doubly difficult, as he did not understand his own people (city dwellers) and friction was constant. Furthermore, most of the men from the hills could not read or write. This is a necessary qualification of a policeman.

On March 31, 1931, the city of Managua was badly shaken by an earthquake. In the ensuing confusion, the police company stood intact, losing only two men by desertion. Now the inadequacy of a force of 100 men or less was demonstrated. Of course a force of 500 men would have been inadequate also, but practically all police functions in the center of the city were taken over by Marines, the police force being used in the important duty of guarding water tanks throughout the city, to supply the people with drinking water.

In connection with the earthquake and the fire which followed, it may be well to state at this point that Managua had no fire protection, except 60 fire plugs. There was not even any hose. Both hose and a small chemical and pump truck had been requested time and again by the Chief of Police who volunteered to organize, as a part of the police force, a fire company. This request was turned down by the city officials because of lack of funds, with the result that there was no way to fight

the fire except by demolition and it burned steadily until sufficient buildings had been demolished to stop it. Thirty-three city blocks were burned over.

The training of a fire company would have called for six additional men—two truck drivers and four hosemen, doing duty day on and day off. The ordinary policemen off watch, could have acted as firemen when an alarm was sounded.

Since the city treasury was bankrupted by the earthquake, the Policia Municipal had to be disbanded at this time. However, the Guardia Nacional helped the situation by increasing the force, temporarily, to 100 men. Within six months after the earthquake the city government allowed the enlisting of 24 Policias Municipales, thus permitting the company to drop back to its original strength of 65 of the regular Guardia. The men enlisted were all of the group that had formerly been Municipales, so that no new recruits had to be trained. Matters from then on to the end of the American occupation continued without unusual incident.

The attitude of the newspapers toward the police force was always antagonistic. Many times editors were requested to forward complaints that they had received to the Chief of Police, in order that they might be investigated before publishing; but this was rarely done. Articles were published without any attempt to verify the facts, the only requirement seeming to be that they should reflect discredit on the police.

As far as the city government was concerned, the police fared very well. The chief reason for this was the fact that a basis of friendship was established between the Chiefs of Police and the three members of the National District, principally with Don Francisco Frixione, an exceptionally patriotic and broad minded Nicaraguan citizen, and much friction was avoided through mutual understanding of each others problems.

The conditions existing between the police force and the officials of the National Government was maintained in the same manner, for some time, but the contact was not close enough to stand the strain in all instances, so that many cases of trouble arose. This is due entirely, it is believed, to the fact that the government officials thought that favors should be done for them and their friends because of their positions. Failure to so act, caused them to become antagonistic toward the police force.

The Police Judge was a member of the Executive branch of the government and amenable to the influence of the Chief of Police; but the criminal judges as members of the judiciary were beyond his influence. In one year out of 567 cases placed before the criminal judges, three convictions were made. At least 50% of these cases were convictable, but graft and inefficiency and unwillingness of the judiciary to coöperate with the Guardia accounted for these results. In this connection, all cases of arrests were carefully investigated by officers of the police force, before the person accused was sent before the criminal judges.

To avoid graft when fines were awarded, the person so fined was not released until the fine was paid at the National Treasury and the receipt of payment received at the police station.

Prisoners arrested, convicted and given thirty days hard labor or less, were held at the police station and used for outside work. Those given a longer sentence were sent to the National Penitentiary or other designated prison.

During the year 1930, the police took over the traffic situation, which heretofore had been a steady source of trouble. The issuing of the license plates, drivers permits, etc., were all handled by the traffic officer. In addition traffic signals were posted on all main intersections and one way streets were instituted. Considering the narrow streets and the blind corners which were everywhere prevalent, this measure was absolutely necessary. Traffic regulations written by Lieutenant Frisbie, embodying the principal features of the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania and California laws, were drawn up and printed. Everyone was supplied a copy on request.

Captain Evans F. Carlson, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.), relieved Captain Fleming as Chief of Police of Managua on 22 December, 1931, and carried on in that capacity until the date of evacuation of American personnel from Nicaragua.

In conclusion, it might be well to note, as far as enlisted men were concerned, the police force was excellent. Freed absolutely from outside influences, and backed by a judiciary that wanted to improve conditions, nothing would have been lacking. But this condition did not exist. Even though officially protected by Guardia Headquarters, officers and men of the police force of Managua were subject to many attempts at official persecution by the native government officials.

The action of the judiciary was so uncertain that many serious cases were placed before the police judge and given thirty days, rather than give the criminal judge the opportunity of freeing them at once without any punishment.

In the case of a future occupation of a country measures should be taken to prevent such conditions, going even to the extent of declaring martial law. Furthermore, the police force of a large city, particularly of the capital city, should not be disturbed by the transfer of its trained personnel to routine military duties.

CHAPTER XII

DEPARTMENT OF CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS

Through negotiations carried out between the State Department of the United States and the Government of Nicaragua, and at the special request of the President of the Republic, arrangements were made for the organization of a Department of Construction of Roads, to be under the supervision of a commissioned officer of the Civil Engineer Corps of the U. S. Navy. This Department was organized in the Guardia Nacional on 23 August, 1929, under the supervision of Commander R. M. Warfield, (C.E.C.), U. S. Navy, who was appointed as a Colonel in the Guardia. Colonel Warfield was given the title of Director of this Department and he was furnished office space at Guardia Headquarters in Managua. The first move on the part of Colonel Warfield was to build up an organization of officers and men experienced in surveying and road building. As his chief assistant in charge of field operations, he obtained the services of Lieutenant Rufus C. Harding, (C.E.C.), U. S. Navy. Five enlisted men, who were Second Lieutenants in the Guardia Nacional, and who were found to have the necessary experience in the work to be performed, next joined this Department. All officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps joining this Department for duty were paid out of funds allotted for the construction of roads by the Minister of Fomento (Public Works), of the Government of Nicaragua, such funds being derived from a separate appropriation authorized by the Nicaraguan Congress, and the Director of this Department was directly accountable to the Minister of Fomento for all expenditures made. The main responsibility of the Guardia in this organization was to carry the American personnel attached thereto on the records of the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, and to furnsih protection at the various road construction camps outside of Managua.

The main project was the construction of either all or as much as practicable of the road between Managua and Matagalpa, with minor repair projects on the road at Yali in the Department of Jinotega and the road from Villa Stimson to Teustepe in the Department of Chontales. A future large project was the construction of a road from Boaco in the Department of Chontales to Rama in the Department of Southern Bluefields, to open up a highway between the West and East Coasts of Nicaragua.

Active work commenced in October, 1929, on the road from Villa Stimson (Tipitapa), to Matagalpa with a view of reconstructing this important road for unlimited motor vehicle traffic out of Managua to points in the rich and important agricultural section of Central and Northern Nicaragua. The main object was to place this road in condition for continued traffic during the heavy rainy season.

A complete survey of the projects to be worked on was made by Colonel Warfield with a view of determining the condition of the road and to ascertain just what parts of the road already in use between Villa Stimson and Matagalpa were the most in need of immediate reconstruction. Nine sections running in length from 0.2 to 4.7 miles each were selected giving the department a total of 11.2 miles of new road for reconstruction. These sections of road were selected on the basis of the worst first, using November, 1929, as a basis. With approximately

$150,000 available for the work to be completed and a requirement of approximately $500,000 for a completely reconstructed road between Villa Stimson and Matagalpa, it can readily be seen that the limited funds compelled a system of reconstruction to be adopted, whereby the nine worst sections, as previously mentioned, were the logical ones to work on to offset the possibility of the stoppage of funds for future complete reconstruction. Colonel Warfield in his final report submitted to the American Minister at Managua, giving his estimate of the work completed and to be completed within the $150,000 allowance, indicates that exclusive of the 11.2 miles of sectional repairs and permanent reconstruction that would be made, his department would also complete repairs to or reconstruct approximately 36 small bridges and culverts. He further estimated that with future proper maintenance by the Nicaraguan Government the sections reconstructed should still be in good shape five years hence.

In September, 1930, the minor reconstruction projects as outlined above were completed and in view of the Nicaraguan Congress failing to appropriate additional funds for continuance of road construction under the supervision of American officers, the Road Department of the Guardia was disbanded and all tools and other road equipment was transferred to the Department of Public Works of the Nicaraguan Government.

CHAPTER XIII

THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL MILITARY ACADEMY

In the Guardia Agreement it was provided that the Government of the United States would detail qualified officers and men of the United States Marine Corps to establish a Nicaraguan Military Academy for the purpose of training Nicaraguan officers for service with the Guardia Nacional. These Nicaraguan graduate officers would gradually replace the officers and men of the United States Marine Corps serving with the Guardia, so that eventually the entire officer personnel of that organization would be Nicaraguan.

With this mission, the Nicaraguan Military Academy was formally inaugurated on 1 April, 1930, in the buildings and grounds known as Momotombo, and located on the northeastern outskirts of Managua overlooking Lake Managua. The staff was composed of the following officers and men:

1st Lieut. Edward J. Trumble, G.N. (2nd Lt.USMC) Director.
1st Lieut. Francis J. Cunningham, G.N. (2nd Lt.USMC) Sub-Director.
2nd Lieut. Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N. (Gy-Sgt.USMC)

The problems confronting the staff were many and varied. There were no text books in Spanish, there was no precedent on which to set a course, there was little or no money with which to operate, and there was no Aladdin's lamp to rub and summon the helpful genii. However, among the staff and corps of cadets there were enthusiastic and willing workers, and within a few days buildings were repaired, orders formulated, classes started, and the work of translating military textbooks into Spanish was begun. New ideals of discipline, orderliness and concerted action arose and became firmly embedded. All regulations and activities of the Military Academy were based on similar regulations and activities of the United States Naval Academy.

The first class of cadets was made up of nine worthy noncommissioned officers of the Guardia Nacional who had been specially recommended by their immediate commanding officers, and selected by a board of officers at Guardia Headquarters. From the very beginning particular stress was laid on the fact that in selecting candidates for admission to the Academy the political affiliations of the candidate bore no weight whatsoever.

The curriculum was designed to cover a period of eight months theory and practice at the Military Academy and one month of practical experience in the field in active operations against bandits. The eight months course of instruction was divided into five departments, which covered the following subjects:

1. Military Science and Tactics.
2. Administration.
3. Laws and Regulations.
4. Infantry weapons.
5. Military engineering.

In addition certain academic subjects were included in the curriculum, such as Elementary Mathematics, Geography of Nicaragua, History of Nicaragua, Composition, Customs and Traditions, Relations with Civilians and Diplomatic Ceremonies.

The staff of the Military Academy and the Corps of Cadets were subject to call for active field service against armed bandits at any time after the first three weeks of preliminary preparation and training. They were in fact a reserve for the fighting forces and were called out several times when the bandits were operating on a large scale.

On June 22, 1930, after two and one half months of instruction and study, the first class of nine cadets was graduated as the result of a national emergency then existing in the Northern and Central Areas. The following morning at 7:00 A.M., the newly commissioned officers were on their way to the scenes of combat.

The period from 22 June, 1930 to 19 November, 1930, was utilized in translating and printing Spanish Military textbooks, in constructing buildings to accommodate a larger class, and in the selection of the members of the new class. The second class when it entered on 19 November, 1930, presented new problems. It was a heterogeneous collection of thirty-seven; four were officer students who had been commissioned in November, 1929 prior to the establishment of the Military Academy, fifteen were noncommissioned officers from the Guardia, and eighteen were selected from civil life. There were ninety-seven applicants for admission. Selections were made by a board composed of the staff of the Military Academy in accordance with the recommendations of the Area and Department Commanders, who had first interviewed and looked into the qualifications of all candidates from their Departments or Areas. The list of selections was then submitted to the Jefe Director, and by him to the President of the Republic for final approval. This group progressed much more rapidly in its studies than the first class, due to the fact that more translations of textbooks were available, and the staff had improved through experience and preparation. An additional officer, Subteniente Humberto Castillo Q., Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, was added to the staff at this time.

The members of the second class carried on their studies at the Academy until 2 January, 1931, on which date the entire staff and the Corps of Cadets were ordered as a special punitive patrol against the bandit groups participating in the disasterous Achuapa ambush for a period of one month.

The spirit demonstrated during the month of field service was admirable. The weaklings were discovered and weeded out, allowed to resign from the Academy. Those who survived the acid test were good soldiers, with the same spirit that keeps Marines on their feet when they want to drop. Exceptional marches were made, the hardships of campaign were endured and one contact was made with a bandit group during these days of active operations. On 5 February, 1931, the staff and the Corps of Cadets returned to the Military Academy to resume their studies.

Rapid progress was noted following the period of active service until the disasterous earthquake at Managua on 31 March, 1931. Following this catastrophe, the officers and cadets worked hard and tirelessly in caring for the sick and injured, maintaining order in the northeastern section of the city, providing food and shelter for the unfortunate, and in general striving to better the horrible conditions that followed the disaster. Subtentiete Humberto Castillo Q., G.N. de N., a member of the Academy staff, died on 4 April, 1931, as a result of injuries received

while assisting the victims of the earthquake. Two members of the staff and four cadets, were awarded the highest decoration of the Nicaraguan Government, the Presidential Medal of Merit, for services rendered during and immediately following the earthquake.

The earthquake was a severe blow to all of Nicaragua, since it paralized the principal city, which was also the seat of government. At one time it seemed that it would be a fatal blow to the Nicaraguan Military Academy. There had been little money for its maintenance since its beginning, the pay of cadets had been reduced from fifty dollars a month for the first class to eighteen dollars a month for the second class, and there seemed for a time to be little prospect of its continuance. However, in its short period of existence it had gained a firm hold on the hearts of the people and had the support of the press and the Government of the country. As a consequence, the Jefe Director was able to secure an appropriation of $3,200 monthly for its continuance. Out of these appropriations funds were obtained for the restoration of the buildings destroyed by the earthquake and the construction of new quarters to provide for a class of seventy-five cadets in July, 1931.

After the earthquake, the studies of the cadets were resumed, and on 1 June, 1931, twenty-eight cadets of the thirty-seven who entered were graduated and commissioned as Second Lieutenants.

Immediately following the graduation of the second class of cadets, work of selecting the members of the third class was begun. Meanwhile, the popularity of the Military Academy had spread throughout the land. There were two hundred and ninety-seven candidates for admission. Every area, department and district in the Republic was represented.

The requirements for entrance, besides a strict physical examination included the following:

Age	20 to 35 Years.
Nationality	Nicaraguan, (born or naturalized)
Height	5'4".
Weight	135 lb.
Recommendations	Two from well known Nicaraguans or foreign citizens living in Nicaragua. Also a confidential report and recommendation on the part of the Area, Department or District Commander, following a personal interview with the candidate.
Education	Competitive examinations formulated in accordance with the requirements for the *Secundaria* (the equivalent to two years in high school) as outlined in the *Plan de Estudios* of the Minister of Public Instruction.

Examinations were held at all Area and Department Headquarters on the same dates, under the supervision of commissioned officers of the Guardia, and all papers sent to Managua for marking by a central board whose recommendations were submitted to the Jefe Director and by him to the President of Nicaragua for final approval.

During the time that candidates for the third class were being selected the work of rebuilding and construction of new quarters at the Academy was rushed in order that all would be prepared for the arrival

of the first contingent of cadets on 1 July. This class of seventy-five cadets reported for duty in groups by Departments as sufficient space was made available for their accommodation. The last group arrived on 15 July, 1931. Nineteen members were noncommissioned officers of the Guardia Nacional, and the remainder were selected from civil life. The majority of the civilians were college and university students. The pay of cadets was maintained at eighteen dollars per month, which excluded the probability of any young men entering the class for purely monetary reasons, especially since each cadet was required to deposit five dollars each month during the entire course in order to partially defray the expenses of equipment and uniforms upon graduation. The staff of the Military Academy during the third academic term was composed of the following officers:

Captain Edward J. Trumble, (1st Lieut. USMC), Director.
Captain Francis J. Cunningham (1st Lieut. USMC), Sub-Director.
1st Lieutenant John H. Coffman (2nd Lieut. USMC), Quartermaster.
1st Lieutenant James H. Satterfield (Gy-Sgt. USMC), Instructor.
1st Lieutenant Robert Colsky (Gy-Sgt., USMC), Instructor.
Teniente Manual Gomez F., Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.
Subteniente Salvador Rizo, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

The third class was under instruction at the Academy from 15 July, to 6 October, 1931. On 7 October, the entire Corps of Cadets was transferred to the Marine Corps rifle range for small arms and infantry weapons instruction. Upon the completion of this practical range work on 29 October, the cadets were returned to the Academy and outfitted and prepared for active field service. On 2 November, 1931, the entire organization moved into the field in the Southern Area for field training in preparation prior to campaign service against the bandits. On 19 and 20 November, all officers and cadets were transferred to the Department of Esteli by planes to assist in operations against strong bandit groups that were menacing the Departments of Esteli, Leon and Chinandega. During these operations the cadets took part in four combats; Mayocunda, Ceniceras, Las Pozas and Guadaloupe; and were given practical instruction in the duties of Post and District Commander in El Sauce and Villa Nueva. In addition, they trained a corps of eighty Auxiliares in these two posts. On 13 January, 1932, the Corps of Cadets was concentrated at El Sauce and returned to Managua by Marine Corps planes.

On 7 April, 1932, fifty-nine cadets of the original seventy-five who entered the third class were found qualified, graduated and commissioned as Acting Second Lieutenants.

On March 23, 24 and 25, 1932, physical and competitive mental examinations were held in all Areas, Department and District Headquarters of the Republic. There were three hundred and forty-eight applicants; of these, ninety-eight failed to qualify physically, failed to report for examination, or otherwise failed to comply with the entrance requirements. Two hundred and twenty-one applicants completed all of the physical and competitive mental examinations, which were so syncronized as to take place in all parts of the Republic at the same time.

From those completing the competitive examinations, eighty cadets were selected in accordance with the percentage obtained by them in the examinations. They assembled at the Academy on 27 April and began their course on 1 May, 1932. This class received the same course of

instruction given the previous class, including practical work on the rifle range with infantry weapons, and two weeks of field service in northern Leon and Estili.

Due to the necessity of replacing the American officers of the Guardia, the fourth class of cadets was graduated on 1 December, 1932, after seven months of instruction, when seventy-three cadets received their commissions as Acting Seconds Lieutenants.

As shown by the increasing number of applicants the Military Academy gained rapidly in popularity and was on its way to become an important institution in Nicaraguan national affairs. Before turning over the Guardia to Nicaraguan control, a complete set of texts was prepared in the Spanish language, and schedules were made for not only the next years course, but for the continuance of the Academy as a National Military School, offering a four years course of instruction. All of which were turned over to the Nicaraguan officers who succeeded to the command of the Guardia.

The success of the Military Academy was clearly demonstrated by the ability of the graduates to perform their duties both in the field and in garrison. The standard of service rendered by the officers who received their commissions through the Academy was surprisingly high, and was a source of the greatest satisfaction to the Jefe Director other American officers serving with the Guardia

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD

Upon the assumption of the Presidency by General Jose Maria Moncada on January 1, 1929, a special guard was furnished him at the Presidential House for his personal protection.

On March 15, 1929, this guard was organized into the Division of the Presidential Guard, and the detachment was known as the 16th Company. It consisted of three officers and seventy-five enlisted men. Of the officers, two were Aides de camp to the President, and were commissioned Marine Corps officers, the senior being assigned the duty of supervising the activities of the Guard in addition to his other duties. The junior officer was an especially selected Marine Corps non-commissioned officer, with the rank of Lieutenant, Guardia Nacional, and was in active charge, being responsible for the administration, instruction, discipline, etc., of the organization.

The enlisted personnel were carefully chosen with a view of having the Guard composed only of men of established Liberal tendency prior to joining the Guardia, including personal friends of the President and his intimates, and men who had served with the Liberal forces during the recently ended revolution. From the standpoint of the personal safety of the President, it is natural that this should have been done, as it was not known, at that time, whether the enlisted personnel of the Guardia who had formerly been Conservatives, would be loyal and above the suspicion of treachery.

Immediately after the organization of the Presidential Guard no effort was spared to make it an efficient, well-drilled and thoroughly military organization. The men were provided new and well-fitting clothing and, in so far as practicable, new equipment, and were taught and required to keep their appearance at all times in the best possible state. The barrels and other metal parts of rifles were emery-papered and burnished to the brilliance of nickle or chromium plate, and all metal parts of cartridge belts and other equipment, and uniform ornaments, were polished. In 1931 a special blue-grey uniform was adopted for the Guard, and it materially improved its appearance and added to the esprit de corps of the organization.

Much attention was given to close order drill in order to instill discipline, smartness and prompt obedience, and, in conjunction with other Guardia troops stationed in Managua, numerous parades and other ceremonies were participated in. The separate quarters located in the rear of the Presidential House, were made adequate and comfortable, and always kept in the best condition as to cleanliness and sanitation.

During the summer of 1930, the Presidential Palace on Loma de Tiscapa was completed, and the President took possession of it. The Guard was moved at the same time to its quarters in the rear of the Palace. This barracks, and a wing of the Palace, were destroyed during the violent earthquake on March 31, 1931, after which the President together with his Guard, removed to a building in the city of Managua. Later when the Palace was renovated, a new and very adequate barracks building was erected for the use of the Presidential Guard.

An out of town residence was maintained by the President at the Laguna, near Masatepe, where he spent considerable time. A detachment of one officer and ten men was kept at this place at all times, and was augmented whenever the President was actually present.

Besides maintaining guards around the living quarters of the President, detachments of the Presidential Guard accompanied him on all trips made by him to various parts of the Republic. In Managua, when using the Presidential automobiles, he was always accompanied by a number of well-armed members of the Guard.

So well were these duties performed that although political assassinations occurred in other parts of the country, and there was an ever-present danger of an attempt on the life of the President, no untoward incident occurred during his incumbency in office.

CHAPTER XV

MUTINIES

Section 1—General

During the five years and seven months regime of Marine Corps control of the Guardia, there occurred ten instances of actual mutiny or events which could be construed as mutinous. All of these were local in character, having no connection with other stations, and, with the exception of the mutinies at Somotillo in January, 1928; at Somoto on December 8, 1930; and at Quilali on April 11, 1932, in each of which bandit influence was manifest, can be attributed to internal factors at the particular station or place involved.

In only five instances can it be said with certainty that careful plans had been evolved more than one day before the actual occurrences, i.e., the mutinies at Somotillo, at Telpaneca on October, 6, 1929 and again on October 21, 1929, at Somoto and at Quilali. In one case, that of Jicaro on April 18, 1930, which was a one-man affair, the plans were evidently made that same day. The other instances appear to have been spontaneous, without prior planning, and carried out in the heat of passion or of excitement.

In addition to the ten cases above mentioned, there were a number of other instances of near-mutiny, which were prevented from developing to serious proportions by prompt discovery and proper action on the part of the officers. These were based usually on some fancied wrong or series of grievances, which directly or indirectly as the case may be, brought on a display of passion and insubordinate conduct on the part of certain enlisted men, whose racial characteristics and ignorance were the primary cause of their actions, and, by the same token, enabled them as quickly to forget their troubles and to serve the Guardia faithfully thereafter.

As a result of the ten instances cited, which will be briefly described in continuation, seven officers, two of whom were commissioned Marine Corps officers, and the balance Marine Corps enlisted men, lost their lives, two officers were captured and were to have been killed by their captors but escaped, and large quantities of government property, including machine guns, automatic weapons, rifles, grenades, ammunition and other supplies were lost. In a few instances substantial losses of money and property were incurred by the civilian population in the towns where a mutiny occurred in the garrison, when the mutineers sacked stores and private residences before leaving the vicinity.

It should be noted that with the exception of the occurrence in Managua on April 4, 1931, wherein a special situation was involved, and which will be described later, all of the mutinies took place in the bandit-infested, isolated sections of the country, where routine service was extremely arduous and where little or no recreation afforded the necessary outlet for the surplus energies of naturally emotional and easily excitable men of slight military experience and discipline.

Section 2—Somotillo

Shortly after noon on January 8, 1928, the first revolt of the newly organized Guardia took place, when a portion of the garrison at Somotillo, Northern Chinandega, an isolated station about seventy miles from the railroad and near the Honduran border, mutinied. Nine enlisted men and a number of local civilians were involved, while the balance of the command, some half a dozen men, remained loyal, but being taken by surprise and unable to coördinate their movements in defense of either the station or the officers, they scattered and remained in hiding until after the mutiny had ceased.

The leader of the revolt, Corporal Manuel Chaverri, named himself a general, and a private as his colonel. It was unquestionably a well-planned movement and the result of a conspiracy between the leaders and civilian bandit sympathizers. Two groups of these civilians had been organized, one at Somotillo to assist the mutineering Guardias to kill the officers, loot the barracks and town, and carry off the arms and ammunition, and the other at Villa Nueva, a town some nine miles to the eastward. It had been planned that the latter group would join the former upon its arrival in Villa Nueva, and that the combined forces would then proceed to join the bandits in Nueva Segovia.

The outbreak occurred as the three Guardia officers were returning to the barracks from their noon meal. At this time a machine gun was so placed that it could be fired directly down the main street, over which the officers approached, and riflemen were stationed at various points in the vicinity of the barracks, particularly in the rear patio, which was large and connected with the back yards of other buildings in the same quadrangle, and also afforded some degree of shelter.

Initial firing upon them as they neared the barracks was assumed by the officers to be a bandit attack, and they continued on. The Commanding Officer, Second Lieutenant George H. Adams, G.N. (Corporal, USMC), reached the barracks, saw civilians outside armed with rifles whom he took to be bandits, and three guardias inside whom he told to get out and join the fight, before he discovered and comprehended the nature of the heavy fire directed against him and the other officers; whereupon all retired down the main street to the Marine Barracks, where two Marines were stationed.

From this point a fire fight was engaged in between the three guardia officers and two marines on one side, and the mutineers on the other, without apparent effect. The firing at this time was badly directed and ineffective on both sides. The mutineers began to assume offensive tactics, and when they made a circling movement towards the Marine Barracks, the five North Americans retreated to the Somotillo River, to the south of town, and here became separated. One Guardia officer and a loyal enlisted guardia whom he encountered, proceeded to Villa Nueva to communicate by telegraph with the Division Commander at Chinandega. The other two Guardia officers, one of whom was an enlisted man of the Navy Medical Corps, the two marines and one loyal guardia whom they met on the trail, took up a defensive position on a small hill on the south bank of the river, along the trail between Somotillo and Villa Nueva, believing that the mutinous group would pass that

way. This proved to be sound course and was a most fortunate decision, as it was the enabling factor in a decisive engagement that was fought later in the afternoon, in which the two leaders were killed, with the resultant failure of the balance of the plot.

Following their lack of success in the attack on the Guardia officers and marines in the town, the mutineers turned their efforts to looting, and took all arms, including automatic weapons and a machine gun, ammunition and clothing, including officers' effects, that were on hand at the barracks, looted some of the stores and private residences in the town, and proceeded toward Villa Nueva.

About 4:00 p.m., they approached the hill, occupied as before stated, and attacked the position, rushing up the slope in the face of rifle and pistol fire from the defenders. The latter remained cool and aimed carefully, with the result that the two leaders, one other guardia mutineer and one accompanying civilian, were killed, and another guardia mutineer so severely wounded that he died the next day. This engagement brought about the total demoraliaztion of the balance of the group, and they scattered towards the frontier, and failed to reach Villa Nueva where the other group of civilians was awaiting their arrival.

It was a good example of the value of training and practice on the rifle range and proper aiming and use of the sights, enabling a small, poorly-armed, but well-trained group to inflict substantial loss and demoralization upon a much larger force armed with automatic weapons, but which lacked the training essential to good marksmanship.

Section 3—Telpaneca (First)

At about 2:00 a.m., on October 6, 1929, Second Lieutenant Lewis H. Trogler, G.N. (Sergeant, USMC), Commanding Officer of the Guardia Nacional garrison at Telpaneca, Nueva Segovia, was shot to death in the town of Telpaneca by mutinous members of his command. The mutiny had been carefully planned and involved the entire garrison, although some were unwilling participants.

A written agreement had been drawn up by First Sergenat Fernando Larios, hijo, as leader, and five others, and signed by them on October 3rd, providing that Lieutenant Trogler, who was the only officer then serving in Telpaneca, was to be killed, and, as circumstances permitted, all other North American officers, as a sign of their opposition to the "American occupation" of Nicaraguan territory. All other members of the garrison of twenty-three enlisted, signed the document, either voluntarily, or through fear for their personal safety if they refused. In each case a seal was placed opposite the signature, made from the blood of the respective individual, obtained by cutting and squeezing his thumb. Some of these signers had not read the document and had no knowledge as to its contents.

It appears that First Sergeant Larios, and one of the other conspirators who was a corporal, had been recommended for reduction by Lieutenant Trogler, and that both knew of this. Larios was undoubtedly the prime mover, and there is a strong probability that he was actuated also by other personal and political motives. He had been a Conservative prior to joining the Guardia, and his father Fernando Larios, padre, a leader of the Conservative element, had been exiled only shortly theretofore by the Liberal Government. His antipathy for North Americans

had not been revealed previously, but became apparent by his actions during the signing of the pact of blood and during the subsequent mutiny. It was related by witnesses that he gleefully viewed the body of Lieutenant Trogler, and that he refused permission to civilians who desired to hold a wake over it. Several letters were found in the possession of Larios which boldly stated his hatred of foreigners.

There was dissatisfaction among some of the enlisted members of the command over a dance given by Lieutenant Trogler for the civilian population of Telpaneca on the night of October 5th. No Guardia was invited, and it has been said that Lieutenant Trogler had stated that the guardias were of a lower social status than his intended guests, and that on this account he had not invited them to participate. Some were disgruntled because they had been sent by Lieutenant Trogler to carry chairs from other houses to the scene of the party, and they believed that they should not have been so employed; that in so doing they were being utilized in the capacity of servants. A concerted effort was made by various guardias to induce the civilians not to attend the fiesta, intimating that some untoward event might occur there.

It was planned by the mutineers to simulate a bandit attack and to kill Lieutenant Trogler as he was returning to his quarters from the fiesta. To make it appear true in case of an investigation, men were stationed at various points throughout the town, with orders to open fire when they heard firing going on. That afternoon a civilian agent of First Sergeant Larios reported to Lieutenant Trogler, in accordance with Lario's instructions that a bandit attack on the town would take place that night. It does not appear that Lieutenant Trogler took any extraordinary precautions that night as to the security of the town.

Because of the fact that he returned from the dance at about 1:30 a.m., in company with a prominent civilian, Lieutenant Trogler was not fired upon at that time. However, soon after reaching his quarters the simulated attack commenced, and weapons were trained and fired upon the doorway of the officers' quarters, through which Lieutenant Trogler emerged and safely ran across the street to the barracks. He then started in the direction of the church plaza where some of the defensive works were located, doubtless with the intention of directing the defense, when he was struck and killed.

Throughout the balance of the night sporadic firing took place, but it has been definitely established that no bandits attacked Telpaneca that night, and that the simulation of an attack was planned and carried out as a smoke-screen to hide the real purpose of the mutineers, the killing of Lieutenant Trogler. Having accomplished this object, no attempts were made to loot or to commit other violence, and no one of the command deserted.

Proof of the complicity of First Sergeant Larios in the plot to mutiny was lacking at the time, but a strong suspicion rested upon him, and he was soon transferred to Ocotal, the Area Headquarters station. He was relieved by Sergeant Adrian Salinas, but his influence was to be felt within a short time in a second mutiny at Telpaneca. He was later tried before a general court-martial and convicted, when the investigation of the Second Telpaneca mutiny brought to light the facts as to the first.

Section 4—Telpaneca (Second)

Following the death of Lieutenant Trogler, Second Lieutenant Charles J. Levonski, G.N. (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), was assigned to duty as Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional, at Telpaneca, and assumed command. He was a capable, energetic and likeable officer, and the morale of the command seemed to improve. For two weeks he observed nothing which indicated to him that the men would not remain loyal.

Rumors were received from Ocotal by the men to the effect that First Sergeant Larios had been executed as a punishment for his part in the mutiny of October 6th. This was untrue but was believed by some of them. A newspaper published in Managua, La Prensa, at this time carried an article on the subject of the infliction of the death penalty upon members of the Guardia Nacional guilty of certain acts, and was read and discussed in Telpaneca. It should be remembered that practically the entire command at this station remained unchanged, and that they had just recently participated in a mutiny following the signing of the Larios Pact of Blood, and had treacherously murdered their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Trogler. Unrest and a feeling of apprehension lest they be discovered and awarded the death penalty, filled the minds of the men.

A fatal error was made in not relieving at least fifty percent of the command and replacing them with other men of known integrity, immediately after the death of Lieutenant Trogler, as a matter of precaution if for no other reason, and especially as, even at that time, the circumstances surrounding the affair, with its "bandit attack" which everyone doubted, and other inconsistencies that pointed to mutiny, were sufficiently evident to warrant such action, particularly when one considers the isolated location of Telpaneca in the mountains, the lack of communications and the impossibility of bringing prompt relief in case of necessity. It was not until October 20th that a patrol under command of Second Lieutenant James C. Rimes (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), arrived at Telpaneca via Palacaguina with ten replacements for the station. The patrol was composed of seventeen enlisted, all but two of whom were recruits.

The rumors of the execution of First Sergeant Larios and discussion of the newspaper article on the death penalty, brought to the minds of enlisted men and civilians in Telpaneca the thought, which soon became a thoroughly believed conviction, that the ten men ordered replaced and transferred were going to Ocotal to be executed for their part in the recent mutiny.

It was established later that one of the members of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol carried a letter from First Sergeant Larios in Ocotal to Sergeant Salinas, who had relieved him as Acting First Sergeant at Telpaneca, and who had previously served with him, and was a good friend of his. This letter was not recovered, but it is known that Salinas announced to various of his men, following the second Telpaneca mutiny, that Larios would join the column of mutineers on the trail near Santo Domingo, between Telpaneca and San Juan de Telpaneca, and that Salinas and his group waited for him at this point until it became evident to them that he was not going to arrive.

It is highly probable that Lario's letter also contained plans, or suggestions, for another mutiny of the garrison at Telpaneca, and it may have been he who suggested the idea of the intended execution of the ten men being transferred, in order to induce Salinas and the others to carry out his plans for this mutiny, a continuation of his pact of blood scheme to kill North American officers and to demonstrate opposition to the presence of these officers in Nicaragua.

At any rate Sergeant Salinas, who theretofore had been a mild mannered company clerk, seemingly trustworthy and incapable of becoming the leader of a revolt (he had been Captain Burwell's sole body-guard on numerous pay trips earlier that year to the outlying stations of the Department of Managua and Carazo), held a meeting of various members of the command at about 12:30 a.m., October 21st, and formulated plans for a mutiny. Salinas named himself as a colonel.

At 6:50 a.m., that same morning while Lieutenants Levonski and Rimes were about to have breakfast, they were surprised by six armed guardias, three having entered the house via the front door and three from the rear. Lieutenant Rimes was not armed; Lieutenant Levonski was disarmed, and both were taken prisoner, marched to the Guardia brig and confined. Expostulations on the part of the officers were silenced with threats of immediate death if they continued talking.

Lieutenant Rimes had intended clearing for Ocotal with his patrol at 7:30 a.m., had given the necessary orders for the movement, and, before going to breakfast, had noted that the men were getting themselves and the animals ready. These men knew nothing about the plans of the mutineers, and were as much surprised at the events which transpired as the two officers. Some attempted to leave town, but were apprehended, and all were forced, through fear of death, to stand watches and to accompany the group when they cleared town later in the day.

The mutineers at once placed sentinels over all trails leading out of town, also machine guns, destroyed the radio set and threw it into the river, and ordered the inhabitants to close their doors and not to leave their homes. Groups then looted the principal stores and private residences for money and merchandise, and secured animals upon which to carry their stolen goods. Guardia Nacional funds, and the cash, clothing and jewelry of the officers was taken, and all Guardia property, including machine guns, automatic weapons, grenades, ammunition, etc., was gathered together to be taken along. The services of various male civilians were impressed for the loading of the pack animals, and later for help in the crossing of the Rio Coco just below town, in boats.

About noon two Marine Corps planes passed over Telpaneca and one made a drop of official and personal correspondence. The aviation panels at the station had been permanently laid out, and one of the mutineers, dressed in Lieutenant Rimes' uniform, recovered the drop, so that there was nothing apparent to the pilots that anything irregular was going on.

During the entire day the two officers remained in confinement, without food and hourly expecting to be taken out and shot. A record of events and some of their thoughts, written by them, was later found on the cell wall.

About 5:00 p.m., the officers were removed from confinement, and taken, with hands tied and lead-rope around their necks, to the river. They were accompanied by all members of the mutinous group, including both the regular garrison and Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, the cargo and animals. At this time they begged the mutineers to shoot them at once, for they feared torture. The crossing of the river was completed at about 7:00 p.m., and many bulky articles were left behind at this point, due either to haste and lack of direction or to insufficient animal transportation. However, all machine guns, automatic weapons and ammunition were taken.

The column continued the march all night, and at daybreak arrived at the Polanco ranch near Santo Domingo Valley. A number of the men who did not wish to accompany the mutineers were able to escape during the night, and did so. The following day others deserted the column as the opportunity presented itself. Lieutenant Levonski and Rimes were told by Salinas that they were going to be killed. Salinas, however, was courteous at all times, stood at attention when addressing them, and shared his food and drink with them.

One of the men agreed to assist the officers to escape, but lost heart and disappeared from the column alone. Later, about 8:00 p.m., Levonski and Rimes found a favorable moment when an accident to a cargo caused a halt and a separation of the force into two groups. They escaped and rushed precipitously up a side trail and into the brush, becoming separated almost immediately. Levonski sprained his ankle, but both encountered some of the loyal men, and with them returned to Telpaneca, Rimes arriving first.

Practically all of the personnel of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, and a few of the original Telpaneca garrison, reported in either at Telpaneca or at Palacaguina. The balance continued on and made their way to Honduras, where the arms and ammunition were confiscated, and the men jailed temporarily. They were not returned to Nicaragua.

Section 5—Paso Real, Jinotega

Captain Edward Selby, G.N. (First Lieutenat, U.S.M.C.), was killed at Paso Real, Department of Jinotega, at about 9:00 p.m., March 9, 1930, by rifle shots fired by a Guardia sentinel.

At the time, Captain Selby was in command of a Guardia patrol operating out of the city of Jinotega, and had camped for the night near Paso Real. Shortly before his death he set out, in company with a Lieutenant (Marine Corps noncommissioned officer), to inspect the security of the corral gate where the animals had been placed for the night. Apparently he committed a grave error in not notifying members of the guard, and especially the sentinels on post, that the officers intended going beyond the limits of the camp and outside the line of sentinels. Particularly was this true in view of his own defective hearing and the fact that the patrol was, at the time, in a bandit-infested region.

Instructions had been issued by Captain Selby to the members of the patrol that when posted as sentinels, before firing at a suspicious object or noise, they should challenge and fire three shots in the air.

This order was disregarded by the sentinel on post at the time the officers made their inspection of the corral gate, and while they were returning to camp he fired upon them at a range of about fifty-two yards, no challenge or warning shots having been made. Captain Selby was struck and instantly killed.

The sentinel in question had absented himself prior to the departure of the patrol from Jinotega in order to avoid accompanying it, and reported in only when he thought the patrol had gone too far for him to be ordered to join it. To escape punishment, however, he agreed to proceed to join the patrol, and did so. These incidents do not appear to have had any relation to the firing upon the two officers, but are stated to show the character of the individual. An investigation of the affair showed an apparent lack of premeditation on the part of the sentinel. He was an illiterate native-Nicaraguan of limited military training and experience, and under the circumstances would likely have been under a nervous tension, and, believing that bandits were approaching in the darkness, probably fired without giving a thought to his orders or to the possibility that those approaching might not be bandits.

Section 6—Jicaro

A one-man mutiny was staged at Jicaro, Eastern Nueva Segovia by Corporal Simon Ortiz Morales, G.N., on the night of April 17-18, 1930, resulting in the deaths of Captain Veryl H. Dartt, G.N. (First Lieut., U.S.M.C.), and the wounding of Sergeant Rodolfo Gonzales, G.N.

Corporal Ortiz had felt himself aggrieved by a recent reduction from the rank of Sergeant, for misconduct. On April 17th, he had been acting sergeant of the guard, and was discovered by Sergeant Gonzales to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was relieved from duty by Lieutenant Young and doubtless anticipated further reduction for this new offense. He had also been harboring a personal enmity against Sergeant Gonzales, and the events of this day inflammed his anger, and caused him to make threats of violence to Gonzales, who reported the facts to Lieutenant Young. On this account, and because of the condition of Ortiz as to sobriety, the Lieutenant directed Sergeant Gonzalez to sleep that night in the office next to the officers' quarters.

The fact that Ortiz was under the influence of intoxicating liquor did not interfere with his formulation of plans during the day. But it will never be known just what his intentions were, and against whom he desired vengeance—whether his objective was to kill Sergeant Gonzalez alone, whether he planned only to kill some of the officers stationed at Jicaro, or both Gonzalez and the officers. It seems, however, in view of all events, both prior to and during the mutiny, that Sergeant Gonzalez was to have been the victim, and that the killing of the two officers was not intended, and was accidental, due to their crossing the line of fire.

During the day Ortiz had secreted a rifle in a convenient location in a toilet near the barracks, and about 12:45 a.m., approached the heavy Browning machine gun emplacement, where, without opposition on the part of the sentinel, he removed the gun and placed it in the street in front of the officers' quarters. About a half hour later he opened fire with it upon the door and windows of the office in which Sergeant

Gonzalez was sleeping. Some shots also went through a window of the officers' section of the building, and others struck the walls of a house on the adjacent corner.

As Sergeant Gonzalez started out to investigate the cause of the firing, he was struck and wounded. Captain Dartt and Lieutenant Young were aroused, and, doubtless believing that a bandit attack was in progress, armed themselves and hurried out to investigate.

As they came to the doorway of the office both were struck by the spray of machine gun fire directed at it. Captain Dartt was instantly killed, while Lieutenant Young lived until 7:40 a.m., that same morning.

Throughout the firing although there were sentinels on post at the barracks, and other guardias were aroused by the noise and came out to take up positions along the defense wall, no attempt was made by anyone to put a stop to it. All appeared to be dazed and stood helplessly by, when a well-directed shot might have been the means of saving the life of one, or both, of the officers. The firing of the machine gun was allowed to continue until finally Corporal Ortiz himself brought it to a halt by committing suicide. He had previously, before opening fire with the machine gun, removed his right shoe and sock; and fired a single shot into his head from the rifle which he had secreted during the day and carried out into the street with the machine gun, by pulling the trigger with his toe.

It appears now that when Ortiz was first reduced from the rank of sergeant for misconduct, he should have been transferred to some other station instead of being allowed to remain at Jicaro, where there was little or no amusement available to cheer him up, and where he would undoubtedly suffer a loss of prestige among the other men of the command, and at the very least would be discontented. Giving him the opportunity of a fresh start at a new station might have been his salvation, as well as that of the two officers who died at his hand.

But the fatal error in the situation unquestionably was made on April 17th in not immediately confining Ortiz when he was found to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor while on duty as Acting Sergeant of the Guard, and for having made threats of violence against Sergeant Gonzalez, with whom he had a known enmity, and especially when the situation was considered so serious as to warrant the issue of orders to Gonzalez to sleep that night in the office as a measure of security.

Section 7—Somoto

Influenced by bandits and bandit sympathizers in and around the town of Somoto, Western Nueva Segovia, several members of the Guardia garrison at that place planned a mutiny, to occur at 1:00 a.m., December 8, 1930.

Two of the mutineers were to disarm the two sergeants by taking their pistols from them while they slept. They were then to open the prison doors and release the eighteen prisoners, cover the barracks with a Lewis machine gun, collect all arms and ammunition from the men in the barracks, arm the prisoners, kill all noncommissioned officers, excepting one, then kill the officers, loot the town, and the entire force of mutineering guardias and armed civilian prisoners was then to clear for the hills and join the bandits.

The instigators of the plot attempted to enlist the assistance of the Gutierrez brothers, a corporal and a private respectively, who promptly reported the circumstances to the Commanding Officer, Captain Gregon A. Williams, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.). Confinement of the leaders brought an end to the attempted mutiny.

Investigation developed that one of the leaders had been seen with a large roll of bills, although he had had no money that same morning, and had been in company with a young girl whose family was closely associated with the bandit chief Jose Leon Diaz.

Section 8—Presidential Guard, Managua

On April 4, 1931, four days after the Managua earthquake, at a time when tension was high and the nerves of the over-worked and sleepless officers and enlisted men were jumpy, a series of events took place at the Guardia section of the Campo de Marte and camp of the Presidential Guard, which resulted in the death of Second Lieutenant William H. Pigg, G.N. (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), and the wounding of Sergeant Francisco Fernandez, G.N.

A private attached to the Presidential Guard happened to be within the Camp de Marte compound when an order was issued to allow no more guardias to leave, and to put all men to work on the ruins of the buildings recovering government property. This man attempted to return to his own organization via the east gate, and was stopped by the sentinel on duty there. He explained his status and continued on through the gate in the direction of the camp of the Presidential Guard. In the meantime the sentinel dispatched a runner to inform the Officer of the Day.

The runner could not locate the Officer of the Day, but met Lieutenant Pigg and informed him. The latter, without authority to do so, proceeded to the camp of the Presidential Guard, and attempted to apprehend the private in question. He encountered the Sergeant of the Guard, Sergeant Carlos Paniagua, and ordered him to arrest the private and take him to the Camp de Marte. The sergeant stated that as he was on duty as sergeant of the Guard he could not leave camp so could not carry out the order, whereupon Lieutenant Pigg drew his pistol, pointed it at the Sergeant and disarmed him, stating at the same time that it was he who was giving orders.

Sergeant Fernandez of the Presidential Guard walked in the direction of the Browning machine gun, and Lieutenant Pigg, evidently thinking that he intended firing it at him, opened fire upon the sergeant with his pistol, wounding him. Other men on the flank, observing the actions of the officer, immediately fired their rifles at him and he was struck and killed.

It was very probable that the tension, previously referred to, had some influence upon the actions of Lieutenant Pigg, and possibly upon the actions of Sergeant Fernandez and the various men who fired upon the Lieutenant. But there is no doubt that the latter exceeded his authority in attempting to make an arrest in the camp of the Presidential Guard for a minor infraction of orders in the Campo de Marte, since he had no connection with the Presidential Guard. Furthermore, he

was entirely wrong in assuming that he could give orders to the Sergeant of the Guard in the camp of the Presidential Guard, and in disarming the sergeant, and taking on an aggressive attitude there. This officer was new in the Guardia and was not able to speak or understand Spanish very well, so it is possible that he did not comprehend the original situation and that his subsequent actions were based on erroneous initial information, which to his mind made his course justifiable.

Section 9—Kisalaya

At 4:30 p.m., on April 4, 1932, a mutiny occurred at Kisalaya, Department of Northern Bluefields, and the Commanding Officer, First Lieutenant Charles J. Levonski, G.N. (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), who had been captured during the second Telpaneca mutiny(see section 4), was killed, and Second Lieutenant Carlos Reyes, G.N., second in command, and only other officer present, was wounded.

That morning the Department Commander, Captain Orrel A. Inman, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.), had visited the station, paid the command and made an inspection. He found everything satisfactory—the men cheerful and apparently thoroughly contented. At 1:00 p.m., he had cleared for Puerto Cabezas, his headquarters, by plane.

During the afternoon an issue of clothing was made to the men. It was a limited quantity, brought there that morning by the Department Commander, and was unsufficient to supply all men. Accordingly the officers issued it to those whom they considered to be most in need of it. Private Pablo P. Salmeron was dissatisfied because he had not been given clothing and made some disrespectful remarks to Lieutenant Levonski, who ordered him confined. Lieutenant Reyes passed on these instructions to Sergeant Sebastian Jimenez, who became insolent, refused to obey, and stated that what Private Salmeron had said was correct. Lieutenant Reyes then told the sergeant that he was going to confine him as well.

Sergeant Jimenez hurried into the barracks, returned with a sub-Thompson machine gun, and ordered all men to get their automatic weapons and rifles and take up positions in the trenches around the barracks. This was done, Lieutenant Levonski, in the meantime, asking him what was going on. The sergeant replied that they wanted to kill Lieutenant Reyes, who by that time had disappeared inside of the barracks, and told Levonski to produce him, which he refused to do. The sergeant stated that they intended no harm to Lieutenant Levonski but wanted to kill Reyes. At this moment the latter jumped out of the barracks, ran for the brush, and was fired upon and wounded. Levonski went to the heavy Browning machine gun position and, standing beside the gun, was shot and killed by Private Juan R. Pantoja, with a Browning automatic rifle. Apparently no violence to Lieutenant Levonski was intended at first, but as the situation developed the motives of the men changed, and Levonski became a victim of the passion and excitement of the moment, possibly because of his refusal to produce Lieutenant Reyes upon demand, and possibly because of his attempts to halt the proceedings and apparent intention of using the heavy Browning machine gun against the mutineers.

Not all enlisted members of the command participated in the firing; during this part of the mutiny some hid in the trenches, the radio operator remained in the radio shack trying to call and inform Puerto Cabezas although he did not succeed; a cook hid behind some bunches of bananas in the galley, and some others ran away.

The fifteen mutineers ramsacked the station and then proceeded upstream, to the westward, in two boats, carrying the automatic weapons, a very large amount of ammunition, a quantity of grenades, and other supplies, and forcibly accompanied by a few unwilling guardias who escaped at the first opportunity, and a woman, common-law wife of Lieutenant Reyes.

It was held by an investigating board that "the mutiny was not due to any fault, negligence or inefficiency on the part of the officers concerned, and that it could not have been averted by any action that could have been taken at that time."

On April 21st, the mutineers, led by Sergeant Jimenez, who had been appointed a colonel of bandits, and accompanied by thirty armed bandits, returned to Kisalaya and made an attack on the new garrison. It was successfully repulsed, and during the fighting, Sergeant Jimenez was killed.

Section 10—Quilali

Bandit agents and sympathizers in and around Quilali were the instigators of a plot that brought about an attempted mutiny at Quilali, Southeastern Nueva Segovia, on April 11, 1932. This station was the furthest from Ocotal, in a wildly mountainous location on the fringe of that part of Nueva Segovia and Jinotega continuously held by the bandit groups.

The plan was developed with the assistance of three guardias of the Quilali garrison. It was intended first to lure the Commanding Officer, and only officer present, Second Lieutenant Joseph K. Roberts, G.N. (First Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), away from the barracks, situated on a high hill on the south edge of the village, down into the town, and there kill him. Returning to the barracks, the mutiny was to be further unfolded by the leaders, who were to impress the services of the balance of the command, capture all the arms and ammunition, and then desert the post with the object of joining the bandits and delivering over to them the weapons and munitions.

On the night of April 10–11, 1932, the first part of the scheme was set in motion by Sergeant Garcia, theretofore a capable noncommissioned officer and expert machine gunner, induced Lieutenant Roberts to accompany him to the town to the house of one of the civilian plotters. As they were proceeding down the hill together, Roberts observed two other guardias coming behind, but thought they were going on authorized liberty. Arriving in the town, Roberts noticed that Sergeant Garcia was armed with a Browning automatic rifle and the other two, one of whom was Corporal Cornejo, the noncommissioned officer in charge of the Armory at the barracks and an arms expert, were both armed with sub-Thompson machine guns. This he considered most unusual, and became further suspicious when the civilian asked him to accompany him to

the edge of town. In the meantime, the three guardias had secreted themselves near this point, Lieutenant Roberts, however, becoming alarmed, returned to the barracks.

Having failed to accomplish their purpose, the three guardias abandoned the balance of the plans, and deserted taking with them the weapons and ammunition which they carried, and proceeded north and west to Guambuco Mountain on the Nicaraguan frontier northwest of Apali, and joined the Salgado group of bandits at its main camp there. They were identified during several later contacts in which they fought aggressivly and employed the automatic weapons most effectively, particularly at Las Puertas, near Apali, Eastern Nueva Segovia, on April 21st when three North American officers and seven enlisted guardias were killed, and during both contacts at Guambuco Mountain on April 23rd and 26th.

Section 11—San Isidro

The sole instance of actual mutiny wherein a Nicaraguan officer was a participant, occurred at San Isidro, Department of Matagalpa, about 1:00 a.m., June 30, 1932, and resulted in the murder of Second Lieutenant Edward H. Schmierer, G.N. (Gunnery-Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), and the loss of valuable government arms and munitions.

The revolt was planned at least several hours before it occurred and involved four enlisted men of the station. The balance of the command knew nothing of the scheme, and later stated that they knew of no reason for dissatisfaction among the men at the station and that Lieutenant Schmierer was well-liked by both guardias and civilians, and that he had no enemies.

During the evening of June 29th, a dance was given at the quarters of Lieutenant Gonzalez, attended by most of the guardias, and it was testified at the investigation held following the death of Lieutenant Schmierer, that Gonzalez repeatedly gave intoxicating liquor to the four guardias whom he had taken into his confidence and with whom he had planned the mutiny. Gonzalez was to have been transferred the following day to Matagalpa, and this fact appears to have been the only grievance which he held against Lieutenant Schmierer. He evidently believed that the transfer had been arranged or made at his order for personal reasons, when as a matter of fact it had been ordered by the Department Commander as a routine procedure. Gonzalez was to have been assigned to special duty under instruction in the work of the Quartermaster's Department in accordance with the policy of Headquatrers, Guardia Nacional, incident to the turn-over of the Guardia to Nicaraguan officers.

About midnight Lieutenant Schmierer sent orders for the return of all guardias to the barracks, and this complied was with. Lieutenant Gonzalez, and the four guardias whom he had chosen to assist him, proceeded at once with arrangements for clearing San Isidro, getting together animals, arms, ammunition, grenades, and other supplies. They awakened one other guardia, told him that they were going on patrol, and ordered him to accompany them.

Assembling in the street, and with all preparations for their departure complete, Lieutenant Gonzalez went to the house of Lieutenant Schmierer, opened the door, and, as Schmierer sat up in bed, awakened by the noise, emptied his pistol into Schmierer's body, killing him. The mutineers then ransacked the quarters, took everything of value and deserted clearing San Isidro in a northwesterly direction, taking with them the Browning automatic rifle, sub-Thompson machine gun. and other supplies they had previously gathered together. They continued on, and eluded capture, although several patrols were in hot pursuit with the intention of apprehending them.

The balance of the San Isidro garrison was alert throughout the night, and most of the men remained in the trenches, anticipating the return of Lieutenant Gonzalez, whom they feared might attempt some vengeance against them. This did not occur, however.

The five enlisted Guardia who accompanied Gonzalez in his flight eventually surrendered themselves with their arms including both automatic weapons, at Guardia Headquarters in Managua. Gonzalez escaped capture.

CHAPTER XVI

ACTIVITIES OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DURING THE EARTHQUAKE IN MANAGUA

The earthquake that visited Managua, Nicaragua at approximately 10:22 a.m., March 31, 1931, found the Guardia Nacional prepared to step into the breach and take control of the situation.

It was fortunate that the earthquake struck the city during Holy Week, when many thousands of the population, especially of the middle and upper classes, were out of the city sojourning at the mountain, lake and sea resorts as was customary at this season of the year. There is no doubt but that the casualties would have been more extensive but for this customary leave taking during Holy Week.

Hardly had the first great shock ceased its terrific rumbling and destruction, than the Guardia Nacional commenced its work of re-establishing and maintaining order, safeguarding of life and property, prevention of looting, the establishment of a water supply, rescue of the injured and the removal and burial of the dead, from the wreckage.

The first official act by which the Jefe Director of the Guardia took control of the situation, was the declaration of Martial Law in the city of Managua. This act of the Jefe Director was carried out in the absence of the President of the Republic, who was at his summer camp at Venecia Laguna. The President on his return to Managua later in the day gave his approval to the action of the Jefe Director in the establishment of Martial Law. Orders issued later by the Jefe Director covered the handling of looters, the distribution of water and food and clothing to the destitute.

The immensity of the task pertaining to policing, guarding of property and the searching for the dead and injured required the closest coöperation between the Marine Corps forces and the Guardia Nacional. These two military organizations functioned together and assisted one another without friction throughout the emergency period. With the added aid of the Marine forces in Managua, the Guardia still found the task of property protection of such proportions that a system of appointments of civilians as Civicos was adopted by the Jefe Director. Prominent citizens and others of reputable character were appointed to Civico rank by the Jefe Director, each was armed with a rifle or pistol, furnished with a reasonable amount of ammunition, given some instruction in police duties and placed on duty in the down town sector as assistants to the regular Guardia police force. Their immediate commanding officer was the Chief of Police of Managua, Captain Hamilton M. H. Fleming, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.). The duties of these Civicos were mainly to prevent looting and to arrest all those caught in the act of looting. The original order issued concerning looters was to kill all persons caught in the act. This was later changed to arrest all looters, in order to preclude the possibility of endangering the lives of bonafide owners of property who inadvertently might attempt to enter their homes or business establishments and be mistaken for looters. Orders had previously been issued and distributed to the public prohibiting anyone from entering any of the buildings in the destroyed area without

proper authority, even though the person concerned was the rightful owner. One of the main duties performed by the Civicos was the prevention of entrance to buildings and the removal of property, until regulations were issued in this connection. Every effort was exerted to assure some protection of property either by Marines, Guardia or Civicos. Within a few hours when the work of taking care of the injured and removal and burial of the dead became mere routine, the citizens began to turn their thoughts to rescue of their household effects in the fire-swept and other wrecked areas. To facilitate this matter of removal of property and also to offset the possibility of unauthorized persons entering and making way with the property of rightful owners, a pass system was inaugurated by the Jefe Director. Passes were issued to individuals upon proper and authentic identification by persons known to the issuing officer, (in this case, Colonel Walter G. Sheard, G.N. (Major, U.S.M.C.), assisted by the Jefe Politico, Colonel Sheard acting as Chief of Staff of the Guardia vice Colonel Robert L. Denig, G.N. (Major, U.S.M.C.), who suffered a fractured leg as a result of the earthquake and was evacuated to the hospital), authorizing such rightful owner to enter his own home or place of business for the purpose of removing his property to a place of safety. The removal of the property in question was as far as practicable supervised by either a Marine, Guardia or Civico. Another important pass or permit system was established whereby certain selected citizens of the community were authorized to commandeer articles of food, medicines and clothing and other necessities of life to alleviate the suffering of the injured and to feed and clothe the destitute. Whenever practicable, and where the original ownership of the commandeered items could definitely be established, proper receipts were given for all items taken, with a view to adjustment when conditions became more settled.

The citizens to the greatest extent possible worked for their food and they, in a majority of cases, were glad to do this even though their only return for their labor was their food. Later the American Red Cross, through its Central Relief Committee, provided work clearing up the debris at a wage of $0.40 per diem, the standard labor wage in Nicaragua. Thousands of the males, and many females, ranging in age from husky youths in their teens to those on the verge of feebleness, turned to with a willingness to assist in the work of clearing debris from all the destroyed areas, in preparation for opening the streets to traffic and thus expedite the work of removal of the dead from beneath the fallen walls. There were numerous cases sometime after the quake where unwillingness was displayed on the part of some of the men to assist in any sort of work; this class was drafted by the Guardia and placed in working gangs with a guard in control.

Within a period of one-half hour after the earthquake struck, all activities at Guardia Headquarters were functioning out in the patio in rear of the General Headquarters buildings. Desks were pulled out from under piles of plaster, stone and broken wood; file cabinets were removed with great difficulty and under dangerous conditions due to the cracked condition of the building walls. There was no telling when another shock of great severity might occur and topple the already weakened walls. A considerable number of Guardia records were lost. One can safely state that the general functioning of the activities at Headquarters of the Guardia was only disrupted for a period of less than a half hour.

Shocks persistently recurred for a period of about five days and it was impossible to determine when one of greater force than the original shock might take place. All sections of the staff headquarters established their activities under either the open sky or canvas. Every desk was a headquarters for some nature of work having to do with relief. To the Chief of Staff fell the bulk of work. All sections worked hard and without complaint for days and nights in the effort to establish and maintain a proper functioning and coördination of all relief activities. Despite the heavy burden on Guardia Headquarters because of the earthquake, there was still the regular routine administrative work to be done in connection with activities in the various outlying departments and areas. Several threats of bandit attacks on Managua required formation of patrols at vital points of entry in the city. Although no bandit attacks materialized from these rumors, still a great added work befell the GN-2 and GN-3 sections of the Guardia in the formation of these patrols as the men who composed them had to be withdrawn from very urgent duties in the destroyed areas. Every officer and enlisted man had a task assigned him and some had three or four to perform. Several officers who were on leave in Managua from outlying stations at the time of the quake, were immediately called into service in various capacities. Additional officers were detailed to the police department; extra officers were detailed to handle the rationing of food to refugees and workers in the Campo; officers were placed in charge of various relief activities throughout the city; Guardia officers, line and medical, assisted in the maintenance of a huge refugee camp on La Loma Golf Course and in the rationing of food, milk and water to the thousands of occupants of this camp. Every Guardia officer called into service by this great emergency displayed a spirit of great enthusiasm in his work and there was never a case where a complaint was registered against any Guardia officer for the manner of performance of his multitudinous duties. They were all tried by fire and found not wanting. To name some of the Guardia officers at this time will take but little space:

Major General Calvin B. Matthews, G.N., Jefe Director, (Lieutenant-Colonel, U.S.M.C.), had as his Chief of Staff up to the time of the quake, Colonel Robert L. Denig, G.N. (then Major, U.S.M.C.). Due to injuries received as a result of the quake, Colonel Denig was evacuated to the hospital and Colonel Walter G. Sheard, G.N. (Major, U.S.M.C.) took over the duties of Chief of Staff. Major Otto Salzman, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.), was GN-2 and 3, in charge of Operations and Training and Intelligence; First Lieutenant Charles Davis, G.N. (Sergeant-Major, U.S.M.C.), was GN-1 and Adjutant of the Guardia in charge of the personnel section; the Law section was also controlled by Colonel Sheard, assisted by First Lieutenat Arthur E. Buckner, G.N. (First-Sergeant, U.S.M.C.); Colonel Gordon D. Hale, (MC), G.N., was Medical Director and assisted by First Lieutenant Roy Aikman, (MC), G.N. (Chief Pharmacist, (MC), U.S.N.); Major William J. Livingston, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.) was Paymaster of the Guardia and assisted by First Lieutenant Erwin, G.N. (Chief Pay Clerk, U.S.M.C.); Major Maurice C. Gregory, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.) was Guardia Quartermaster and assisted in his work by First Lieutenant Frank H. Williams, G.N. (Quartermaster-Sergeant, U.S.M.C.); Captain H. M. H. Fleming, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.), was Chief of Police of Managua, while Captain Evans

F. Carlson, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.) was in command of the Department of Managua-Carazo and was also appointed as liaison officer between the civil government and the Guardia. Others who played important parts in the activities during the earthquake period were Captain Edward J. Trumble, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.), Captain Francis J. Cunningham, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.), First Lieutenant Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N. (First-Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), the latter three as Director, Sub-Director and Chief Instructor at the Nicaraguan Military Academy, respectively; Captain Lewis B. Puller,G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.) who performed valuable duty in various capacities; Major Glenn D. Miller, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.) who happened to be in Managua at the time under orders to the United States, was appointed as commanding officer of the Penitentiary area, vice Captain James L. Denham, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.) who had been injured by falling stones. First Lieutenant Harry E. Hurst, G.N. (First Sergeant, U.S.M.C.) as second in command at the prison area assisted Major Miller in the enormous task of caring for the injured and removal and burial of the dead resulting from the collapse of the Penitentiary. First Lieutenant Walter E. Anderson, G.N. (Gunnery Sergeant, U.S.M.C.) was Transportation Officer of the Guardia and on his shoulders fell the task of furnishing trucks and other transportation for the purpose of hauling water in barrels and large gasolene drums to newly established water distribution stations throughout the city. Water was also hauled into the burning area in an effort to stem the onward march of the flames.

Water was of no avail with a strong east wind blowing steadily and fanning the flames into greater fury. Finding that the continued and unchecked spread of the flames would eventually destroy the entire city it was decided that the use of dynamite must be resorted to check the flames. For this important duty the services of the United States Army Engineers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dan I. Sultan, (Corps of Engineers), U. S. Army, then stationed in Granada, were requested. A selected group under Colonel Sultan immediately came to Managua to handle this work. The Engineers, who were in Nicaragua in connection with the Nicaraguan Canal Survey, immediately on arrival in Managua with a supply of demolitions, commenced their task of clearing a path in the face of the flames to halt their advance. In this task the Engineers were assisted by both Guardia and Marine Corps personnel. With lack of any fire-fighting apparatus or water service the job was a difficult one. However, after a persistent battle of almost five days the fire, through the use of explosives, was brought under control and finally extinguished. To the use of dynamite can be given credit for saving the entire city from destruction by fire; by means of demolitions the fire was confined to the downtown area and within a few blocks of its point of origin, the market buildings.

The immensity of the task of the Guardia and Marine forces in their multitudinous duties can be realized by visualizing the extent of the damage done by the original shock, intermittant tremblers and the fire that followed the first shock. It has been conservatively estimated that over thirty-three down town city blocks were completely gutted by the fire and hundreds of other business establishments and private

homes were either totally or partially destroyed in the sections outside of the fire zone. Destruction reached every point within the boundaries of the city and considerable damage was done to structures in the outlying districts. The total damage, only fractionally covered by insurance ran well into the millions of dollars.

In the market buildings hundreds of lives were lost, a great majority being women and children. At the time of the quake, the busiest shopping time of the morning, the markets were jammed with housewives and their children making their daily purchases. The almost instantaneous outbreak of the flames in the market buildings, following the crumbling of the thick walls, created a panic among the women and with the fallen walls blocking the exits escape was almost impossible. They were trapped in what became a blazing inferno. The Guardia who were first on the scene of the market fire had great difficulty in preventing men and women from rushing into the blazing buildings in search of their loved ones whom they knew were or had been in these buildings making purchases. To form fire lines back of which the crowds could be kept was practically impossible, and in fact unnecessary, as the oncoming flames and intensity of the heat soon drove all back to a safe distance. Many minor casualties were suffered among the Guardia and Marine personnel due to burns received in the efforts to rescue persons from the flames. The military personnel, in the face of a losing battle to halt the flames, fought doggedly on without respite and it can never be said that the fighters relaxed their efforts while there remained a chance to save even a single life.

It was soon ascertained that the Guardia police station, located in the heart of the downtown sector, was in the direct path of the fire, and it was found necessary to remove such property and records as could be salvaged from the almost demolished building, to space in Campo de Marte. A temporary open-air police headquarters was therefore established on the Guardia tennis courts. The prisoners formerly confined in the police station were placed in working parties and utilized in rescue work and other activities of relief. The fact that the headquarters of the Guardia Police was destroyed did not hinder for one moment the continuance of the efficient activities of that organization under the able leadership of Captain Fleming, its chief, and his assistants. Like other members of the Guardia the police labored day and night without halt for an indefinite period in their work of maintaining order, security of lives and property and the prevention of looting. Their every task was accomplished without complaint and they performed all of their duties in a highly commendable manner. Through the efforts of the Guardia police, looting was kept to a minimum and possible rioting was eliminated.

The National Penitentiary which was under control of the Guardia, was completely destroyed by the first shock of the quake, with a loss of life among the Guardia and prisoners running well over one hundred. It was at the Penitentiary that the American personnel of the Guardia suffered their greatest casualties, in the loss of the lives of Major Hugo F. A. Baske (MC), G.N. (Lieutenant-Commander, MC,–U. S. Navy), Medical officer in charge at the prison, and First Lieutenant James L. Dickey, G.N. (Chief Quartermaster Clerk, U. S. M. C.),

both of whom were instantly killed by falling walls. Second Lieutenant Lieutenant Robert G. Crawford, G.N. (First Sergeant, U. S. M. C.), who was assisting Lieutenant Dickey in making an audit of the prison accounts, was buried for many hours under huge blocks of stone. For a time it was thought that he had been instantly killed but later was removed from the wreckage alive but suffering from serious internal injuries and broken pelvis bones. First Lieutenant Louis Rossich, G. N. (Gunnery Sergeant, U.S.M.C.) Mess officer at the prison, was likewise buried under tons of huge blocks of stone but later in the day was removed alive though suffering serious internal injuries, fractures of the bones of the right leg and hand and severe scalp wounds. Numerous other minor casualties were suffered by Americans on duty at the prison but their injuries did not stop them from pitching into the work of rescue and relief after having their injuries dressed The escapes from instant death of Lieutenants Crawford and Rossich were miraculous and it is beyond human comprehension how they survived their burial under tons of debris for hours. The Penitentiary was constructed of huge blocks of lava rock, each block weighing five hundred pounds or more.

The uninjured prisoners of the Penitentiary were grouped into working parties under control of Guardia and proceeded in the work of removing dead and injured from the wreckage. This was an immense task in view of the size and weight of the blocks of stone that covered the wrecked area. They labored under the most difficult and dangerous conditions without thought for personal safety, and for this excellent performance of labor many of them were later pardoned by the President of the Republic. Prisoner details were also utilized in digging trench and individual graves to bury the dead at the New Cemetery and other burial places. A trenchlike fissure opened in the ground by the earthquake near the Penitentiary was used as a common grave for interment of approximately 120 or the Penitentiary dead. A huge wooden cross now stands at one end of this long grave as a memorial to those trapped under the prison walls.

The Republic lacking funds for the reconstruction of the Penitentiary, it became necessary to transfer the surviving prisoners of the institution to prisons in Leon, Granada, Masaya and Matagalpa, for completion of their terms of sentence. At the time of the collapse of the prison there were over three hundred prisoners booked for confinement on various serious charges The transfer of the surviving prisoners to other towns for safekeeping made more Guardia available for the more necessary work of policing in the city.

The students at the Nicaraguan Military Academy were enjoying a short Holy Week holiday at the time of the quake and many of them had departed from Managua for their home towns. However, on receiving news of the disaster, the majority of them immediately returned to Managua to be available for such services as they might be detailed to. The student group under command of Captain Edward J. Trumble, G.N., Captain Francis J. Cunningham, G.N. and First Lieutenant Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N., performed outstanding duty in various capacities above and beyond the ordinary call of duty. With their own Academy buildings practically a mass of ruins they established quarters for themselves under such canvas as could be obtained. They also

established a relief camp in the academy grounds where hundreds of refugees were given shelter, fed and clothed. The students acted as traffic police on the roads leading out of Managua and assisted hundreds of refugees who were hastily departing from the stricken city for more distant points of safety. It was a pitiful sight to witness the fear stricken survivors fleeing the city, most of them on foot, with all their worldly belongings on their backs, or in carts drawn by hand, a few in bull carts, in the superstitious belief that the entire city would eventually be destroyed by recurrent shocks and swallowed by the waters of the lake. The inhabitants of the lower and more ignorant classes surely believed that the prediction of years of standing was now coming true and the time had arrived when Managua and the surrounding country would be totally destroyed, sink below the lake level and be no more. This belief caused an exodus from the city running into many thousands. This exodus however was in a way a great Godsend to those who were laboring day and night in their untiring efforts to render relief to those remaining. It greatly reduced the number to be cared for by the relief agencies. Military academy students under charge of First Lieutenant Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N., acted in a very efficient capacity in expediting the transportation of milk from the outlying fincas into the city. They They regulated this source of food supply so that on arrival of milk carts at the city limits, their contents were evenly apportioned to assure a reasonable supply of milk at each of the food distributing stations throughout the city. They likewise regulated incoming supplies of meats and other rations, and maintained a distribution station for gasolene for use in cars taking refugees out of the city. The work of the staff and student body of the academy cannot be commended too highly. They saw their job and did it without complaint throughout he emergency period.

Thousands of men, women and children were fed and sheltered at kitchens and camps supervised by Guardia and Marine Corps personnel. Food was even furnished to the President of the Republic and his Cabinet and their families, from Marine Corps supplies. A huge refugee camp on La Loma Golf Course on the slopes of the Presidential Palace hill, was constructed and maintained by Guardia and Marine Corps personnel where thousands were fed and given shelter in tents, as early as the afternoon of the quake. Dressing stations and hospital facilities were also provided at this camp and supervised by the medical department personnel of the Guardia and Marine Corps. This large camp continued its service of mercy for a period of approximately two weeks by which time the various civilian committees for relief were well organized and capable of caring for the thousands formerly provided for at the Loma camp.

Great credit must be given to the medical department personnel of the Marine Corps and Guardia for the expeditious and efficient manner in which they handled the thousands of injury cases in hastily improvised dressing stations in Campo de Marte, the military center. At these dressing stations American medical personnel treated on the first day of the quake alone over one thousand injury cases, a great many of them being major operative cases. In addition to the more

serious cases, over 8000 cases of minor injuries were treated the first week. A final check on the casualties among the natives shows that over one thousand lives were lost. Great and deserving credit is due Lieutenant Commander Hetfield, (MC), U. S. Navy, and his staff at the Brigade Field Hospital for their untiring and unselfish services in their efforts to alleviate suffering; and to Colonel Gordon D. Hale, (MC), Guardia Nacional Commander, (MC,) U. S. N.),and his staff, for the efficient manner in which he handled the organization and functioning of a sanitary corps to ward off the possibility of an epidemic of disease. The city's water supply was cut off, the sewer system being therefore without water to operate it. Thousands of refugees were under temporary shelter or living in the open without any sanitary arrangements. Latrines had to be provided even for those fortunate enough to be in partly demolished homes. The scarcity of water drove the populace to abandoned wells, the lake and other polluted sources. The population was undernourished and further weakened by injuries and exposure. The shadow of epidemic was near. Colonel Hale met this situation with good judgment and great energy and through his untiring efforts in establishing sanitary measures the danger of an epidemic soon passed. The best possible proof of the adequacy of the sanitary measures adopted is found in the fact that the public health of the city remained practically normal throughout the entire emergency period.

At the time of the quake the Presidential guard was quartered in a newly constructed barracks (supposedly earthquake proof by reenforcement with steel and concrete), on Loma Hill, directly to the right rear of the Presidential Palace. The first shock caused the barracks to collapse completely, however without loss of life or injury on the part of members of the Guard. The Presidential Palace suffered considerable damage, the rear portion that extended out over Lake Tiscapa (an extinct crater lake), dropping off into the lake a hundred or so feet below. The main buildings were also severely damaged, large cracks being found in the foundations and walls. Engineers later declared the buildings to be unsafe and recommended that they be completely demolished as a measure of safety. The President would not permit this however as it was his belief that the Palace could be later restored to its original form with stronger reenforcement material. The President as stated before, was not in the Palace at the time of the quake, and among the personnel of the household, no reported casualties were suffered. A temporary home was provided for the President in the house of General Anastacio Somoza, then Sub-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, which house withstood the shocks of the quake very well with a few minor cracks. This temporary palace of the President was situated across from the Guardia compound. A temporary camp was also established for the enlisted members of the Presidential Guard under canvas in a vacant lot diagonlly across from the abode of the President. The usual functions of the Presidential Guard in protecting the President were carried out very efficiently even under these disrupted conditions.

The barracks buildings of the Department of Managua–Carazo, which were located in the Guardia compound of Campo de Marte, completely collapsed and thus left the members of that organization

without quarters. This matter was taken care of after a day or so by the construction of a sufficient number of tents to quarter the officers and enlisted men. A regular field service camp was established with sufficient latrines to take care of the personnel involved. Drinking water was furnished through the use of Lister bags, loaned to the Guardia by the Marine Corps, and water for cooking was contained in large gasolene drums. A small camp was also established in rear of Guardia Headquarters for General Matthews and his staff. Families of the Marine Corps and Naval personnel on duty in the Brigade and Guardia were given shelter in the frame barracks buildings in the Marine Corps compound and they were fed in the Marine Corps mess hall. The families of the American personnel were thus taken care of until their final evacuation by planes to Corinto a few days later, to be transported to their homes in the United States via government vessels.

It is almost unbelievable that no serious injuries were suffered by the officers and enlisted men on duty at the Guardia Barracks in the Department of Managua. At the time of the first shock the Paymaster of the Guardia was in the process of paying the enlisted personnel of that organization money due them for the month of March. The headquarters office was full of officers and men at the time. However, with few minor exceptions, all escaped from under the collapsing walls uninjured. A few seconds later this entire group of buildings, approximately two hundred feet in length adjoining the Guardia compound wall, was razed, with the heavy tile roof flat on the ground. The Paymaster likewise was fortunate in being able to save all funds that he had spread out on one of the desks, with the exception of about $25.00. The complete pay roll of this particular organization ran into the thousands of dollars. The Commanding Officer of the Department of Managua, Captain Evans F. Carlson, G.N., established his headquarters out under the open sky until such time as tents could be obtained. It was particularly fortunate for those in the Guardia compound that the quake struck during the dry season as otherwise considerable more suffering would have resulted from lack of shelter.

Within a week after the earthquake it was found necessary to seek inside quarters in some substantial building that had withstood the fury of the quake, for establishment of the offices of the Guardia Headquarters section. The dry season was on the wane and in a short while heavy rains could be expected which would make the functioning of the staff sections impracticable under temporary canvas. The heavy winds, bringing on a continuous stream of dust, and the intense heat from the sun made working in the hastily improvised canvas protected offices almost unbearable. The important work of the headquarters could not be halted. The Guardia Quartermaster, Major Gregory, G.N., was directed by the Jefe Director to make a canvas of such buildings of suitable size to accomodate the activities of the entire staff sections and to obtain space to house the entire group. The Christian Brothers College buildings, though severely shaken up and cracked in places, still withstood the quake to such an extent as to be pronounced safe for occupancy on all its three floors. Through the courtesy of the Director of the College the Guardia Quartermaster was enabled to obtain sufficient space on the first and second floors of one of the wing buildings

of the college to house the offices of the Jefe Director, Chief of Staff, Personnel Section, Operations and Training and Intelligence Sections, Law Section, Paymaster and Quartermaster Departments. This allotment of space gave these activities four of the school's large class rooms and space on the large porches for filing cabinets and the excess equipment that could not be placed inside of the rooms. On the porch of the college was also established the Guardia telegraph officer to insure communication with the outlying stations. However the havoc created by the earthquake completely destroyed the telegraph lines in the city proper and due to single lines having to be placed in service, requiring relays through various temporary stations throughout the city, messages to be sent had to be pooled at the last relay point and sent out later in routine order of importance of the message. To send messages during the emergency period from Managua to Leon or some other outlying station no great distance from Managua, sometimes took a whole day. Messages were received from outlying stations of the Guardia that were sometimes three days old. However, with the co-operation of the Guardia Nacional, telephone and telegraph lines were repaired rapidly and within a week or ten days service in these two lines of communication was again functioning on a fairly satisfactory basis. At the time of the quake the Guardia did not have a regularly established communication branch and therefore radio communication was not available to any of the outlying Guardia stations, excepting throught the Tropical Radio Company to the Bluefields area.

In view of the fact that space occupied temporarily by the headquarters activities of the Guardia in the Christian Brothers College would have to be vacated sometime in May, 1931, in order to make room for the regular students of the college on its reopening date, it was necessary to rush construction of the damaged buildings formerly occupied by the staff sections in Campo de Marte. Lack of funds made it necessary that the reconstruction of these buildings be handled by the Guardia Quartermaster and that such funds as the Guardia had available be used. Numerous deductions had to be made from appropriations and allotments for other purposes in order to accomplish the rebuilding expeditiously. Under the direction of the Guardia Quartermaster, the work progressed rapidly. Second Lieutenant Robert J. Mitchell, G.N., (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.) was placed in general charge of the reconstruction of the Headquarters group of buildings and of the Guardia compound wall extending on First Avenue, Southeast, from 5th Street to the La Loma Golf Course. All workmen on this project came under his direct charge. Likewise it was found necessary to construct a set of barracks buildings for the enlisted personnel of the Department of Managua–Carazo and for office and storage space. Second Lieutenant John Krawie, G.N. (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), with considerable construction experience, was placed in charge of this building project, one sufficient to accomodate approximately 300 men. The services rendered by these two Marines in supervising this work were outstanding and early in May the entire headquarters activities of the Guardia moved back into their old quarters from the Christian Brothers College. The Department of Managua barracks buildings for the enlisted men were also ready for occupancy at about this time

and the men moved into them just in time to escape the oncoming rainy season. The work of clearing the Guardia compound of its tent city was then carried out, and the clearing of the debris of the old barracks and quartermaster buildings was another job to be completed. In a comparatively short time the Campo began taking on the appearance of a post whose activities had never been disrupted.

Lists of the dead and injured among the American personnel on duty with the Guardia include:

DEAD:

Major Hugo F.A. Baske, (MC), G.N. (Lt-Comdr. MC, USN), instantly killed by falling walls at Penitentiary, March 31, 1931.

First Lieutenant James L. Dickey, G.N. (Chief Quartermaster Clerk USMC) instantly killed by falling walls at Penitentiary, 31 Mar 1931.

Second Lieut. William H. Pigg, (Gy-Sgt. USMC), shot and killed by a member of the Presidential Guard through a misunderstanding.

INJURED:

Colonel Robert L. Denig, G.N. (Lt-Col. USMC) fracture of right leg.

Captain James L. Denham, G.N. (1st-Lieut. USMC), scalp injuries.

First Lieutenant George Occhionero, G.N. (Gy-Sgt. USMC) fracture right hip, severe scalp injuries and body bruises. Occhionero is a cripple today as a result of the earthquake injuries.

First Lieutenant Louis Rossich, G.N. (Gy-Sgt. USMC), buried under walls at Penitentiary; internal injuries, severe scalp injuries, fracture bones right knee and hand; body bruises.

First Lieutenant Charles Davis, G.N. (Sgt-Major, USMC), slight bruises top of head and left instep.

Second Lieutenant Robert G. Crawford, G.N. (First Sgt. USMC), buried under walls at Penitentiary; internal injuries, serious; broken pelvic bones; severe body bruises.

Second Lieutenant McKinley D. Hoskin, G.B. (Sgt. USMC), bruises back and face.

Second Lieutenant Hugo Makus, G.N. (Sgt. USMC) body bruises and right foot severely bruised.

Numerous minor injuries were also sustained by other American members of the Guardia and several deaths and severe injuries by Nicaraguan personnel.

On June 1, 1931, President Jose Maria Moncada formerly conferred the Presidential Gold Medal of Merit on nineteen officers and enlisted-men of the United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps for their valiant and self-sacrificing services following the earthquake in connection with the relief of Managua. Several of these officers and enlisted men were serving with the Guardia Nacional, and four Nicaraguan officers of the Guardia were similarly decorated at the same time. The personnel decorated include:

GUARDIA NACIONAL (USMC AND NAVY):

Major-General Calvin B. Matthews, Jefe Director, G.N. (Lt-Col. USMC)
Colonel Walter G. Sheard, G.N. (Major, USMC)
Colonel Gordon D. Hale, G.N. (Commander, MC, USN)
Major Otto Salzman, G.N. (Captain, USMC)
Major Maurice C. Gregory, G.N. (Captain, USMC)
Major Horace R. Boone, G.N. (Lieut-Comdr. MC, USN)
Captain H. M. H. Fleming, G.N. (Captain, USMC)
Captain Edward J. Trumble, G.N. (First Lieut. USMC)
Captain Evans F. Carlson, G.N. (First Lieut. USMC)
Captain Herbert S. Keimling, G.N. (First Lieut. USMC)
First Lieutenant Charles Davis, G.N. (Sgt-Major, USMC)
First Lieutenant Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N. (First Sgt. USMC)

SECOND BRIGADE, USMC, AND U. S. ARMY ENGINEERS:

Brigadier-General Frederic L. Bradman, U.S.M.C. Brigade Commander
Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin B. Garrett, U.S.M.C.
Lieutenant-Colonel William C .Wise, U.S.M.C.
Lieutenant-Colonel Dan. I. Sultan, U. S. Army Engineers.
Major Paul R. Hawley, (MC), U. S. Army
Major Ralph J. Mitchell, U.S.M.C.
First Lieutenant L. R. Groves, U. S. Army Engineers.

NICARAGUAN OFFICERS, GUARDIA.

Second Lieutenant Gabriel Castillo, G.N.
Second Lieutenant Jose Maria Castrillo, G.N.
Second Lieutenant Lisandro Delgadillo, G.N.
Second Lieutenant Francisco Bello, G.N.

The following extract is quoted from the "Official Report of the Relief work in Nicaragua after the Earthquake of March 31, 1931" as issued by the American Red Cross:

"The citations of services are an eloquent tribute to the sound judgment, tireless efforts, devotion to duty and keen sympathy for suffering humanity displayed by the officers receiving the medals when confronted by an emergency calling for the ability of high degree and sustained effort for several days with complete disregard for personal welfare and safety. They present striking examples of initiative in crisis, calmness in moments of confusion, fortitude in the face of danger, and leadership in the midst of chaos. They are the generous expression of the gratitude of a Nation, made by its Chief Executive, for the humane services rendered by the stranger within its gates in the hour of great distress."

CHAPTER XVII.

DECORATIONS, CITATIONS, ETC.

During the period that American officers were serving in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, the President of the Republic awarded, with appropriate citations, the Presidential Medal of Merit, the Medal of Distinction and the Nicaraguan Medal of Merit. As there was no copy of the Medal of Distinction in existence, though several had been awarded, a design was made in Guardia Headquarters, and after being approved by the President was adopted for the Medal of Distinction.

On the recommendation of the Jefe Director of the Guardia, another medal, the Cross of Valor, was adopted to be awarded for extraordinary heroism in the line of duty.

While Guardia regulations called for the individual recommendations by commanding officers, and the approval of those recommendations by a Board of Awards sitting at Headquarters, Guardia Nacional, many medals of all types were awarded by the President of the Republic of Nicaragua to officers and men of the Guardia without reference to the Jefe Director, and without being passed upon by the Board of Awards.

In addition to the medals, citations were awarded to enlisted men individually and as members of organizations, the recipients of which were authorized to wear appropriate chevrons. Chevrons were also authorized for wounds, contacts, service in the Segovias and for reenlistments.

The extracts from Chapter Six of the Guardia Personnel Manual quoted below contain the regulations for the award of both medals and chevrons:

"CHAPTER 6

DECORATIONS, ETC.

6–1. CHEVRONS:—The following service chevrons and stripes are authorized and will be worn on the sleeves of the field shirt by all enlisted men entitled thereto:

(a) **CITATION CHEVRONS:**
To be worn by men cited in general orders; one chevron for each citation or commendation.

(b) **CONTACT CHEVRONS:**
To be worn by all men who have participated in contacts with the enemy; one chevron for each contact.

(c) **WOUND CHEVRONS:**
To be worn by all men who have been wounded in a contact with the enemy; one chevron for each wound received.

(d) **ONE YEAR'S SERVICE IN THE NORTHERN OR CENTRAL AREA CHEVRON:**
To be worn by all men who have had one year's service in the Northern or Central Area, the El Sauce District of Leon or the Somotillo District of Chinandega. One chevron for each year of such service.

(e) **SERVICE STRIPE:**
To be worn by all re-enlisted men; one stripe for first complete enlistment, regardless of duration, and additional stripes for each three years of reenlisted service.

Chevrons and stripes will be of white tape in accordance with the sample in the hands of the Quartermaster, Headquarters, Guardia Nacional, Managua, a supply of such tape to be issued to each activity for issue to the men concerned.

Chevrons and stripes will be of the size shown in the illustrations appended in Uniform Regulations, this Manual, and will be placed on the sleeve as indicated, except that a space of one half inch will be left between the citation chevron and the chevron indicating rank on the right sleeve. (See illustrations in Uniform Regulations, G.N. Volume 3.

6–2. MEDALS:—Recommendations for and award of:

(a) The President of Nicaragua having approved a recommendation from the Jefe Director that certain Nicaraguan Medals be adopted for award to officers and enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, the following regulations under which the various medals can be awarded are hereby promulgated:

(b) Classification of medals is as follows:

1. Presidential Medal of Merit.
2. Medal of Distinction.
3. Cross of Valor.
4. Nicaraguan Medal of Merit.

The PRESIDENTIAL MEDAL OF MERIT may be presented by the President to any person in the service of the Government of Nicaragua who has distinguished himself, or who shall hereafter distinguish himself, by extraordinary heroism beyond the call of duty or by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a position of great responsibility; or to any person who shall have rendered, or who shall hereafter render, any exceptionally meritorious service to the Nicaraguan Government.

The MEDAL OF DISTINCTION may be presented by the President to any person who had distinguished himself, or who shall hereafter distinguish himself, by extraordinary heroism or distinguished service to the Government of Nicaragua, such heroism or distinguished service not being sufficient to justify the presentation of a Presidential Medal of Merit.

The CROSS OF VALOR may be presented by the President to any person who while in the service of the Nicaraguan Government has distinguished himself, or who shall hereafter distinguish himself, by extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession.

The NICARAGUAN MEDAL OF MERIT may be presented by the President to any person who has distinguished himself, or who may hereafter distinguish himself by extraordinary heroism or distinguished service to the Nicaraguan Government, such heroism or distinguished service not being sufficient to justify the presenting of a Presidential Medal of Merit, a Medal of Distinction, or a Cross of Valor.

(c) No more than one Presidential Medal of Merit, Medal of Distinction, Cross of Valor, or Nicaraguan Medal of Merit will be issued to any one person; but for each succeeding deed or service sufficient to justify the award of a Presidential Medal of Merit or a Medal of Distinction, the President may award a gold palm. For each deed or service sufficient to justify the award of a Cross of Valor or a Nicaraguan Medal of Merit, the President may award a bronze palm. These palms are to be worn with the respective decorations.

(d) A Board of Awards has been appointed at Headquarters, Guardia Nacional, Managua, Nicaragua, to consider all recommendations submitted by Area and Department Commanders for awards of medals, letters of commendation, citations and other awards to officers and enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional, and to further make recommendations to the Jefe Director in the premises. It is not the function of the board to originate any recommendations. It wil therefore be necessary for Area and Department Commanders to submit a separate recommendation for each individual, accompanied by a citation setting forth in detail the facts pertaining to the specific act or acts for which the individual is recommended. Furthermore, the recommendations submitted will specifically state the medal for which the individual is recommended. Former Area and Department Commanders may submit recommendations for awards to officers or enlisted men who served under them while they were in command of their respective areas or departments.

(e) The final decision for the award of a medal in all cases rests with the President of Nicaragua."

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE ELECTION OF 1932.

Prior to the election of 1928, the candidates of the two contending parties, General Moncada and Senor Adolfo Benard, agreed by an exchange of letters that the one who was successful would request the supervision of the next presidential elections in 1932 by the United States.

Shortly after his inauguration in 1929, President Moncada addressed a formal communication to the Government of the United States stating that the Government of Nicaragua had arrived at an agreement with the Supreme Court by which that High Tribunal would appoint a citizen of the United States of America, previously designated by the President of the United States, as President of the National Board of Elections, and requested the designation of the American who would serve in this capacity. The President of the United States accordingly designated Captain Alfred W. Johnson, U. S. Navy, who was appointed by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court on May 20, 1930, and supervised the congressional elections of 1930.

President Moncada made a similar request on June 18, 1931, for the cooperation of the United States in the 1932 Presidential elections, and Rear Admiral Clark H. Woodward, U. S. Navy, was similarly appointed as Chairman of the National Board of Elections for the 1932 electoral period.

The electoral period of 1932 was of special significance to the Guardia Nacional, as in the election of 1928, it was an infant organization able to assist only feebly the troops of the Marine Brigade in protecting the voters and the personnel of the Electoral Mission. In 1930 the Guardia Nacional had grown to a strength and size where it could assist materially in the preservation of law and order during the electoral period, but there were marines located in the larger towns throughout the country furnishing much protection and operating actively to see that the personnel engaged in electoral duties were properly safeguarded. In 1932 the marines had been withdrawn from all sections where there was likelihood of their coming into contact with any forces in armed revolt against the constituted government, and it was the stated policy of the American Government that even for the purpose of insuring a fair and impartial election no marines should be sent to stations where they were exposed to attack by bandits.

Upon his return from Nicaragua after the elections of 1932, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles F. B. Price, U. S. M. C., prepared for the Department of State a personnel plan for the supervision of the 1932 elections. This plan which later became known as Plan "A" was based on the assumption that the degree of supervision to be extended over the 1932 elections would be as complete as that extended in 1930 and 1928, and called for a total of 1115 electoral personnel to supervise the 432 voting mesas, and approximately 1800 Marines, in addition to those of the Second Brigade and the Special Service Squadron already in Nicaragua or in Central American waters, for use as security troops.

Meanwhile serious opposition to keeping United States Marines in Nicaragua had developed in the United States, among the people and in Congress, and no appropriations were available to the Navy Department to meet the expenses incident to organizing and transporting the necessary personnel to Nicaragua.

These points were discussed at a conference between representatives of the State and Navy Departments, with the result that Colonel Price prepared an alternate plan known as plan "B" which contemplated the substitution of Nicaraguan personnel at 178 mesas out of the total of 432, and a reduction of the total personnel of the mission to 47 officers and 596 enlisted men, or a total of 643, instead of the 1115 contemplated by the previous plan. It was estimated that this plan would cost about $184,000.00 to the Naval appropriations, with a total cost to the United States Treasury of $200,000.00 for the Electoral Mission alone.

The question of what protection would be necessary under this plan, over and above that furnished by the Second Brigade was referred to the Commander, Special Service Squadron and the Commander, Second Brigade as the responsible agencies for furnishing such protection.

The number of troops necessary to furnish adequate protection under plan "B" was estimated at 690, by the Commander Second Brigade and Commander Special Service Squadron, the Guardia Nacional having offered to afford protection to American personnel in towns where the Guardia had posts commanded by commissioned officers of the Guardia Nacional. This provided for the security of the personnel of 178 mesas and all Department Headquarters.

The Jefe Director of the Guardia further stated "If the American Legation secures from the Nicaraguan Government assurances that the Nicaraguan Government will provide for an adequate force of selected citizens to be approved, armed, and **controlled** by the Guardia Nacional, said citizens being selected from those who are willing to engage themselves as 'CIVICOS' of the Guardia Nacional. The Guardia Nacional will furnish protection to the electoral personnel of the 178 mesas to be supervised by Nicaraguan citizens, in addition to those mesas supervised by American personnel where the Guardia Nacional had posts commanded by an officer." (Memo. J.D GN 5 April, 1932).

Meanwhile a provision had been inserted in the Naval Appropriation bill for 1933 that no part of the funds appropriated be used for the supervision of the Nicaraguan elections, and the Commander of the Special Service Squadron was notified that the additional 690 troops needed for the security of the Electoral personnel could not be furnished. In a letter of 17 April, 1932, to the Chief of Naval Operations the Commander, Special Service Squadron stated, "Further careful consideration of plan "B" made it extremely doubtful if there could be any material reduction in the additional troops necessary for guards if the plan were to be rigidly adhered to. Other means were therefor sought to furnish a satisfactory solution.

"Attention is invited to the enclosure which is a suggested modification of plan "B".....

"This plan was thoroughly gone over in our conference here and was satisfactory to those present, the American Minister, Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional, Commanding General of the Second Brigade and Comsperon. It will be noted that no additional combatant troops or guards to those now on hand need be furnished. It is assumed that the marine allowances of the Second Brigade and the Special Service Squadron will be kept up to strength."

This plan which was finally adopted, provided that no Americans be sent into remote or dangerous districts, but the electoral duties in such districts were to be taken over by Nicaraguans selected by the National Board of Elections and taken from both the leading parties. Marine Security detachments were to be placed in the towns of Matagalpa, Juigalpa, Granada, Leon and Chinandega, with such protection as might be neces ary in Managua, Carazo and Masaya Departments to be furnished from the garrison at Managua. The usual supervision of the Nicaraguan coasts by ships of the Special Service Squadron to continue during the electoral period. Destroyers to be held so as not to be more than 24 hours steaming distance from any Nicaraguan port and to make routine trips to these ports from time to time during the electoral period.

The orders to the Marine security detachments clearly stated the State Department policy that they were not in any sense to be considered as available for the general preservation of peace during the Electoral Period, and limited their duties to protecting American personnel engaged in the supervision of the election.

(1)—(Appendix 1—Chapter 18)

This left to the Guardia the task of preserving law and order, protecting American personnel in 178 voting mesas, and all the Nicaraguan personnel assigned to the Electoral Mission.

The Electoral Law as applied to the situation placed the Chairman of the U. S. Electoral Mission in command of all troops both Marines and Guardia on duty in Nicaragua during the period of registration and election. Most of the American members of the Mission were line officers of the Navy or Marine Corps. The Letter of Instructions of the National Board of Elections as first issued placed this responsibility in case of emergency or bandit attack, with commensurate authority in the hands of the Departmental Chairmen of the Electoral Mission who were in many cases line officers junior to the Marine and Guardia officers charged with the protection of the mesas. This matter was quickly adjusted when brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Electorial Mission by the Jefe Director of the Guardia, and the following resolution clarifying the situation was adopted and made a part of the letter of instructions of the National Board of Elections:

Leg–Div. Elec. Mis.
REW: 9/10/32/

WHEREAS:

The contents of paragraph (b), under the subject "GUARDIA NACIONAL", as contained in the "Letter of Instructions" adopted by the National Board of Elections at the fifth session on 1 September 1932, appear to require further amplification and extension in order to clearly establish the electoral mission of the Guardia Nacional, and to fix responsibility for the exercise of command under certain circumstances during the electoral period; be it

RESOLVED:

That the aforesaid paragraph (b) is hereby amended to provide as follows, and that said amendment shall be furnished all persons and officers in possession of one or more copies of the said "Letter of Instructions" for their information and guidance:

"(b) In view of the foregoing, the Guardia Nacional shall, under the direction of the Jefe Director thereof, cooperate in every way with the National Board of Elections to insure a free and fair election of Supreme Authorities of the Republic of Nicaragua during the current electoral period of 1932. It shall, upon the request of the respective Chairmen of the Departmental Boards of Elections, assign the necessary personnel to guard and preserve order at each electoral mesa as far as the available personnel of the Guardia Nacional make this possible.

"The paramount duty of both the U. S. Electoral Mission and the Guardia Nacional on the days of the registrations and the election shall be the preservation of a free and fair election. For the accomplishment of this purpose, Guardia Commanders shall comply to the fullest extent with all requests of the Chairmen of Departmental Boards of Elections, and shall utilize all regular Guardia, Auxiliares, and Municipal Police under their control for this purpose.

"The Guardia Nacional shall retain its responsibility for the security of lives and property, and shall use every resource at its disposal to prevent bandits and armed forces in revolt against the existing government of the Republic of Nicaragua from intimidating peaceful, lawabiding inhabitants and interfering with the exercise of the right of qualified electors to register and vote.

"In any case of general rioting, attack by bandits, or other grave and immediate emergency threatening the successful accomplishment of the purpose of the U. S. Electoral Mission, or the lives of personnel engaged in the supervision of the aforesaid elections or in the guarding and maintaining of law and order at the electoral mesas, the senior line officer of the Navy or Marine Corps present shall immediately assume command of all forces, including those of both the Guardia Nacional and the U. S. Electoral Mission, and take such steps as are necessary to meet the military situation. In all such cases, **the officer assuming command,** as herein set forth, and all of the foregoing personnel thereby engaged in the maintenance of law and order, **shall pass, for this purpose, under the command of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional.** Prompt reports of all disorders and

emergencies, as described above, shall be transmitted to the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional and the President of the National Board of Elections."

Upon arrival of the personnel of the United States Electoral Mission in Nicaragua, a Departmental Chairman was sent to each political department, where after a study of the situation and in consultation with the Department Commander of the Guardia, he prepared a recommendation as to the number and location of the mesas to be established in his Department. After the mesas had been decided upon it became the duty of the Guardia Nacional to make the necessary arrangements for their protection.

These arrangements fell into two categories, the preservation locally of law and order, safeguarding the lives of the electoral personnel and the security of the ballot boxes; and the protection of the areas against bandit attacks, and depredations, securing safe conduct to the voters on their way to and from the voting mesas for the purpose of voting, and furnishing protection to the propaganda activities of both parties. The problem of the Guardia was rendered more difficult by the fact that the Jueces de la Mesta and Jefes de Canton, a sort of rural constable whose cooperation had been found very useful, were relieved of their duties and authority for the Electoral period, which extended from 7 September, 1932, the first day of registration, to 6 November, 1932, the day of the election, inclusive.

After the number and the location of the mesas had been determined, it was found, as had been anticipated, that the available strength of the Guardia was insufficient to meet the demands of the situation. The Jefe Director, therefore sent the following letter to the President of Nicaragua requesting authority to enlist a limited number of auxiliares for use as mesa guards and for the maintenance of order:

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

13 September, 1932.

Excelentismo Sr. Presidente:

The National Board of Elections has requested the services of the Guardia Nacional to furnish guards and maintain order during the electoral period, in excess of the number of Guardias now authorized.

I highly appreciate the economic support given by your Excellency to the Guardia Nacional in the past, and due to the economic situation of the country I do no desire to request from Your Excellency another additional credit.

As a result of strict economy during a long period, the Guardia Nacional has now on hand some funds in excess which are available for immediate use. With the funds now on hand, a limited number of Auxiliares could be maintained during the electoral period by transferring the savings from the account of the Guardia Nacional and Prison maintenance to the credit granted by Your Excellency, for pay and maintenance of Auxiliares.

In view thereof, it is requested that Your Excellency authorize the enlistment of a number of Auxiliares which may be maintained with previously approved credits, and transfer the necessary funds from the account of the Guardia Nacional and prisons to the credit of pay and maintenance of Auxiliares under Guardia Nacional control.

Con toda consideracion, me suscribo del Excom. Senor Presidente, atento y seguro servidor,

/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS,
Jefe Director, G.N.

Sr. Don Jose Maria Moncada,
Presidente de la Republica de Nicaragua,
Casa Presidencial,
Managua, Nicaragua.

- -

Copies to: American Minister by cover letter.
Admiral Woodward,
FILE.

- -

At this time the total strength of the Guardia Nacional was 242 officers and 2250 enlisted, to this could be added 150 auxiliares, in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega, and 203 Municipal Police, making a total strength available for all purposes 242 officers, including Medical officers, and 2603 men. The Jefe Director under the authority granted by President Moncada in response to the former's request of September 13th enlisted 300 auxiliares, who performed duty as mesa guards releasing regular Guardia for combat and patrol duties.

In addition to safeguarding the electoral personnel, and furnishing protection to the citizens of Nicaragua while registering and voting at the general election, the Guardia was charged with the duty of preserving order during the plebiscite of the Liberal Party held on 31 July and 7 August, 1932, (1), and complete control over the manufacture, sale possession, transportation and distribution of alcoholic liquors. The manufacture of Aguardiente, and its sale to retailers was a government monopoly. This monopoly did not extend to beer which was brewed and sold both at wholesale and retail by private citizens. (2)

At the beginning of the Electoral period there were many rumors in circulation that Sandino and his bandit groups were going to prevent or at least seriously interfere with the holding of a free and fair election. At the same time reports were received of accumulation of arms and ammunition in the Honduran towns of Danli and Choluteca. Guardia intelligence indicated that the main bandit groups were mobilizing for some activity. The Guardia therefore planned and executed strong offensive campaigns against each of the three principal bandit groups with the result that two of them were decisively defeated, and the other was fought to a stand-still in a long drawnout battle with a patrol composed mostly of auxiliares, under command of native officers, compelled to expend the bulk of its ammunition and thus deprived of its offensive power until after the election had been held. In addition numerous small patrols operated constantly throughout the areas subject to bandit depredations, making many contacts and succeeded in completely preventing interference with the registration and voting and reduced the intimidation of voters to a minimum, so that both the number of registrations and the number of votes cast exceeded those of the 1928 elections.

(1) Appendix 2—Chapter 18
(2) Appendix 3—Chapter 18

The task of providing a free and fair election to the people of Nicaragua was recognized as the paramount mission of all forces of the United States Naval Service participating therein, and after a few administrative difficulties were ironed out, the members of the four organizations involved, i.e., Special Service Squadron, Second Brigade, USMC, The American Electoral Mission, and the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, displayed a remarkable spirit of cooperation and singleness of purpose, as each played its separate part in the accomplishment of the task of fulfilling a promise made by Constituted and Responsible Authorities of the Government of the United States of America to a weaker and smaller country, for the purpose of assisting it to maintain its independence and meet its obligations as a member of the family of civilized nations of the world. As to the manner of performance of

duty by the Guardia, Admiral Woodward expressed his appreciation of its activities in the following letter to the Jefe Director, copies of which were made a part of the official records of all the commissioned personnel of the organization:

UNITED STATES ELECTORAL MISSION
TO
NICARAGUA

Managua, Nicaragua.
28 November, 1932.

From: Chairman, U. S. Electoral Mission to Nicaragua.

To: Major General Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Performance of the Guardia Nacional under command of Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Matthews, USMC, (Major General, G.N.).

1. During the recent electoral period, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, under the able leadership of Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Matthews, U. S. Marine Corps (Major-General of the Guardia Nacional) performed outstanding service in the maintaining of law and order throughout the Republic of Nicaragua. Greatly handicapped by the lack of sufficient personnel and funds, this organization conducted itself in a manner that would be a credit to any military organization. Their determined persistence to accomplish their difficult task, their complete non-partisan attitude and the exemplary conduct of the personnel as a whole and especially those who are members of the U.S. Marine Corps merits the highest praise.

2. It was the bold self-sacrificing and determined action of the Guardia Nacional that made possible the outstanding success attained by the Electoral Mission in its supervision of the National Elections of Supreme Authorities this year.

3. From my personal observation of the Guardia and my close association with Colonel Matthews in military affairs throughout the electoral period, during which the Guardia Nacional was under my command, it is apparent that the wonderful morale and efficiency of the Guardia Nacional is due in high degree to Colonel Matthews' ability as an organizer, his calm, sound judgment, thorough knowledge of military matters and his comprehensive understanding of human nature.

4. I request that a copy of this letter be made a part of the military record of Lieutenant Colonel Matthews.

/s/ C. H. WOODWARD

To the native Nicaraguan officers and enlisted men of the Guardia is due great praise for their devotion to duty and the manner in which they preserved their neutrality during the elections, when party feeling was at its height. With remarkably few exceptions their work was as conscientiously and impartially done as was that of the American officers.

Attached are copies of the orders issued in the Guardia Nacional covering its activities in connection with its electoral duties. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

(1) Appendiz 4—Chapter 18
(2) Appendix 5—Chapter 18
(3) Appendix 6—Chapter 18
(4) Appendix 7—Chapter 18
(5) Appendix 8—Chapter 18
(6) Appendix 9—Chapter 18
(7) Appendix 10–Chapter 18

CHAPTER XIX.

THE TURN OVER

When the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua was first organized with officers of the United States Marine Corps and Medical Corps of the United States Navy to command it and act as instructors for a corps of Nicaraguan officers, it was assumed that the time allowed to put the Guardia on its feet and build up an officer personnel to command it would be set by treaty, and would be a matter of at least ten years. On the change of administration in the United States as a result of the elections of 1928, the American policy became opposed to the military intervention in Nicaraguan affairs, and it was soon known that the American military forces would be withdrawn earlier than was first expected.

This withdrawal could not be made immediately because of the commitments already made by the American government. Mr. Stimson at the signing of the Tipitapa agreement had promised that the United States would use its armed forces to disarm any of the troops of either of the armies engaged in the revolution who refused to lay down their arms. Furthermore the United States was morally obligated to supervise the elections of 1930 and 1932, having encouraged and given its approval to the agreement of the two Nicaraguan presidential candidates in 1928 that the one who was successful would request supervision of the elections to be held during these two years. Hence it devolved upon the officers in command of the Guardia to prepare plans for the procurement of a corps of native officers to replace the American officers at an early date, presumably some time after the election of 1932.

The situation offered many difficulties, first due to the revolt of Sandino it was necessary to keep as many as possible of the Guardia in the field operating against the forces of the revolt. This situation required that experienced officers be placed in command of the troops of the north which were actively engaged with the enemy. It was impracticable to place untrained native officers in the higher offices thus giving them command over the experienced American officers of the Guardia, and no natives of the type desired for the higher offices would accept commissions as Second Lieutenants, or in other junior ranks in order to gain the experience necessary to enable them to properly assume the duties and responsibilities of higher command.

The first step taken was to commission a number of worthy noncommissioned officers who had proven themselves in battle, and promote them to the rank of Second Lieutenant, but keeping them at all times junior, for the purpose of command, to the American officers of the same grade. Eight native officers were commissioned in November, 1929. A military academy was established from which the first class of nine Cadets graduated on June 22, 1930, and were commissioned Second Lieutenants. By the date of the evacuation four classes totalling 166 cadets had been graduated. The third and fourth classes were commissioned as Second Lieutenants (Temporary), upon graduation in order that they might have a period of probation before receiving permanent commissions.

While these newly commissioned officers were in the aggregate all that could be expected with the amount of training and instruction that could be given them in the time allowed, they were all young men and relatively inexperienced, not so much in military affairs as in administrative problems. The Jefe Director of the Guardia as well as the President of the Republic of Nicaragua, was not willing to turn over to them the responsibilities of administering and maintaining the Guardia organization, which had hardly been in existence long enough to function efficiently under its experienced commandres, and could hardly even with their assistance be called a well oiled machine. These facts were made known to the American Minister, and at his request, the Jefe Director of the Guardia recommended a plan for the turnover to the control of Nicaraguan officers. The story is best told by the correspondence between the two:
"3–CBM–wsl.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

15 June, 1932.

Sir:

In compliance with your verbal request that I give you my further views on the subject of the turnover of the command of the Guardia Nacional to native Nicaraguan officers, I wish to state that, while the turnover once started should be completed as promptly as possible to avoid responsibility devolving on a small number of American officers without their having the commensurate authority and force of numbers to meet it, an orderly turnover is vitally important and the short time available under the present plan makes such a turnover highly problematical.

It will in all probability not be practicable to secure the appointment of suitable native officers for the higher commands during the current administration. The President who will be elected on 6 November, 1932 and inaugurated on 1 January, 1933, will have to be depended upon to make these appointments. I believe that some time should be allowed the incoming President for the making of these appointments after he takes office. It is probable that these appointments could be made and an orderly turnover effected in one month. However in the instructions issued to the Jefe Director he should be allowed some latitude. A maximum of two months after the inauguration of the new President should be sufficient. The Jefe Director should be allowed to retain fifty American officers until the turnover is completed.

I do not believe that the little bit of training in higher command that could be given the newly appointed officers in the time allowed, would be of enough importance to warrant serious consideration. The best that can be hoped for is that men of character and standing in the country with some experience in administrative matters and in handling men and with a minimum of political bias may be secured. It would be most helpful if these officers could be selected in equal numbers from the two political parties and I recommend that our Government use its good offices with the new President to bring about this result.

Very truly yours,

/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS,
JEFE DIRECTOR, G. N.

The Honorable Matthew E. Hanna,
The American Minister,
Legation of the United States of America
Managua, Nicaragua.

– – – – – – – –

Secstate

July 19, 1932 4 p.m.
72

Gray

Legation's dispatch 828 June 21. The Department has given careful consideration to the question of turning over the Guardia to Nicaraguan control (period) While it agrees with General Matthews that an (quote) orderly turnover is vitally important(end quote) and notes his opinion (quote) that the short time available under the present plan mades such a turnover highly problematical (end quote) the Department is strongly of the opinion that it would not be advisable to leave any Marines in Nicaragua after the date already announced for their withdrawal and considers it essential to adhere to the plan to withdraw the Marines immediately after the new President takes office (paragraph)

The Department notes that General Matthews does not believe that (quote) the little bit of training in higher command that could be given the newly appointed officers in the short time allowed (parenthesis) he apparently means two months (end parenthesis) would be of enough importance to warrant serious consideration (end of quotation) (period) The basis of a really orderly turnover that would not immediately breakdown would seem to lie not merely in the transfer of positions to Nicaraguan officers but in the ability of these officers to handle capably and efficiently their new duties when once assumed it appears to the Department therefore that the first step should consist in the immediate selection by Matthews of those Nicaraguans who will hold the higher commands upon the withdrawal of the Marines particularly of those men who will occupy the key positions both on headquarters staff and in the field in order that they may serve an apprenticeship by working along side the American officers now holding those positions for the time remaining before January 1st In this connection the Department is seriously concerned that there are no Nicaraguan officers of higher rank than Lieutenant (period) In fact it understands that all but two of these officers are Second Lieutenants (period) It is in order that such inexperienced men shall not be suddenly appointed to positions of responsibility that the Department feels steps should be taken to select and appoint immediately those who will hold higher commands in the Guardia after American withdrawal (period) In this connection it is suggested that General Matthews divide his selections as nearly as possible both as to number and rank between Liberals and Conservatives (period) The important point would seem to be that those Nicaraguans who are to occupy highest and responsible positions obtain as much instruction and experience as possible in order to prepare them to take over their commands when the new President takes office (paragraph)

Furthermore the commander of the Guardia will be able to judge in those succeeding months and especially by their conduct in the electoral

period how trustworthy these officers are and any who do not measure up to requirements can be removed before the Guardia is turned over July 19 5 p.m.

Stimson.

3–CBM–JCS–wsl.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

8 August, 1932.

Sir:

I note that in dispatch No. 72 of July 19, 1932, from the Secretary of the State, Washington, D. C., that the State Department agrees with me that an orderly turnover of the Guardia to Nicaraguan control is vitally important but is strongly of the opinion that it would not be advisable to leave any Marines in Nicaragua after the date already announced for their withdrawal, and considers it essential to adhere to the plan to withdraw the Marines immediately after the new President takes office.

This of course renders impossible the adoption of my original plan that the new President appoint, upon his assumption of office, Nicaraguans in the higher offices of the Guardia and that the present incumbents, Marine Corps officers, remain for a period of not to exceed two months in order to insure an orderly turnover.

In view of the conditions of the political unrest and financial instability existing in Nicaragua and the fact that there is no immediate prospect of the cessation of the armed resistance to the government, led by Sandino who has announced that he will continue his resistance against any president elected under American supervision, it is inconceivable to me that any President will accept or continue in office Nicaraguan officers, of high rank in key positions in the Guardia, of whose personal loyalty to himself and to his party there is the slightest doubt. His Excellency, the present Chief Executive, has shown conclusively that party and personal loyalty are large considerations in the appointment of even the present junior Nicaraguan officers of the Guardia and of the cadets of the Military Academy, who because of their youth have not become seriously involved in politics. He has passed personally on each applicant for appointment and rejected many who appeared in every way eligible for appointment except for their political or family affiliations. In certain cases I have been required to investigate the enlistments of members of the Conservative party as privates in the Guardia.

In view of these conditions, the existence of which I believe every one familiar with the situation here will admit, it is obviously impossible to select for the higher commands of the Guardia, Nicaraguans who will be acceptable to the new President until it is known who the new President will be. Hence my alternate plan is: Immediately upon the nomination of the candidates of the leading political parties, to arrange with each candidate for the selection of a list of names, composed equally of members of both parties acceptable to him; and immediately after the election has been decided, request the present Chief Executive to appoint to the higher commands the persons on the list of the successful candidate, to work alongside the American personnel until January 2nd when their appointments will be made permanent by the new President. This plan overcomes the objection to leaving any Marines in Nicaragua after January 2nd, and is one which I hope can be put into effect without serious difficulties.

It will be necessary to give the additional officers appointed under this plan the rank and pay of at least Captains, and for this purpose an additional appropriation will be required. The number of this class of officers should be thirty (30)and the additional appropriation should therefore be three thousand seven hundred and fifty cordobas (C$3750.00) per month.

I have considered and rejected as impracticable the plan of requesting the President to appoint Nicaraguans whom I believe to be qualified for the higher ranks before the candidates of the leading parties are known; both because I am certain that the present Chief Executive will refuse to make the necessary appointments because of the expense involved, and because no one would accept an appointment without assurance that it would be made permanent by the new President, an assurance which it is of course impossible to give at the present time. There is another plan that suggests itself which has much in its favor but in addition to the expense involved presents so many difficulties, due to the uncertainty of the political situation, that I have also rejected it as impracticable at this time. It is to have the leading candidates agree upon a list of names and request President Moncada to make the necessary appointments from this list, both candidates pledging themselves to continue these appointments in office. This also rests upon the uncertainty as to the identity of the leading candidates, and its success depends upon the possibility of obtaining the agreement between them.

Very truly yours,
/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS,
JEFE DIRECTOR, G. N.

The Honorable Matthew E. Hanna,
The American Minister,
Legation of the United States of America,
Managua, Nicaragua.

No. 885 Managua, August 9, 1932.

Subject: General Matthew's plan for turning over the Guardia to Nicaraguan officers.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

With reference to the department's telegram No. 72 of July 19, 4 p.m., regarding the question of turning over the Guardia to Nicaraguan control, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter of August 8, 1932, from General Matthews in which he presents for the Department's consideration the plan he suggests for the selection of the Nicaraguan officers to replace the American officers serving with the Guardia.

The essential points of Matthews' letter are as follows:

(1) To arrange with each Presidential candidate of the leading political parties, immediately after the nomination of the candidates, for the selection of a list of names composed equally of members of both parties acceptable to such candidate.

(2) To request President Moncada, immediately after the Presidential election has been decided, to appoint to the higher commands in the Guardia the persons on the list of the successful candidate, such appointments to be made permanent by the new President on January 2, 1933.

It will be specially noted that the list approved by each Presidential candidate is to be composed equally of the members of both political parties.

The officers thus appointed would begin their service about the middle of November and the additional appropriation for their salaries would be approximately $5,625 until January 1, 1933.

General Matthews has set forth in his letter his reasons for rejecting other plans considered by him and for recommending the proposed plan as the one best suited for an orderly turnover of the Guardia under the conditions confronting him.

General Matthews will proceed to carry out this plan as soon as he has learned it has received the Department's approval. He has not consulted President Moncada in this connection nor have I. I think President Moncada should be advised of the plan adopted when it has received the Department's approval and I would appreciate the Department's instructions as to the manner in which that advice should be given to him.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ MATTHEW E. HANNA.

The Jefe Director's plan of August 8, 1932, met with the approval of the State Department and he was directed orally by the American Minister to proceed to put it into effect. Meanwhile Mr. Hanna, the Minister, advised President Moncada as to the details of the plan for the turnover. They met with his approval and he agreed to make the necessary temporary appointments, and suggested that the two Presidential candidates sign an agreement in the presence of the American Minister, pledging themselves to preserve the non-partisan character of the Guardia during the period that either was President of Nicaragua. (1)

It was decided as the most practical method of working out the plan, that the Jefe Director would furnish each candidate with a list of names of Nicaraguan citizens considered suitable for officers in the higher ranks of the Guardia, which had previously been prepared under his direction. From this list, or from other suitable citizens, each candidate was requested to select fifty names of persons that were acceptable to him; an equal number from each political party. From the list of the successful candidate President Moncada was to commission thirty, half from each party, as soon as practicable after the result of the election had been officially determined.

In the absence from the country of Senor Adolfo Diaz, the Conservative candidate, the matter as far as the Conservative party was concerned was handled by the candidate for vice-president, General Emiliano Chamorro.

The following translation of letters from the Guardia files record the events as they happened:

"3–CBM
JCS–fam

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

20 October, 1932.

My dear Doctor Sacasa (General Chamorro):

I have received appropriate instructions to proceed with the execution of the plan set forth below for selecting Nicaraguan officers to replace American officers serving with the Guardia Nacional, which plan has received the approval of the Government of Nicaragua and the Government of the United States:

(a) Each of the Presidential candidates of the two Historical Parties in Nicaragua will be requested to present immediately a list of names acceptable to each candidate from which may be selected the Nicaraguan officers who are to replace the American officers now serving in the Guardia. The list of names thus presented by each candidate shall be composed equally of members of both political parties.

(b) The two Presidential candidates will be requested to sign an agreement in the presence of the American Minister in which they pledge themselves respectively to preserve strictly the non-partisan character of the Guardia during the period that one or the other of the candidates is President of Nicaragua.

(Note: I am advised that this feature of the plan has been communicated to the respective candidates by the American Minister.)

(c) President Moncada will be requested, immediately after the Presidential election has been decided, to appoint to the higher commands in the Guardia the persons on the list of the successful candidate.

(d) The Nicaraguan officers thus appointed will work alongside the American officers until January 2 when their appointments will be made permanent by the newly inaugurated President of the Republic.

In accordance with our conversation of recent date and in compliance with your request, I have the pleasure of submitting herewith a list of names of Nicaraguan citizens who have been recommended to me as suitable for officers in the higher ranks of the Guardia Nacional.

Will you please furnish me at your earliest convenience a list of fifty names of Nicaraguan citizens composed equally of members of both political parties whose appointment to the Guardia is desired by you should the Liberal Party (Conservative Party) be successful in the coming elections. These names may be taken from the list I am submitting to you or may be those of any other suitable citizens whom you may select.

I am, my dear Doctor Sacasa (General Chamorro),

Very truly yours,
/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS,
JEFE DIRECTOR, G.N.

Dr. Juan B. Sacasa,
City.
(General Emiliano Chamorro,
City).
3–CBM
JCS–cd.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

29 October, 1932.

Senor Juan B. Sacasa, (General Chamorro),
Managua, Nicaragua.
Distinguido Dr. Sacasa: (General Chamorro):

In accordance with your verbal request of this date I am submitting herewith for your information a list of the higher commands and executive ranks in the Guardia Nacional.

POSITION:	RANK:
Jefe Director	Major-General
Chief of Staff	Colonel
Operations & Training Officer (GN-2&3)	Colonel
Law Officer	Colonel
Area Commander, Northern Area	Colonel
Area Commander, Central Area	Colonel
Area Commander, Eastern Area	Colonel
Paymaster, Guardia Headquarters	Major
Quartermaster, Guardia Headquarters	Major
Executive Officer, Northern Area	Major
Executive Officer, Central Area	Major
Executive Officer, Eastern Area	Major
Department Commander, Leon	Major
Department Commander, Granada	Major
Communications Officer, Headquarters GN	Captain
Adjutant, Guardia Headquarters, GN-1	1st-Lieutenant

It is my view that those officers to fill the above positions should be selected from the names on the list submitted to you, and from among other citizens of like mature age, experience and general reputation, the balance of the final list of thirty (30) to be appointed Captains as assistants to those appointed to the higher ranks.

It is also my intention under the final agreement to be drawn up in connection with the turnover of the Guardia, to recommend that the officer appointed to fill the position of Chief of Staff of the Guardia Nacional hold the rank of Brigadier-General and that of Adjutant and GN-1 shall have the rank of Captain.

/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS,
JEFE DIRECTOR, G. N.

Information of the appointment of officers without previous military training to the higher commands was not favorably received by the native commissioned officers of the Guardia. In order to quiet the many false rumors that were being circulated and assure the Nicaraguan officers already in the Guardia of fair treatment the Jefe Director had a plan prepared providing for their promotion to the next higher rank.

Special Order Number 38, containing this information was published on October 21, 1932. President Moncada approved of the idea and made the promotions recommended by the Jefe Director without exception. This had the desired effect of quieting many of the rumors in circulation and by assuring promotion and furnishing definite information as to their future status, it allayed much of the dissatisfaction among the junior officers of the Guardia.

3–CD–fam.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

October 21, 1932.

SPECIAL ORDER)
NUMBER 38–1932)

1. Arrangements are being made for the appointment of a number of officers selected from citizens of Nicaragua of mature age and experience to some of the higher executive and command positions in the Guardia Nacional.

2. It is the present intention of the Jefe Director, upon graduation of the new class at the Military Academy on or about November 30, 1932, to recommend the following promotions among the Nicaraguan officers of the Guardia.

(a) All Nicaraguan officers down to and including Second Lieutenant Lisandro Delgadillo, G.N., for promotion to the rank of Captain.

(b) All officers of the class of 1931 of the Military Academy, and other Permanent Second Lieutenants, for promotion to the rank of First Lieutenant.

(c) Nicaraguan Medical officers for promotion as recommended by the Medical Director.

(d) All Nicaraguan Second Lieutenants (Temporary) for promotion to the rank of Second Lieutenant (Permanent).

3. Examination questions for promotions to the grades of Captain and First Lieutenant, with exception of Medical Officers, are now being prepared by the faculty of the Military Academy. Officers due for promotion in these grades will be examined in accordance with Guardia regulations prior to November 30, 1932.

4. Examinations for promotions of Medical Officers will be prepared by the Medical Director and those recommended will be examined prior to November 30, 1932.

5. Second Lieutenants (Temporary) will be recommended for permanent commissions on their records alone, and no examination will be required of them.

6. This order will be published to all Nicaraguan officers of the Guardia and every opportunity for study afforded to those officers of whom promotion examinations will be required.

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR-GENERAL
C. B. MATTHEWS, G. N.:
/s/ J. C. SMITH,
COLONEL, G. N.
CHIEF OF STAFF

OFFICIAL:
/s/ C. DAVIS,
1st Lieut. G. N.
GN–1.

The lists of names were duly furnished by the two candidates and presented to President Moncada by the Jefe Director of the Guardia. Immediately after the election Doctor Sacasa, the successful candidate, requested permission to withdraw his list and substitute another. His request was acceded to by President Moncada and the American Minister. The new list was accordingly prepared and submitted through the Jefe Director to the President, who proceeded to make the necessary appointments.

3–CBM
JCS–fam

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

17 November, 1932.

Excelentismo Senor Presidente:

In accordance with the plan of turning over the Guardia Nacional to the control of Nicaraguan officers and the approved agreement entered into before election to insure the non-partisan status of the Guardia, I have the honor to submit to your Excellency a list of names furnished me this date by Doctor Juan B. Sacasa, President-Elect of the Republic of Nicaragua.

This list is a revision of the list of names furnished me prior to the election by Doctor Sacasa and was made, according to my understanding, with the approval of your Excellency and the American Minister.

Doctor Sacasa requests that thirty-five of the gentlemen named on this list, in addition to General Anastacio Somoza who already has been appointed as Assistant Jefe Director of the Guardia, be commissioned as officers of the Guardia Nacional to take over the higher commands. In view of the fact that one of these officers is to be Chief of Staff, and in accordance with the above agreement the Chief of Staff is to be a member of the party of the successful candidate, it is requested that of the thirty-five names selected eighteen be members of the Liberal Party and seventeen be members of the Conservative Party.

In view of the short time remaining before the turnover must be completed, I respectfully request that your Excellency take the necessary action to have the new officers commissioned at the earliest practicable date.

Con toda consideracion etc.,

/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS,
JEFE DIRECTOR, G. N.

Sr. Don Jose Maria Moncada,
Presidente de la Republica de Nicaragua,
Palacio Presidencial,
Managua, Nicaragua.

While the original plan called for thirty officers of high rank to be appointed from civil life, by December 31, 1932, thirty-eight appointments had been made in addition to the Jefe Director, as shown:

RANKS:	CONSERVATIVES:	LIBERALS:	TOTAL:
COLONELS	3	3	6
MAJORS	5	5	10
CAPTAINS	11	11	22
			38.

Upon receiving their commissions the Nicaraguan officers were given a few days to supply themselves with uniforms and equipment, which were purchased from the Guardia Post Exchange and the Depot of Supplies, where they were allowed credit sufficient to permit them to procure their first outfits. They were then sent directly to their stations, and command of the various posts, Departments and Areas was turned over to them by the American officers as the latter evacuated. Full control and command passed to Nicaraguan officers immediately after the inauguration of President Sacasa on 1 January, 1933, and the next morning the American personnel of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua bade farewell to their former comrades in arms, and joined the officers and men of the Second Marine Brigade in the second complete evacuation of the Republic of Nicaragua by American Naval Forces.

CHAPTER XX.

THE EVACUATION.

The plan for the evacuation of Nicaragua by the United States Naval forces was promulgated in a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 16 September, 1932. (1). It called for the turnover of the command of the Nicaraguan National Guard to Nicaraguan authority as soon as possible after the inauguration of the new President on 1 January, 1933, and not later than 2 January, and the withdrawal of all personnel of the Naval Service from Nicaragua as soon thereafter as practicable.

On 29 October, 1932, the Brigade Commander, Second Marine Brigade, who was charged with the evacuation of all Naval personnel including that assigned to the Guardia, requested the Jefe Director of the Guardia to advise him as to his plans for the relief of the American personnel and the details regarding its evacuation. (2). In response to this request, the Jefe Director had a plan prepared for the concentration of the American personnel in the railroad and coast towns. (3). The details of the Jefe Director's plan as well as those of the Brigade for the evacuation, were discussed at a conference with the Commander, Special Service Squadron in the early part of November. The plan for the Guardia was approved substantially as originally submitted, and it was decided to suspend the aviation service on December 15. This date was therefore fixed as the last day of the turnover in the posts of the interior where there was danger of bandit interference with the relief of the American officers.

On 16 November a tentative plan of concentration for evacuation was forwarded to all Area and Department Commanders who were directed to advise Guardia Headquarters in case they considered necessary any changes in so far as their respective areas were concerned.

1. Appendix 1—Chapter 20.
2. Appendix 2—Chapter 20.
3. Appendix 3—Chapter 20.

Copies were sent to the Commanding General, Second Marine Brigade and to the Commanding Officer, Aircraft Squadrons, Second Marine Brigade, to ascertain if the contemplated arrangements fitted into their plans. (1). It was found advisable, on the recommendation of certain Department Commanders, due principally to the desirability of meeting regular train and boat schedules, to make some minor modifications in the plan. These were made and incorporated in the final order of 3 December, 1932. (2).

The concentration was effected without difficulty. The details were kept secret until the last moment. The Marine Corps planes performed their part of the evacuation with their usual promptness and efficiency. The defeats administered to the groups of Altamirano and Colindres before the elections effectively quieted them until after the withdrawal, and Umanzor was the recipient of the most decisive defeat ever inflicted on a group of Nicaraguan bandits by either Marines or Guardia, when, on December 26, 1932, he encountered a combined patrol at El Sauce where he went with the probable intention of interfering with the ceremony of opening the railroad by the President of the Republic on 29 December.

Wherever officials were required to move long distances over the trails to reach concentration points, they were accompanied by strong combat patrols of Guardia, who, officers and enlisted men, maintained to the last minute their loyalty to their American comrades in arms.

1. Appendix 4—Chapter 20.
2. Appendix 5—Chapter 20.

CHAPTER XXI.

The Proposed Legislation Submitted by the Guardia Nacional:

The last military code of Nicaragua was enacted on or about October 15, 1896. The present Constitution of Nicaragua became effective March 1, 1912. The Guardia Nacional came into existence and operated entirely under the terms of the Tipatapa Agreement and Guardia Agreement, entered into between the Governments of the United States and Nicaragua in 1927. These agreements became non-effective on January 1, 1933, upon the withdrawal of American military personnel serving with the Guardia Nacional.

In view of the above stated facts it was deemed necessary and essential to the future continued existence of the Guardia Nacional that it be accorded a recognized legal status in the laws of Nicaragua. The Military Code of 1896, adopted before the present Constitution was obsolete and did not meet the existing conditions in Nicaragua. Accordingly there was prepared for submission to the Congress of Nicaragua a proposed draft of legislation to constitute the Military Code of the Republic of Nicaragua, embodying what was believed to be the fundamental principles for the continued operation of the Guardia Nacional.

It was especially desired to give a legal status to the military tribunal of the Guardia Nacional as part of the judicial system of the nation by the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress of Nicaragua so that trial by a court-martial would operate as a bar to further trial in the civil courts of Nicaragua for the same offense as provided for in article 32 of the National Constitution. This appeared desirable in view of the fact that the validity of trials by courts-martial has never been officially recognized by the Supreme Court of Justice.

The Jefe Director first submitted the proposed legislation to the Minister of the United States to Nicaragua for his approval. The Minister in turn submitted it to the Department of State of the United States. The State Department submitted a letter setting forth its desires with reference to certain changes and modifications. The proposed legislation was carefully revised to conform to the expressed desires of the Department of State except where such changes or modifications were not clearly a violation of the Constitution of Nicaragua. A letter was written to the Minister of the United States to Nicaragua setting forth the revisions made and the reasons for not making certain revisions which were contrary to the Constitution. The final draft was then approved by the Minister.

The proposed legislation was then submitted to the President of Nicaragua by the Jefe Director in Spanish with the following letter (English version):

CUARTEL GENERAL,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

19 December, 1932.

Excelentisimo senor Presidente:

I have the honor to submit, for your consideration, the original and one copy of the "TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR ENACTMENT BY THE CONGRESS OF NICARAGUA TO CONSTITUTE THE BASIC LAW FOR THE FOUNDATION OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA."

It is recommended that this proposed legislation be submitted to the Congress of Nicaragua, for its consideration and formal incorporation in the laws of Nicaragua. It is, further, recommended that this legislation, if enacted, be designated as "THE MILITARY CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA."

I feel that I can not too strongly recommend to Your Excellency, and, through Your Excellency, to the Congress of Nicaragua, the desirability and necessity for the enactment of this proposed legislation or some similar legislation as soon as practicable for the government and orderly administration of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

My reasons for making these recommendations are as follows:

(1) The Guardia Agreement by which the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua was created, and under which the Guardia Nacional has function until the present time, will cease to exist on 1 January, 1933, upon the withdrawal of American personnel from duty with the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

(2) The last Military Code of Nicaragua was published on or about 15, October, 1986, prior to the adoption of the present Constitution of Nicaragua on 21 December, 1911.

(3) It is obvious that the Military Code of 1896, enacted and published 36 years ago, fails to and cannot meet the present and more modern conditions existing in the Republic of Nicaragua.

(4) If the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is to be expected to operate with the maximum efficiency, it must have a recognized legal status in the laws of Nicaragua.

(5) I believe that the proposed legislation which I have the honor to submit herewith to Your Excellency includes the necessary principles for establishment of the military structure of the Republic of Nicaragua on a sound basis in accord with the latest military thought, developments and experiences of other nations.

Con la mayor consideracion y aprecio, me suscribo del Excelentisimo senor Presidente,

Muy atento y seguro servidor,
C. B. MATTHEWS,
Jefe Director.

Sr. Gral. don Jose Maria Moncada,
Presidente de la Republic de Nicaragua,
Palacio Presidencial.

ENGLISH VERSION OF LETTER SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT OF NICARAGUA.
19 December, 1932.

The proposed legislation which was submitted in Spanish was as follows: (English version)

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TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR ENACTMENT BY THE CONGRESS OF NICARAGUA TO CONSTITUTE THE BASIC LAW FOR THE FOUNDATION OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA.

Be it enacted by the Camara de Senadores and the Camara de Diputados de Nicaragua en asemblea de Congreso:—

The provisions of this law shall constitute the basic legislation for the foundation of the Military structure of the Republic of Nicaragua; all existing laws, rules, decrees, regulations and orders now in effect which are in conflict with this law are hereby abrogated; Provided, that if this legislation be enacted prior to January 2, 1933, it shall become effective on January 2, 1933; if it be enacted on or subsequent to January 2, 1933, it shall become effective as provided for in Article 94 of the Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua.

PART I—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1.

The Military force of the Republic of Nicaragua shall be known as the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and it shall constitute the only armed national force of the Republic. Any additional armed forces which are now or may hereafter be authorized shall be as additions to the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and shall become an integral part of that organization, but this provision shall not be interpreted to prohibit the organization of Municipal Police forces by municipalities or Hacienda Guards or Customs Guards or other forces dedicated solely to the enforcement of civil or criminal laws. Any such forces as now exist, or as shall hereafter be organized, except Hacienda Guards or Customs Guards, shall immediately become subject to the authority and control of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and be subject to the provisions of the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua in the same manner and to the same extent as the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

Article 2.

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is clothed with full power to preserve domestic peace and the security of individual rights. It shall have control of all arms and ammunition, military supplies and supervision of the traffic therein throughout the Republic. It shall have control of all fortifications, barracks, buildings, grounds, prisons, penitentiaries, vessels and other government property used by the Guardia.

Article 3.

The President of the Republic of Nicaragua shall be ex-officio Commanding General of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and all orders from him pertaining to the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, except in cases of emergency, shall be delivered through the Minister of War to the Jefe Director for execution.

Article 4.

The strength of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be fixed annually by the Congress upon recommendation of the President of the Republic, and for the ensuing year is hereby fixed as follows:

OFFICERS, LINE.

RANK:	NUMBER:
MAJOR GENERAL, Jefe Director	1
BRIGADIER GENERAL, Chief of Staff	1
COLONELS	4
MAJORS	8
CAPTAINS	26
FIRST LIEUTENANTS	40
SECOND LIEUTENANTS (Permanent)	50
SECOND LIEUTENANTS (Temporary)	70
TOTAL LINE	200

MEDICAL

COLONEL, Medical Director	1
CAPTAINS	3
FIRST LIEUTENANTS	3
TOTAL MEDICAL COMMISSIONED	7
MEDICAL CONTRACT SURGEONS	10
DENTAL CONTRACT SURGEON	1
TOTAL MEDICAL	18
AGGREGATE	218

ENLISTED, LINE

SERGEANTS MAJOR	4
QUARTERMASTER SERGEANTS	15
FIRST SERGEANTS	34
SERGEANTS	115
CORPORALS	238
TRUMPETERS	14
PRIVATES	1638
TOTAL LINE	2058

MEDICAL

FIRST SERGEANTS	4
SERGEANTS	10
CORPORALS	31
PRIVATES	17
TOTAL MEDICAL	62

BAND

SECOND LEADER	1
FIRST CLASS MUSICIANS	10
SECOND CLASS MUSICIANS	5
THIRD CLASS MUSICIANS	14
TOTAL BAND	30
AGGREGATE ENLISTED	2150
TOTAL OFFICERS AND ENLISTED	2368

(Including ten (10) Medical Contract Surgeons and one (1) Medical Contract Dentist).

Article 5.

Moneys shall be appropriated annually to defray the expenses for pay, subsistence, allowances, equipment, uniforms, transportation, administration and other current expenses of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. The proportionate monthly installments of the amount appropriated for the fiscal year shall be delivered on or before the first day of each month to the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, who shall make allotments from these moneys for the various needs of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

Article 6.

The rates of pay of the various ranks, commissioned and enlisted, of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, shall be fixed annually by the Congress upon recommendation of the President of the Republic, and for the ensuing year is hereby fixed as follows:

COMMISSIONED

MAJOR GENERAL, Jefe Director .....
BRIGADIER GENERAL, Chief of Staff .....
COLONEL (Line and Medical) .....
MAJOR (Line and Medical) .....
CAPTAIN (Line and Medical) .....
FIRST LIEUTENANT (Line and Medical) .....
SECOND LIEUTENANT (Line and Medical) .....
SECOND LIEUTENANT (Temporary) .....

(Medical Contract Surgeons and Medical Dental Surgeons will receive one-half the regular pay of the ranks which are assigned to them).

ENLISTED

SERGEANT MAJOR .....
FIRST SERGEANT (Line and Medical) .....
QUARTERMASTER SERGEANT .....
SERGEANT (Line, Medical and Drum Major) .....
CORPORAL (Line and Medical) .....
FIELD MUSICIAN (Trumpeter) .....
PRIVATE (Line and Medical) .....
PRIVATE (Medical after three (3) months training) .....

BAND

DIRECTOR (Leader) .....
SUB-DIRECTOR (Second Leader) .....
MUSICIAN, First Class .....
MUSICIAN, Second Class .....
MUSICIAN, Third Class .....
(The Drum Major of the band will be paid the pay of a sergeant).

PART II—COMPOSITION

ARTICLE 1.

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall consist of a General Staff Corps, line combatant troops, the Medical Department, Quartermaster Department, Paymaster Department, and such other administrative staff departments as may hereafter be created by law, and of all officers and men who may be called into the military service as volunteers or auxiliares and all such persons as are drafted into the military service of the Republic of Nicaragua in accordance with the authority contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of Nicaragua.

ARTICLE 2.

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall at all times be organized so far as practicable into companies, battalions, regiments and brigades, and whenever the national interests so require and the President may deem it expedient, into divisions or larger units. For the purpose of administration and tactical control the territory of Nicaragua shall be divided into military areas and departments with an appropriate number of troops assigned to each in accordance with the existing situation.

PART III—THE CORPS OF OFFICERS

ARTICLE 1.

All officers commissioned in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be commissioned as either line or medical officers.

Officers of the line shall be detailed in the number required for duty in the General Staff Corps, Quartermaster Department, Paymaster Department and other staff departments; while so serving they shall be designated as staff officers.

ARTICLE 2.

All officers of the line of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be carried on one lineal list and take rank and precedence in accordance therewith, the officer holding the commission of oldest date in his rank being senior officer in that rank, the officer holding the second oldest commission being the second senior officer in his rank and so on from the Jefe Director downward through the lineal list to the foot of the rank of second Lieutenant. Officers of the same rank and date of commission shall take rank among themselves in accordance with the number stated on their commissions, a lower number being senior in rank to a higher number.

All officers of the Medical Department shall be carried on one lineal list and take rank and precedence therewith, the officer holding the commission of oldest date in his rank being senior officer of that rank, the officer holding the second oldest commission being the second senior officer in his rank and so on from the Medical Director downward through the lineal list to the foot of the rank of second Lieutenant. Officers of the same rank and date of commission shall take rank and precedence among themselves in accordance with the number stated on their commissions, a lower number being senior to a higher number.

All officers commissioned in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua after the passage of this act shall enter the Guardia as and be commissioned as second Lieutenants and be placed at the foot of the Lineal list in accordance with the dates of their commissions. Officers commissioned on the same date shall be placed on the lineal list and their commissions numbered in accordance with their relative standing as determined by a competitive examination.

ARTICLE 3.

All promotions of officers from one rank to another shall be made by seniority after having demonstrated before an examining board appointed by the Jefe Director, their professional moral and physical fitness for promotion to the next higher rank. Should the senior officer of a rank due for promotion to the next higher rank fail to pass the prescribed examination, the next senior officer shall be examined to fill the existing vacancy. Examination of officers to fill the vacancy will be continued until an officer is found competent.

ARTICLE 4.

Examining boards for the appointment or promotion of officers of the line and Medical Department shall be convened by the Jefe Director and shall be composed as follows:

(a) In the case of examination for original appointment as a second lieutenant of the line, of three line officers.

(b) In the case of examination for promotion of line officers, of three officers of the line senior in rank to the officer being examined.

(c) In the case of examination for original appointment as a second lieutenant in the Medical Department, of three Medical officers.

(d) In the case of examination for promotion in the Medical Department, of three Medical officers senior in rank, if practicable, to the officer being examined.

(e) Appointments to office as Jefe Director and Medical Director shall not be made subject to examination by either a Medical Board or Examining Board.

ARTICLE 5.

All candidates for appointment as commissioned officers in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, shall, prior to appearing before an Examining Board, for examination for appointment, be examined by a board of medical examiners convened by the Jefe Director, which shall determine the candidate's physical fitness or unfitness for appointment. The report of the board of medical examiners shall be referred to the Examining Board.

ARTICLE 6.

All officers who are to be examined for promotion from one rank to a higher one shall, prior to appearing before an Examining Board for examination for such promotion, be examined by a board of medical examiners, convened by the Jefe Director, which shall determine the officer's fitness or unfitness for promotion. The report of the board of medical examiners shall be referred to the Examining Board.

ARTICLE 7.

A board of medical examiners convened for the examination of candidates for appointment as commissioned officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua or for promotion of commissioned officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to a higher rank shall consist of two officers of the Medical Department of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

In the event a candidate for original appointment as a commissioned officer in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua fails to pass successfully the prescribed physical examination by the board of medical examiners, the Examining Board will not proceed with the mental, moral or professional examination.

In the event an officer, due for promotion, fails to pass the required physical examination for promotion before a board of medical examiners, the Examining Board will not proceed with the professional examination of the candidate but shall definitely determine whether the physical incapacity is a result of the officer's own misconduct or whether it was incurred in line of duty and incident to the service.

ARTICLE 8.

Any officer found physically incapacitated for further service or for promotion will be retired from the service. If the disability results as an incident to service, he shall be placed on the retired list at ..... of his regular pay of his rank; if the disability results from his own misconduct or is not incident to service he shall be retired without pay.

ARTICLE 9.

Any officer found professionally unqualified for promotion shall, provided he be found physically, mentally and morally qualified for such promotion, be re-examined within six months by an examining board. If he again fails, either mentally, morally or professionally, he shall be discharged from the service. If he is found physically, mentally, morally and professionally qualified he shall be promoted subject to the following provisions:

(a) When the examination is for promotion from major to colonel he shall lose one number from what he would have had had he not failed in his first examination.

(b) When the examination is for promotion from captain to major he shall lose two numbers from what he would have had had he not failed in his first examination.

(c) When the examination is for promotion from first lieutenant to captain he shall lose three numbers from what he would have had had he not failed in his first examination.

(d) When the examination for promotion is from second lieutenant to first lieutenant he shall lose five numbers from what he would have had had he not failed in his first examination.

ARTICLE 10.

No commissioned officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall hold any other elective or appointive office in the Government of the Republic, nor take active part in promoting the election of any political candidate to any office. The acceptance of any other office by a commissioned officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be considered as his resignation from the Guardia: Provided, That a Guardia officer may be appointed by the President to fill the office of Jefe Politico of a department in time of internal disorder, rebellion, or war, or when Martial Law has been declared in that department, and the officer so appointed may detail officers serving under his command to subordinate positions for the administration of Martial Law throughout the department. In such a case the officer so appointed shall be known as the Military Governor of the department.

ARTICLE 11.

No commissioned officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be arbitrarily dismissed from the Guardia service, without cause, by any authority.

ARTICLE 12.

All officers shall be required, upon their original appointment as commissioned officers, to take an oath to sustain the Constitution of Nicaragua and to abstain from an active participation in politics during their service in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

PART IV—THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL

ARTICLE 1.

In time of peace all enlistments in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be voluntary. Each person enlisting shall take an oath to sustain the Constitution of Nicaragua and sign a contract to serve faithfully for a period of two years, and to abstain from active participation in politics during the period of their enlistment.

The ranks of enlisted men and their distribution therein shall be such as the President may from time to time direct.

The Jefe Director with the approval of the President shall promulgate special rules and regulations regarding all matters of recruiting, instruction, training, promotion, examination, discipline, operations, clothing, rations, arms and equipment, quarters and administration, but for the purpose of this act the existing orders, rules, and regulations now in force in the Guardia Nacional continue in effect until revoked or modified by competent authority.

ARTICLE 2.

No enlisted man shall be discharged by any authority except by the order of the Jefe Director, the President of the Republic, or, pursuant to the sentence of a consejo de guerra. In every case of the separation of an enlisted man from the Guardia Nacional, except in cases of death or desertion, there shall be delivered to the man a certificate of discharge signed by the Jefe Director or an officer designated by him to sign each certificate.

PART V—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1.

The Jefe Director shall, subject to the approval of the President of the Republic, promulgate the necessary regulations for the administration of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, but for the purpose of this law the rules and regulations now in effect pertaining to the staff departments shall be continued in full effect and force until they shall have been revoked or modified by competent authority.

ARTICLE 2.

The Jefe Director shall, subject to the approval of the President of the Republic, promulgate the necessary regulations for the administration of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, but for the purpose of this law the regulations now in effect shall remain in full force and effect until revoked or modified by competent authority.

ARTICLE 3.

It shall be the duty of the Jefe Director to issue the necessary and timely orders for the interior government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the conduct of its military operations.

It shall be the duty of all officers who are in command of stations, districts, departments and areas, to issue such necessary and timely orders as may be necessary for the proper interior government of their respective commands and the conduct of military operations.

ARTICLE 4.

Officers and enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall have the right to purchase for their personal use articles carried on the property account of the Quartermaster Department, under the provisions of such regulations as shall be issued by the Jefe Director.

ARTICLE 5.

It shall be illegal for any person not in the military service of the Republic of Nicaragua to wear any distinctive parts of the uniform or insignia of rank adopted by and prescribed for the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

PART VI—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COURTS AND CONSEJOS DE GUERRA DEFINED IN RELATION TO MEMBERS OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NIC.

ARTICLE 1.

All offenses committed by members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua in violation of the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be subject to trial by a consejo de guerra composed of commissioned officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua in accordance with the provisions of the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

ARTICLE 2.

All offenses committed by members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua against the civil and criminal laws of the country, if committed as individuals not in the performance of assigned military or police duties, shall be tried by the civil or criminal courts of the Republic.

All offenses committed by members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua while in the performance of their assigned military or police duties, or in time of martial law, shall be tried by a consejo de guerra and punished as such consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 3.

In cases where an offense is committed by a member of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua which is in violation of both the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the civil or criminal laws of the Republic, the decision as to which tribunal shall take jurisdiction shall rest with the President, who will be furnished with the report of an investigation of the case conducted by an officer or officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, but if the offense is committed in the performance of an assigned military or police duty or in time of martial law, a court-martial shall have exclusive jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 4.

The findings of the consejos de guerra of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, after approval by the Jefe Director in the cases of enlisted men and after approval by the President in the cases of officers, are final, and not subject to appeal or review except by the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua, and then only on matters of jurisdictional authority.

ARTICLE 5.

An enlisted man of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who has been turned over to civil or criminal courts shall, at the discretion of the Jefe Director, be either discharged from the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua or be suspended from the pay and allowances of his rank during the time he is absent from duty while in the hands of such authorities. In every case of conviction of a criminal charge in which more than a correctional sentence involving confinement is adjudged, the enlisted man concerned shall be discharged from the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

ARTICLE 6.

A commissioned officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who has been turned over to a civil or criminal court for trial, shall be suspended from his rank, pay and allowances of his rank during the period he is in the hands of such civil authorities. In all cases of conviction in a civil or criminal court in which more than a correctional sentence involving confinement is adjudged, the officer concerned shall be dismissed from the Guardia Nacional.

ARTICLE 7.

All trials by consejos de guerra in the cases of officers and enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua which have been had prior to the enactment of this law under authority of the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, shall have full validity and effect and such trials shall constitute a bar to further trial by military, civial or criminal tribunals of the Republic of Nicaragua as provided for in Article 32 of the Constitution of Nicaragua.

ARTICLE 8.

Officers and enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, who prior to the enactment of this legislation, have committed offenses in line of duty as members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and who have not, prior thereto, been brought to trial by consejos de guerra as provided for in the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

PART VII

ARTICLES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA

CHAPTER 1

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1.

Conduct and morals in general: The commanders of all patrols, stations, districts, departments, areas, companies, battalions, regiments or other units of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and all other officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be bigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, all persons who are guilty of them; and any such commander, or other officer, who offends against this article shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

In determining what tribunal shall take jurisdiction in case of offenses committed by members of the Guardia Nacional the provisions of Part VI, Jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal Courts and Consejos de Guerra, defined in relation to members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua of this present law, shall govern.

The trial of persons by military tirbunals shall be governed by provisions of the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua as hereinafter set forth.

ARTICLE 2.

Definitions: The following words when used in these articles shall be construed in the sense indicated in this article, unless the context shows that a different sense is intended, namely:

(a) The word "officer" shall be construed to refer to a commissioned officer;

(b) The words "enlisted men" and the word "guardia" shall be construed as meaning a non-commissioned officer, a private, or any other enlisted man;

(c) The word "company" shall be understood as including a troop or battery.

(d) The word "battalion" shall be understood as including a squadron.

(e) The word "enemy" shall be understood to include those persons who are members of a revolutionary force or an armed band operating in violation of the laws of Nicaragua or against the recognized authorities of the Government of Nicaragua.

(f) The word "confinement" where used in sentences adjudged by competent authorities shall be understood as including and carrying with it compulsory labor at public works, and

(g) The word "tribunal" shall be understood as including any form of consejo de guerra, court, commission, inquiry, inquest, investigation or military board.

ARTICLE 3.

Persons subject to military law: The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law," or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers and enlisted men belonging to the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua; all volunteers, from the dates of their muster or acceptance into the military service of the Republic of Nicaragua; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft or order to obey the same;

(b) Cadets;

(c) All persons attached to and serving with the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua;

(d) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the forces of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua when operating against the enemy, and

(e) All persons under sentence adjudged by consejos de guerra.

CHAPTER II

CONSEJOS DE GUERRA

ARTICLE 4.

Consejos de guerra classified: Consejos de Guerra shall be of three kinds, namely:

First, Consejo de guerra general;
Second, Consejo de guerra ordinario, and
Third, Consejo de guerra sumario.

A. COMPOSITION

ARTICLE 5.

Who may serve on consejos de guerra: All officers in the service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be competent to serve on consejos de guerra for the trial of any persons who may be lawfully brought before such consejos de guerra for trial. When appointing consejos de guerra the appointing authority shall detail as members thereof those officers of the command who, in his opinion, are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, training, experience, length of service and judicial temperament.

ARTICLE 6.

Consejo de guerra general: A consejo de guerra general may consist of any number of officers not less than five nor more than eleven and a judge advocate

ARTICLE 7.

Consejo de guerra ordinario: A consejo de guerra ordinario may consist of any number of officers not less than three nor more than seven and a judge advocate.

ARTICLE 8.

Consejo de guerra sumario: A consejo de guerra sumario shall consist of one officer.

B. BY WHOM APPOINTED

ARTICLE 9.

Consejo de guerra general: The Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua or an officer designated by him may appoint consejos de guerra general and any other form of military tribunal. The appointing authority may detail as one of the members of a consejo de guerra general a law member, who, in addition to his duties as a member, shall perform such other duties as the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua may be regulations prescribe.

ARTICLE 10.

Consejo de guerra ordinario: The commanding officer of an area, a department, a designated district or a designated detached command may appoint consejos de guerra ordinario and such courts as may in any case be appointed by a superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable.

ARTICLE 11.

Consejo de guerra sumario: The commanding officer of a district, post, garrison, camp or other place where troops are on duty may appoint a consejo de guerra sumario, and such consejo may in any case be appointed by a superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable: **Provided**; That when but one officer is present with a command he shall be the consejo de guerra of that command and shall hear and determine cases brought before him.

ARTICLE 12.

Appointment of judge advocate and counsel: For each consejo de guerra general and consejo de guerra ordinario the authority appointing the consejo de guerra shall appoint a judge advocate and a defense counsel.

C. JURISDICTION

ARTICLE 13.

Consejos de guerra general: Consejos de guerra general shall have power to try any person subject to military law for any crime or offense made punishable by these articles, and any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals.

ARTICLE 14.

Consejos de guerra sumario: Consejos de guerra sumario shall have power to try any person subject to military law, except an officer, for any crime or offense not capital, made punishable by these articles; **Provided:** That Guardias holding certificates of citation for exemplary conduct shall not, if they object thereto, be brought to trial before a consejo de guerra sumario unless such trial is directed by an officer competent to bring them to trial before a consejo de guerra ordinario.

D. PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 16.

Judge advocate to prosecute; counsel to defend: The judge advocate of a consejo de guerra general or of a consejo de guerra ordinario shall, under the direction of the consejo de guerra, prepare the record of its proceedings. The accused shall have the right to be represented in his defense before the consejo de guerra by a military counsel of his own selection provided that detail of such counsel does not interfere with the demands of the service.

ARTICLE 17

Challenges: Members of a consejo de guerra general or of a consejo de guerra ordinaro may be challenged by the accused or the judge advocate for cause stated to the consejo de guerra. The consejo de guerra shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge; but the law member of the consejo de guerra shall not be challenged except for cause.

ARTICLE 18.

Oaths: All testimony before a consejo de guerra general or a consejo de guerra ordinario shall be given orally, upon oath of affirmation, administered by the senior member of the consejo de guerra.

Before proceeding to trial the president of the consejo de guerra general shall administer the following oath or affirmation to the judge advocate or person officiating as such:

I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will keep a true record of the evidence given to and proceedings of this consejo de guerra; that I will not divulge or by any means disclose the sentence of the consejo de guerra until it shall have been approved by the proper authority; and that I will not at any time divulge or disclose the vote or opinion of any particular member of the consejo de guerra.

The oath or affirmation being duly administered, each member of the consejo de guerra, before proceeding to trial, shall take the following oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the judge advocate or the person officiating as such:

"I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will truly try without prejudice or partiality, the case now depending, according to the evidence which shall come before the consejo de guerra, the rules for the government of the Guardia Nacional, and my own conscience; that I will not by any means divulge or disclose the sentence of the consejo de guerra until it shall have been approved by the proper authority; and that I will not at any time divulge or disclose the vote or opinion of any particular member of the consejo de guerra."

An oath or affirmation, in the following form, shall be administered to all witnesses before any consejo de guerra, by the president thereof:

"You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the evidence you give in the case now before this consejo de guerra shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and that you will state everything within your knowledge in relation to the charges So help you God; (or "this you do under the pains and penalties of perjury.)"

Before proceeding to trial the members of a consejo de guerra ordinario shall take the following oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the recorder:

"I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will well and truly try, without prejudice or partiality, the case now depending, according to the evidence which shall be adduced, the laws for the government of the Guardia Nacional, and my own conscience."

After which the recorder of the consejo de guerra shall take the following oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the senior member of the consejo de guerra:

"I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will keep a true record of the evidence which shall be given before this consejo de guerra and of the proceedings thereof."

The judge advocate, or person officiating as such, shall administer to the members of any military tribunal other than a consejo de guerra, the following oath or affirmation:

"You do swear (or affirm) well and truly to examine and inquire according to the evidence, into the matter now before you, without partiality;"

After which the president shall administer to the judge advocate or person officiating as such, the following oath or affirmation:

"You do swear (or affirm) truly to record the proceedings of this consejo de guerra and the evidence to be given in the case in hearing."

Every reporter of the proceedings of a consejo de guerra shall, before entering upon his duties, make oath or affirmation in the following form:

"You swear (or affirm) that you will faithfully perform the duties of reporter to this consejo de guerra. So help you God."

Every interpreter in the trial of any case before a consejo de guerra shall, before entering upon his duties, make oath or affirmation in the following form:

"You swear (or affirm) that you will truly interpret in the case now in hearing. So help you God."

In case of affirmation the closing sentence or adjuration will be omitted.

ARTICLE 19.

Continuance: A consejo de guerra may, for reasonable cause, grant a continuance to either party for such time and as often as may appear to be just.

ARTICLE 20.

Refusal or failure to plead: When an accused arraigned before a consejo de guerra fails or refuses to plead, or answers foreign to the purpose, or after a plea of guilty makes a statement inconsistent with the plea, or when it appears to the consejo de guerra that he entered a plea of guilty improvidently, or through lack of understanding of its meaning and effect, the consejo de guerra shall proceed to trial and judgement as if he had pleaded not guilty.

ARTICLE 21.

Process to obtain witnesses: Every judge advocate of a consejo de guerra general or a consejo de guerra ordinario and every consejo de guerra sumerio shall have power to issue like process to compel witnesses to appear and testify which courts of the Republic of Nicaragua, having criminal jurisdiction, may issue; but such process shall run to any part of the Republic of Nicaragua.

ARTICLE 22.

Refusal to appear to testify: Every person not subject to military law who, being duly subpoenaed to appear as a witness before any consejo de guerra or any form of military tribunal, or before any officer, military or civil, designated to take a deposition to be read in evidence before such consejo de guerra or other form of military tribunal, wilfully neglects or refuses to qualify as a witness, or to testify, or produce documentary evidence which such person may have been legally subpoenaed to produce, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, for which such person shall be punished on information in the respective court of first instance of the Republic of Nicaragua, jurisdiction being hereby conferred upon such courts for such purpose; and it shall be the duty of the civil officer prosecuting for the Government in any such court, on the certificate of the facts to him by the military court, commission, court of inquiry, or board, to file any information against and prosecute the person so offending, and the punishment of such person, on conviction, shall be a fine of not more than $40.00, or confinement for 30 days, or both.

ARTICLE 23.

Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited: No witness before a military court, commission, court of inquiry, or board, or before any officer conducting an investigation, or before any officer, military or civil, designated to take a desposition to be read in evidence before a military court, commission, court of inquiry, or board, or before an officer conducting an investigation, shall be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him, or to degrade him.

ARTICLE 24.

Depositions—When admissable: A duly authenticated deposition taken upon reasonable notice to the opposite party may be read into evidence before any consejo de guerra or military tribunal in any case not capital, when it appears to the consejo de guerra or military tribunal that it is impracticable to obtain the oral testimony of the witness at the place of the trial or hearing.

ARTICLE 25.

Depositions—Before whom taken: Depositions to be read in evidence before consejos de guerra and military tribunals or for other use in military administration, may be taken before and authenticated by any officer, military or civil, authorized by the laws of the Republic of Nicaragua to administer oaths.

ARTICLE 26.

Court to announce action: Whenever the consejo de guerra has acquitted the accused upon all specifications and charges, the consejo de guerra shall at once announce such result in open court.

Under such regulations as the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional may prescribe the findings and sentence in other cases may be similarly announced.

ARTICLE 27.

Closed sessions: Whenever a consejo de guerra general or a consejo de guerra ordinario shall sit in closed session, the judge advocate and the assistant judge advocate, if any, shall withdraw; and when their assistance in reference to the recorded evidence is required, it shall be obtained in open court, and in the presence of the accused and of his counsel, if there be any.

ARTICLE 28.

Method of voting: Voting by members of a consejo de guerra general or consejo de guerra ordinario upon questions of challenge, on the findings, and on the sentence shall be by secret written ballot. The junior member of the consejo de guerra shall in each case count the votes, which count will be checked by the president, who will forthwith announce the result of the ballot to the members of the consejo de guerra. The law member of the consejo de guerra, if any, or if there by no law member of the consejo de guerra, then the president, may rule in open court upon interlocutory questions, other than challenge, arising during the proceedings: Provided, that unless such ruling be made by the law member of the consejo de guerra if any member object thereto the consejo de guerra shall be cleared and closed and the questions decided by a majority vote, viva voce, beginning with the junior in rank: **And provided further,** that if any such ruling be made by the law member of the consejo de guerra upon any interlocutory question other than an objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during the trial, and any member object to the ruling, the consejo de guerra shall likewise be cleared and closed and the question decided by a majority vote, viva voce, beginning with the junior in rank.

ARTICLE 29.

Contempts: A military tribunal may punish as for contempt any person who uses any menacing words, signs, or gestures in its presence, or who disturbs its proceedings by any riot or disorder; **Provided,** that such punishment shall in no case exceed one months confinement, or a fine of $40.00, or both.

ARTICLE 30.

Proceedings: The proceedings of all consejos de guerra and military tribunals shall be conducted with as much conciseness and precision as may be consistent with the ends of justice, and all such proceedings shall be transmitted in the usual mode to Headquarters of the Guardia Nacional where they shall be kept on file for a period of three years from date of trial after which time they may be destroyed in the discretion of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional.

ARTICLE 31.

Rules governing: Consejos de guerra and other military tribunals shall be governed in all the details of their composition, constitution, powers, procedure, and modes of proof, except as herein provided, by such rules and regulations as the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional may prescribe.

ARTICLE 32.

Irregularities—Effect of: The proceedings of a consejo de guerra shall not be held invalid, nor the findings or sentence disapproved in any case on the ground of improper admission or rejection of evidence or for any error as to any matter of pleading or procedure unless in the opinion of the reviewing authority or confirming authority, after an examination of the entire proceedings, it shall appear that the error complained of has injuriously affected the substantial rights of an accused: **Provided,** that the act or omission upon which the accused has been tried constitutes an offense denounced and made punishable by one or more of these articles: **Provided further,** that the omission of the words "hard labor" in any sentence of a consejo de guerra adjudging imprisonment or confinement shall not be construed as depriving the authorities executing such sentence of imprisonment or confinement of the power to require hard labor as a part of the punishment in any case where it is authorized by the laws prescribing maximum punishments.

E. LIMITATIONS UPON PROSECUTION

ARTICLE 33.

As to number: No person shall, without his consent, be tried a second time for the same offense; but no proceeding in which an accused has been found guilty by a consejo de guerra upon any charge or specification shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article until the reviewing, and if there be one, the confirming authority shall have taken final action upon the case.

No authority shall return a record of trial to any consejo de guerra for reconsideration of:

(a) An acquittal; or

(b) The sentence originally imposed, with a view to increasing its severity.

F. PUNISHMENTS

ARTICLE 34.

Cruel and unusual punishments: Cruel and unusual punishments of every kind, including flogging, branding, marking or tattooing on the body are prohibited.

ARTICLE 35.

Places of confinement: The Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional may from time to time designate the places of confinement.

ARTICLE 36.

Death sentence—When lawful: No person shall, by consejo de guerra general, be convicted of an offense for which the death sentence is made mandatory by law, nor sentenced to suffer death, except by the concurrence of all the members of said consejo de guerra present at the time the vote is taken, and for an offense in these articles expressly made punishable by death; nor sentenced to life imprisonment, nor to confinement for more than ten years, except by the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members present at the time the vote is taken. All other convictions and sentences, whether by consejo de guerra general of consejo de guerra ordinario, may be determined by a two-thirds vote of those members present at the time the vote is taken. All other questions shall be determined by a majority vote.

ARTICLE 37.

It shall be the duty of a consejo de guerra in cases of conviction to adjudge a punishment adequate to the nature of the offense, but the members thereof may recommend the person convicted as deserving of clemency, and state on the record their reasons for so doing.

ARTICLE 38.

Any punishment which a consejo de guerra ordinario is authorized to inflict may be inflicted by a consejo de guerra general.

ARTICLE 39.

Consejo de Guerra ordinario: May sentence non-commissioned officers and persons of inferior ratings to any one of the following punishments, namely:

1. Discharge from the service with a bad-conduct discharge.
2. Solitary confinement, not exceeding 30 days, on bread and water, or on diminished rations.
3. Solitary confinement not exceeding 30 days.
4. Confinement not exceeding six months.
5. Reduction to the rank of private.
6. Deprivation of liberty.
7. Discharge from the service with a bad-conduct discharge, extra fatigue duties, and loss of pay, not to exceed three months, may be added to any one of the above mentioned punishments; **except that** extra fatigue duties may never be added to the punishment noted above in sub-paragraph 2 of this article.

ARTICLE 40.

Consejos de guerra sumario may sentence an enlisted man of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to any one of the following punishments, namely:

1. Solitary confinement, not exceeding 20 days, on bread and

water, or on diminished rations.
2. Solitary confinement not exceeding 20 days.
3. Confinement not exceeding 20 days.
4. Deprivation of liberty not exceeding one month.
5. Reduction in rank.
6. Extra fatigue duties and loss of pay not to exceed 20 days may be added to any one of the above mentioned punishments; **except that** extra fatigue duties may never be added to the punishment noted above in sub-paragraph 1 of this article.

ARTICLE 41.

A consejo de guerra shall not, by a single sentence which does not include a bad-conduct or a dishonorable discharge, adjudge against an accused:

1. Forfeiture of pay at a rate greater than two-thirds of his pay per month.
2. Forfeiture of pay in amount greater than two-thirds of his pay for six months.
3. Confinement at hard labor for a period greater than six months.

A consejo de guerra shall not, by a single sentence, adjudge against an accused:

Detention of pay in an amount greater than two-thirds of his pay for three months.

ARTICLE 42.

Maximum limits: Whenever the punishment for a crime or offense made punishable by these articles is left to the discretion of the consejo de guerra the punishment shall not exceed such limit or limits as the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional may from time to time prescribe.

G. ACTION BY APPOINTING OR SUPERIOR AUTHORITY

ARTICLE 43.

Approval and execution of sentences:

(a) Sentences of consejos de guerra general must be confirmed by the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional.
(b) Sentences of consejos de guerra ordinario must be confirmed by the Immediate Superior in Command to the Convening Authority.
(c) Sentences of consejos de guerra sumario will be carried into execution when approved by the Convening Authority.
(d) No sentence of a consejo de guerra extending to the loss of life shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the President.
(e) The proceedings, findings, and sentence of all consejos de guerra and military tribunals will be subject to review by the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional; who in all cases has

the power to remit, mitigate, commute or suspend any part or the whole of the sentence adjudged.

(f) The execution of all sentences of consejos de guerra except those sentences extending to discharge from the service or loss of life will be carried into effect upon the approval of the Convening Authority.

(g) Every officer who is authorized to appoint a consejo de guerra shall have power, on revision of the proceedings, to remit or mitigate, but not to commute, the sentence of any such consejo de guerra which he is authorized to approve or confirm.

ARTICLE 44.

Suspension of sentences: The authority competent to order the execution of the sentence of a consejo de guerra may suspend the execution, in whole or in part, of any such sentence as does not extend to death, and may restore the person under sentence to duty during such suspension. The death or honorable discharge of a person under a suspended sentence shall operate as a complete remission of any unexecuted or unremitted part of such sentence.

CHAPTER III

PUNITIVE ARTICLES

A. ENLISTMENT: MUSTER: RETURNS:

ARTICLE 45.

Fraudulent Enlistment: Any person who shall procure himself to be enlisted in the military service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua by means of wilfull misrepresentation or concealment as to his qualifications for enlistment, and shall receive pay or allowances under such enlistment, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 46.

Officer making unlawful enlistment: Any officer who knowingly enlists or musters into the military service any person whose enlistment or muster in is prohibited by law, regulations, or orders shall be dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 47.

False muster: Any officer who knowingly makes a false muster of man or animal and who signs or directs or allows the signing of any muster roll knowing the same to contain a false muster of false statement as to the absence or pay of an officer or guardia, or who wrongfully takes money or other consideration on mustering in a regiment, company, or other organization, or on signing muster rolls, or who knowingly musters as an officer or guardia a person who is not such officer or guardia, shall be dismissed from the service and suffer such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 48.

False returns—Omission to render returns: Every detachment commander whose duty it is to render to the Guardia Nacional a return of the state of the troops under his command, or of the arms, ammunition, clothing, funds, or other property thereunto belonging, who knowingly makes a false return thereof shall be dismissed from the service and suffer such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. And any officer who, through neglect or design, omits to render such return shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

B. DESERTION; ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE

ARTICLE 49.

Desertion: Any person subject to military law who deserts or attempts to desert the service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, suffer death or such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct, and, if the offense be committed at any other time, any punishment, excepting death, that a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 50.

Advising or aiding another to desert: Any person subject to military law who advises or persuades or knowingly assists another to desert the service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, suffer death or such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct, and, if the offense be committed at any other time, any punishment, excepting death, that a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 51.

Apprehension of deserters: Any person subject to military law who knows the whereabouts of a deserter or a declared absentee and does not without delay give information thereof to his commanding officer shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge.

ARTICLE 52.

Absence without leave: Any person subject to military law who fails to repair at the fixed time to the properly appointed place of duty, or goes from the same without proper leave, or absents himself from his command, guard, quarters, station or camp without proper leave, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

C. DISRESPECT: INSUBORDINATION: MUTINY

ARTICLE 53.

Disrespect toward superior officer: Any person subject to military law who behaves himself with disrespect toward his superior officer shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 54.

Assaulting or wilfully disobeying superior officer: Any person subject to military law who, on any pretense whatsoever, strikes his superior officer or draws or lifts up any weapon or offers any violence against him, being in the execution of his office, or wilfully disobeys any lawful command of his superior officer, shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 55.

Insubordinate conduct toward non-commissioned officer: Any guardia who strikes or assaults, or who attempts or threatens to strike or assault, or wilfully disobeys the lawful order of an officer or a non-commissioned officer while in the execution of his office, or uses threatening or insulting language, or behaves in an insubordinate or disrespectful manner toward an officer or a non-commissioned officer while in the execution of his office, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 56.

Mutiny or sedition: Any person subject to military law who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes, aids or joins in any mutiny or sedition in any company, party, post, camp, detachment, guard or other command, or at any place, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 57.

Failure to suppress mutiny or sedition: Any officer or guardia who, being present at a mutiny or sedition, does not use his utmost endeavor to suppress the same, or, knowing or having reason to believe that a mutiny or sedition is to take place, does not without delay give information thereof to his commanding officer shall suffer death or such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 58.

Quarrels: frays: disorders: All officers and non-commissioned officers have power to part and quell all quarrels, frays, and disorders among persons subject to military law and to order officers who take part in same into arrest, and other persons subject to military law who take part in the same into arrest or confinement, as circumstances may require, until their proper superior officer is acquanited therewith. And whosoever, being so ordered, refuses to obey such officer of non-commissioned officer, or draws a weapon upon or otherwise threatens or does violence to him, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 59.

Releasing prisoner without proper authority: Any person subject to military law who, without proper authority, releases any prisoner duly committed to his charge, or who through neglect or design suffers any prisoner so committed to escape, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 60.

Charges; action upon: No charge will be referred for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be given the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides.

When any person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confinement immediate steps will be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him.

E. OFFENSES COMMITTED IN TIME OF WAR, INSURRECTION OF ARMED REBELLION AGAINST THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA

ARTICLE 61.

Misbehavior before the enemy: Any officer or guardia who, before the enemy, misbehaves himself, runs away, or shamefully abandons or delivers up or by any misconduct, disobedience, or neglect endangers the safety of any fort, post, camp, guard, or other command which it is his duty to defend, or speaks words inducing others to the like, or casts away his arms or ammunition, or quits his post or colors to plunder or pillage, or by any means whatsoever occasions false alarms in camp, garrison, or quarters, shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 62.

Subordinate compelling commander to surrender. Any persons subject to military law who compels, or attempts to compel, any commander of any garrison, fort, post, camp, guard, or other command, to give it up to the enemy or to abandon it shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 63.

Improper use of countersign: Any person subject to military law who makes known the parole or countersign to any person not entitled to receive it according to the rules and discipline of war, or gives a parole or countersign different from that which he received, shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, insurrection or armed rebellion against the authority of the Government of Nicaragua, suffer death or such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 64.

Forcing a safeguard: Any person subject to military law who, in times of war, insurrection or armed rebellion against the authority of the Government of Nicaragua, forces a safeguard shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 65.

Captured property to be secured for public service: All public property taken from the enemy is the property of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and shall be secured for the service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and any person subject to military law who negelcts to secure such property or is guilty of wrongful appropriation thereof shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 66.

Dealing in captured or abandoned property: Any person subject to military law who buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or to any other person directly or indirectly connected with himself, or who fails whenever such property comes into his possession or custody or within his control, to give notice thereof to the proper authority without delay, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine or imprisonemnt, or by such other punishment as a consejo de guerra, military commission, or other military tribunal may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties.

ARTICLE 67.

Relieving, corresponding with, or aiding the enemy: Whosoever relieves, or attempts to relieve, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other things, or knowingly harbors or protects or holds correspondence with or gives intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a consejo de guerra or military commission may direct.

ARTICLE 68.

Spies: Any person who in time of war, insurrection or armed rebellion against the authority of the Government of Nicaragua, shall be found lurking or acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of any of the forces of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, or elsewhere, shall be tried by a consejo de guerra general or by a military commission and shall on conviction thereof, suffer death.

F. MISCELLANEOUS CRIMES AND OFFENSES

ARTICLE 69.

Military property—Wilfull or negligent loss, damage, or wrongful disposition: Any person subject to military law who wilfully or through neglect, suffers to be lost, spoiled, damaged, or wrongfully disposed of, any property belonging to or in the possession of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall make good the loss or damage and suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 70.

Waste or unlawful disposition of property issued to enlisted men: Any enlisted man who sells or wrongfully disposes of or wilfully or through neglect injures or loses any horse, arms, ammunition, accounterments, equipment, clothing, or other property issued to or intended for the use of the military service, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 71.

Drunk on duty: Any officer who is found drunk on duty shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, insurrection or armed rebellion against the authority of the Government of Nicaragua, be dismissed from the service and suffer such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge; and if the offense be committed in time of peace, he shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. Any person subject to military law, except an officer, who is found drunk on duty, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 72.

Misbehavior of sentinel: Any sentinel who is found drunk or sleeping upon his post, or who leaves it before he is regularly relieved, shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, suffer death or such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct; and if the offense be committed in time of peace, he shall suffer any punishment, except death, that a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 73.

Personal interest in sale of provisions: Any person subject to military law in any garrison, fort, barracks, camp or other place where troops of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua may be serving who, for his private advantage, lays any duty or imposition upon or is interested in the sale of any victual, forage or other supplies brought into such garrison, fort, barracks, camp or other place for the use of troops, shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 74.

Intimidation of persons bringing provisions: Any person subject to military law who abuses, intimidates, does violence to, or wrongfully interferes with any person bringing provisions, supplies, or other necessaries to the camp, garrison, or quarters of the forces of the Guardia Nacional shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 75.

Good order to be maintained and wrongs redressed: All persons subject to military law are to behave themselves orderly in quarters, garrison, camp, and on the march; and any persons subject to military law who commits any waste or spoil, or wilfully destroys any property whatsoever (unless by order of his commanding officer), or commits any kind of depredation or riot, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. Any commanding officer who, upon complaint made to him, refuses or omits to see reparation made to the party injured, in so far as the offender's pay shall go toward such reparation, as provided for in Article 88, shall be dismissed from the service, or otherwise punished, as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 76.

Provoking words, menaces and maltreatment: Such punishment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge may be inflicted on any person in the Guardia Nacional:

(1) Who is guilty of cruelty toward, or opression or maltreatment of any person subject to his orders;
(2) Or quarrels with, strikes, or assaults, or uses provoking or reproachful words, gestures, or menaces toward any person in the Guardia Nacional;
(3) Or endeavors to foment quarrels between other persons in the Guardia Nacional;
(4) Or, when on duty or liberty, plunders, abuses, or maltreats any inhabitant or injures his property in any way.

ARTICLE 77.

Dueling: Any person subject to military law who fights or promotes or is concerned in or connives at fighting a duel, or who, having knowledge of a challenge sent or about to be sent, fails to report the fact promptly to the proper authority, shall, if an officer, be dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct; and if any other person subject to military law, shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 78.

Murder—Rape: Any person subject to military law who commits murder or rape shall suffer punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 79.

Various crimes: Any person subject to military law who commits manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking, robbery theft, fraud, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, subordination of perjury, forgery, sodomy, assault with intent to commit any felony, assault with intent to do bodily harm with a dangerous weapon, instrument, or other thing, or assault with intent to do bodily harm, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct.

ARTICLE 80.

Frauds against the Government: Any person subject to military law who makes or causes to be made any claim against the Government of Nicaragua or any officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false; or

Who presents or causes to be presented to any person in the civil or military service thereof, for approval or payment, any claim against the Government of Nicaragua, or any officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false or fraudulent; or

Who enters into any agreement or conspiracy to defraud the Government of Nicaragua by obtaining, or aiding others to obtain, the allowance or payment of any false or fraudulent claim; or

Who for the purpose of obtaining or aiding others to obtain, the approval, allowance, or payment of any claim against the Government of Nicaragua or against any officer thereof, makes or uses, or procures, or advises the making or use of, any writing or other paper knowing the same to contain any false or fraudulent statements; or

Who for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding others to obtain, the approval, allowance, or payment of any claim against the Government of Nicaragua or any officer thereof, makes or procures, or advises the making of, any oath to any writing or other paper knowing such oath to be false; or

Who for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding others to obtain, the approval, allowance, or payment of any claim against the government of Nicaragua, or any officer thereof, forges or counterfeits, or procures, or advises the forging or counterfeiting of any signature upon any writing or other paper, or uses, or procures, or advises the use of any such signature, knowing the same to be forged or counterfeited; or

Who, having charge, possession, custody or control of any money or other property of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, furnished or intended for the military service thereof, knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered to any person having authority to receive the same, any amount thereof less than that for which he receives a certificate or receipt; or

Who, being authorized to make or deliver any paper certifying the receipt of any property of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua furnished or intended for the military service thereof, makes or delivers to any person such writing, without having full knowledge of the truth of the statements therein contained and with intent to defraud the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua; or

Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and wilfully misappropriates, applies to his own use or benefit, or wrongfully or knowingly sells, or disposes of any ordnance, arms, equipments, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, money, or other property of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua furnished or intended for the military service thereof; or

Who knowingly purchases or receives in pledge for any obligation or indebtedness from any guardia, officer, or other person who is a part of or employed in said forces or service, any ordnance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, or other property of or in the possession of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, such guardia, officer, or other person not having lawful right to sell or pledge the same;

Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties. And if any person being guilty of any of the offenses aforesaid while in the military service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, receives his discharge or is dismissed from the service he shall continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a consejo de guerra in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had not received such discharge nor been dismissed.

And if any officer, being guilty, while in the military service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, of embezzlement of ration savings, post exchange, company, or other like funds, or of embezzlement of money or other property intrusted to his charge by an enlisted man or men, receives his discharge, or is dismissed, or is dropped from the rolls, he shall continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a consejo de guerra in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had not been so discharged, dismissed, or dropped from the rolls.

G. MISCELLANEOUS

ARTICLE 81.

Weapons, possession of: Unless specific written authority is granted by commanding officers, it is prohibited for any member of the Guardia Nacional to have in his possession firearms or any other dangerous weapon other than those issued by the Government and then only in the performance of duty.

ARTICLE 82.

General article: Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders, neglects and offenses to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service, and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons subject to military law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a consejo de guerra general or a consejo de guerra ordinario, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such consejo de guerra.

ARTICLE 83.

Disciplinary powers of commanding officers: Under such regulations as the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional may prescribe, the commanding officer of any detachment, company, or higher command may, for minor offenses, impose disciplinary punishments upon persons of his command without the intervention of a consejo de guerra.

The disciplinary punishments authorized by this article may include admonition, reprimand, withholding of privileges for not exceeding one week, extra fatigue for not exceeding one week, restriction to certain specified limits for not exceeding one week, but shall not include forfeiture of pay or confinement under guard. A person punished under authority of this article, who deems his punishment unjust or disproportionate to the offense, may, through the proper channels, appeal to the next superior authority, but may in the meantime, be required to undergo the punishment adjudged. All punishments, except admonition and reprimand, awarded by the authorities mentioned in this article, shall be fully entered in a book reserved for that purpose.

ARTICLE 84.

A Department Commander or higher commander may reduce in rank any non-commissioned officer or other person of inferior rank serving under his command for incompetency.

ARTICLE 85.

Authority to administer oaths: Any judge advocate or acting judge advocate, the president or senior member of any consejo de guerra or military tribunal, any officer designated to take a deposition, any officer detailed to conduct an investigation, any commanding officer of a designated detached command, and the adjutant of any command shall have the power to administer oaths for the purpose of the administration of military justice and for other purposes of military administration; and shall have the general powers of a notary public of Nicaragua in the administration of oaths, the execution and acknowledgement of legal instruments, the attestation of documents and all other forms of notarial acts to be executed by persons subject to military law, and by any person who is a party to any subject matter under discussion or investigation with the Government of Nicaragua or its representative.

ARTICLE 86.

Appointment of Reporters and Interpreters: Under such regulations as the Jefe Director of the Guardia may from time to time prescribe, the president or senior member of a consejo de guerra or any military tribunal shall have power to appoint a reporter, who shall record the proceedings of and testimony taken before such consejo de guerra or commission and may set down the same, in the first instance, in shorthand. Under like regulations the president or senior member of a consejo de guerra or of any military commission or tribunal may appoint an interpreter, who shall interpret for the consejo de guerra or military tribunal.

ARTICLE 87.

Injuries to property—redress of: Whenever complaint is made to any commanding officer that damage has been done to the property of any person or that his property has been wrongfully taken by any person subject to military law, such complaint shall be investigated by a board consisting of any number of officers from one to three, which board shall be convened by the commanding officer and shall have, for the purpose of investigation, power to summon witnesses and examine them upon oath or affirmation, to receive depositions or other documentary evidence, and to assess the damages sustained against the responsible parties. The assessment of damages made by such board shall be subject to the approval of the commanding officer, and in the amount approved by him shall be stopped against the pay of the offenders. And the order of such commanding officer directing stoppages herein authorized shall be conclusive on any disbursing officer for the payment by him to the injured parties of the stoppages so ordered.

Where the offenders cannot be ascertained, but the organization or detachment to which they belong is known, stoppages to the amount of damages inflicted may be made and assessed in such proportion as may be deemed just upon the individual members thereof who are

shown to have been present with such organization or detachment at the time the damages complained of were inflicted as determined by the approved findings of the board.

ARTICLE 88.

Political activities: Any person subject to military law who indirectly or directly attempts to use or uses his influence in any manner whatsoever to assist anyone to be nominated or elected to any political office will be subject to such punishment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge.

ARTICLE 89.

Oath of enlistment: At the time of his enlistment every guardia shall take the following oath:

"I, ..., by this present do voluntarily consent to enlist as ..... of Nicaragua, for the duration of three years, unless I be discharged prior to that time by a competent authority. And I solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Republic of Nicaragua; that I will serve her honestly and faithfully against all her enemies whomsoever; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the Republic of Nicaragua and the orders of my chiefs and superior officers, in accordance with the laws and regulations for the government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and I do swear that all I have said and that appears in this document is correct. I also swear to hereby renounce all political affiliations, and that never, during my enlistment will I speak of or associate myself with any political organization or activity."

This oath may be executed before any officer.

ARTICLE 90.

Certain acts to constitute desertion: Any officer who, having tendered his resignation and prior to due notice of the acceptance of the same, quits his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to absent himself permanently therefrom shall be deemed a deserter.

Any person subject to military law who quits his organization or place of duty with the intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service shall be deemed a deserter.

A prima facie case of desertion is deemed to be established if the individual:

(a) Has been absent without authority from his station and duty for more than 14 days, or

(b) During unauthorized absence secures employment, or wears civilian clothing, or changes his name, or if sick fails to notify the nearest Guardia commander, or

(c) Has been absent without authority for more than 48 hours and has in his possession any weapon issued to him by the Guardia, or

(d) If he is apprehended at a point more than 15 miles from his station and duty, or

(e) If he sells or disposes of any article of clothing or equipment issued to him by the Guardia.

ARTICLE 91.

If an individual after unauthorized absence voluntarily surrenders himself to the Guardia, due weight will be given that fact in connection with the circumstances noted in the preceding article.

ARTICLE 92.

All matters of recruiting, appointment, instruction, training, promotion, examination, discipline, operation and movement of troops, finances and expenditures, clothing, rations, arms and equipment, quarters, administration and control and regulation of prisons and penitentiaries shall be under the jurisdiction of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional who may issue rules and regulations governing the same.

ARTICLE 93.

Uniforms and equipment—not to be sold, etc. The clothes, arms, military outfits, and accounterments furnished by the Guarida Nacional to any enlisted man shall not be sold, bartered, exchanged, pledged, loaned, or given away; and any member of the Guardia Nacional so disposing of the aforesiad articles will be subject to such punishment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge; and no person not an enlisted man, or duly authorized officer of the Guardia Nacional who has possession of any such clothes, arms, military outfits, or accounterments, so furnished and which have been the subject of any such sale, barter, exchange, pledge, loan, or gift, shall have any right, title, or interest therein; but the same may be seized and taken wherever found by any officer of the Guardia Nacional, and shall thereupon be delivered to any quartermaster, or other officer authorized to receive the same. The possession of any such clothes arms, military outfits or accounterments by any person not an enlisted man or officer of the Guardia Nacional shall be presumptive evidence of such a sale, barter, exchange, pledge, loan, or gift.

ARTICLE 94.

Enlisted men to make good time lost: Every enlisted man who in an existing or subsequent enlistment deserts the service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, or without proper authority absents himself from his organization, station, or duty for more than one day, or who is confined for more than one day under sentence, or while awaiting trial and disposition of his case, if the trial results in conviction, or through the intemperate use of drugs or alcoholic liquor, or through disease or injury the result of his own misconduct, renders himself

unable for more than one day to perform duty, shall be liable to serve, after his return to a full duty status, for such period as shall, with the time he may have served prior to such desertion, unauthorized absence, confinement or inability to perform duty, amount to the full term of that part of his enlistment period which he is required to serve with his organization.

ARTICLE 95.

Enlisted men—Separation from the service: No enlisted man, lawfully inducted into the military service of the Republic of Nicaragua shall be discharged from said service without a certificate of discharge signed by the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional or an officer empowered by him to do so, and no enlisted man shall be discharged from said service before his term of service has expired except by order of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional, an officer empowered by him to do so, or by sentence of a consejo de guerra.

H. CONSEJOS DE GUERRA EXTRAORDINARIOS

When martial law is proclaimed in Nicaragua, or any part thereof, it is essential that those cases be handled expeditiously and in a uniformly legal manner, where the offender is not in the military service of the Republic of Nicaragua and when the offense or crime is of such a nature that trial by civil court is either undesirable or impracticable.

Therefore, when there is an armed disturbance, or when martial law has been declared, or when there is rebellion against the supreme authority of the Republic ,or, in time of invasion, the following provisions will be applicable:

ARTICLE 96.

The President or an official delegated by him may appoint one or more consejos de guerra extraordinario in each Department for the purpose of hearing and determining cases brought before it and to adjudge sentences within the limitations prescribed by law.

ARTICLE 97.

Composition: A consejo de guerra extraordinario will be composed of not less than three nor more than seven members and a fiscal militar.

ARTICLE 98.

Jurisdiction: A consejo de guerra extraordinario shall have the power to try any person not in the military service of the Republic of Nicaragua for any crime or offense made punishable by these articles, martial law, the law of war, or any and all rules and regulations duly promulgated for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the aforesaid articles and laws.

(1) **Same: Jurisdiction as to place:** The jurisdiction of a consejo de guerra extraordinario extends to every part of the Republic of Nicaragua.

(2) **Same: Jurisdiction as to time:** If the court have jurisdiction of the person and offense, it may proceed, if the offense was committed within a martial law district, and in case of war, insurrection or armed rebellion against the authority of Nicaragua, anywhere within the territorial limits of Nicaragua, even if it was of a date anterior to the proclamation of either martial law or war, insurrection or armed rebellion against the authority of Nicaragua, at the place of the trial.

(3) **Same: Jurisdiction as to offenses:** In time of war, martial law, armed disturbance, invasion, or rebellion against the supreme authority of the Republic of Nicaragua, such punishment as a consejo de guerra extraordinario may adjudge may be inflicted on any person not in the military service of the Republic of Nicaragua, who:

(a) Is a member of a revolutionary force or an armed band operating in violation of the laws of Nicaragua or against the recognized authorities of the Government of Nicaragua; or

(b) Incites, intends, prepares or attempts to commit or commits any act of hostility against the forces of the recognized Government or against any pacific inhabitant or the Republic of Nicaragua; or

(c) Shall be found lurking as a spy in or around the detachments or encampments of the armed forces of the Republic of Nicaragua; or

(d) Attempts to commit or commits certain crimes of violence such as murder, poisoning, rape, mayhem, malicious assault and battery, robbery or theft against any individual of the constituted forces of the supreme authority or against any pacific inhabitant of the Republic of Nicaragua; or

(e) Attempts to commit or commits the wanton desecration or destruction except by order of a superior officer representing the supreme authority of the Republic, of public or private property; or

(f) In any manner whatsoever aids or attempts to aid, conceals or attempts to conceal, or procures or gives refuge to, or protects any person who may be judged guilty or may be suspected or alleged to have violated any of the provisions herein contained.

ARTICLE 99.

Arrest, etc: All offenders in the matters aforesaid shall be promptly seized, confined and reported for trial before a consejo de guerra extraordinario.

ARTICLE 100.

Procedure: When conditions permit, the modes of procedure and proof, voting and the recording of the proceedings shall be the same as provided herein for consejos de guerra general.

ARTICLE 101.

Confirmation and execution of sentences: No sentence adjudged by a consejo de guerra extraordinario will be carried into effect without the previous confirmation of the President of the Republic; except that in case of war or other absolute emergency when it is impracticable to secure the decision of the President of the Republic the confirmation of the Commander-in-chief of the forces operating in the field will be sufficient to effect the execution of the sentence.

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CHAPTER II.

Tipitapa, May 4, 1927.

General Jose Maria Moncada,
Tipitapa.

Dear General Moncada:

Confirming our conversation of this morning, I have the honor to inform you that I am authorized to say that the President of the United States intends to accept the request of the Nicaraguan Government to supervise the election of 1928; that the retention of President Diaz during the remainder of his term is regarded as essential to that plan and will be insisted upon; that a general disarmament of the country is also regarded as necessary for the proper and successful conduct of such election; and that the forces of the United States will be authorized to accept the custody of the arms of those willing to lay them down, including the government, and to disarm forcibly those who will not do so.

Very respectfully,
/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON.

Tipitapa, Nicaragua, May 11, 1927.

General Jose Maria Moncada,
Tipitapa.

Dear General Moncada:

I am glad to learn of the authority that has been placed in you by your army to arrange for a general disarmament. I am also glad to make clear to you and to your army the attitude of the President of the United States as to this matter. In seeking to terminate this war, President Coolidge is actuated only by a desire to benefit the people of Nicaragua and to secure for them a free, fair and impartial election. He believes that only by such free and fair elections can permanent peace be secured for Nicaragua. To insure this in 1928 he has consented to the request that American representatives selected by him shall supervise the election. He has also consented to assign American officers to train and command a non-partisan national constabulary for Nicaragua which will have the duty of securing such a fair election and of preventing any fraud or intimidation of voters. He is willing also to leave in Nicaragua until after the election a sufficient force of marines to support the work of the constabulary and insure peace and freedom at the election.

As further evidence of the good faith of the American Government and of the present Nicaraguan Government in this matter, I am glad to tell you what has already been done. It will answer the questions contained in the letter of your soldiers which you have shown me. General amnesty has already been granted by the President of Nicaragua. I have recommended to President Diaz that the Supreme Court be reconstituted by the elimination of the illegal judges placed in that court under Sr. Chamorro. President Diaz has already called upon those judges for their resignations and I believe that those resignations will be obtained. I have already advised that the Congress be reconstituted by the holding of special elections in those Liberal districts where elections were not held in 1926 under conditions which will insure that the Liberal voters will be amply protected in their rights. I have also recommended that members of Congress illegally expelled by Sr. Chamorro whose terms have not yet expired be reinstated. I have been assured that this will be done.

I have recommended that Liberal Jefes Politicos be appointed in the six Liberal districts of Bluefields, Jinotega, Nueva Segovia, Esteli, Chinandega and Leon. I have been assured that this will be done.

In short, I have recommended that steps be taken so far as possible to restore the political condition as it existed in Nicaragua before the Chamorro coup d'etat and I believe that so far as possible it will be done.

I hope that these steps will assure you and your army of the fairness of the United States Government and its desire to see peace, justice and freedom re-established in Nicaragua without any unfairness or favoritism towards any party but being regardful of the rights of Liberals and Conservatives alike.

Very respectfully yours,
/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON.

Private Correspondence
of the
President of the Republic
of Nicaragua.

June 18, 1927.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional.
City.

Sir:-

From the date of the reorganization of the Guardia Nacional was undertaken on May 12, 1927, until permanent designations are authorized for the commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the U. S. Marine Corps that have been or may be, ordered for duty in the said Guardia and for the purpose of the appointment of these officers and non-commissioned officers, the following designation and pay is hereby effective until further orders:—

Jefe Director	$250.00
Asst. Jefe Director	200.00
Paymaster and Quartermaster	200.00
Medical Director	200.00
Departmental Director	200.00
Departmental Inspector	150.00
Medical Inspector	150.00
District Commander	150.00
1st Sub-District Commander	100.00
2nd Sub-District Commander	60.00

Very truly yours,

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ
PRESIDENT.

President of the Republic

Managua, 13 July, 1927.

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional.—
City.

From and including this date, you are authorized to recruit men for the Guardia Nacional and increase its strength to six hundred (600) men as soon as you may deem it convenient; and also to appoint officers and non-commissioned officers of the U. S. Marine Corps and Naval Service, as officers of the Guardia Nacional when you deem it necessary, up to six and a half per cent (6½%) of the enlisted strength hereby authorized.

Very truly,

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ
PRESIDENT.

Managua, September 8, 1927.

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional,
City.

From and including this date you are authorized to appoint officers and non-commissioned officers of the U. S. Marine Corps and Naval Services for duty with the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, as soon as you deem it necessary, up to ten percent (10%) over the strength of six hundred (600) men, which, up to the present, is the authorized strength of that organization, by order issued the 13th July, 1927. This large percentage of officers is considered necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the activities of the different headquarters, consequent with the expansion of the Guardia.

Yours very truly,

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ,
PRESIDENT.

Presidente
y
Comandancia General.

MANAGUA. July 29, 1927.

Sr. General Elias R. Beadle,
Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional,
City.—

My dear General:

Wishing that the Guardia Nacional under your command may contribute, in an efficient manner, to establish a permanent peace throughout the Republic, my Government would be pleased if that organization would take over the police service in the country as soon as possible.

In this connection, it seems to me that it would be convenient to commence with the Department of Chinandega, so that in accordance with the Decree issued this date by the Executive, a detachment of the Institution under your command, is sent over to take over the policing of that Department.

Very truly yours,

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ,
PRESIDENT.

NO. 54. THE PRESIDENT OF NICARAGUA DECREES:

1. As the strength, the resources and training of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua will permit, it will take over and thereafter carry out the policing of the Republic.

2. The Police forces of the Republic now in authority will continue to exercise their functions until their duties have been taken over by the Guardia Nacional in accordance with the preceding Article and when the Government so directs.

3. The funds assigned for the pay and expenses of all the police organizations will be alloted for the operation and maintenance of the Guardia Nacional as it takes over the duties of the present police force.

4. When the duties of the police officials have been formally taken over by the Guardia Nacional, the said police officials will cease to hold office as police officials.

5. The directors of police will remain in exercise of their judicial functions.

6. As the Guardia Nacional takes over the policing of any section of the Republic it shall take over control of all fortifications, barracks, buildings and grounds, prisons, penitentiaries, vessels and other Government property which were formally assigned to or under the control of the Army, Navy and Police forces of the Republic of Nicaragua. The Guardia Nacional will furthermore take over the supervision and control of all arms, ammunitions, military supplies and traffic therein.

7. The Guardia Nacional shall be subject only to the Direction of the President of Nicaragua.

8. The Chief of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall provide and issue the Regulations for the Government of the members of the Guardia Nacional.

9. The personnel of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, excepting the citizens of the United States of America, will be subject for all military offenses and for acts committed in the line of duty to the jurisdiction of the courts-martial established under the regulations for the government of the Guardia Nacional as aforementioned.

10. The findings of these courts-martial of the Guardia Nacional after approval by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional are final and are not subject to appeal or review, except by the Supreme Court of Nicaragua and then only in question of excess of power or question of jurisdiction.

11. In civil cases only, members of the Guardia Nacional may be subject to civil courts.

12. The officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who are citizens of the United States of America will be replaced by Nicaraguans when they have successfully completed the instruction and service prescribed by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and have shown by their conduct and an examination that they are fit for command.

13. Members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who are citizens of the United States of America will not be subject to the courts of Nicaragua but will be subject to trial by the courts-martial under the laws of the United States.

14. This law repeals any other law which is in conflict with it, and is effective from the date of its publication as a decree.

OFFICIAL: PRESIDENTIAL MANSION—MANAGUA, 30 July, 1927. ADOLFO DIAZ—THE MINISTER OF POLICE, RICARDO LOPEZ C.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA.

Whereas the Republic of Nicaragua is desirous of preserving internal peace and order and the security of individual rights, and is desirous of carrying out plans for the maintenance of domestic tranquility and the promotion of the prosperity of the Republic and its people;

And whereas the assistance and cooperation of the Government of the United States is deemed essential to an early realization of the measures to be adopted;

And whereas the United States is in full sympathy with these aims and objects of the Republic and is desirous of contributing in all proper ways to their attainment the undersigned duly authorized thereto by their respective governments have agreed as follows:

I.

The Republic of Nicaragua undertakes to create without delay an efficient constabulary to be known as the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua urban and rural composed of native Nicaraguans, the strength of which and the amounts to be expended for pay, rations, and expenses of operation, et cetera, shall be as set forth in the following table:

COMMISSIONED PERSONNEL

		$ Gold Per annum
1	Brigadier General	3,000.00
1	Colonel, Chief of Staff	2,500.00
3	Colonels (Line) at $2,400.00 per annum	7,200.00
1	Colonel, Quartermaster	2,400.00
1	Colonel, Medical	2,400.00
4	Majors (Line) at $2,100.00 per annum	8,400.00
1	Major, Paymaster	2,100.00
1	Major, General Headquarters Inspector	2,100.00
1	Major, Law Officer	2,100.00
2	Majors, Medical, at $2,100.00 per annum	4,200.00
10	Captains at $1,800.00 per annum	18,000.00
2	Captains, Medical, at $1,800.00 per annum	3,600.00
20	First Lieutenants, at $1,200.00 per annum	24,000.00

2	First Lieutenants, Medical, at $1,200.00 per annum	2,400.00
20	Second Lieutenants, at $900.00 per annum	18,000.00
3	Second Lieutenants, Medical, at $900.00 per annum	2,700.00
20	Student Officers (Cadets), at $600.00 per annum	12,000.00
93		$ 117,100.00

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

		$ Gold	Per annum
4	Sergeants Major, at $40.00 per month		1,920.00
10	First Sergeants, at $35.00 per month		4,200.00
10	Q. M. Sergeants, at $30.00 per month		3,600.00
60	Sergeants, at $25.00 per month		18,000.00
120	Corporals, at $18.00 per month		25,920.00
20	Field Musics, at $14.00 per month		3,360.00
840	Privates, at $12.00 per month		120,960.00
1064			$ 177,960.00

BAND

		$ Gold	Per annum
1	Leader		1,200.00
1	Assistant Leader		900.00
10	Musicians, First Class, at $30.00 per month		3,600.00
10	Musicians, Second Class, at $25.00 per month		3,000.00
15	Musicians, Third Class at $20.00 per month		3,600.00
37			$12,300.00

ENLISTED MEDICAL PERSONNEL

		$ Gold	Per annum
1	First Sergeant, at $35.00 per month		420.00
4	Sergeants, at $25.00 per month		1,200.00
20	Corporals, at $18.00 per month		4,320.00
10	Privates, at $12.00 per month		1,440.00
35			$7,380.00

OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

Civil employees; uniforms and clothing; arms equipment and target practice; remounts and forage; motor vehicles and maintenance; repairs and replacements; transportation of supplies and troops; maps, stationery and office supplies; intelligence service; rent, repairs and construction of barracks; gasolene, kerosene; lights; tools and miscellaneous expenditures for operations and maintenance of the Constabulary $200,000.00

RATIONS

Expenses of procuring and preparing rations for 1136 enlisted at $0.30 per diem	$124,392.00

PRISONS AND PENITENTIARIES

Operation and Maintenance	$ 40,000.00
Medical supplies and Maintenance of Constabulary Hospitals, Prison Dispensaries, etc	$ 10,000.00
GRAND TOTAL	$689,132.00

The foregoing provisions shall be regarded as the minimum requirements for the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. If the condition of the Nicaraguan Government's finances shall so warrant, the strength of the Guardia Nacional commissioned and enlisted, and the expenses thereof may be increased upon the recommendation of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional and upon the consent in writing of the President of Nicaragua.

If the condition of the Nicaraguan Government's finances shall so warrant a suitable Coast Guard and a suitable Aviation Unit may upon the recommendation of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and upon the consent in writing of the President of Nicaragua be made a part of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, similarly officered and manned with appropriate ranks and subject in the same manner to regulations and discipline as provided herein for the personnel of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

II.

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be considered the sole military and police force of the Republic, clothed with full power to preserve domestic peace and the security of individual rights. It shall have control of arms and ammunition, military supplies and supervision of the traffic therein throughout the Republic. It shall have control of all fortifications, barracks, buildings, grounds, prisons, penitentiaries, vessels, and other government property which were formerly assigned to or under control of the Army, Navy and Police forces of the Republic. It shall be subject only to the direction of the President of Nicaragua; all other officials desiring the services of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be required to submit requests through the nearest official of that organization. The guard of Honor for the Palace of the President shall be a company of selected men and officers from the personnel of the Guardia Nacional, and will wear distinctive insignia while employed on this service.

III.

All matters of recruiting, appointment, instruction, training, promotion, examination, discipline, operation of troops, clothing, rations, arms, and equipment, quarters and administration, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional.

IV.

Rules and regulations for the administration and discipline of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Prisons and Penitentiaries, shall be issued by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional after being approved by the President of Nicaragua. Infraction of these rules and regulations by members of the Guardia Nacional may be punished by arrest and imprisonment, suspension from duty without pay, forfeiture of pay, or dismissal, under regulations promulgated by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional and approved by the President of Nicaragua.

V.

Other offenses committed by members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be investigated by officers of the Guardia Nacional as directed by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional. If it should appear on investigation that an offense has been committed the offender will be turned over to the civil authorities.

VI.

Courts-martial constituted under the rules and regulations of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional may try native Nicaraguan officers and enlisted men of the Guardia for infraction of the rules and regulations. The findings of the courts-martial of the Guardia Nacional after approval of the Chief are final, and not subject to appeal or review except by the Supreme Court of Nicaragua and then, only in questions of excess of power or questions of jurisdiction.

VII.

Persons violating the Regulations (if there is no civil law) or the Laws (if there is a civil law) governing traffic in arms, ammunition and military stores, shall be punished by a fine of from fifty to one thousand cordobas or imprisonment of from ninety days to five years, or both; for which purpose the Government of Nicaragua will present to Congress a project of law to amend the criminal laws in the sense indicated.

VIII.

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be under the control of the President of Nicaragua and all orders from him pertaining to the Guardia Nacional shall be delivered to the Chief thereof. All other civil officials desiring protection or the services of the Guardia Nacional will make application to the senior officer of the Guardia Nacional in that locality.

IX.

An adequate amount as provided in Article I of this Agreement shall be appropriated annually to defray the expenses for pay, allowances, equipment, uniforms, transportation, administration and other current expenses of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. Allotments for the various needs of the Guardia Nacional shall be made from this sum by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional.

X.

Reports of expenditures shall be made by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional as directed by the President of Nicaragua and audited in accordance with the law.

Savings effected under any title may be expended under any other title upon written approval of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional.

XI.

The laws necessary to make effective the above provisions shall be submitted to the legislative body of Nicaragua.

XII.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Government of the United States in virtue of authority conferred on the President by the Act of Congress approved May 19, 1926, entitled "An Act to authorize the President to detail officers and enlisted men of the United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps to assist the Governments of the Latin-American Republics in military and naval matters" undertakes to detail officers and enlisted men of the United States Navy and Marine Corps to assist the Government of Nicaragua in the organizing and training of a constabulary as herein provided.

All American officers serving with the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be appointed from personnel of the United States Navy and Marine Corps by the President of Nicaragua upon nomination of the President of the United States. They will be replaced by Nicaraguans when the latter have successfully completed the course of instructions provided by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and have shown by their conduct and examination that they are fit for command.

Officers and enlisted men of the United States Navy and Marine Corps serving with the Guardia Nacional will not be tried by Nicaraguan civil courts or courts-martial but will be subject to trial by courts-martial under the laws of the United States for the Government of the Navy.

In witness whereof, the undersigned have hereunto signed their names and affixed their seals in duplicate, in the city of Managua, this twenty-second day of December, 1927.

(Seal of the Legation of the United States of America, Managua, Nicaragua.) (Signed) DANA G. MUNRO.

(Seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua, Managua.) (Signed) CARLOS CUADRA PASOS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington

December 9, 1927.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: The Commander, Special Service Squadron.

Subject: Instructions for forces in Nicaragua.

1. The following principles will govern in the relations between the Second Brigade, U. S. Marines, and the Nicaraguan National Guard.

(a) **Basis Principles.** The Second Brigade constitutes the force of the United States, responsible to the President of the United States. The National Guard constitutes the force of Nicaragua, responsible to the President of Nicaragua. These two forces should operate independently of each other, except in an emergency requiring joint action.

(b) **Command.** The command of the Second Brigade will rest in the Brigade Commander, responsible to the Commander, Special Service Squadron, to the Navy Department and to the Major General Commandant. The command of the National Guard will rest in the commanding officer thereof, responsible to the President of Nicaragua. In the absence of the brigade commander, the senior officer of the brigade will succeed him, and a similar succession will apply to the National Guard.

(c) **Discipline.** The discipline of the Second Brigade will be administered by the Brigade Commander, in accordance with the law and regulations. The discipline of the National Guard will be administered by the Commanding Officer thereof solely in so far as the native personnel is concerned. In the case of members of the naval service attached to the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, discipline will be administered by the Commanding Officer thereof within the limits of his legal powers; i.e., in ordering summary courts-martial, deck courts, and the awarding of punishments. In cases where such naval service personnel require trial by general courts-martial, the individuals will be transferred to the Second Brigade with appropriate report and recommendation in each case. The senior officer present will act as immediate superior in command on summary courts-martial ordered either by the brigade commander or by the commanding officer of the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment. The records of proceedings of all courts will be forwarded direct as prescribed by regulations.

(d) **Organization, Supply, Administration and Training.** These activities will be conducted independently by the commanders of the Second Brigade and the National Guard. There should be full cooperation and assistance between these two organizations.

(e) **Correspondence.** Correspondence will be conducted direct by each commander through the proper channels without reference to each other. Matters pertaining to combined operations, however,

will be conducted through the senior officer present. Each commander will keep the other informed of matters which have a bearing on combined operations.

(f) **Police and other civil functions.** The Second Brigade should refrain from all police and other civil duties except where necessary to preserve peace and public order. As rapidly as conditions permit, the brigade should withdraw from these duties, being relieved by the National Guard.

When so relieved, units of the brigade should constitute a reserve force only, available in cases of emergency to which the National Guard is not equal.

(g) **Senior Officer Present.** The senior officer present will be the officer of the naval service present in the line of command, according to United States commission. His functions as such, in the coordination of the Second Brigade and of the National Guard will be restricted to combined operations, the necessity for which he will be the judge.

(h) **Combined Operations.** In case of disorder to which the National Guard is unequal, the senior officer present is responsible for the measures taken for the reestablishment of tranquility, and will direct the action to be taken by the Second Brigade and by the National Guard for combined operations for that purpose. Such combined operations should continue only so long as the military necessity exists. The supervision of elections is considered as a combined operation.

(i) **Military Operations.** Combined operations will be under the direction of the commanding officer of the brigade subject to the command of the senior officer present. When forces of the Second Brigade and of the National Guard are acting together, the senior officer in line of command, according to United States commission, whether of the brigade or of the guard, will command the combined force.

/s/ CURTIS D. WILBUR.

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

/s/ L. B. Freen, 2nd,
L. B. Green, 2nd, Lieut-Commander, U.S.N.,
Flag Secretary to,
Commander Special Service Squadron.
A1/Ef49 (995) G–r

COMMANDER,
U. S. SPECIAL SERVICE SQUADRON,
U.S.S. ROCHESTER, Flagship.

Balboa, Canal Zone,
28 April, 1928.

From: Commander, Special Service Squadron.

To: Commanding Officer, National Guard of Nicaragua.

Subject: Instructions for forces in Nicaragua.

Reference: Comsperon letter A1/Ef49(618) of 23 December, 1927.

1. By direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the last sentence of sub-paragraph "h", paragraph 1, of the inclosure in reference (a) above, which reads as follows: "The supervision of elections is considered as a combined operation", should be eliminated

/s/ D. F. SELLERS.

Managua, 21 February, 1928.

General Elias R. Beadle,
Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional.–
Presente.–

I am addressing you to inform you that I have decided that the Guardia Nacional, under your worthy direction, take over the Police Service of this Capital, from and including the 1st March, 1928, replacing the Republican Police, which is actually performing such duty.

I also wish to advise very earnestly that the members of the Guardia assigned to perform the Police duties be selected from among the most able and capable for this kind of duty, being in addition most trustworthy.

For the above mentioned reasons, it is necessary that the men selected have clean records and no vices, that they may render the guarantees to which the people are entitled, and perform their duty in the most correct and efficient manner.

Yours very truly,

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ,
PRESIDENT.

Presidency and
Comandancy of the Republic,
Managua, Nicaragua. June 10, 1928.

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional,
City.–

In accordance with the provisions of the agreement between the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua relative to the organization of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua signed the twenty-second day of December, 1927, by Carlos Cuadra Pasos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua, and by Dana G. Munro representing the United States, and as funds are available you are authorized to increase the enlisted strength of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to two thousand men and the strength of officers, including the medical personnel to take over the prophylactic service of the Republic, to two hundred and forty-six divided among the various ranks as follows·

1 Brigadier-General,
7 Colonels,
10 Majors,
31 Captains,
86 First Lieutenants,
91 Second Lieutenants,
20 Cadets.

Very truly yours,

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ,
PRESIDENT.

HEADQUARTERS GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

1 July, 1932.

STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION TABLE BASED ON 267 OFFICERS AND 2150 ENLISTED MEN (exclusive of student Cadets in the Military Academy).

STATIONS:	LINE		MEDICAL		TOTAL	
	OFFICERS:	ENL:	OFFICERS:	ENL:	OFFICERS:	ENL:
GEN. HDQTRS.	13	6			13	6
MEDICAL DEPT.			7	9	7	9
PAY DEPARTMENT	6				6	
QM DEPARTMENT	13	25			13	25
DEPT. MANAGUA-CARAZO						
MANAGUA	4	30			4	30
RADIO CLASS		13				13
LOS BRASILES		1				1
S.F. DEL CORNICERO		1				1
MATEARE		1				1
SABANA GRANDE		1				1
LA UNION	1	11			1	11
SAN RAFAEL		1				1
TICUANTEPE		1				1
EL CARMEN		1				1
SAN MARCOS		1				1
JINOTEPE	1	3			1	3
DIRIAMBA		1				1
SANTA TERESA		1				1
TIPITAPA		1				1
POLICE CO. MANAGUA	5	59		1	5	60
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD	3	59		1	3	59
BAND	1	30			1	30
MILITARY ACADEMY	10	4			10	4
DEPT. CHONTALES.						
JUIGALPA	4	39	1	1	5	40
SANTO DOMINGO	2	17			2	17
LA LIBERTAD	1	16		1	1	17
BOACO	2	17		1	2	18
CAMOAPA		2				2
SAN JOSE		2				2
SAN LORENCO		2				2
TEUSTEPE		2				2
SAN CARLOS		3				3
EL MORITO		2				2
SAN MIGUELITO		2				2
ACOYAPA		4				4
SANTO TOMAS		2				2
SAN PEDRO		2				2
COMALAPA		2				2
CUAPA		1				1

STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION TABLE BASED ON 267 OFFICERS AND 2150 ENLISTED MEN (exclusive of student Cadets in the Military Academy).

STATIONS:	LINE OFFICERS:	ENL:	MEDICAL OFFICERS:	ENL:	TOTAL OFFICERS:	ENL:
DEPT. GRANADA						
GRANADA	5	35	1	1	6	36
S. S. VICTORIA		1				1
DIRIA		2				2
DIRIOMO		2				2
NANDAIME		2				2
MASAYA	2	1		1	2	2
MASATEPE		4				4
NIQUINOHOMO		1				1
DEPT. LEON—						
LEON	6	45	1	2	7	47
NAGAROTTE	1	4			1	4
LA PAZ CENTRO		2				2
LA CEIBA		2				2
TELICA		2				2
QUEZALGUAQUE	1	5			1	5
EL SAUCE	3	19	1	1	4	20
ACHUAPA	2	15			2	15
VILLA NUEVA	2	14			2	14
SOMOTILLO	2	18		1	2	19
SAN FRANCISCO		16				16
PUNTA RIELES (RR Gd)	1	10			1	10
DEPT. CHINANDEGA—						
CHINANDEGA	4	24		1	4	25
CORINTO	1	7			1	7
CHICHIGALPA	1	15			1	15
EL VIEJO		2				2
SAN ANTONIO	1	10			1	10
DEPT. RIVAS—						
RIVAS	3	20		1	3	21
POTOSI		1				1
SAN JORGE		1				1
SAN JUAN DEL SUR	1	2			1	2
CARDENAS	1	8			1	8
NORTHERN AREA—						
AREA HEADQUARTERS	7	8	2	5	9	13
DEPT. NUEVA SEGOVIA—						
OCOTAL	4	70			4	70
DIPILTO	1	15			1	15
MACUELIZO	1	15		1	1	16
SANTA MARIA	1	15		1	1	16
SOMOTO	5	45		1	5	46
PATASTE	1	17			1	17
YALAGUINA	1	15			1	15
CONDEGA	5	45		1	5	46

STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION TABLE BASED ON 267 OFFICERS AND 2150 ENLISTED MEN (exclusive of student Cadets in the Military Academy).

STATIONS:	LINE OFFICERS:	LINE ENL:	MEDICAL OFFICERS:	MEDICAL ENL:	TOTAL OFFICERS:	TOTAL ENL:
TOTOGALPA	1	15			1	15
PUEBLO NUEVO	2	20	1	1	3	21
DARAILI	1	15			1	15
PALACAGUINA	2	19			2	19
QUILALI	3	40		1	3	41
SAN JUAN TELPANECA	3	23	1	1	4	24
TELPANECA	2	24		1	2	25
APALI	3	45	1	1	4	46
JICARO	3	24		1	3	25
JALAPA	2	20		1	2	21
SAN FERNANDO	1	15			1	15
DEPT. ESTELI—						
ESTELI	5	55	1	2	6	57
LA TRINIDAD	1	15			1	15
LIMAY	3	41		1	3	42
CENTRAL AREA—						
AREA HEADQUARTERS	3	2	3	2	6	4
CO. "D" JINOTEGA	6	77		1	6	78
CO. "M" JINOTEGA	3	30		1	3	31
CO. "A" CORINTO FINCA	3	42	1	1	4	43
CO. "A" SAJONIA	1	14			1	14
CO. "B" SAN RAFAEL	3	37	1		4	37
CO. "B" YALI	4	37		1	4	38
CO. "B" LA CONCORDIA	1	20			1	20
CO. "C" LA FUNDADORA	1	20		1	1	21
CO. "C" LAS CAMELIAS	1	15			1	15
CO. "C" ARAN JUEZ	1	15			1	15
DEPT. MATAGALPA—						
MATAGALPA	9	71	1	1	10	72
SAN RAMON		3				3
EL CONSUELO	3	28		1	3	29
DARIO	1	9			1	9
TERRABONA		5				5
SAN ISIDRO	2	27		1	2	28
SEBACO		5				5
MUY MUY	3	30		1	3	31
MATIGUAS	1	13			1	13
LA PINEDA	1	7			1	7
ESQUIPULAS	1	10			1	10
SAN DIONISIO		3				3
BUENA VISTA	1	15			1	15
ALGOVIA		9				9
LAS LAJAS		9				9
NAVARRO	3	37		1	3	38
LA ISLA	1	8			1	8
CUATRO ESQUINAS		12				12

STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION TABLE BASED ON 267 OFFICERS AND 2150 ENLISTED MEN (exclusive of student Cadets in the Military Academy).

RECAPITULATION

STATIONS:	LINE OFFICERS:	ENL:	MEDICAL OFFICERS:	ENL:	TOTAL OFFICERS:	ENL:
LA CUMPLIDA		5				5
EASTERN AREA—						
AREA HEADQUARTERS	3	2	2	2	5	4
BLUEFIELDS	5	43			5	43
EL RAMA	2	19		1	2	20
EL GALLO	2	19		1	2	20
NEPTUNE MINES	2	19		1	2	20
WAUNI	2	29		1	2	30
PRINZAPOLCA		8				8
LA CRUZ		4				4
PUNTA GORDA		4				4
EL BLUFF		4				4
RIO GRANDE BAR		4				4
DEPT. PUERTO CABEZAS:						
PUERTO CABEZAS	6	63	1	1	7	64
KIPLA FARM	1	15			1	15
MOSS FARM	3	34		1	3	35
TOLEDO WYE		5				5
CABO GRACIAS	1	19		1	1	20
G. N. HEADQUARTERS	13	6			13	6
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT			7	9	7	9
PAY DEPARTMENT	6				6	
Q. M DEPARTMENT	13	25			13	25
DEPT. MANAGUA	6	68			6	68
POLICE COMPANY	5	59		1	5	60
PRESIDENTS GUARD	3	59		1	3	60
BAND	1	30			1	30
MILITARY ACADEMY	10	4			10	4
DEPT. CHONTALES	9	115	1	3	10	118
DEPT. GRANADA	7	48	1	2	8	50
DEPT. LEON	18	152	2	4	20	156
DEPT. CHINANDEGA	7	58		1	7	59
DEPT. RIVAS	5	32		1	5	33
NORTHERN AREA	58	616	6	19	64	635
CENTRAL AREA	53	615	6	12	59	627
EASTERN AREA	27	291	3	9	30	300
GRAND TOTAL	241	2178	26	62	267	2240

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The authorized strength of the Department of Northern Bluefields includes 50 enlisted, funds for whose maintenance are furnished by the Standard Fruit Company for service in that department. Chinandega and Leon are incerased 20 each (10 at San Antonio Sugar Estates; 10 at Sugar warehouse at Chichigalpa and 20 for Railroad Guard at Leon). If at any time the companies concerned withdraw funds for the maintenance of these extra men the authorized strength of these departments will be reduced ac-

cordingly. The Departments of Leon and Chinandega are authorized 150 Auxiliares (85 in Dept. of Leon and 65 in Dept of Chinandega) to be distributed as the military situation may require.

Radio Lieutenants, in addition to the officers provided for in this table, are authorized at the following places: OCOTAL 6; SANTA MARIA 1; TELPANECA 1; SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA 1; JALAPA 1; APALI 1; MANAGUA 2; JINOTEGA 3; CORINTO FINCA 1; MATAGALPA 2; EL CONSUELO 1; CABO GRACIAS 1; NEPTUNE MINE 1; PUERTO CABEZAS 1; WAUNI 1.

CUARTEL GENERAL DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE.....,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA.....NICARAGUA.

CONTRATO CELEBRADO ENTRE LA GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA Y LA MUNICIPALIDAD DE....., DEPARTAMENTO DE..... REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA.

A fin de proveer los fondos necesarios para el mantenimiento de un descramento de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua que permanencera estacionada en....., la Municipiladad de..... se compromete a proveer una suma de dinero al Oficial en comando de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua estacionada en.....para el mantenimiento de.....guardias de acarrdo con el programa que adelante de describe.

La Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua se compremete a enlistar guardias que van estar de servicio en.....para el desempeno de las funciones de policia municipal en ese lugar. Dichos guardias van a ser alistados por un periodo de un ano solo para el servicio de policia municipal en.....y la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua se compromete a no transferir dichos guardias a otros lugares ni dedicarlos a otros servicios.

Es concenido entre ambas partes, La Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua y la Municipiladad de.....que los gastos del mantenimiento del destacamento de la Guardia de que se habla, se proveeran como bajo se indica, y que la Municipilidad de.....proveera los fondos para dichos gastos en las candidades y tiempo establecidos en este contrato. La Guardia Nacional pagara y proveera de vestido a los guardias que se alisten de conformidad con este contrato de los fondos que se reciban de la Municipilidad, a quien ae la rendira una cuenta mensual acompanada de sua respectivos comprobantes por los fondos que se hayan gastado.

Vesturio: Un equipo completo que se la dara a cada guardia al principar el contrato y cada seis meses, como sigue:

3 Camisas khaki.....	$ 3.75	
3 Corbatas de campo.....	.45	Total del equipo que se le dara a cada guardia cada seis (6) meses.
3 Fajas de cintura.....	.36	
1 Insignia para sombrero.....	.14	
2 Pantalones khaki.....	3.00	
2 (1 par) sobrebotas khaki.....	.19	
1 Sombrero de campana.....	2.19	
1 par Zapatas del pais.....	1.75	
	$11.83	

Total de.....guardias.
Pago de cada guardia por mes..... $
Total por mes,.....Guardias.

Es entenido y convenido entre ambas partes contratantes que los Guardias que se alisten bajo los condiciones de este contrato, seran incorporados de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua conforme el contrato ordinario de alistimiento, y que estaran sujetos a las Leyes y Reglamento para el gobierno y disciplina de la Guardia Nacional.

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Guardia Nacional, Comandante Departamental. Alcalde Municipal.

GUARDIA CIVICA DE NICARAGUA, CONTRATO DE ENGANCHE.

Yo, el suscrito.....nacido..... en.....Departamento de..... por el presente consiento voluntariamente an alistarme como Civico de Nicaragua para servicio en.....por el termino de un ano sin recibir de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua pago ninguno por los servicios prestados, al menos que sea licenciado antes por autoridad competente y solomnemente juro que guardare fidelidad y adhesion a Nicaragua; que la defendere fielmente y honrossamente contra todos sus enemigos, cualquera que estos sean y que obederce las ordenes del Presidente de la Republica y las de mas Jefes y Oficiales superiores, de acuerdo con las leyes y reglamentos para el gobierno de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua durante el tiempo que yo este en actual servicio militar:

Marca del dedo pulgar derecho del Civico. Firma del Civico contratado

Suscrito y tomado juramente por mi en..... el.....de.....de 19.....

Comandante del.....

GUARDIA CIVICA DE NICARAGUA (EN FINCAS)
CONTRATO DE ENGANCHE.

Yo, el suscrito.....nacido.....en.....
Departamento de.....por el presente consiento voluntariamente en alistarme como Civico de Nicaragua para servicio en.....
por el termino de un ano sin recibir de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua pago ninguno por los servicios prestados, al menos que sea licenciado antes por autoridad competente y solemnemente juro que guardare fidelidad y adhesion a Nicaragua; que la defendere fielmente y honorosamente contra todos sus enemigos, cualquiera que estos sean, y que obedecere las ordenes del Presidente de la Republica y las de mas Jefes y Oficiales superiores, de acuerdo con las leyes y reglamentos para el gobierno de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua durante el tiempo que yo este en actual servicio militar, pero se entiende que para mis servicios como guardia civico simplemente, en el empleo de.....
....., que cualesqueira procedimientos legales que puedan resultar de mis acciones en tal capacidad caen bajo la jurisdiccion de los tribunales comunes. He recibido el rifle descrito abajo y accepto la responsabilidad para su seguridad y limpieza:

Clase.....Calibre.....Numero.....

.....
Marca del dedo pulgar derecho del Civico.

.....
Firma del Civico contratado

Suscrito y tomado juramente por me en .....el.....
de.....de 19.....

.....
Comandante del.....

El individuo arriba mencionado es empleado mio, y siempre lo he reconocido como un ciudadano fiel y observador de las leyes de la Republica de Nicaragua. Estoy de acuerdo en que sea dado de alta para prestar servicios como civico de Nicaragua, y prometo no molestar ni intervenir en sus servicios como tal, y asumo toda responsabilidad acerca de la seguridad del arma arriba mencionada, y devolver dicha arms a la Guardia Nacional cuando reciba ordenes a ese respecto del Comandante de la Guardia Nacional, Departamento de.....

.....
Firma del empressario del Civico arriba mencionado.

Suscrito por mi en.....el.....de.....de 19.....

.....
Comandante, Guardia Nacional,
Departamento de.....

3-CD/fam HEADQUARTERS GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA MANAGUA NICARAGUA.

28 November, 1931.

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION #4.

SUBJECT: Creation of the Auxiliary force of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

1. His Excellency General Jose Maria Moncada, President of the Republic of Nicaragua, has decided to create a force of Auxiliares of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and has directed the Minister of Finance to immediately place to the order of the Guardia the sum of C$7,200 for the payment and maintenance of this force for the term of one month.

2. 300 Auxiliares shall be enlisted immediately in the manner indicated below for the period of three months, subject to discharge at any time during such period if convenient to the Government.

3. They will earn a salary of C$12.00 a month. Ration allowance of C$0.20 a day. Clothing allowance C$0.20 a day during the first month and C$0.07 a day thereafter. The following clothing items will be furnished initially:

1 khaki shirt, 1 khaki trousers: pr., 1 shoes, pr.

The Auxiliares are obligated to use their uniforms while on patrol duty in the field. The use of said uniform on other occasions is left to their discretion. The officers should encourage Auxiliares to keep their civilian clothing.

4. Enlistments shall be effected as follows:

Leon	100 men
Chinandega	100 men
Masaya	50 men
Carazo	50 men

As far as possible, inhabitants of the comarcas (rural districts) will be given preference over those of the cities for enlistment in this force. The Jefes Politico have been instructed by His Excellency the President to recruit and send in to the Guardia inidviduals for enlistment under this contract.

5. It will not be required that an officer make a formal medical examination, but the Jefes Politico and the enlisting Guardia officer shall take into account the physical condition of each man before enlisting him. No funds have been furnished for medical treatment of the Auxiliares. They will be entitled to medical treatment only while on active patrol duty. The Auxiliares are not entitled to enjoy the benefits stipulated in General Order No. 28–1930.

6. As concerns discipline, all Auxiliares will be subject to the Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Guardia Nacional. The Commanding Officers will give instructions to all Auxiliares in

matters regarding their duties and behavior as members of the Guardia Nacional. All efforts will be made to develop discipline and efficiency in them.

7. Training of Auxiliares will be carried out to insure discipline and prepare them for active field operations. It must be held in mind that the mission of this force is to cooperate in exterminating banditry.

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR MAJOR-GENERAL C. B. MATTHEWS, G. N.:

OFFICIAL: C. DAVIS /s/ WALTER G. SHEARD,
FIRST LIEUT. GN. GN-1. COLONEL, G.N. CHIEF OF STAFF.

AUXILIAR DE LA GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA. CONTRATO DE ALISTAMIENTO.

Yo. el suscrito.....nacido en.....
Departamento de.....por el presente contrato consiento voluntariamente a alistarme como Auxiliar de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, por un periodo de.....meses con goce de sueldo a razon de C$12.00 cordobas mensuales, a no ser que sea dado de baja por autoridad competente, y solemnemente juro que sere leal y adhesivo, que defendre a Nicaragua fiel y honorosamente contra todos sus enemigos quienesquiera que sean, y que obedecree las ordenes del Presidente de la Republica y las que expidan mis Jefes lo mismo que las de mis Oficiales superiores, de acuerdo con las leyes y reglamentos para el gobierno de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua durante el tiempo que permaneza en servicio active militar. Convengo tambien en custodiar toda propriedad del Gobierno puesta baja mi custodia. En caso de que se me licencio del servicio del Gobierno por cualquier razon antes de haber prestado un mes de servicio, convengo devolver la ropa que se me ha proveido, o si no me es posible, que su valor se deduzca de mi pago.

.....
Impresiones digitales del dedo gordo derecho del Auxiliar.

.....
Firma del Auxiliar alistado.

Alistado y juramentado por me en....., hoy.....
de.....de 19.....

.....
.....G.N. de Nic.
Oficial Comandante.

AMERICAN PERSONNEL WHO SERVED IN THE GUARDIA NACIONAL IN VARIOUS POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY AS HEADS OF ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE OR COMMAND DEPARTMENTS.

JEFE DIRECTORS

NAME:	MC RANK: GN RANK.	DATES OF SERVICE:
RHEA, Robert Y	Lt-Colonel: Brig-General	12 May to 29 June, 1927
PIERCE, Harold C	Major: Major	30 Jun to 10 Jul, 1927(Actg).
BEADLE, Elias R	Lt-Colonel: Brig-General	11 Jul 1927 to 10 Mar 1929
McDOUGAL, Douglas C	Colonel: Maj-General	11 Mar 1929 to 5 Feb 1931
MATTHEWS, Calvin B	Lt-Colonel: Maj-General	6 Feb 1931 to 1 Jan 1933
SMITH, Julian C	Major: Colonel	16 Aug to 5 Oct 1931(Actg).

STAFF:

CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SAGE, Albert B	Captain: Major	23 May 1927 to 10 July 1927
HARRINGTON, Samuel M	Major: Colonel	11 Jul 1927 to 28 Feb 1929
THRASHER, Tom E	Major: Colonel	1 Mar 1929 to 27 Apr 1929
HOYT, Leon W	Major: Colonel	28 Apr to 30 Apr 1929
VOGEL, Clayton B	Lt-Colonel: Colonel	1 May 1929 to 31 May 1930
SHEARD, Walter G	Major: Colonel	1 Jun 1930 to 27 Oct 1930 & 31 Mar 1931 to 9 May 1932
SALZMAN, Otto	Captain: Major	9 to 23 Jun 1931 (Actg)
MATTHEWS, Calvin B	Lt-Colonel: Colonel	28 Oct 1930 to 5 Feb 1931
DENIG, Robert L	Major: Colonel	6 Feb 1931 to 30 Mar 1931
SMITH, Julian C	Major: Brig-General	10 May 1932 to 1 Jan 1933

GN-1(PERSONNEL AND ADJUTANT:

PARKER, John H	Captain: Major	11 Jul 1927 to 30 Nov 1928
HOGABOOM, Robert E	2nd-Lieut: Captain	1 Dec 1928 to 14 Dec 1928 & 26 Feb 1929 to 23 Dec 1929
PULLER, Lewis B	2nd-Lieut: Captain	15 Dec 1928 to 25 Feb 1929
ALBAN, Harvey B	1st-Lieut: Captain	24 Dec 1929 to 14 Jul 1930
DAVIS, Charles	Sgt-Major: Captain	15 Jul 1930 to 1 Jan 1933 (25 Jan 1929 to 14 Jul 1930 Personnel Officer, G.N.).

GN-2 (INTELLIGENCE)

BLEASDALE, Victor F	Captain: Major	9 Sep 1927 to 7 Apr 1929
BAIN, James M	Captain: Major	8 Apr to 31 May 1929
HOLMES, Maurice G	Captain: Major	1 Jun to 23 July 1929
PATCHEN, Fred G	Captain: Major	24 Jul to 11 Nov 1929
SHEARD, Walter G	Major: Colonel	12 Nov 1929 to 28 May 1930 & 1 Aug 1930 to 24 Oct 1930 & 1 Feb 1931 to 30 Mar 1931

NAME:	MC RANK: GN RANK.	DATES OF SERVICE.
STENT, Howard N	Captain: Captain	29 May 1930 to 14 Jun 1930
SALZMAN, Otto	Captain: Major	15 Jun 1930 to 31 Jul 1930 & 25 Oct 1930 to 31 Jan 1931 & 31 Mar 1931 to 28 Nov 1931
HUNT, LeRoy P	Major: Colonel	29 Nov 1931 to 1 Jan 1933

GN-3 (OPERATIONS AND TRAINING):

BLEASDALE, Victor F	Captain: Major	1 Feb 1928 to 7 Apr 1929
BAIN, James M	Captain: Major	8 Apr 1929 to 25 Apr 1929
HOLMES, Maurice G	Captain: Major	26 Apr 1929 to 23 Jul 1929
PATCHEN, Fred G	Captain: Major	24 Jul 1929 to 17 May 1930
SALZMAN, Otto	Captain: Major	18 May to 26 May 1930 & 15 Jun 1930 to 28 Nov 1931
STENT, Howard N	Captain: Captain	27 May to 14 Jun 1930
HUNT, LeRoy P	Major: Colonel	29 Nov 1931 to 1 Jan 1933

GENERAL STAFF (Cont).

GN-4 (QUARTERMASTER)

HAYES, Glenn E	Captain: Major	23 May to 10 Jul 1927
VOETH, Robert W	Major: Colonel	11 Jul 1927 to 15 Feb 1928
SAVAGE, Eli	Captain: Major	16 Feb 1928 to 9 Apr 1930
SALZMAN, Otto	Captain: Major	10 Apr 1930 to 19 May 1930
GREGORY, Maurice C	Captain: Major	20 May 1930 to 31 May 1931
HUEFE, Edward G	Captain: Major	1 Jun 1931 to 9 Apr 1932
REA, Leonard E	Captain: Major	10 Apr 1932 to 1 Jan 1933

PAYMASTERS:

HAYES, Glenn E	Captain: Major	23 May to 10 Jul 1927
VOETH, Robert W	Major: Colonel	11 Jul to 31 Aug 1927
DYE, Leon L	Captain: Major	1 Sep 1927 to 28 Jun 1930
LIVINGSTON, William L	Captain: Major	29 Jun 1930 to 30 Apr 1932
SCHMIDT, Carl S	Captain: Major	1 May 1932 to 1 Jan 1933

LAW AND PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICERS:

PARKER, John H	Captain: Major	1 Jun 1928 to 31 Jan 1929
SCOTT, William W	1st-Lieut: Captain	2 May to 11 Nov 1929
SHEARD, Walter G	Major: Colonel	12 Nov 1929 to 21 Sep 1930 & 24 Mar to 14 Apr 1931
HUEFE, Edward G	Captain: Major	22 Sep 1930 to 23 Mar 1931
BALES, William L	1st-Lieut: Captain	15 Apr 1931 to 31 Jul 1932
CHEATHAM, Thomas P	Major: Colonel	1 Aug 1932 to 1 Jan 1933

COMMUNICATIONS OFFICERS:

SALZMAN, Otto	Captain: Major	15 Jun 1930 to 2 Jun 1931
SMITH, James M	1st-Lieut: Captain	3 Jun 1931 to 1 Jan 1933

MEDICAL DIRECTORS:

NAME:	MC RANK: GN RANK.	DATES OF SERVICE.
HELM, Jesse B	Commander: Colonel (MC) (MC, USN)	8 Oct 1927 to 11 Oct 1929
CONKLIN, Frederic L	Lt-Comdr.: Colonel(MC)	12 Oct 1929 to 22 Apr 1930
HALE, Gordon D	Commander: Colonel(MC)	23 Apr 1930 to 31 Jan 1932
TURVILLE, Wm. H. H.	Lt-Comdr: Colonel(MC)	2 Feb 1932 to 1 Jan 1933

AREA COMMANDERS
NORTHERN AREA

HOYT, Leon W	Major: Colonel	1 Jun to 23 Oct 1929
VOGEL, Clayton B	Lt-Colonel: Colonel	24 Oct to 18 Nov 1929
DENIG, Robert L	Major: Colonel	19 Nov 1929 to 27 Nov 1930
HUNT, LeRoy P	Major: Colonel	28 Nov 1930 to 1 Oct 1931
BURWELL, Edward L Jr.	Captain: Captain	2 Oct to 14 Oct 1931
ARNETT, Roscoe	Captain: Captain	15 Oct to 30 Nov 1931
CHEATHAM, Thomas P	Major: Colonel	1 Dec 1931 to 31 Jul 1932
WATSON, Thomas E	Major: Colonel	1 Aug 1932 to 14 Dec 1932

CENTRAL AREA

LOWELL, Roy D	Major: Colonel	1 Apr 1929 to 18 Jan 1930
ERSKINE, Graves B	Captain: Major	19 Jan 1930 to 21 Feb 1930
WYNN, Charles A	Major: Colonel	22 Feb to 13 Jul 1930
MATTHEWS, Calvin B	Lt-Colonel: Colonel	14 Jul to 27 Oct 1930
SMITH, Julian C	Major: Colonel	28 Oct 1930 to 5 Apr 1932
WATSON, Thomas E	Major: Colonel	6 Apr to 31 Aug 1932
SHEARD, Walter G	Major: Colonel	1 Sep 1932 to 14 Dec 1932

AREA COMMANDERS
EASTERN AREA

SAGE, Albert B	Captain: Major	27 Feb 1928 to 31 Jan 1929
PEARD, Roger W	Captain: Major	1 Feb to 6 May 1929
MARSTON, John	Major: Colonel	7 May 1929 to 5 May 1931
WYNN, Charles A	Major: Colonel	6 May 1931 to 12 Sep 1931
LEECH, Lloyd L	Major: Colonel	13 Sep 1931 to 1 Jan 1933

WESTERN AREA

THRASHER, Tom E jr	Major: Colonel	29 Jul 1929 to 3 May 1930
SPOTTS, George W	Captain: Major	4 May to 7 Jul 1930
ARNETT, Roscoe	Captain: Captain	8 Jul to 13 Jul 1930
WYNN, Charles A	Major: Colonel	14 Jul to 5 Sep 1930 & 15 Nov 1930 to 28 Feb 1931
PATCHEN, Fred G	Captain: Major	6 Sep to 14 Nov 1930

AREA EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.

NORTHERN AREA.

NAME:	MC RANK:	GN RANK.	DATES OF SERVICE.
WYNN, Charles A	Capt & Major:	Major & Colonel	6 Sep 1929 to 21 Feb 1930
SALZMAN, Otto	Captain:	Major	22 Feb to 9 Apr 1930
CROKA, William B	Captain:	Major	10 Apr to 31 Aug 1930
HUNT, LeRoy P	Captain:	Major	1 Sep 1930 to 7 May 1931
BURWELL, Edward L jr	Captain:	Major	8 May 1931 to 14 Dec 1932

CENTRAL AREA.

CRAIG, Edward A	Captain:	Captain	25 Jun to 18 Aug 1929
ERSKINE, Graves B	Captain:	Major	19 Aug 1929 to 19 Apr 1930
WEBB, James W	Captain:	Major	20 Apr 1930 to 31 Aug 1930
MILLER, Glenn D	Captain:	Major	1 Sep 1930 to 30 Mar 1931
COX, Max	Captain:	Major	31 Mar to 3 Sep 1931
CHEATHAM, Thomas P	Cap & Major:	Major	4 Sep to 31 Oct 1931
WHALEY, Louis W	Major:	Major & Colonel	1 Nov 1931 to 14 Dec 1932

EASTERN AREA.

CRONMILLER, LePage jr	2d-Lieut:	Captain	18 Jun 1928 to 18 May 1929
LINSCOTT, Henry B	Captain:	Major	1 Jun 1929 to 31 Aug 1929 & 1 Nov 1929 to 11 Jul 1930
WOOD, John C	Captain:	Major	12 Jul 1930 to 18 Mar 1932
COX, Max	Captain:	Major	19 Mar 1932 to 1 Jan 1933

WESTERN AREA.

BURWELL, Edward L jr	Captain:	Captain	1 Aug to 10 Nov 1929
SPOTTS, George W	Captain:	Major	11 Nov 1929 to 3 May 1930
SHANNON, Harold D	Captain:	Captain	4 May to 30 Jun 1930
PATCHEN, Fred G	Captain:	Major	25 Aug to 5 Sep 1930 & 15 Nov to 30 Nov 1930
WEBB, James W	Captain:	Major	6 Sep 1930 to 14 Nov 1930 & 1 Dec to 31 Dec 1930

DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS.

NUEVA SEGOVIA (HQ AT OCOTAL)

HAYES, Glenn E	Captain:	Major	1 Aug to 31 Oct 1927
PEARD, Roger W	Captain:	Major	1 Nov 1927 to 2 Jan 1928 & 13 Feb to 18 Mar 1928.
BURWELL, Edward L jr	Captain:	Captain	29 Mar to 31 Mar 1928
YOUNG, Archibald	Major:	Colonel	3 Jan to 12 Feb 1928 & 1 Apr to 27 Jun 1928
ERSKINE, Graves B	Captain:	Major	28 Jun to 6 Aug 1928
CLAUSON, Nicholas E	1st-Lieut:	Captain	7 Aug 1928 to 30 Jun 1929

NOTE: From 1 Jul 1929 the Area Comdr. Northern Area functioned as Department Commander, Nueva Segovia also.)

ESTELI.

NAME:	MC RANK:	GN RANK.	DATES OF SERVICE.
PEARD, Roger W	Captain:	Major	18 Jul to 26 Dec 1928
McDONALD, Donald	Gy-Sgt:	1st-Lieut	27 Dec 1928 to 31 Aug 1930
CROKA, William B	Captain:	Major	1 Sep to 25 Dec 1930
ARNETT, Roscoe	Captain:	Captain	26 Dec 1930 to 20 Aug 1931 & 15 Oct 1931 to 29 Feb 1932
McQUEEN, John C	1st-Lieut:	Captain	21 Aug to 14 Oct 1932
ELMORE, Willett	Captain:	Captain	1 Mar to 18 Apr 1932
GASPAR, Walter S	Captain:	Captain	19 Apr 1932 to 14 Dec 1932

JINOTEGA

PAUL, Albert W	1st-Lieut:	Captain	17 Apr to 20 May 1928
BAIN, James M	Captain:	Major	21 May 1928 to 6 Dec 1928
SHANNON, Harold D	Captain:	Captain	7 Dec 1928 to 20 Jun 1929

(NOTE: From 21 June 1929 the Department came directly under the Area Commander)

MATAGALPA.

HAYES, Glenn E	Captain:	Major	20 May 1928 to 14 May1929
STAFFORD, David A	1st-Lieut:	Captain	15 May 1929 to 28 Nov 1931
MIXSON, James A	Captain:	Captain	29 Nov 1931 to 14 Dec 1932

CHONTALES.

PATCHEN, Fred G	Captain:	Major	18 Jul to 17 Aug 1928 & 1 Dec 1928 to 13 Jan 1929
ERSKINE, Graves B	Captain:	Major	18 Aug to 30 Nov 1928
CORBETT, Murl	Captain:	Captain	14 Jan 1929 to 5 May 1929
MCHENRY, George W	1st-Lieut:	Captain	6 May 1929 to 19 Aug 1929
SNYDER, William K	Captain:	Captain	20 Aug 1929 to 24 Sep 1930
HOWARD, Frederick M	Captain:	Cpatain	25 Sep 1930 to 16 Dec 1932

RIVAS.

ACKERMAN, James A	1st-Lieut:	Captain	21 Aug 1928 to 13 Jan 1929
HOPPER, James G	1st-Lieut:	Captain	14 Jan 1929 to 31 Aug 1929
NICHOLAS, Henery T	1st-Lieut:	Captain	1 Sep 1929 to 22 Aug 1930
YORK, Joseph	1st-Sgt:	1st-Lieut	23 Aug 1930 to 7 Sep 1930
LARSON, Emory E	1st-Lieut:	Captain	8 Sep 1930 to 17 Jun 1931
SCHNEEMAN, Robert E	Sgt:	1st-Lieut	18 Jun 1931 to 8 Jul 1931
FORSYTH, Ralph E	1st-Lieut:	Captain	9 Jul 1931 to 21 Dec 1932

GRANADA.

BURWELL, Edward L, jr	Captain:	Captain	22 Aug to 25 Nov 1928
KEIMLING, Herbert S	1st-Lieut:	Captain	26 Nov 1928 to 13 Jan 1929

DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS.

MASAYA.

NAME:	MC RANK: GN RANK.	DATES OF SERVICE.
PAUL, Albert W	1st-Lieut: Captain	6 Jun 1928 to 4 Jul 1928
DARNALL, Grover C	1st-Lieut: Captain	5 Jul 1928 to 19 Nov 1928
HOPPER, James G	1st-Lieut: Captain	20 Nov 1928 to 13 Jan 1929

GRANADA–MASAYA (Combined 14 Jan, 1929).

KEIMLING, Herbert S	1st-Lieut: Captain	14 Jan 1929 to 30 Apr 1929
ERSKINE, Graves B	Captain: Major	1 May to 18 Aug 1929
O'NEILL, Stewart B	Captain: Major	19 Aug 1929 to 31 Dec 1932

LEON

HAYES, Glenn E	Captain: Major	21 Nov 1927 to 15 Feb 1928
ACKERMAN, James	1st-Lieut: Captain	16 Feb to 24 Mar 1928
PUGH, Lloyd R	1st-Lieut: Captain	25 Mar 1928 to 30 Sep 1928
SHANNON, Harold D	Captain: Captain	1 Oct 1928 to 30 Nov 1928
ROGERS, William W	Captain: Captain	1 Dec 1928 to 9 Mar 1929 & 1 May to 31 May 1929
PUGH, Lloyd R	1st-Lieut: Captain	10 Mai to 30 Apr 1929
GRAVES, Avery	1st-Sgt: 1st-Lieut	1 May to 30 Jun 1929
O'NEILL, Stewart B	Captain: Captain	1 Jul 1929 to 18 Aug 1929
BURWELL, Edward L jr	Captain: Captain	19 Aug 1929 to 25 Jun 1930
SHANNON, Harold D.	Captain: Captain	26 Jun 1930 to 11 Jul 1930
ARNETT, Roscoe	Captain: Captain	12 Jul 1930 to 22 Dec 1930
WEBB, James W	Captain Major	23 Dec 1930 to 27 Feb 1931
SYNN, Charles A	Major: Colonel	28 Feb 1931 to 11 Apr 1931
WEBB, James W	Captain: Major	12 Apr 1931 to 20 Mar 1932
ARNETT, Roscoe	Captain: Major	21 Mar 1932 to 1 Jan 1933

CHINANDEGA.

SAGE, Albert B	Captain: Major	4 Aug 1927 to 21 Oct 1927
JAMES, William C	Captain: Captain	22 Oct 1927 to 21 Nov 1927
YOUNG, Archibald	Major: Colonel	22 Nov 1927 to 31 Dec 1927
PUGH, Lloyd R	1st-Lieut: Captain	1 Jan 1928 to 28 Feb 1928
ROGERS, William W	Captain: Captain	1 Mar 1928 to 30 Nov 1928
DARNALL, Grover C	1st-Lieut: Captain	1 Dec 1928 to 31 Oct 1929
YANDLE, Marcin V	1st-Lieut: Captain	1 Nov 1929 to 30 Nov 1929
CRAIG, Edward A	Captain: Captain	1 Dec 1929 to 26 Jul 1930
HUEFE, Edward G	Captain: Captain	27 Jul 1930 to 21 Sep 1930
WEBB, James W	Captain: Major	22 Sep 1930 to 26 Sep 1930
CRAIG, Edward A	Captain: Captain	27 Sep 1930 to 2 Sep 1931

MANAGUA.

SKINNER, Rees	Captain: Captain	3 Sept 1931 to 30 Apr 1932
ELMORE, Willet	Captain: Captain	1 May 1932 to 1 Jan 1933
DARNALL, Grover C	1st-Lieut: Captain	24 May 1927 to 31 May 1927
HAYES, Glenn E	Captain: Major	1 Jun 1927 to 3 Aug 1927
PARKER, John H	Captain: Major	4 Aug 1927 to 15 Mar 1928
YOUNG, Archiblad	Major: Colonel	16 Mar 1928 to 31 Mar 1928
HOYT, Leon W	Major: Colonel	1 Apr 1928 to 23 Apr 1928
PARKER, John H	Captain: Major	24 Apr 1928 to 25 Nov 1928
BURWELL, Edward L jr	Captain: Captain	26 Nov 1928 to 19 Mar 1929

CARAZO.

BURWELL, Edward L jr	Captain: Captain	17 Apr 1928 to 20 May 1928
PAUL, Albert W	1st-Lieut: Captain	21 May 1928 to 31 May 1928
DARNALL, Grover C	1st-Lieut: Captain	1 Jun 1928 to 4 Jul 1928
BURWELL, Edward L jr	Captain: Captain	5 Jul 1928 to 15 Aug 1928
SHANNON, Harold D	Captain: Captain	16 Jul 1928 to 4 Sep 1928
FRISBIE, Julian N	1st-Lieut: Captain	5 Sep 1928 to 16 Nov 1928
PAUL, Albert W	1st-Lieut & Captain: Captain	17 Nov 1928 to 19 Mar 1929

DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS.
MANAGUA–CARAZO (Combined 20 Mar 1929)

BURWELL, Edward L jr	Captain: Captain	20 Mar 1929 to 31 Jul 1929
BAIN, James M	Captain: Major	1 Aug 1929 to 31 Jan 1930
ELMORE, Willett	Captain: Captain	1 Feb 1930 to 4 Dec 1930
CARLSON, Evans F	1st-Lieut: Captain	5 Dec 1930 to 30 Apr 1931
YORK, Joseph	1st-Sgt: 1st-Lieut	1 May 1931 to 31 May 1931
MAYNARD, George L	Captain: Captain	1 Jun 1931 to 1 Jan 1933

CHIEFS OF POLICE, MANAGUA.

KEIMLING, Herbert S	1st-Lieut: Captain	1 May 1928 to 16 Nov1928
FRISBIE, Julian N	1st-Lieut: Captain	17 Nov 1928 to 20 Mar 1930
FLEMING, Hamilton M. H.	Captain: Captain	21 Mar 1930 to 21 Dec 1931
CARLSON, Evans F	1st-Lieut: Captain	22 Dec 1931 to 1 Jan 1933

COMMANDANTES, NATIONAL PENITENTIARY, MANAGUA

GLADDEN, Alton A	Captain: Major	1 Nov 1927 to 25 May 1929
BAIN, James M	Captain: Major	26 May 1929 to 31 Oct 1929
DENHAM, James L	1st-Lieut: Captain	1 Nov 1929 to 31 Mar 1931

(NOTE: National Penitentiary destroyed by earthquake 31 Mar 1931).

DIRECTOR, MILITARY ACADEMY, MANAGUA.

TRUMBLE, Edward J	1st-Lieut: Captain	1 Apr 1930 to 25 Aug 1931
CUNNINGHAM, Francis J	1st-Lieut: Captain	26 Aug 1931 to 26 Oct 1931
TRUMBLE, Edward J	1st-Lieut: Captain	27 Oct 1931 to 1 Jan 1933

CHAPTER III

EL BERRUGILLO, June 14, 1927.
Senor
Jefe Politoco
OCOTAL

My dear Sir,

I have very much the pleasure to participate you in this letter while we accept you as the Jefe Political of Ocotal. But we don't accept any of the authority that interferes officially in the following places: SAN FERNANDO — CIUDAD ANTIJUA — TELPANECA — QUILALI — EL JICARO — MURRA and JALAPA. We are enough men to give a guarantee in those places and all the inhabitants are Liberalists, and they dont feel like they have a guarantee with the Adolf Diaz as a president of Nicaragua. We dont give up our rifles even if the Nicaraguan president is substituted by a Liberal man of honor. I want you to let these things be known to your government, our attitude is, if the Yankees want to disarm us we are willing to kill them and those who want to take away our rifles which was obtained with honor by us, those rifles we have, they was taken away from the Conservatives, if they dont like it, tell them to do what they want to.

Truly

A. C. SANDINO

THE COWARDLY AND FELONIC YANKS HIDE BEHIND THE MASK OF HYPOCRISY SHOWING A WHITE FLAG TO KILL FROM THE BACK MY COMPANIONS IN ONE HAND THEY HAVE A CRUCIVIX AND IN THE OTHER THE POINARD.

All the Central American people know already our attitude of sane protest against the criminal Yankee invasion and against the traitors to my country who like Boy Scouts come as the advance guard of the invaders. Therefore I consider it convenient to make known to my fellow Latin-Americans the latest happenings which have taken place in the area that is out of Adolfo Diaz's control; which comprises the following villages: in the Department of Nueve Segovia: San Fernando, Ciudad Antigua, Telpaneca, San Juan de Segovia, Quilali, Murra, Jalapa and Ciudad Sandino which was called Jicaro before. In each of the above villages we had small detachments to maintain public order as well as the organization of our administration based in the most sure democracy, inasmuch as even to our enemies we give all kinds of guarantees to their persons and interests. Besides we keep seven mounted patrols, each with 50 men patrolling the above mentioned zone; having our war depot in a place called El Remajon which has only one entrance, i.e., El Cerro del Chapote.

On July 11th, last, I received from the so-called chief of the damnable Yankee invading expedition in Camp de Ocotal the telegraph message which textually says: "General Augusto C. Sandino, Jicaro. It is not possible that you should continue unheeding reasonable offers and in spite of your insolent replies to my previous overatures I am again giving you another chance to surrender. As you will no doubt know we are prepared to attack you in your own position and finish once for all your forces and yourself if you insist in maintaining your present attitude. Furthermore if you should succeed in fleeing to Honduras or any other place there will be a price on your head and you will never be able to return in peace to your country, which you seem to love so much but as a bandit who would put to flight his own peaceful countrymen. If you come to Ocotal with all your forces and deliver your arms you and your soldiers will be given amnesty. I promise you as a representative of a great and powerful nation which never wins battles treacherously. Thus you would have the possibility of living an honest life in your own country and be able to help your countrymen now for the future. Otherwise, you will be an exile and outlawed like the pigs, hunted everywhere and repudiated by everyone while awaiting a shameful death, that of a criminal who deserves to be shot from the back by his own followers. Not a single outlaw has prospered and died satisfied. And as an example twenty-five years ago there was one who was in the same position that you are in and who saw the light in time. He was Aguinaldo of the Philippine Islands who was afterwards a good friend of the United States of America. Finally I must inform you that Nicaragua has had its last revolution and that soldiers of fortune will no longer have opportunities to use their talents in the future. I shall be waiting for you in Ocotal at 8:00 a.m. on July 14th, 1927. Your resolution will save the lives of many of your followers and your own. Your answer will be yes or no and I hope it will be yes. G. D. Hatfield."

Simply reading such threats makes my blood, as a legitimate son of Nicaragua, boil. Nevertheless I restrain all the hatred that was awakened in me by the chief of adventurers who are trampling down our country's sovreignty and I answered as follows: "El Rempajon, July 12th, 1927. Mr. G. D. Hatfield, Ocotal: I am in receipt of your telegram dated the 11th instant and to which I now reply. When I joined the Constitutionalists Movement I did it with the firm purpose of getting a free country or death, and as we have not got effective liberty nor am I dead, I shall continue in my original purpose. Our arms will not be thrown down because they represent the enerjetic protest of my country and that is why your threats have no interest for me and it does not make any difference to me whose representative you are, and the first one who dares to trespass across the frontier of the section that we have allotted to ourselves will have to leave many corpses on the battlefield. And if you are ready to do so you are welcome to, so that we may have the honor of wetting our country's soil with treacherous and invading blood. Besides, if United States wants peace in Nicaragua they must deliver the presidency to a legitimate Liberal and then I will lay down my arms peaceably. A. C. Sandino."

Now as the chief of the felonious adventurers has challenged me, and I, as a legitimate son of my race, accepted it with honor, and all comments on his threatening message would be welcome, inasmuch as the Indian blood stood up for my country's majesty. Once more I wanted to prove to Wall Street's lackeys and Coolidge's assassins that to be humble does not mean to be cowardly. And that therefore in Nicaragua there are legitimate sons who are proud of being Nicaraguans, and in this connection we have proved to the civilized world the decision of the pygmies of a portion of Central America. Immediately afterwards the threatening telegram was read to the Army of the Defenders of the National Honor and every soldier, even the humblest showed in his face, signs of deadly hatred for the invaders and the traitors to our country. Death to the Yankees shouted my soldiers with all their might. Death to the Yankees answered the rugged mountains of Nueva Segovia. And my soldiers added, "On to Ocotal, On to Ocotal." "General Sandino, your subordinates hereby swear to die in defense of the National Freedom before permitting the invaders to insult our sovereignity." My answer was: "I am grateful comrades, if the Fatherland needs another pint of blood let us offer it in a holocaust."

The pirate, G. D. Hatfield's challenge had to be rataliated for with facts that history will gather. And I being the representative of the legitimate sons of my country, could not then permit nor will I nor my brothers allow, for the country or for the race, such humiliation.

In order to shame the pirates and traitors I reviewed my cavalry and only sixty men were left fit to fight, as the other cavalries had been sent two days before toward the vicinity of Jinotega on expeditions, and for this reason and being unable to control the war-like eagerness of my men I decided to attack the invaders in their excellent position in Ocotal, and we went with the arms of honor to show a dignified example, although inferior in number, as in Ocotal there were no less than 200 armed men between the invaders and the traitors who were obstructing our road to freedom. Ocotal was reached at 12:45 on the morning of July 16th last and after these minutes had elapsed in preparing for the battle at one o'clock sharp the first shot was fired at the first patrol the enemy had in the place called El Divisadere, which was taken by assault. All the other attacks on the rest of the patrols placed around the town were simultaneous all of which were either annihilated or fled to the center of the town. The combat lasted fifteen hours and the Yankees and the servile constabularies were surrounded so closely that they were not able to even obtain drinking water. They were obliged by fear to remain within their walls, awaiting whatever death we wished to give them. But our humane hearts laid us open to the charge of criticism as to finish them the easiest way was to set fire to the two blocks in which the invaders and felons had taken refuge, after boasting so loudly about their strength. The families owning the houses of the two blocks in question begged me with tears in their eyes to consider the poverty in which they would be left, if we set

their houses on fire, and considering that these supplicants were my countrymen, I sacrificed the victory, and thus it was that the bunch of pigs were left alive, as I hold the interests of my countrymen above my country's glory; this obliged me to order my men to form and leave in complete order. Unfortunately we had to mourn the death of six of my brave soldiers, amongst whom was the courageous Colonel Rufo Antonio Marin, whose name will be immortalized in history. We captured from the enemy ninety mules, saddles, and 32 Springfield rifles with their corresponding equipment.

On the 25th of the same month the Yankees appeared with flags of truce in the square of San Fernando and when they were sixteen yards away from the barracks, they opened fire against the soldiers who were on duty there. As a result one of my soldiers and three of the invaders were killed. Immediately I instructed the cavalry operating nearest to San Fernando to intervene and hinder the advance of the invader while the other cavalries were concentrating at general headquarters to organize the Guerillas who would fight the enemy; but unfortunately the one commanded by Colonel Porfirio Sanchez, exhausted by the long journey, encamped in Capules where they were surprised, but as soon as our men recovered from the surprise they kept up fighting for two hours which resulted in thirty-two casualties among the Yankees; as I must mention that in all my Guerillas there are sharpshooters who can contest for the championship at any rifle match. If not inform yourself of the five aeroplanes that have been rendered useless to the enemy when they tried to approach our trenches. It is true that the advance guard of the invaders is an aeroplane squadron, but this does not frighten my brave soldiers as the enemy believes, but our powerful rifles bring them down from whatever height they may be. Our Guerilla plans are perfectly organized and therefore we believe that God will give us strength to annihilate the invaders and traitors to our country. We possess the entire region of Nueva Segovia body and soul, and this insures the effectiveness of the hostilities against the enemy.

The Yankees by their brutal acts spread terror against the people inhabiting this zone, for in their criminal expeditions they have violated sixteen women amongst whom there were nine virgins. Two of these unfortunate victims died later because of their brutal ravishment by the barbarians of the North. They have destroyed in towns and villages houses and furniture as well as the provisions and cattle and cultivated land. What we tell in this report is based on the purest truth and told with complete exactness for we could profit by saying the contrary and as a proof I must confess that in the battle of Los Calpules we lost three of our brave soldiers, two Louis Machine Gun Ammunition Drums, five rifles, and four horses. Finally I only need to tell all my countrymen that our brothers in arms have felt the bitterness on indentifying amongst the enemy dead a lot of our former comrades who only yesterday shared the same life with us, united by the heat of the campfire in defending the same ideals. Today perhaps due to bait offered to them, we are forced to murder our own brothers. Stop to think that before anything else you are Nicaraguan and that your attitude makes you liable to bitter criticism.

Countrymen: we shall certainly stay in arms while Adolfo Diaz stays in the Presidency, as it is well known that this man is the shame of our country as well as of the good Nicaraguans, and being firmly convinced that no stranger, whatever his power may be, has a right to impose conditions that only natives here have a right to determine. Mr. Stimson said to Dr. Sacasa's delegates that the maintenance of Adolfo Diaz in the Presidency is a matter of honor and prestige to the United States. In that connection, I believe as does Dr. Sacasa that a great nation acquires honor and prestige by respecting the sovereignty of small and weak countries instead of oppressing those who are struggling for the security of their rights. We fight for honor and not for prestige, because if we lose honor we also lose the right to live.

I am addressing you: traitors, imposters, myrmidons, bribe-takers, moyssillos, pamphlet-makers, get on your knees all of you because I am going to invoke the holy name of my unconquered brothers in arms who have died defending Nicaragua's liberty: Rufo Antonio Marin and Carlos Fonseca.

/s/ A. C. SANDINO

REGULATIONS FOR CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF THE LOCALITY BELONGING TO OUR DEFENSOR ARMY OF THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF NICARAGUA.

- -

The undersigned General and Supreme Chief of the Defensor Army of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, in view of the several complaints which are presented to these Headquarters from the local authorities as well as from the inhabitants of the vicinity of this area, decrees:

All the inhabitants who live in the areas in which our forces are operating will recognize as legal authorities of our army, such as civil as in the military line, those who have in their possession the credentials of these Headquarters, and in which their duty is determined.

The Jueces of Canton might be appointed by the Jueces of Mesta in the locality in which the Juez de Canton lives, but the Juez of Mesta who appoints any Juez de Canton must bear on hand his own credentials of these Headquarters, or signed by one of our chiefs, expeditionary chiefs, etc., of our army.

The Municipal Mayors, Commanding Officers of the Posts and Chiefs of Police, must have their own credentials signed by these Commands or by any of our Expeditionary Chiefs of our Army. The Alcaldes only can be elected by a solemn assembly of out Staff headed by this Supreme Authority.

The appointments for Commanders of Posts, Chiefs of Police and Jueces de Mesta issued by our expeditionary Chiefs will be as provisional ones while the proper appointment signed by this Supreme Authority is provided. When by a mistake several persons are performing the same duty, in the same locality, will be the legal authority that has the order of this Supreme Authority. In case that no one of them have any credentials from these Headquarters, will be the legal authority that who has a previous appointment; besides that all our Expeditionary Chiefs are well instructed about this matter.

This Regulations for the authorities must be read to the inhabitants of every place by the authorities who receive it.

Headquarters, Defensor Army of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, 1 January, 1931.

Party and Liberty

/s/ A. C. SANDINO

El Chipote, Nicaragua, C. A., March 16, 1929.

General
PEDRO ALTAMIRANO,
Wherever he may be.

Esteemed friend and companion:

I have had the honor to receive your appreciable communication dated the 10th of this month.
It is very grateful to me to send you and the other companions my tender salute. I beg you to salute very specially to Colonel CENTENO and for his family goes my best wishes for their happiness, with my respects for Mrs. Maria.
I am very well informed of the news which you sent me in regards to the situation of the enemy.
The enemy is judging now that it is not possible to hide the truth, as it is seen in the newspaper which you had the kindness to enclose, but it does not say all the truth because the buccaneer chief must not only have been wounded by the brave column under your command but he must have been one of those killed.
Today I enclose a copy of the triumphs obtained by you and your column on the 8th and 19th of February.
Something like that copy are the ones that I sent to be published by the world news and by this time it ought to be known by all the people in the world, because I sent them to France also, where we also count with good friends of our cause of Liberty.
I congratulate you and the other companions once more and always our country expects from all of us the most energy and abnegation until we see her free and sovereign.
In the same paper that you send me I see that it is being comprehended of the graves prejudices brought to us by the policy of the dollar and in a letter sent by me to HOOVER (it is pronounced hoover), the yankee president, I let him see of those prejudices which has been brought to us by the malignant policy of the governments of the United States. In that letter I told him (Hoover) that if he continues the policy of the other governments, we are disposed to continue fighting against him as we have been doing up to date.
As you understand, it is a challenging letter and very energic in which I told him that the same as we routed Coolidge will rout all the insolent yankee government who are trying to enslave Nicaragua. I am writing a letter to all the government of Latin American Countries and also one to the United States of North America inviting them to celebrate a conference at Bueno Aires, the capital of the Republic of Argentine, between representatives of their government and me as representative of our Army.
In this conference I will present a project for the opening of the Nicaraguan Canal, as you know the pirates are trying to open it themselves only, and that is the reason why want to enslave Nicaragua.
In case of accepting the Conferences, I will say that the Canal be opened with money of all Latin America; but if it is granted to the Yankees to open it up with their money, the yankees will have to

promise to respect the liberty and sovereignity of all Latin American Countries.
If the Governments accept the Conference I will have to go to the conference and I will have to concentrate all our army and give them all the instructions of the case. This will probably be within about two months, and I will have to call you in to see what instructions I shall give you. My departure will not be before I talk to all Chiefs of Columns.
It is understood that if this Conference are not accepted we will have to continue fighting the enemy without rest.
I have the honor to let you know what is going to arrive a strong quantity of ammunition, Springfield, Concon and pistol ammunition, and also 10 Sub-Thompson machine guns. All this elements will come through Honduras and even if the Government knows it, he is letting it come to us.
Of this shipping I have true information of it, and we expect it at any time, but we must always try to fight the enemy in order to have them leave the biggest possible quantity of ammunition.
There are also coming many companions of other Republics.

General ESTRADA and General IRIAS left with 120 men, a few days ago, with instructions to persecute Caldera and I have already had news that they have had contacts with the enemy at Teocintal and other places, but I have not the official report from them, I am expecting it at any moment.
On the side you are operating on, we expect everything from the column under your orders.
General Salgado an Ortez are operating around Pueblo Nuevo and Chinandega and in the mountains of EL SAUCE with Hondurian Generals who have joined our forces.
They all have knowledge of the arrival of the elements I have told you and at the right opportunity I will call all the Columns in to give them plenty ammunition and good rifles.
As I have told you by former letters that in case you want to see me in order to let me know something important, you may do it with a light Column leaving the rest of the force under command of Colonel CENTENO an at a place where there is something to eat; but this will be only when you have something important, otherwise you will have to continue the march as we have already agreed.
You know that you will always find me at the place I told you about and you must not have the least preoccupation in regard to my personal security.
I expect that when it is possible for you to send some funds with some trustworthy person you will do it because the runners going to Honduras are leaving with few funds and it is necessary that they go well provided with them
I always expect you will send me the biggest quantity of newspapers. I am not sending you any because they are in Murra and this runners is going to your place right away. Very soon I shall send you plenty newspapers.
To those who may ask you about the purpose of our Army you must tell them that during the time the Yankees stay in Nicaragua we will stand ready and as soon as possible that General ESTRADA AND

GENERAL IRIAS may want to get in tough with your column because they are going to Esteli, and I expect you will lend each other cooperation in your military actions. They have good instruction of what they are going to do.

I always expect your appreciable communications because being in frequent communication we will work the best form to combat the enemy.

With my regards for all your family and my tender salute for all the companions, I remain yours, brotherly.

COUNTRY AND LIBERTY.

A. C. SANDINO.

The reference I mention above, is a political thought of mine, but it is not known whether they will accept it or not, but if they do accept it we then have given them the most positive blow to the enemy and the yankees will not be able to remain one more day in Nicaragua after the celebration of the Conferences mentioned.

But even if they do not accept them the triumph is completely our.

A. C. SANDINO.

TRANSLATIONS FROM NEWSPAPER ARTICLES IN NICARAGUAN PAPERS:

"LA NOTICIA (Managua, Nicaragua). — April 16, 1932.

MEXICO CITY — 23 April, 1932 — The papers here talk extensively of the battle of Apali. The representative of Sandino, Pedro Jose Zepeda, in a statement, says that the battle was waged between three perfectly trained columns of Guardia and approximately 500 Sandinistas. Furthermore the same Zepeda says that a few days ago he sent a letter to President Hoover in which he said **that Sandino would not recognize the results of the November elections that are supervised by Marines, and that he will continue to fight in this country as long as the elections of Nicaragua are supervised by foreigners.** And lastly Sandino is preparing a new offensive for the 5th of May in memory of the first anniversary of the death of Miguel Angel Ortez.

* * * * * * * * *

"LA NOTICA (Managua, Nicaragua) — 12 November, 1932.

MEXICO CITY — 11 Nov (AP) Cable — Through his representatives here Sandino says that in order that he lay down his arms it is necessary that certain important positions be granted to his defenders of Nicaraguan sovereignty, in order that peace in Nicaragua may be assured. It is said here that as soon as the North American Marines leave, the warrior will try to secure an interview with President Sacasa in Managua with the idea of making arrangements and to determine whether the evacuation of the Marines has been actually accomplished, for he will not tolerate a single Marine even on duty with the Legation,

for he would still consider this as actual intervention. He also is thinking of first sending his delegates in order to obtain his own safe-conduct by means of signatures. Also the warrior wants Dr. Zepeda to be named Minister of Nicaragua to Mexico.

Editor's Note: The latter part of the foregoing telegram appears to confirm the fact that Dr. Pedro Jose Zepeda, as has been published in Mexican newspapers, is trying to gain personal advantage from the Sandinista cause.

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"**LA NOTICIA (Managua, Nicaragua)** — 21 November, 1932.

IT IS ASSURED IN COSTA RICA THAT SANDINO IS PREPARING ANOTHER OFFENSIVE.

By yesterday's mail we received the notice that the Diario de Costa Rica has information that Sandino is preparing a new offensive, stronger than the others, **and that he will not recognize the government of Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa.**

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NOTE: Dr. Pedro Jose Zepeda, mentioned in the first two above articles was well known in Mexico City as the representative of Sandino, and gave out many interviews regarding the declared policies of Sandino.

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BULLETIN OF THE DEFENSING ARMY OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, FOR THE MONTH OF JULY

For the Latin–American observers:

The following combats excelled during the month of July:–

Our Atlantic Division under the command of the Generals Francisco Estrada and Simon Gonzales, attacked and captured the banana camp "BACARO" property of American Companies at Puerto Cabezas. Reinforcements reached the enemy stationed at the named camp but our boys repulsed them capuring the trains and gasoline motors; the following day a squadron of planes bombarded our column. One of the planes was brought down. The bombardment of the planes lead the enemy to our forces between which a sanguinary battle took place until the fall of night. Enemy casualties were estimated in over one hundred. One of our boys who perished in the battle was the bearer of a haversack containing documents from General Gonzalez which were lost.

It was reported to us that 26 amphibious planes landed at Puerto Cabezas to pick up the American families residing thereat. It is believed that the idea had has been well thougt as the luck which awaits the Americans there is very ill. (negress)

On July 14th our forces under the command of Cononel Ruperto Hernandez Roblero and of Sergeant Major Francisco Garcia, had a sanquinary contact with the enemy at "Los Chotes", Department of Jinotega, in which three dogs and traitor lieutenants together with nine pirates Yankees lost their lives, Colonel Roblero also lost documents in the battle but captured arms and ammunition.

On July 16th, our forces under Colonel Zacarias Padilla had a sanguinary contact at "La Rocia", Department fo Leon. In this contact ammunition and eatable provisions were captured. Padilla lost a purse containing documents pertaining to his duty.
Lately (Last information)

General Estrada and General Gonzalez, chiefs of the Atlantic Division, report that strong contingents of American troops crossed the hondurenan Mosquitia into Nicaraguan Territory and that they have their headquarters at a banana camp of the Yankee Companies at Trujillo due to which strong combats are expected from the 20th of July on.

NOW THEN (GIST)

In my standing as the Supreme Chief of the Defensing Army of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, declare before the observers of the Continent that our army has and will respect the integrity of the Hondurenan territory; that there exist a great fraternity between the people of Honduras and our army, but if the Hondurenan Government permits the armies of the invader and that of the traitors dogs of

Nicaragua to cross or camp at their territory in order to protect their operations against our army, WE WILL NOT ANSWER FOR THE CONSEQUENCES, for which only the Government of Honduras will be responsible. Headquarters of the Defensing Army of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, Segovias, Nic., 3 August, 1932.

COUNTRY AND LIBERTY

(A seal)

Ceasar Agusto Sandino.

HEADQUARTERS, THIRD BATTALION, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
Ocotal, Nicaragua,
23 July, 1929.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM:

ENTRY OF SANDINO INTO HONDURAS AND HIS TRIP TO DANLI.

1. Permission to enter Honduras with promises of protection having been granted him, Sandino left Limon, Nic., 16 Jun 29, accompanied by four men (Quezada was with Sandino) and crossed the border near Malacate at a place called La Laguna; Polo Gamero (friend and ex-secretary of Sandino) came to meet him at La Laguna and guided him to Amastran.

2. From Amastran he sent a message to Danli telling of his entry into Honduras and requesting escort, his message was not replied to immediately and fearing that something had gone wrong, he had Gamero guide him to Guayambre, where Jose Idiaquez joined him.

3. 17 Jun 29 he received a reply from his message he had sent to Danli telling him that an escort was being sent to meet him at Amastran; the next morning 18 Jun 1929 without waiting for the escort to arrive, he proceeded to Danli and met escort at Chichicaste, the escort was commanded by the Director of Police of Tegucigalpa and consisted of sixteen selected men, all with good mounts and all armed with Thompson sub-machine guns; the party arrived Danli at about 4:00 p.m., 18 Jun 29. Sandino slept at the Commandancia and took all his meals at his friend's house Jose Idiaquez. Sandino and escort left Danli for Tegucigalpa at 8:00 a.m., 19 Jun 29.

4. This information was volunteered by Senor Alfonso Moncada of Ocotal.

J. L. Blanchard.

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22.A/ja

HEADQUARTERS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

My dear Sir:

I acknowledge, with thanks, your letter of the 5th inst., containing certain information of the activities of Sandino. In this connection, I am quoting below an extract from the daily operations report of the Northern Area of March 3, 1931;

> "Information received from two different sources that Sandino is in Honduras suffering from old leg wound received in Saraguasca and that he may lose leg due to improper care. Above information voluntarily given by two old Indian guides who pass between Honduras and Nicaragua."

I am, my dear Sir,

Very truly yours,

C. B. MATTHEWS,
BRIG. GEN. G. N.
Jefe Director.

American Minister,
American Legation,
Managua, Nicaragua.

NOTIFICATION TO MR. GUILLERMO HUPER OF MATAGALPA.

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The suscribed General and Supreme Chief of the Defense Army of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua in use of the faculties conferred by the same Army and foundation in the decree number 26 of our military institution.

D E C R E E

To order Mr. Guillermo Huper in Matagalpa to deposit in the General Treasury of our Army in the quality of forced contribution the quantity of $5,000.00 for the upkeep of the war, that the sams Army has established against the drove of North American bandito who with their greatness are treading upon our National Territory.

The proprietor Guillermo Huper will turn over the contribution in reference to any one of the Expeditionary Chiefs of our Army to wit:–

General Pedro Altamirano.
General Carlos Salgado.
General Ismael Peralta.
General Simon Gonzales.
General Francisco Estrada.
General Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen.
Colonel Pedro Blandon.
Colonel Domitilo Ledezma.

The National Foreign interests that exists in Nicaraguan territory will be used for the National Defense of Nicaragua.

The foreigners that are not satisfied with this disposition should evacuate to the terminal distance of our National Territory.

Natives and foreigners that do not carry out this order will give room to proceed according to the laws of our military institution, the day that our Army takes control of the Republic or should fall in our power any plaza where resides any of the deliquents.

Headquarters of the Defense Army of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua. The Segovias, Nicaragua, C. A. July 20, 1930.

Liberty and Country.

(Seal)

A. C. SANDINO.

Senor Lt. Felix Pedro Herrera,

Wherever he may be.

Dear Brother Lt. Herrera:

I am sending you this note with the brother Transito Rodriguez. As soon as you receive it you will leave for "Los Cedros", join brother Avelino Rodriguez and together go and collect the contributions they promised to have ready in your last trip.

When you get to the house of the party who already have been notified get whatever he has, give him a short period of time to pay the balance and make him understand that until he pays the total he wont be able to work in his place. With the receipt of the total we will send him the corresponding guaranties. You may take all the boys you need to help you on this mission. From the money collected leave a part for your families and bring the rest to this camp.

Be on the watch as you may be surprised by the bandits. If you meet any body and you are sure that he is our enemy, "**lo chalequean**" (cut his throat) and burn his house. You may show this note to all the people you will collect from, so that they see the orders I give you.

My brotherly regards for all your families who I hope are in good health.

Thanks to God we have nothing new up here.

Be back as soon as possible.

PATRIA Y LIBERTAD.

/s/ Padro Altamirano.

November 12, 1930.

– –

Translation of a letter taken from the person of bandit Lieutenant Herrera wounded and captured in a contact at Sisle, 29 December, 1930.

Campo Los Boloanes,
Nov 3, 1930.

Senor Don------

It has been decreed that on this date you will give the sum of $200.00 as a forced contribution and will give it to Don Justo Hernandez who has instructions to receive what you bring.

The contribution which this Command imposes upon you is to help the forces of the Army of the Defender of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua and which is under my command like this; as those who live in the Headquarters with the Supreme Jefe.

If you do not help the cause which we defend, which is the obligation of all honorable Nicaraguans to do for the good of their party, you will be obliged to abandon your property as you will be declared an enemy of the Army, and in this case, you will lose your family and all kinds of guarantees and will be subjected to whatever punishment from us that you merit as a traitor to your country.

If you do not want to be molested by our forces, you will pay the required sum, this in order that you may live in peace on your properties. All orders which this Headquarters issues which are not complied with, obligate me to have them complied with by blood and fire in order that the Army will not be a laughing stock.

Think carefully and well because if you do not feel inclined to help us, only God will keep your family from falling into my hands and your properties from being left in ashes. Acknowledge.

Country and Liberty,

PEDRO ALTAMIRANO,
Jefe Expeditionario.

QUOTATION FROM AN ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL AREA OF NICARAGUA, AS EXTRACTED FROM REPORT SUBMITTED BY COLONEL JULIAN C. SMITH, G.N. (MAJOR, U.S.M.C.) THEN AREA COMMANDER, TO THE JEFE DIRECTOR, GUARDIA NACIONAL, 4, 1931.

EXTRACT

3. BANDIT ACTIVITIES AND PROBABLE PLANS.

In the San Rafael sector and the Colon Valley bandits are always to be found. Their principal leader is Pedro Blandon. The bandits move about on the mountain trails in small groups pillaging and robbing the poorer inhabitants. The groups unite under Blandon for larger expeditions and forays.

In the vicinity of Jinotega a small band under Villegas and one under Sequiera operate constantly. Both of these Jefes have a great local influence and keep the inhabitants pretty well terrorized. The second in command of each band has been killed in contact with the guardia in the last two months and the bands greatly reduced by casualties and desertions.

The main groups operating under the leaders Peralta, Blandon, Irias and Sequiera all under the general control of Pedro Altamirano have their general headquarters between the Tuma and Coco Rivers and make forays into the richer more populous sections of the Northern and Central Areas.

The bandits steal all of their food and clothing from inhabitants of the country through which they operate. They obtain funds through blackmail and robbery demanding sums from all finca owners, except those whose properties are guarded by Marines or Guardia posts and those living in the south pay tribute to the bandits.

While it is not definitely known how many bandits operate in this area, groups of from two-hundred and fifty to three-hundred and fifty have been encountered and it is believed that Altamirano can concentrate three hundred armed men.

In addition to the operations of small bands previously described the bandits have in the past year made four forays in force in this area. One in June when some three or four hundred were concentrated at Corraguasca; in November when they captured Matiquas; in December when they crossed the Tuma at Coyolar and moved northwest to La Vencedora; and in January when they passed east of Guapatol and Muy Muy, circled south of Matagalpa and returned north in small groups through the Colon Valley. After each raid the bandit leader returned to the section north of the Tuma where their bands apparently broke up into small groups awaiting the disposal of the proceeds of the raids and the renewal of ammunition supplies. During their incursions into this area it is notable that the bandits attacked no marine or guar-


dia post with the exception of Matiquas where the garrison was known to be very weak and isolated. They generally avoided decisive engagements when attacked, indicating that their intention was to secure loot and contributions but not to seek battle with military forces.

While in each of the above mentioned forays the bandits were defeated in one or more engagements with comparatively heavy losses, by dispersing and assembling at distant rendezvous, their main groups escaped intact and no prominent leader was killed or captured, and in each raid some loot was secured, some property damage done and the power to destroy isolated haciendas demonstrated, frightening many owners into making contributions.

All information received indicates a shortage of serviceable arms and ammunition, though the larger groups are generally equipped with Lewis guns and Thompson sub-machine guns. Their method of recruiting is simply to replace losses. They conserve their automatic weapons and salvage the rifles of those who fall in action. As every band reported, has a number of men in it armed with cutaches, it is safe to say that the number of armed bandits will remain in the near future somewhat at its present strength, and is dependent purely on the number of firearms and amount of ammunition available. The killing of a few mozos has little effect on the number of their fighting forces. The leaders even of the raiding groups keep well to the rear in contacts with the guardia. Sandino and Altamirano keep practically clear of the contact zone. Hence the likelihood of ending banditry by killing the leaders is remote. The mobility of the bandits, their practice of dispersing when attacked and assembling at some prearranged rendezvous, and their habit of traveling at night over mountain trails, precludes the possibility of their destruction by a large military force, which, due to the necessity of carrying supplies is limited to the main trails. The only successful offensive operations have been by small very mobile patrols capable of living off the country and of following the bandits wherever they have been able to go.

As to the furture plans of the bandits it seems safe to assume that they will continue their present methods of rendezvousing north of the Tuma for operations against the Northern and Central Areas, collecting contributions by means of threats, burning an occasional hacienda, making occasional forays into the settled districts, ambushing patrols and wiping out small detachments of guardia whenever possible without committing themselves to the danger of attack by strong guardia forces.




CAPTAIN ANDERSON'S CONTACT
SAN JUAN PATROL, 28 JUNE 1930
OJOCHE, NUEVA SEGOVIA.
1ST. POSITION
2ND. POSITION
3RD. POSITION
SKETCH BY
ROBERT L. DENIG COL. G.N.
FIRE OF REAR GUARD NOT SHIFTED SOON ENOUGH WHICH HELD BACK THE RUSH OF THE MAIN BODY
RIFLE FIRE AND BOMBS FROM HERE
BRUSH COVERED RIDGE
BOMBS FROM HERE
RIFLE FIRE FROM HERE
UMANZOR, JEFE - WOUNDED MANY MORE WOUNDED FIVE KILLED. GROUP BROKEN UP
N
S
E
W
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
10
20
30
40
50

R.D. 1033-B.

REPORT OF CONTACT WITH BANDIT FORCES NEAR SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA, NORTHERN AREA, GUARDIA NACIONAL, NICARAGUA, 28 JUNE, 1930.

"GUARDIA NACIONAL, SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA,
29 June 1930.

From : Commanding Officer, San Juan.
To : The Area Commander.

Subject Contact with bandits.

1. The San Juan patrol, on mission assigned in connection with operations ordered by radio of 23 June 1930, encountered a group of bandits and engaged them in combat at 11:55 a.m., 28 June 1930. The engagement took place on the trail to San Juan, coordinates 233 dash 359, near Ojoche. The engagement continued until 12:30 p.m., 28 June 1930, or about 35 minutes.

2. Captain R. A. Anderson, G. N., was in command of the patrol, a roster of the patrol is attached. It is estimated that the bandit group numbered about fifty. The patrol lost one guardia, Venabides, Eusebio, No. 2085, killed, no wounded and no missing. No bandit dead were found nor were any captured. I saw no bandit wounded but believe several of them to have been.

3. The patrol was armed with one Lewis machine gun, two Sub-Thompsons; one Browning Auto rifle, one Springfield Rifle with grenade discharger, the rest of the patrol carrying Krag rifles.

4. The bandits were armed with Krag rifles and Krag carbines, a number of dynamite bombs were used. No arms and no supplies were captured. A bandit banner, hats with red bands, knives and machetes were picked up by the members of the patrol after the engagement, also one dynamite bomb.

5. The bandits were driven from the place they occupied and fled down the valley under cover of heavy brush, separating and running in all directions. It was impossible to maintain contact or to pursue other than by fire.

6. The Guardia killed, Venabides, Eusebio, No. 2085, was struck by three rifle bullets at the beginning of the combat, one penetrating the skull, one the abdomen and one the right leg. The conduct of all men concerned was excellent. There were no outstanding examples of bravery beyond the call of duty.

/s/ R. A. ANDERSON.

- -

NOTE: The patrol consisted of one officer, one First Sergeant, two Corporals and twenty-six Privates of the Guardia Nacional.
Editor.

THE FOLLOWING CONTACT REPORT SUBMITTED BY LIEUTENANT C. H. CLARK, G. N. (SERGEANT, U.S.M.C.) IS QUOTED FOR THE INFORMATION OF READERS:

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
EL SAUCE, NICARAGUA,
26 February, 1932.


From: Second Lieutenant C. H. Clark, G. N.
To : The Director of Operations.

Subject: Contact report.

Reference: Telegram #114 Dir Opers El Sauce, 09423 Feb 32.

1. In compliance with the above reference I cleared Villa Nueva at 06324, Feb 32 with seventeen enlisted men for Limay via Achuapa. At a place called Los Pinos I took a man as a guide to take me as far as he knew the trail. This being the first time that I had been in this area, I had no idea where I was or what the trail was like. At Los Encuentros the guide stated that ke knew the trail led up to the north, pointing out to me the entrance to the trail, but he said he did not know the trail any further. I thought this was strange, but as I had not encountered any other men I took this man along thinking that if we got lost that he might be able to help us out. We followed this trail arriving at a place called Caracol at noon. There the old woman, the only person there, told me it was three leagues to Achuapa and that there was no information there except that the bandits had been in a place called La Cucaracha three days before, but she did not know where this place was. I cleared there at twelve o'clock. Fifteen hundred yards further on we were ambushed; time about twelve five in a place called Posa Honda; contact lasted two hours; group estimated at two hundred and fifty; jefes thought to have been Colindres, Salgado and Umanzor; bandits employed four automatic weapons and were very aggressive; patrol was immediately surrounded, bandits closing in until they were only fifty feet from the creek banks, throwing bombs down on the patrol.

2. When my point entered the creek I was eight men back from the first man and could not see what kind of a place we were entering. My men were some five or ten yards apart so that, when I came into the creek bed, the first man was nearly through the ambush which was laid in from and down both sides of the creek, the high banks making it impossible for my men to see more than twenty feet on either side and the big rocks in front, affording perfect hiding and protection for the bandits. As I came out into the creek the bandits opened fire on me with a Lewis, killing my mule. Immediately the cargo mule, being behind, broke loose from the mulero. Returning down the trail I called to the men in front to take the left bank my idea being to try and hold the bandits off until I could get an idea of the position, but the brush being so thick that very little could be seen, and the bandits were closing in so that all my attention was given to


WOODED
WOODED
CREEK
WOODED
A
AW
POTRERO
WOODED
DRY CREEK BED
2
WD
WOODED
WOODED
SKETCH OF CONTACT OF LIEUT. CLARK G.N.
ON 24 FEBRUARY 1932.
G.N.
A- AUTO WEAPONS
M- RIFLE GRENADES
W- WOUNDED
→ MY ENTRANCE
↔ MY ADVANCE
BANDITS
+ AUTO WEAPONS
□ DEAD
« » THEIR POSITION

R.D. 1033-C.

holding them off. In the first shots two men were wounded. I called to the Cabo asking if any had been killed and he told me that none had, but the bandits found his position and started bombing him and me. One bomb knocked me down and one of my men threw water in my face and helped me back to cover, and, as I got my bearings again, I saw dirt, stones and water fly up in front of the Cabo. Thinking him dead I started over to get the Sub-Thompson that he had, but he got up wondering around. He could not see, nor hear. I got hold of him, guiding him to shelter. Then, thinking it impossible to hold this position, I called the rest of the point back, signalling them to follow me up the right bank of the creek. One Guardia helped the wounded man and I guided the Cabo. Using his Sub-Thompson we proceeded up the hill in the face of what I thought was the main group. There was hand to hand fighting until we got to the top of the hill and I had no time to check my men. Arriving at the top I left the Cabo and took check of the men, finding one short. This being a very good position I left five men there with the wounded. The Cabo was nearly all right by that time and was left in charge. I took the rest of the men, going down the ridge to look for the missing man, and I saw the bandits were confused and were running in every direction, I returned to the scene of the ambush and followed down the creek, finding two bandits trying to get my blanket roll and medicines off the dead mule. These were killed and I got my equipment and returned to the crest of the hill. Two more of the men with me got wounded in returning. These I bandaged, and leaving them, I returned down the hill with six men. At this point the bandits started to clear out upon my arrival to the creek. Again they had all gone. This time I found the other guardia, dead. He was killed by the bombs that exploded near the Cabo, but as he was on the other side of the rocks, I could not see him during the contact, and as the Cabo was dazed, this man was left behind. The bandits had taken his rifle, belt and shoes, but otherwise he was not harmed, as is nearly always the case. I proceeded up the opposite bank and down the creek but the bandits had cleared out, so I sent one man up the hill with instructions to send all but three men down, and to bring the wounded. After putting another sentry post up on the other side, I started to make preparations to evacuate the wounded and the dead man. We made stretchers out of poles for two wounded men and the dead man. I took four men and returned down the creek about five hundred yards looking for the cargo mule, but was unable to find it, so I returned, it being three thirty. Then I lost no time in getting started for Achuapa.

3. The guide had been killed, so we followed the creek north. My map showed a creek leading to Achuapa from that area. We carried the dead man about two thousand yards, but this proved to be too much and we had to leave him, so we marked two trees with a cross and hid him back off the trail. We found no people in that area until we had gone nearly two leagues. We had to travel very slow and did not arrive in Achuapa until ten thirty that night. I redressed the wounds of the men and made preparations to clear for El Sauce the next morning, dispatching a runner to notify the Director of Operations and to request airplane transportation for the wounded men.

4. At six o'clock the next morning I sent ten civilians out from Achuapa to bring in the dead man. There not being sufficient guardia to send a patrol and also to clear the wounded men too, and as the men were seriously wounded, I cleared with them at nine thirty for El Sauce.

5. I recommend the entire patrol for citation, and especially note and recommend the conduct of Cabo Panfilo Mendez, #3037. After being dazed and nearly killed, he fought bravely begging to accompany me down the hill. I also want to commend the conduct of Raso Iginio Romero #3030, Raso Manuel Gomez, #4579, and Raso Velasquez Apolonio #4788. These men while wounded continued to fight without any thought of self or of asking for aid, and to the entire trip into El Sauce without complaining. In fact the conduct of the entire patrol was such that no words can repay them for the way they conducted themselves during the contact and throughout the entire patrol.

6. The following is a list of the men who took part in this contact:–

	No.	ARMS EMPLOYED
Cabo Panfilo Mendez	2037—wounded	Sub-Thompson
Raso Meneses Elias	4079	Rifle (Asst) STMG
Raso Justo Castillo	3384	Rifle Grenadier
Raso Arcado Castillo	3385	B. A. R.
Raso Diaz Ramon	4022	Rifle-hand grenades
Raso Antonio Diaz	4020	Rifle-Asst. B. A. R.
Raso Higinio Romero	3030—wounded	Sub-Thompson
Raso Humberto Martinez	4115	Rifle (Asst) STMG
Raso Gonzalez Tomas	4245	Rifle (Asst) STMG
Raso Francisco Savalbarro	3304	Rifle-hand grenades
Raso Ignacio Hernandez	4029—killed	Rifle-hand grenades
GUARDIA FROM OCOTAL		
Raso Manuel Gomez	4579—wounded	Rifle
Raso Vasquez Apolonio	4788—wounded	Rifle (Asst) Mulero
Raso Jose Maradiaga	4438	Rifle-Mulero
Raso Fermin Arroliga	3246	Rifle (Asst) B. A. R.
Raso Vernardo Paguaga	3689	Rifle grenadier

GUARDIA CASUALTIES:

Raso Ignacio Hernandez #4029—Killed.
Three wounded

EQUIPMENT LOST:

Two Krag rifles
Eighty rounds ammunition
Two mules
GN blanket rolls
One B. A. R. magazine, empty

BANDIT CASUALTIES:

Eight known dead
Many known wounded

EQUIPMENT CAPTURED:

Two Krag rifles
23 rounds Krag ammunition
Mess articles
Two dynamite bombs
50 yards cloth

/s/CECIL H. CLARK,
Patrol Commander.

El Sauce, Nicaragua,
27 February, 1932.

Following is a copy of letter from Captain J. C. McQueen regarding Lieutenant Clark's contact which is quoted for general information:

Achuapa

Dear Roberts:

Atwell and I and our patrol arrived at the scene of Clark's contact near Caracol at 0832. Within fifteen minutes Hutchcroft and twenty enlisted from Limay combined with Martinez and ten enlisted from Achuapa arrived. Atwell and I had covered Jocote before arriving at Caracol and found all houses deserted, men and women and children all gone. We assume the bandits under Umanzor took them so we could get no dope from natives. Saw none.

After a long search we found the body of the dead Guardia, Ignaco Hernandez. It had been removed from where Clark reported it to the other side of the trail up on a hill well hidden. We buried the body and marked the grave. Body was in too bad condition to bring in. Also found body of Clark's guide. This was located at scene of contact still lying on the trail with a note as follows:

"Campo de operacio militares de la column expedicionaria No. 8 del Ejercito defensor de la Soberania Nacional de Nicaragua:

Feb 25 1932.

"Esta es la suerte que los espera perros, haste un pine de tierre les niegan.

Patria y Libertad
Capt. Jose de Parades — General y Jefe Exodo.
Juan Pablo Umanzor."

- -

We covered the area about the scene of contact and then to trails leading out. We found no dead bandits due to the fact that they had been carried away. Umanzor and his group returned morning of twenty-fifth to do this. Indications point to several wounded besides the dead, Clark reported. We found crude stretchers at various points, covered with blood. I do not believe any other jefe was present except Umanzor, but doubtlessly he had a large group. The place of ambush is wicked. A stretch of 150–175 yards along a stream bed with long hills on either side and very heavy with brush. No cover for the patrol at all. **Sketch enclosed.**

We found the mule which was shot under Clark. Bullet passed under left eye and the bandit who shot was no more than 15 or 20 yards from Clark at the time.

There is no question that Clark and his patrol were in an awful place. The group was strung along on the hills on both sides of the trail for 150 yards and were at close range. There was no cover for patrol. Indications show Clark must have attacked the bandit left flank on left of trail which evidently was the strongest part of the bandit line. Bandits of left side of trail had a better getaway and a closer range on patrol. Parts of a bandit bomb were found at east end of ambush which apparently killed his guide or lead man of point.

I hope as do the officers, that I get a chance to see Clark and personally congratulate him for his fine work. A glance at the ambush position is enough to tell the story of a desperate situation. Only extraordinary coolness and strong control over his men enabled Clark to get out of the mess, and strike the blow he did, which was done in a praiseworthy manner. In the position he found himself and patrol the astonishing thing is how he emerged without serious losses; heavy fire from both sides and a mean position from which to attack. (up the hill).

If Clark is there still, we all (Hutchcroft, Martinez, Atwell and I) send our heartiest congratulations.

We will wait here for more dope on location of group. If we get none we will come back direct from here, otherwise we will clear on information unless you have orders for me to the contrary from the Dir. Operations.

Yours,

/s/ J. C. McQUEEN

REPORT — CONTACT AT EMBOCADEROS ON JUNE 15, INCIDENT TO DEATHS OF CAPTAIN POWER & LIEUT McGHEE

HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL AREA,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA.
18 June, 1931.

From: The Area Commander.
To : The Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional, Managua.

Subject: Report of contact at Embocaderos on June 15.


1. The following account of the contact at Embocaderos is compiled from the accounts of the following eye-witnesses:

Raso Luis Garcia Perez #4323 (wounded),
Raso Pedro Joaquin Maradiaga #2351 (wounded),
Jose Valdavia (Owner of the house),
Amador Montenegro (an intelligent reliable citizen, a civico of Jinotega, who was a bandit prisoner).

and Lieut. Robert L. Griffin, G.N., Lieut. William A. Lee, G.N., and Lieut. Policarpo Gutierrez, G.N., who inspected the scene of action and made oral reports.

2. The guardia patrol, consisting of Captain Lester E. Power, Lieutenant William H. McGhee and fifteen enlisted men, cleared Corinto Finca on combat patrol at 09515 for Embocaderos, Las Cuchillas and Pena Blanca areas. The patrol reached the house of Jose Valdavia at about 2:00 p.m., where it stopped and began to prepare a meal. The house was open to the south and partly boarded with one inch pine boards on other sides, has a tile roof, lies on ground generally sloping from north to south. The house is lower than the surrounding country.

About noon the bandit group captured Amador Montenegro in Estrella, about a league to the north. He states that the group numbered two hundred more or less, that he recognized Pedron Altemirano and Pedro Irias. Pedron is well dressed and rides a fine big mule, has high boots, khaki trousers and woolen khaki shirt, wears several gold chains and many gold rings. He carries a Lugar pistol and a forty-five revolver. Nothing notable about the dress of Irias. The bandits were not in any kind of uniform, some had hardly any clothes at all. They had four machine guns, "two big ones and two little ones", all had rifles and pouches full of ammunition. At about 2:00 p.m., a big black man in the bandit point came to a hill marked "A" (the bandits were not on the main trail but moving from Los Cedros toward the house of Victor Rodriguez to a place called Escaleros) with a pair of field glasses, saw the guardia pack mules crossing a small rise marked "B". The bandits halted until they saw the guardia come to the house of Jose Valdavia




R.D. 1033—D.

PLATE ONE

EMBOCADEROS, 15 JUNE, 1931

Captain L. Power, G.N.



R.D.1033-E.

PLATE TWO

EMBOCADEROS, 15 JUNE, 1931

and unload the mules. They then sent a runner for a group which had gone on ahead and made plans to surround the house on three sides. Irias took the left wing and told a man he called "Colonel", a small white man with heavy drooping mustaches to take the right wing. Montenegro was with Irias and during the fight laid in a hollow about fifty yards in rear of the bandit line to the east of the house and could not see any of the fight. About 3:00 p.m., the fight started, rifles first, followed immediately by machine guns and lasted until nearly dark. It was so dark when the bandits left that he was enabled to escape. The bandits left in two directions, most of them went back toward Estrella, the remainder going to the southeast. The latter group carried three dead bodies, one of whom was the Colonel who commanded the right wing. (The Jefe Politico of Jinotega states that the man was Daniel Hernandez, a Colonel with Altamirano, known to be the best shot in his army). Another of the dead was "Chino". (This man's name is Juan Zelaya). He heard the bandits, carrying the body, say they were sorry "Chino" had been killed.

3. When the bandits first opened fire the sentry gave the alarm and the guardias immediately returned the fire, most of them outside of the house. "During the height of the combat" Lieutenant McGhee, while firing the Thompson from behind a stone to the north of the house "C" on sketch, was hit in the head by a rifle bullet, went into the house, sat down on a pile of lumber and died. Captain Power went behind a pile of tiles "D" in sketch, firing his pistol, he called for the B.A.R. It was handed to him but was jammed; he then called for the grenade discharger and was shot in the head as he reached for it; he went into the house, laid on the bed and died in about fifteen minutes. He told the guardia to continue the fight.

4. Private Santiago Talavera, #4100, was mortally wounded while firing through a crack from within the house. He was dragged to some little bushes marked "E" and left there. Private Perez says that he shot from behind a stump and that he saw two dead men in the open. Private Maragiaga says two men were together, one of whom shot Captain Power at about one hundred meters. He shot this man and the other shot him; when he fell his hand fell on the pistol of Captain Power and he brought it with him. He afterward killed a bandit with it when he was getting away. Perez was wounded in the leg by a bomb, also had a slight flesh wound from a rifle bullet and could not walk. He lay hidden in the brush until the bandits left and was found next morning by a guardia patrol. He heard the bandits say that seven bandits were killed.

5. All accounts agree that the fight started about 3:00 p.m., and lasted till nearly dark.

6. Lieutenant Lee with the first Guardia patrol on the ground estimated the bandits at one hundred and fifty men; their line was horseshoe shape and covered more than two hundred yards. In searching the bushes he found a number of blood spots, and on both trails that the bandits used in leaving, there were trails of blood. He picked up from the bandit line and brought to this office the following cartridge cases by actual count:

826 — Cal. 30 Krag and Springfield
32 — Cal. 45
5 — Cal. 38 Rifle
5 — Cal. 38 Special pistol
5 — Cal. 32 Short pistol
11 — Cal. 32/20 pistol

884 — Total.

From the vicinity of the house on the ground occupied by the guardia he picked up a larger quantity by volume of empty cartridge cases but was unable to bring them in due to lack of transportation. As the bandits were in thick brush and the cases were hard to find, particularly the Cal. 45 cases, it is safe to say the bandits fired 1500 rounds and hit six guardia in the open at a distance of from fifty to one hundred and fifty yards.

Each guardia who reported in either to Jinotega or to Corinto Finca had an empty cartridge belt. Even the wounded stayed to shoot their last cartridges. Corporal Rivas, who handled the BAR was wounded and unable to carry the weapon, but states that he completely disabled it.

7. The undersigned believes that it is safe to say that the bandits lost seven killed, including Colonel Daniel Hernandez, and an unknown number of wounded. The guardia losses:

DEAD

Captain Lester E. Power, G.N.
Lieutenant William H. McGhee, G.N.
Raso Santiago Ralavera, #4100, G.N.

WOUNDED

Corporal Daniel Guierrez, #3529, G.N.
Corporal Isaac Rivas, #2544, G.N.
Private Pedro Maradiaga, #3251, G.N.
Private Luis Perez, #4323, G.N.

PROPERTY CAPTURED BY BANDITS

1 BAR (Completely disabled)
12 Magazines, BAR
1 Drum, Thompson, SMG
1 Pistol, (Lieut. McGhee's)
19 Blankets
1 Aeroplane panel and code cards
1 Dispatch case (Captain Power's)
1 Thompson

8. Everything indicates that the guardia were attacked by a group of from one hundred and fifty to two hundred bandits under Altamirano and Irias, (armed with two Lewis guns and two sub-Thompsons,) who had not been heard of in this neighborhood for nearly six months; that the guardia put up a gallant fight against terrific odds, and with the utmost loyalty stuck by their officers until it was known that they were dead and until their ammunition was exhausted. Too high praise cannot be given them for their loyalty and gallantry, especially the old guardia who took cover and cooly shot it out with the bandits.

9. Lieutenant Gutierrez deserves the highest praise for his loyalty and courage in marching at once by night to the scene of the action with a patrol of only twelve men.

10. Specific recommendations will be made when more exact information is available.

/s/ J. C. SMITH.

THE FOLLOWING, WITH ACCOMPANYING SKETCH, COVERS CAPTAIN McQUEEN'S REPORT OF THE ATTACK ON LIMAY, 1 JULY, 1931.

GUARDIA NACIONAL, DISTRICT OF SAN JUAN DE LIMAY, DEPARTMENT OF ESTELI, NICARAGUA.
4 July, 1931.

From: The District Commander, Captain John C. McQueen, G.N.
To : The Department Commander, Department of Esteli.

Subject: Attack on Limay by Bandits, 1 July, 1931.

1. During the night of 1 July, 1931, Limay was attacked by bandits, Jefe Jose Leon Diaz and a sub-jefe named Juan Castillo with combined groups estimated to be about 75 men. The first phase of the attack began about 9:50 p.m., and ended at 10:00 p.m., the second phase of the attack, a short demonstration of about seven minutes, began at about 11:00 p.m. At the beginning of the attack there were 28 of the 31 guardias in the cuartel, with three still on liberty. There was a moon, and although somewhat overcast, the visibility was fairly good.

2. The mission of the bandits, evidently, was to hold the guardias in the cuartel by their fire, and sack the town. From reliable native reports obtained after the fight, the Castillo group arrived at the SE edge of the town at about 9:30 p.m., and halted, having come via La Flor trail from the south. A small part of this group circled the east and north outskirts of town and joined the Diaz group at the NW edge of town. Two mounted men of the Castillo group rode through the streets to look things over. They found everything quiet and saw only two guardias of the night police patrol on the streets whom they avoided. At about 9:30 p.m., the Diaz group with some of the Castillo group had taken positions in P18 rear of the cuartel (see attached sketch) 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5. For a few minutes after the attack began fire came from these positions only. Also at this time the remainder of the Castillo group composed mostly of machete men, had entered various patios in the eastern half of the town searching for mules and pack-saddles with which to carry away the prospective loot. Many of the townspeople were aware of this, but were afraid to leave their houses to report the matter.

3. It is believed that the bandits were not entirely in position and not ready for the attack when it began; that it was precipitated due to the guardia turning back to the cuartel after having started for the outhouse (to relieve himself) near bandit position 2, causing suspicion on the part of the bandits there. Fire opened up from this point as the guardia neared the cuartel. The electric lights of the town were burning. The customary hour for extinguishing lights is 11:00 p.m.

4. 2nd Lieut. James R. Bell, second in command, and I were in the officers' quarters when the firing began. We closed and bolted the doors of the quarters and took position in the trenchera in front

of the quarters preparatory to making a dash for the cuartel. No sooner had we occupied this position then machine gun fire from bandit position 3 was directed at the trenchera and up street A in front of the officers' quarters, and rifle fire directed at the trenchera from (6). At the first lull in the machine gun fire, we ran across the plaza and gained the cuartel.

5. At the cuartel we found all the guardias (with the exception of the three on liberty) manning their assigned attack station, fighting calmly, and in high spirits. Firing was heavy on the part of both the guardia and the bandits. Lieut. Bell was assigned to command the firing line in front (plaza side) of the cuartel. Machine gun fire by this time had opened up also from (7). In the rear of the cuartel I found the heavy Browning out of action due to a jam. The gun was put into action and performed perfectly with the exception of occasional misfires due to poor ammunition. Bandit fire was silenced from the rear. On the plaza side of the cuartel, Lieut. Bell and his men were firing on targets (6), (7) and new target (8). Target 7 was silenced and also target 6, and rifle grenades were laid on target (8). This group had formed along sides and rear of the church. The first three grenades fired failed to explode and the group scattered to the east before the fourth grenade burst. A patrol consisting of thirteen men under my command left the cuartel and covered the vicinity in rear of the church to the edge of the town. The patrol then headed south down street B and fired into a group of about 10 men at position (9). Apparently they were taken by surprise. We heard several cries of "Ay, mamita" as they scattered into the brush and disappeared. While on the run they fired a hurried short burst of Thompson fire and a few poorly directed rifle shots. The patrol searched through this vicinity, found nothing, and thence continued along the east and south outskirts of the town, entered the town to see if the various stores were secure, searched patios and possible hiding places, and then went back to the cuartel to report the town quiet preparatory to searching the vicinity in rear of the cuartel. The three guardias who had been on liberty had returned to join the others. Several civicos had reported and volunteered their services (these names given in last paragraph). Two of the guardias who had been on liberty had made an attempt to get to the cuartel during the fight, but were driven back by bandit fire, one of them receiving a bullet hole through one knee of his trousers.

6. At 10:55 p.m., the bandits again opened fire from the rear of the cuartel before the patrol had cleared to search through this section. Firing was not severe and of short duration. During the time the first patrol had been out, Lieut. Bell had kept the defense positions in readiness and fire was returned by the guardia immediately. After sweeping this section with machine gun fire the patrol cleared in the direction of the bandit firing line and found it abandoned. The cemetery and the potrero were thoroughly covered and the patrol continued on west to investigate the trails and houses. We learned that the Diaz group had entered the potrero from the NW corner before taking positions, but had not departed in that direction. It is believed that the

group scattered and formed later in the night, and headed toward Chilamatal. Reliable natives reported that the group sacked Chilamatal on July 2nd and headed NW toward the Honduran border; that they carried four seriously wounded; that two dead had been buried the morning of the 2nd of July near a river at Chilamatal; that Diaz believed a large patrol was absent from the garrison at the time of his attack. It was reported later also, by natives living on the La Flor Trail, that the Castillo group on the morning of July 2nd was seen to pass in small bunches of four and five men heading southeast in the general direction of Lagartillo.

7. CASUALTIES: Guardia — 1 (two slight wounds in face).
Bandits — unknown (believed to be 2 dead and 11 wounded)

More serious damage could have resulted to the bandits had all the rifle grenades been serviceable, as the bandits were within range of grenades in most of their positions.

8. Guardia weapons employed were 1 Heavy Browning Machine Gun; 1 Lewis machine gun; 1 Browning Automatic rifle; 1 Thompson gun; rifle grenades and rifles. The bandits employed 2 Lewis Guns; 2 Thompson Guns; rifles, pistols, shotguns and dynamite bombs.


9. The conduct of the guardias was splendid. They quickly took their assigned attack stations, pickep up the target and used good judgement in the volume and direction of their fire. In the early part of the attack there were several recruits not as attentive to orders as they might have been, due probably to their eagerness to fight. Lieut. Bell handled his men with precision and I felt confident of the safety of the cuartel left in his charge when the patrol cleared to protect the town.

Diputado Senor Fernando Morales L., voluntarily accompanied the patrol in its search of the vicinity in rear of the cuartel. He went with the point and with his whole-hearted cooperation was of great assistance to us.

The following civilians reported at the cuartel at 10:45 p.m., and offered their assistance. They also formed part of the patrol covering the town during the remainder of the night:

Senor Marcial Lopez y Lopez, the Alcalde.
" Arnold Pineda
" Teodoro Castillon
" Pastor Prado
" Adan Vindel
" Ramon Gonzalez.

/s/ J. C. McQUEEN.


ATTACK ON LIMAY
1 JULY, 1931
WHERE DIAZ GROUP ENTERED POTRERO PRIOR TO TAKING POSITION.
LEWIS
THOMPSON GUN AND BOMBS
RIFLES
POTRERO
CUARTEL
PLAZA
SLIGHT RISE IN GROUND USED AS PARAPET
MAIN PORTION OF TOWN LIES EAST OF CUARTEL
GUARDIA WEAPONS
A-HEAVY BROWNING
B-LEWIS GUN
C-B.A.R.
D-THOMPSON
EDGE OF TOWN
N
W
E
S
CEME-TERY
LEWIS
STREET-A.
OFFICER'S QUARTERS
BIG TREES
CORN FIELD
STREET-B.
THOMPSON GUN
R.D.1033-F

FROM GUARDIA NEWS LETTER NO. 32.
SOMOTO NICARAGUA 21 JANUARY, 1931.

From: Second Lieutenant F. M. McCorkle, G. N.
To : The Commanding Officer.

Subject: Attack on Somoto, report of.

1. At exactly 2130 on 19 January 1931, Raso Ignaxio Gonzales on town patrol, encountered a group of men and receiving no answer to his challenge, fired three shots at them and ran for the barracks, garrisoned by myself and twenty-four enlisted men and four auxiliares, was attacked from all sides by the bandits numbering about two hundred under Miguel Ortez, Jose Leon Diaz and Julan Pablo Umanzor.

2. Bandits employed two Browning automatic rifles, two Thompson sub-machine guns, eleven rifle grenades, bombs, rifle and pistol fire. Bandits also had one additional Thompson Sub-machine gun in the center of the town to protect the looters who were also covered by a BAR, in the rear of the church. Machine guns and bombs were concentrated in the first part of attack on the officers quarters. The bandits were apparently aided by someone who was well acquainted with Somoto and barracks as bombs and rifle fire were accurately directed, rifle fire being directed to parts of building where officers slept. Ten bombs fell in the patio and through roof of officers quarters. A very heavy fire was maintained in the streets in front of barracks, apparently to keep the Guardia in while looting of town was taking place.

3. A patrol of ten men under Sergeant Chaverria was sent out about ten minutes after start of the attack to prevent looting of the town. The patrol encountered very heavy machine gun and rifle fire and after failure of their Thompson sub-machine gun were forced to return to the barracks. Stoppage was claered in about 15 minutes and the patrol was again sent out. Looters were driven from the streets about thirty minutes later. The store of Senora Maria Lopez, wife of Senator Lopez, was broken into and robbed. The bandits then made several unsuccessful attempts to set fire to the store and house. The manager of Sierke's store, who was armed with a pistol, opened the door of the store upon request of the bandits armed with machetes and from an investigation of his store a few minutes after the bandits retreated, it was apparent that a comparatively small amount of merchandise had been molested, a small amount of clothing and liquor being the principal articles taken.

4. Attack lasted until 2330, five unsuccessful assaults being made on the barracks, when apparently upon signal of bomb being fired about one-half mile from town on the Ocotal road, bandits retired in all directions but for the most part toward the north and east. Heard one bomb and rifle and machine gun fire about one quarter mile from town on the Ocotal road at 2345 lasting only a few minutes.

5. Bandits were apparently augmented by natives in the vicinity of Somoto for the purpose of aiding in the looting of the town.

6. There were no Guardia or civilian casualties. Bandit casualties unknown.

7. Conduct of all Guardias and auxiliares was excellent with no confusion at start of attack. Stations were promptly manned and an effective fire laid down. Orders were obeyed, especially in the conservation of ammunition, the bandits expending more than the Guardia. Discipline was very good despite the fact that the machine guns were not of much use due to stoppages. Raso Vasquez, Franciso #1973, General Court Martial prisoner awaiting transfer to Ocotal, was upon repeated requests, released from confinement, armed and allowed to take part in the engagement where he conducted himself well.

/s/ F. M. McCORKLE.

1st Endorsement. Guardia Nacional 21 Jan 1931.
Somoto, Nicaragua.

From: District Commander.
To : Area Commander, Northern Area.

1. A patrol consisting of myself and eight enlisted men cleared Palacaguina at 1830, January 19th, and proceeded towards Somoto.

2. Due to the direction of the wind the firing during the attack on Somoto was not heard until arrival at La Cruz Grande (170–357) where the telegraph line was found to be cut. When one half mile from town a dynamite bomb was fired from a nearby hill. The patrol continued towards Somoto and when about a quarter of a mile from town the movement of a group, apparently of considerable size, was heard on the road ahead and in an adjoining pasture, and at practically the same time a shot was fired at the patrol. The patrol returned the fire and the bandits after firing a few shots dispersed in all directions. From blood trails and cries, it is believed that at least two were wounded. The patrol continued on to Somoto and on arrival additional patrols were sent out through the town.

3. At daylight a search was made of the town and outskirts and blood trails were found in the streets and nearby trails leading from town. Reliable native reports indicate that two dead and five wounded bandits were taken out of the town on animals. The following articles were found near positions occupied by the bandits in town:

Two Thompson clips
Ninety rounds of miscellaneous ammunition
Two bombs.

4. It is believed that the regular bandit groups were temporarily increased by sympathizers from the surrounding districts, many armed only with machetes, who joined to participate in the contemplated looting.

/s/ G. A. WILLIAMS.

CONTACT REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GRAY, G.N. 2 FEBRUARY, 1932:

DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN BLUEFIELDS
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
BLUEFIELDS, NICARAGUA
4 February, 1932.

From: 2nd Lieut, Earl T. Gray, District of Neptune Mine.
To : The Department Commander of Southern Bluefields.

Subject: Contact report.

1. Having information that a large group of bandits which sacked Tunky on January 28, 1932, were cutting a road to Waspook river, I cleared with the following patrol at 1200, 1 Feb 1932:

Myself in command.
1 Sergeant; 1 Corporal; 9 Privates.
2 civilian guides; 2 pack animals.

Patrol took a northeast direction going through Eden Mines and camped in a small house near the Biltigni River, a tributary of the Waspook. 2 February cleared at 0600. Here it was necessary to cut a trail to intercept the route taken by the bandits column. Cut trail until 1100 when distinct trail of the bandits was found. This was followed for a short distance where it entered into the Biltigni river. Here the bandits had followed the river banks, crossing where necessary. The Biltigni river is small and rapid. The trail indicated a very large number of bandits. About 1200, a clearing was entered but which had not been under cultivation for some time, being grown up higher than the head with woods. Here partly constructed bandit camps were found but no bandits. We proceeded cautiously seeing fresh tracks. The banks of the river were steeper and the two guides, six guardias and the mules were left after we cleared the first bandit camp, because they could not follow the trail. When I had proceeded about a half mile down the river, a bandit approached the river bank from the opposite side with a balsa log. (Which were used in construction of rafts), This was the first man we had seen. He was about 100 yards ahead of us. We proceeded now very slowly and quietly. The river bank had dense cover which was fortunate. Our presence was not discovered.

2. We opened fire with the Thompson and B.A.R. at about 20 yards. The surprise of the bandits was complete and our position so close that they fled with very little resistance. They returned a feeble fire from the camp and some more from the high grounds back of it, but in all the firing lasted less than five minutes. The bandits used only shotguns and rifles.

3. There were about 75 men in the camp when we attacked. We crossed the river as soon as fire had ceased. There were five dead. The amount of loot taken from Tunky was large and most of it lay there in the camp in rubber sacks. This could not be carried as our mules were worn out. Most of the articles were in rubber sacks of which there were about 100. A rough estimate is given of the content:

100 trousers; 100 shirts; 50 hats; 50 pair shoes; 25 womens dresses; 75 blankets; 20 rain coats; a great quantity of cloth in pieces; a great quantity of cooking utensils; 200 lbs beans; 300 lbs rice; 200 lbs sugar; 300 tins canned goods; 20 pounds coffee; 5 lbs tea.

The aforementioned articles were either burned or thrown in the river.

The amount of the military articles were:—

1 Krag rifle; 3 shotguns; 4 clips for Lugar pistol; ½ lb powder. About 200 rounds assorted ammunition, mostly Krag Combat 1930 and 1917, which was reissued to the Guardias after the second combat. 36 rounds Lugar; 6 rounds brass shotgun — 12 & 16 guage; Remington reloaded. 12 rounds 38 special pistol Winchester; 30 Machetes; 2 pack bulls (killed in contact) Quantity of correspondence.

Five bandits were killed (counted)

4. When we had destroyed everything, I returned and picked up the pack animals and guides. The guardias left behind had come up on hearing the firing, but too late to take part in the contact. I followed the same route back that I had taken down hoping to find some bandits at the first camp. The bandits were on a high bank on the opposite side of the river, while the Guardia were in the clear. The patrol took cover in a banana grove. The bandits opened a heavy fire including one Thompson. The fire increased when another Thompson fired on the patrol from an angle. Firing continued for about 20 minutes; it was not practical to advance across the river and up the bank in the face of the bandits fire. Careful placing of rifle grenades by Raso Acdana finally dislodged the bandits.

5. No examination of the bandits position could be made, due to the river and our own shortage of ammunition, as practically all the automatic arms and ammunition and all except one grenade had been used, along the majority of rifle ammunition. This contact took place about 1600, the first one being at 1300.

6. The weapons of the Guardia were 1 BAR; 1 TSMG; 1 Rifle with grenade discharger; 9 Krag Rifles; 1 Pistol, Cal 45; 1 Pistol, Cal 38.

The bandits were armed with 2 TSMG; Rifles, Pistols and shotguns. Guardia expended 150 rounds ammunition Springfield 1906; 120 Cal 45; 600 new Krag Combat.

It is estimated that the bandits expended a slightly lesser amount. 1830 — camped on Beltigni River. 3 February, 0530 cleared for, and arrived at Neptune Mine 1200.

7. The conduct of the Guardia as a whole was satisfactory but Cabo Elisio Vargas #2130 with the TSMG; Raso Gumercido Alaniz #3084 with the BAR and Raso Rodolfo Acdana #2485 with the grenade discharger were particularly cool and effective with their weapons.

/s/ EARL T. GRAY.

1st Endorsement.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN AREA GUARDIA NACIONAL
Bluefields, Nicaragua DE NICARAGUA.
18 February 1932.

From: Area Commander, Eastern Area.
To : The Jefe Director, Headquarters, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Managua, Nicaragua.

Subject: Contact report Lieut. Gray (R), G.N., of February 2, 1932, at BILTIGNI RIVER.

1. Forwarded.


2. From a study of Lieutenant Gray's report and from personal conversation with Captain McAfree, who explained satisfactory the reason for sending Lieut. Gray, (Radio), G.N. on the patrol, too much credit cannot be given for the action of Lieut. Gray in boldly attacking first the large main camp of the bandits with only six (6) Guardia, completely surprising and routing the bandits, seizing and destroying their stolen loot of several raids, capturing a mass of papers and killing six and wounding others.

3. Being rejoined by the remainder of his patrol and having completely dispersed the main group, Lieut. Gray promptly turned back on the trail, suspecting the presence of a rear guard and was ambushed, but fortunately without casualties. After a spirited long range fire action the bandits scattered and vanished.

4. The manner in which Lieut. Gray led and handled his small patrol, the boldness of his attack against such a large force, and the results attained receive my admiration and his patrol deserves the highest commendation. Such conduct on the part of the officers and enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional and especially on the part of Lieut. Gray, who is not a line officer, and subject to combat and patrol duty, cannot fail to leave its imprint on the morale and future of the Guardia Nacional.

5. I recommend that Second Lieutenant Earl T. Gray, (R), G.N., be officially commended in official orders for his conduct and splendid results.

/s/ L. L. LEECH.


PIS-PIS RIVER
SKETCH OF SCENE OF CONTACT
OF LIEUT. GRAY R G.N.
2 FEBUARY, 1932
NEPTUNE
MINE
TO NEPTUNE MINE
10 MILES
POSITION OF G.N.
IN FIRST
CONTACT.
BILTIGNI RIVER
BANDIT CAMP
-1ST. CONTACT
1 MILE
BANDIT
AMBUSH
POSITION OF G.N.
-2ND. CONTACT
FIRST BANDIT CAMP
HOUSE
ABOUT 3 MILES OF
TRAIL CUT BY GUARDIA
BANDIT TRAIL

R.D. 1033-G

CONTACT REPORTS OF CAPTAIN PULLER)
EXTRACTS FROM GN NEWS LETTER #120)

HEADQUARTERS GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA
3 October 1932.

From: Commanding Officer, Company "M"
To : The Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.
Via : The Area Commander, Central Area.

Subject: Report of engagements with bandit groups at:
(1) RIO AUYABAL (295–375) 1030 26 Sept 1932.
(2) LINDO LUGARE (291–379) 1130 26 Sept 1932.
(3) SAN ANTONIO (362–329) 0370 30 Sept 1932.
(4) LA CEIBA (249–326) 1300 30 Sept 1932.

1. The following officers and men took part in the four engagements listed above with bandit groups at the time and places shown:
Captain Lewis B. Puller, G.N.
1st Lieut. William A. Lee, G.N.
40 enlisted men.

NOTE: Raso Alberto Nicaragua ,#1224 was killed in the second engagement and Raso Juan A. Altamirano #4998 died on the morning of 27 September from a wound received in the second engagement.

2. On this patrol from 20 September to 1 October, my plans approved by the Area Commander, were to locate and destroy large permanent camps of the bandit leaders, SANDINO and ALTAMIRANO, that I believed to be located east of the RIO COCO and between the RIO CUA and the RIO WAMBLAN. The company had nineteen mules with it and carried thirty days rations. When SANDINO went north from SARAGUASCA (337–327) in 1930, he established his camp in the MALAGATE MOUNTAIN (367–345), and from here he went further north and established his camp on the RIO CUA (279–367), later on he moved still further north. I believe that he now has three camps, one between the RIO CUA and the KILANDE Mountain (285–374), one east of QUILALI (272–279), and the other east of POTECA, (276–405). Since returning to Nicaragua last July, I have heard rumors of a large open road running north eastward of PENA BLANCA (284–328) and extending from the East Coast of Nicaragua to the border of Honduras. During the few days that I served as District Commander of CORINTO FINCA during July and August, I learned that the bandits were driving cattle northward around both ends of PENA BLANCA. I decided to go east from PAVONA (379–333) and cut a trail until I ran into the road that I believed to exist; within three miles of PAVONA this road was located. It is just about the same road that is shown on the map; from PAVONA, it runs eastward through the CHACHAGON PASS (284–331) and then northward. An open trail from the east joins this road about one days march north from the CHACHAGON PASS and another open trail runs

south westward from CARROBO (301–370). These are more than trails, they are almost roads; it is hard to believe that they exist. Hundreds of head of cattle, pack animals, and men have been using these roads.

3. In planning this patrol, I had hopes that the company would be able to get into the territory without being observed by the bandits as we did in the PANTASMA VALLEY and the JICALITA mountain in August. From the moment that the company crossed the CHACHAGON PASS, we were picked up by two (2) bandit scouts who kept just ahead of us for a day and half and then pushed on ahead up the road. Twenty-four (24) temporary deserted bandit camps were passed all of which had been used in the last three months. From the time we were picked up, I knew that we would be ambushed at any moment; it was not practicable for me to employ flankers all the time if I wished to get anywhere. My only course was to push ahead and cover as much distance as practicable.

4. (1) RIO AUYABAL (295–375), 1030 26 Sept 1932.
The company was ambushed by a small group of bandits who employed rifle fire only. There were no Guardia casualties. There were no known bandit casualties. The bandits fired one volley and fled to the north westward. From what Lieutenant Lee told me and what I know, I believe this was an effort to get the officers of the company. The Guardias did not hesitate a second when the line went forward to the bandit position.

5. (2) LINDO LUGAR (291–379) 1130, 26 Sept 1932.
The company was ambushed by a large group over, one hundred and fifty (150) bandits here, who employed seven (7) or more automatic weapons, rifle grenades, hand grenades, between one hundred fifty (150) and two hundred (200) dynamite bombs, and a great quantity of rifle ammunition. When I say one hundred and fifty bandits and seven automatic weapons, it is a conservative statement; the Guardias estimate is much larger. I know that they employed on (1) Lewis Machine Gun, three (3) Browning Automatic Rifles, and from three (3) to six (6) Thompson sub-machine guns. After the fight the guardias picked up empty cartridge cases by the hats full; a hat and a half of Springfield ammunition was also picked up. The noise of their dynamite bombs drowned our fire out. Raso Alberto Nicaragua #1224 was killed by a burst of automatic fire and was buried a short distance from the scene of the engagement (grave concealed). Raso Juan A. Altimirano, #4998, was shot through the head, died on the morning of 27 September and buried near (295–355), (grave concealed); he never regained conciousness. Lieutenant William A. Lee was shot through the right arm and in the head; he was knocked unconcious and thought to be dead. Raso Fernando Dorman #3545 was wounded in the head and left-hand by a hand grenade or bomb fragments. Raso Felipe Salgado #3465 was wounded in the left leg by rifle or machine gun fire. Ten (10) bandits were killed and six (6) known wounded; during the fight when a bandit was hit you could hear the machete men being called up to drag them off. The machete platoons were also being urged to charge the company during the entire fight. The bandit casualties were heavier than is being re-

ported. This group was under an experienced leader and they had plenty of fight in them. SANDINO was somewhere in the vicinity as was evidenced by the constant vivas for him; also PEDRON ALTAMIRANO. The bandits took advantage of a natural "V" position which was seemingly made to order. This engagement lasted thirty (30) minutes. Lieutenant Lee after being unconscious for fifteen or twenty minutes, took over the Lewis machine gun and used it with telling effect; his six days of marching back to JINOTEGA was no joy ride. In the days of the wooden ships he would have been an iron man. The company cleared the bandits from their position, went forward to a ridge that crossed the road, established outposts, took care of the wounded, and buried Raso Nicaragua. Here due to my wounded, I was forced to begin my return to JINOTEGA. The terrain at the scene of this engagement is broken and covered with heavy forest and brush.

6. (3) SAN ANTONIO (362–239) 0730, 30 Sept 1932.

The company was ambushed here by a group of eighty (80) or more bandits who employed two (2) automatic weapons, rifles, and many dynamite bombs. There was no shortage of bandit rifle ammunition. Before the bandits opened a heavy fire, one shot was fired and the company at once took advantage of available cover. There were no guardia casualties. One bandit was killed and seven or more wounded. Here again the machete men were called when a bandit was hit. The company went forward and drove the bandits through the woods. The bandits split in two main groups; one went south and the other southwest. The spirit of the company was excellent in this contact after expecting to be ambushed every foot of the trail for the past five days. Again Lieutenant Lee put the Lewis machine gun in action and set a splendid example for the company.

7. (4) LA CEIBA (249–326) 1300, 30 Sept 1932.

The company was ambushed here by a group of forty (40) or more bandits who employed two automatic weapons, rifles, and dynamite bombs. The trail here runs along a stream, crosses the stream, and enters thick brush and trees on the other side. On the near side of the stream is a bluff from twenty to thirty feet in height. The bandit position was along this bluff and to the south of the trail on the other side. The bandits opened fire one at a time and most of the company was under cover. There were no guardia casualties. Three or more bandits were killed or wounded in this engagement. Again the spirit of Lieutenant Lee and the men was excellent. The bandits were driven from their position and scattered in all directions.

8. I was strongly advised against making this patrol with a small number of guardias and was told that SANDINO could concentrate more than five hundred (500) well armed bandits to employ against the company.

9. Lieutenant Lee has been in twenty (20) some engagements against bandits while serving under me and has distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism a number of times in the line of his profession: I recommend him for the Cruz de Valor.

/s/ L. B. PULLER

EXTRACT FROM REPORTS FROM EASTERN AREA REGARDING OPERATIONS AGAINST BANDITS: (DEATH OF BLANDON).

On April 11, 1931, Captain H. Pefley, G.N., commanding Puerto Cabezas, cleared Puerto Cabezas with a small guardia patrol to investigate a rumor of some trouble at Logtown (approximately 60 miles from Puerto Cabezas on the Lumber Company's railroad). Upon arrival at Logtown the Guardia patrol was fired at and Captain Pefley was killed and one Guardia wounded. The guardia patrol fought off the assailants and drove them in the direction of the Coco River. Captain Pefley's body was recovered and taken to Puerto Cabezas. Lieutenant Darrah and Puerto Cabezas guardia patrol then cleared in pursuit. Another guardia patrol cleared at night to assist.

On April 12, it was reported that Lieutenant Darrah and his patrol were surrounded at Moss Farm, south of Logtown, after all night fighting with armed outlaws of unknown number and identity but apparently well armed with plentiful supply of ammunition. No guardia casualties. The USS ASHVILLE was ordered to proceed to Puerto Cabezas. Marine Planes cleared Managua to assist. Captain Wood arrived Puerto Cabezas from Bluefields and cleared with Lieutenant Simmer (M.C.) and guardia patrol to reinforce Darrah.

Last report received April 12, indicated Darrah with patrol in good condition at Wakinwas interposing himself between Puerto Cabezas and Blandon group at Snaki. Definitely known that Blandon with 75 men well armed were present.

On April 13 planes returned to Puerto Cabezas. Report that Captain Wood's patrol was escorted across Snaki bridge and found Moss Farm bridge burned. Guardia marched to Cuyutigny where they captured supply train from the bandits. Contact lastee 35 minutes. Known dead bandits left on field — eight and two wounded. The following message was recieved after the contact:

"Telegram from Bluefields, to Jefe Director, G.N., Managua, April 15, 1931: "Following recived from Wood quote my 18413 Apr correction scratch out Pedron Altamirano to correct error over long distance telephone period the jefe killed at Logtown was in neat complete uniform puttees black and red neckerchief rather short of stature, under middle age black pompadour hair squarely built body armed with a forty five and broad bladed sword period I took following papers from his person colon typewritten letter dated February twenty one addressed to Senor General Blandon entreating and ordering him to report to headquarters comma one typewritten quote Credencial de Representante personal de esta Jefatura Suprema a favor del hermano Jefe Expedicionario de Nuestra Ejercito General Pedro Blandon en jira militar a nuestra costa Atlantica unquote dated sixteen march both signed A. C. Sandino and his seal and obvious originals period also one order with Pedro Blandon's official signature period Natives in vicinity Logtown stated **the Jefe killed was Pedro Blandon** — 08015 April 31 WOOD unquote 09015 April 31 MARSTON".

It is apparent that Pedro Blandon was killed in the contact. Lieutenant Benson and patrol returned from Wawaboom–Puerto Cabezas region and reported no bandit activities.

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The following report concerning operations in the vicinity of NEPTUNE MINE is quoted:

DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN BLUEFIELDS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, DISTRICT OF NEPTUNE MINES.

27 May, 1932.

From: 2nd Lieut. E. T. Gray, G.N., District of Neptune Mine.
To : The Department Commander, Bluefields, Nicaragua.

Subject: Detail of activities since 18 May, 1932, to present date.

1. On the morning of the 18th, received a report that a large group of bandits were in the vicinity of WAUNI and SIUNA. It was generally assumed in NEPTUNE that the bandits were a long way from this District, however finqueros were coming in bringing all their possessions but would not give any information regarding location or even infer that there were bandits in this area. Their manner was very strange and unusual. We dispatched a runner to try and discover the disturbance. About ten thirty same morning a native came running into NEPTUNE very excited and reported a group of three hundred men under PEDRON ALTAMIRANO about one hour and a half from NEPTUNE MINES. Also reported another group about one hundred and fifty under Jefe PERALTA. Natives stated both groups were advancing on our station. Considered immediate offensive action impractical as our automatic weapon was with the patrol in TUNKY and further believed the reported circumstances necessitated the defense of the Mine, primarily, until we could further ascertain just what the situation might be. The people living in the mine of course got terribly excited and with some difficulty they were quieted and assured of their safety. Dispatched a runner to TUNKY patrol notifying them to return to the Mine and expect trouble enroute. Also started a runner to WAUNI who was captured same day. Formed heavy guard through the night.

2. Morning of 19th, patrol returned from TUNKY with nothing more than rumors. Sent two men to try and reach WAUNI, and attempt to get definite information of the location of the bandits. One of these men was captured, the other escaped and returned to NEPTUNE, bringing authentic data on bandits group. Dispatched one more man to WAUNI who reached there and reported to Lieut. CURCEY. Throughout the night a machine gun or automatic weapon was fired twice. Up to the morning of the twenty first I still could not get any direct location of the bandit forces. In the afternoon of the twenty-first I cleared with ten Guardia and five Civicos to ascertain and verify

reports and to be able to give CURCEY an accurate point when he arrived as I was expecting him then. My destination was due south of Neptune in direction of largest group. It was about six miles to this place and when we were about half way I ran up to the guide and asked how much further to go. He told me and I turned half around to motion the patrol on when I glanced through the bush and saw five armed men pass slowly by and looking directly at me. For a minute I thought it was Lieut. CURCEY'S Civicos. I flanked the patrol through the bush, which was very heavy, and found another new well worn trail alongside of a very steep hill at right angles to our original one. Patrol gathered together on the trail and we ran to catch up with this group, I then saw the trail showed evidence of many having passed). The bandits opened fire on us at about thirty yards. The growth was so heavy that we could not see but only a few of them, however from their position and amount of firing I estimate about one hundred fifty, but do not believe PEDRON was in this group as was previously reported. Patrol was unable to ascertain any bandit casualties if any at all. There were no Guardia casualties. We captured three mules and two horses all equipped for riding, with saddles. Patrol then cleared for the mine and when we were within a half mile we heard heavy rifle and pistol shots to our right and left. Then the heavy Browning from our Cuartel was fired. I assumed the mine was being attacked so proceeded cautiously and fast as I could. On arrival, however, I found Lieut. Somarriba, who was manning and holding that position, had fired at a small group that were seen creeping along toward the Cuartel. These bandits were dispersed. Lieut. Somarriba remained in the Cuartel on the hill to hold that position and I took up a station in the lower part of the town with ten armed Guardia and Civicos to maintain a guard over the trails and ravines. Sergeant Garcia was placed on the other hill overlooking Neptune to take care of that point using the BAR there being the most effective position for it. Bandits fired on him during the night and he routed them with about five minutes fire. My position was not bothered.

3. Morning of twenty-second, planes came over and bombed area South, by Southwest and East. Fortunately they hit a group square, which was reported to be PERALTA and group. A woman he had captured along with her husband reported that Captain Mulcahy and planes killed five including her husband but she escaped and reported to me, stating that the group had been completely scattered. I received other similar statements almost identical from natives who had been hiding from the bandits in that vicinity. At this time I had Sergeant Garcia and ten men patrol over to the Company Bodega to confirm a report of a group in that location. When he arrived the building had been partly looted but bombing cleared them out. In the afternoon Somarriba cleared with twenty men to the Eden Mine on report of a main group passing through there. The main group had passed through. It was about four o'clock so he returned to the mine. While Somarriba was in that vicinity we heard a very heavy fire for about ten minutes, and assumed he was in contact with them, but on return found it must have been Gonzalez and group, who had been to our north, not recognizing Pedron and opened fire. Throughout the night we kept the same positions as stated above.

4. Activities had quieted during the night and on the twenty-third the bandits were reported to be taking the Biltigni trail and leaving. Believing they could not travel fast with the stolen cattle, I cleared with a patrol of twenty Guardia and Civicos leaving from Neptune west over a longer trail but which I thought would not take me between two big groups and get in front of both of them to the North. I slipped my patrol out one by one as secret as possible and formed them a mile West of Neptune. We had hardly gone two hundred yards, when they opened fire on us in the open trail but thickly wooded on both sides. My point, which in this firing position became the right flank was forced into hand to hand conflict to get out and gain combat position. PEDRON blew a bugle during the contact and at the beginning called out: "Now I have you Macho, you and all your dogs", as interpreted by the patrol. The contact lasted for an hour and a half and we killed a known seventeen bandits. There were no serious Guardia casualties. I was dazed for a few minutes by a bomb exploding close to me and three men were slightly cut by machetes. No one shot, some grazed but it did not bother them. I tried to get their automatic weapons and machine gun and I placed rifle grenades mighty close to them and bugle, but they got away. Captured three more riding animals and saddles, little correspondence and picked up some of their spent and good ammunition. Planes arrived just as I got back to Neptune and the Guartel was again firing at a group at rear of the Mine. During my contact the power plant was being attacked at Big Falls but Civicos dispersed them from that point. Planes again hit the right spot to the west and I am certain they created casualties from the mess of torn flesh and blood found in that area. Bandits to the South fired on planes with machine gun or automatic weapon when planes fired machine guns. The airplanes put a decisive end to the bandits contemplated attack on Neptune Mines.

5. On the twenty-fifth I again cleared with a combined patrol of twenty two to meet Curcey at the Star Mine and continue after the bandits. About twelve noon a native appeared, who was identified and well known in this vicinity, and reported that at ten o'clock a group had passed into his place and robbed him of everything. I cleared for that district and the house had been torn up. The man's mule and some cattle were stolen. Proceeded to the Pis-Pis Bodega, did not locate group and returned to Neptune after dark. Lieut. Curcey arrived the next afternoon twenty-sixth and reported many large camps enroute from Wauni. Lieutenant Curcey cleared this morning, twenty-seventh for bandits. Believe he will get them too.

6. I am very positive that no bandit force can ever enter Neptune Mines as long as there is a good armed force here.

7. Official contact reports being forwarded next mail.

8. These recent bandit activities were the most unusual and perplexing than any I have ever seen in Nicaragua.

9. Bandit Jefes were as follows: PEDRON ALTAMIRANO, PEDRO IRIAS, SIMON GONZALEZ, PERALTA AND COLONEL PINEDA. All identified.

/s/ E. T. GRAY.

PATROL AND CONTACT REPORT OF CAPTAIN A. R. BOURNE, G. N.

(Guardia News Letter #63)

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF NAVARRO, DEPARTMENT OF MATAGALPA, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, MATAGALPA, NICARAGUA.

17 August 1931.

From: The District Commander.
To : The Department Commander, Department of Matagalpa, Matagalpa, Nicaragua.

Subject: Patrol and contact report.

1. At 1430 on 7th August, 1931, report was brought to me that a large group of bandits had passed through Agua Amarilla at 1000 same day. No information as to what route they had taken was available. I immediately dispatched one Catarino Gutierrez, Captain General de Canada, with message to Lieutenant Ragsdale at Cutro Esquinas with message as follows: "Move out at once for Tuma with your entire command, to head off bandit group, should they try to cross river at that point." At 1500 Lieut. Pulver and myself and twenty enlisted then cleared then for Auga Amarilla to find and get on their trail. 1700 arrived at Agua Amarilla, hacienda of R. Hawkins, which had been burned that morning. Lieut. Lebetter, Lieut. Thompson and twenty-five enlisted arrived same time from El Consuelo.

1730 — Combined Navarro and El Consuelo patrols cleared over trail to Tuma. Marched until 2400 when it became necessary to halt as we were not making any time and half of the patrol was helplessly lost in the darkness.

8 AUGUST

0430 — Cleared over same trail arriving at Tuma at about 0600 where we learned that bandits had not crossed river but had gone over trail toward Cuatro Esquinas. Pursuit was continued. We found about twenty-five or thirty worn out animals on the trail which they had changed for fresh ones as they traveled.

They were carrying many sick and wounded and seemed to be in a terrible hurry. On night of 7th August they had camped at hacienda of Leiva, in Tuma Arriba, about one league from Cuatro Esquinas. In the morning they had killed a cow and as the column moved past each bandit had grabbed a strip of meat from the carcass. They had cleared at daybreak in direction of Sajonia until upon arriving at Santa Margarita in Coyolor, they learned of our presence and that we were gaining, whereupon they turned and marched over a dozen different trails, direct to the Tuma river bridges at San Nicolas del Carmen, crossing there the same day. They had had a little time to rob, only changing animals at each hacienda moving very fast, the main group under Altamirano and Irias stopping nowhere. We pushed on until arriving at Santa Margarita where it became necessary to halt at 1630

with half of my patrol hopelessly behind, while several of the men were really fainting from hunger and exposure of the night before. Camped for the night.

9 August, 1931.

0500 cleared over trail in direction of River Tuma, this trail was by this time in a terrible state for men affect, due to the passage of many animals and three days steady rain. The bandits had resorted to many ruses enroute, splitting up, going through cornfields and taking short cuts up nearly perpendicular slopes. Upon arriving at hacienda within a league of Tuma river bridges it was decided that if we were to make any time it would be necessary to whittle out some of the sick, lame and lazy that we were nursing along. At this time 1400, Lieut. Ragsdale and fourteen enlisted arrived from Cuatro Esquinas. He informed me that he had not received my message until 0700, 8th August, and then I knew that my runner had failed me. (He should have arrived at 1600 or 1630 the same day). Our only hope lay in a swift and energetic pursuit.

Accordingly I formed a strong patrol of the following officers and men:

Captain A. R. Bourne — 1st Lieut. O. C. Ledbetter — 2nd Lt. R. A. Thompson and 2nd Lieut. W. F. Pulver, G. N.
20 enlisted from NAVARRO.
10 enlisted from Cuatro Esquinas.
11 enlisted from El Consuelo.

Patrol was armed with four BAR'S, five sub-thompson machine guns, and five "Lanza Bombas".

Cleared at 1445 for San Nicolas del Carmen and arrived at that point at 1600, when it was found heavy rains that day had made the river extremely high. Bandits had crossed at about 1730, the last of them the afternoon before, and slept at La Union on the opposite side.

10 AUGUST, 1931.

0500 cleared and crossed river. Passed through La Union and Quebrada Honda del Tuma, when at a group of houses, considerable activity in the kitchen was noticed, and meat and tortillas for at least 50 men was found cooking. Being somewhat hungry, all hands turned to and obliterated every trace of food. 1500 At moved on in direction of Las Cuchillas. About one league further we found their camp freshly made and unslept in, shelters for about 50 men were observed. We pushed on.

Upon arrival at Las Cuchillas, about 1800, a group of about 10 men with red hat bands were observed leaving house of Chaverria, Feliciano, over trail for La Pavona and there were signs of more men in trail ahead. Point, under command of Lieut. Pulver opened fire at once while advanced with main group, taking position on the left. A heavy fire was laid down and four men were seen to fall. While firing was heard from the brush on the other side of cleared space surrounding buildings. Two of the men who fell, got up and dived for the brush and firing ceased, the bandits scattered in all directions. The whole thing

lasted about ten minutes. We then rushed the buildings and entered brush on opposite side but contact was impossible to regain, due to approaching darkness. We had opened fire and looked like our only chance of contact. Looking over the scene we found the following:

Bandits: 1 known dead
1 known wounded

1 civilian, owner of house, by name of Chaverria, wounded, died later. Signs of other wounded.

Guardia: NONE.

Captured: 1 Rifle, Krag, serviceable. 3 rounds Krag ammunition, Combat 1930.
1 red and black hat band; 1 red and black neckerchief;
2 Muletas, containing womens clothing and considerable cloth.

Camp was made for the night.

11 AUGUST, 1931.

0340 cleared over trail for La Pavona and arrived 0700. This is quite a large plain, cleared of trees but covered with underbrush. Many trails were found here, all of them showing signs of recent use. Proceeding over the one showing use by animals in direction of Mt. Chachagon, we arrived at halfway point in the ascent of that mountain about 1330 where a bandit camp was found. The trail since morning had been getting fainter and fainter until at this point it showed that only about 15 men had passed over it about three hours before. With Lieut. Pulver and 15 of my best men I proceeded up Mt. Chachagon, leaving the remainder to make camp. Upon arriving at the summit, a thorough reconnoissance was made of same and we saw where this group had scattered hitting the brush, singly and in pairs, it was impossible for us to go on. We returned to camp at 1730.

12 AUGUST, 1931.

0700 cleared for La Pavona, arrived at 1330, where camp was established, a beef killed and the remainder of the day spent in reconnoissance of the neighborhood.

13 AUGUST, 1931.

0600 cleared for Las Cuchillas over San Antonio trail. Upon arrival at scene of contact of two days previous we met Corinto Finca patrol. Combined patrols then proceeded over San Antonio trail. About one league further on I heard firing 50 yards ahead about 10 shots, followed by the explosion of a bomb; moving into the brush from where we heard the disturbance, we found signs of a group of from 5 to 10 bandits who had been hiding there apparently. One of them must have gotten the Buck Fever and accidently fired his rifle, the rest of them firing a few shots and tossing a bomb at us to cover their getaway. Entire patrol searched the woods here a dense jungle,

for about one half mile, and found one red and black hat band and one neckerchief. Cleared and crossed Tuma at La Union (Arriba) where we camped for the night.

14 AUGUST, 1931.

0700 cleared for Corinto Finca, arriving at 1130.

15 AUGUST, 1931.

0800 cleared for Cuatro Esquinas arriving at 1830.

16 AUGUST, 1931.

0600 cleared with Lieut. Pulver and 20 enlisted for Navarro, arriving at 1100.

The conduct of all officers and men on this patrol was excellent.

/s/ A. R. BOURNE,
Captain, G.N.

REPORT OF COMBAT MISSION COMPLETED BY CAPTAIN WILLIAMS AND SOMOTO (NA) PATROL ON OCTOBER 14, 1931:

Captain Williams and Somoto (NA) patrol returned to Somoto from combat mission on October 14. Reports having picked up bandit tracks in the morning of October 13th near Zapote Mountain and followed same to a point where newly constructed camp was located and destroyed. The bandits were apparently warned of approach of the patrol and fled, leaving behind various articles of food and clothing. Followed tracks to southeast and at 1:00 p.m. sighted a large group across deep ravine fleeing to the south. Followed group — part of group, apparently to facilitate escape of main group, formed a firing line some two hundred yards long on small hills and opened fire on the patrol at range of about three thousand yards as latter approached across open valley. Due to long range, fire was not returned by patrol until within about four hundred yards when bandits prepared to abandon position. Bandits fled to hills on flanks which were bombed with rifle grenades. The patrol pursued the main group firing at small groups of stragglers at long range. Darkness overtook the patrol and shortly afterwards the bandits split into small groups proceeding across country in various directions, but mostly south. The natives claim that the group numbered more than one hundred, but, from views of columns from considerable distance, the patrol leader believed the number to have been approximately eighty, three-fourths armed with rifles or revolvers, no machine guns, and carrying a large red flag. The jefes were recognized as Santon Benavides, Daniel Rios and Colonel Morales. The patrol pursued to point of exhaustion but due to nature of the country and rapid flight of the bandits, close contact could not be gained with the main group before darkness made possible their escape. During more than five hours pursuit the bandits abandoned various articles, including bayonets, cutachas, flashlights, food and clothing. On the morning of October 14th the patrol was unable to pick up definite tracks or information other than vague report that the group was thought to be proceeding towards Colorado. No Guardia casualties. Bandit casualties unknown.

(Pursuit of bandits)

(Distances between firing lines)

ENCLOSURE:..... COPY—bm—179

From: NA/Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Date: 17 Feb., 1933.

Source: Newspaper.

Subject: Nicaragua, Political, (Banditry)

Translation from "La Noticia", Managua, Nicaragua, under date of February 4, 1933.

"THE CONVENTION OF PEACE WITH AUGUSTO C. SANDINO:

Salvador Calderon Ramirez, Pedro J. Zepeda, Horacio Portocarrero and Escolastico Lara, Representatives of General Augusto C. Sandino; and David Stadthagen and Crisanto Sacasa, representatives of the Conservative and Liberal Nationalist parties, respectively, openly agreed to the necessity of peace in the Republic, have convened in the following harmonious agreement, which tends to cement the sincere love inspired by the welfare of Nicaragua and amid those high sentiments of honor to which the undersigned render homage.

STATEMENT OF SANDINO'S REPRESENTATIVES AND THAT OF THE PARTIES:

1. The representatives of General Augusto C. Sandino declared, before all, that the mission which he and his army undertook was to assure the liberty of the Fatherland; and for that reason, at the present time they wish to state in the name of the one they represent, his absolute lack of personal interest and irrevocable resolution not to demand nor accept anything which might restrict the motives and movements of his private life. He therefore wants to set down as a principle or immobile base that he aspires to neither glory nor material benefits.

In view of the proceeding manifestations of elevated dis-interest the representatives of the conservative and liberal nationalist parties rendered homage to the noble and patriotic attitude of the referred to General Sandino.

STATEMENT OF SANDINO:

2. General Augusto C. Sandino, through his delegates and the representatives of both parties, stated: that in virtue of the dis-occupation of the national territory by the forces of the foreigners, a new era of renovation of the fundamentals of our public existance is undoubtedly opened; that, disciplined by a painful experience, he considers it an imperative duty to fortify the collective sentiment of automony which with unanimous enthusiasm moves all the Nicaraguans. To the end of increasing such a noble tendency. Those signing the present pact agree to designate as a capital point in their political programs the respect of the Constitution and fundamental laws of the Republic, and to maintain by all rational means which are adequate and justified, the resplendishment in all its abundance of the sovereignty, political independence and economy of Nicaragua.

DEDICATION TO WORK AND ABANDON OF THEIR ARMS:

3. The delegates of General Sandino and the parties recognize the benefits of cementing in a practical manner the peace of all the territory of the Republic, by means of the earnest dedication to work of all the men now soldiering under the command of General Augusto C. Sandino and the same time the gradual abandon of their arms. To secure by a sure means the normalization of the life of these men in the activities of work under the guarantees of law and of the constituted authorities, the following means have been adopted:

AMNESTY:

(a) The Executive power will present to the National Congress a project to grant amnesty for political offenses and civil offenses committed in the period elapsed from 4 May 1927 until the day of today which will be enjoyed by all the individuals of the army of General Sandino who within fifteen days of the promulgation of such decree deposit their arms and equally so all those who with the direct authorization of General Sandino promise to deposit their arms within three months, including in the benefits of the amnesty one hundred persons of the aforementioned army who may conserve their arms temporarily for the vigilance of the zone of free land in which they will be permitted to farm and work, all of whom shall have belonged to said army.

(b) To represent the administrative and military authority of the government of the Republic in the Departments of the North, comprising especially the zone destined to the work of the individuals of the army of General Sandino and also to receive their arms by degrees, the Executive power will appoint as its delegate Don Sofonias Salvatierra to whom General Sandino will deliver within the twenty days from this date, not less than twenty-five percent of the arms of any kind which his army possesses.

THE ZONE WHICH WILL BE ALLOTTED THEM:

(c) The zone of free land to be destined for the labor and to which sub-paragraph (a) of this decree refers, should be located with sufficient amplitude in the valley of the Coco (or Segovia) river, or in the region agreed to by the Government and General Sandino; this zone should be at least two leagues (30 miles) distant from the towns in which there is actually a municipal regime.

GUARD OF ONE HUNDRED SANDINISTAS CHOSEN:

(d) The chiefs of the guard of one hundred armed men which will be permitted to exist, will be appointed by the Government as auxiliaries in emergency, choosing them in accordance with the recommendation of General Sandino from among the more capacitated of his army; but if after one year from the promulgation of this decree of amnesty it should become convenient, in the judgement of the Government, to maintain said guard of one hundred armed men or a smaller number, the appointment of the respective chiefs will fall directly upon the President of the Republic.

PUBLIC WORKS IN THE SEGOVIAS:

(e) The Government will maintain in all the Republic and especially in the Departments of the North, for the minimum period of one year, projects for public labor in which they will enjoy preferably the individuals of the army of General Sandino who should request work, and who submit to the ordinary regime established in these works.

THE HOSTILITIES CONCLUDED:

4. By the act of signing this agreement all form of hostilities will cease between the two parties to this document, i.e., the Constitutional Government presided by Dr. Jaun B. Sacasa and the forces of General Augusto C. Sandino, for immediate and supreme guarantees of lives and properties of the Nicaraguans; and once becoming definitely effective this pact on approval by General Sandino and by the acceptance of the President of the Republic, all the followers of General Sandino will come under the guarantees of the constituted authorities and as a consequence obligated to cooperate in conserving the public order.

5. To facilitate the disarming of the forces of General Sandino and to offer a provisional retreat for them the town of San Rafael del Norte is designated, General Sandino being responsible for maintaining order during the time which the Government judges convenient.

APPROVAL:

In good faith of that treated the two parties thereto do sign hereby in the city of Managua, on the second day of February of the year nineteen hundred and thirty three.

(Between the lines) For General Sandino:

S. Claderon R. — Pedro Jose Zepeda — H. Portocarrero — D. Stadthagen — Crisanto Sacasa.

ACCEPTANCE BY SANDINO:

Approved and ratified in all its parts,
Managua, National District, 2 February, 1933 — A. C. SANDINO.

ACCEPTANCE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC:

Accepted in all its parts.
Managua, National District, 2 February, 1933 — Juan B. Sacasa.

A–40
TPC–hwb.

HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN AREA, GUARDIA NATIONAL,
OCOTAL, NICARAGUA.
30 May, 1932.

AREA ORDER NO. 24 — 1932:

Subject: Designation of Districts and District Combat Patrols.

1. Hereafter the districts of the Northern Area will be designated as follows:

MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF NUEVA SEGOVIA:

(a) **First District**
Ocotal, (Headquarters).
Dipilto.
Macuelizo.
Santa Maria.

(b) **Second District**
Somoto (Headquarters).
Totogalpa.
Yalaguina.
Pataste.

(c) **Third District**
Condega (Headquarters).
Pueblo Nuevo.
Daraili.
Palacaguina.

(d) **Fourth District**
Quilali (Headquarters).
San Juan del Telpaneca.
Telpaneca.

(e) **Fifth District**
Apali (Headquarters).
Jicaro.
Jalapa.
San Fernando.

(f) **Sixth District**
Esteli (Headquarters).
La Trinidad.

(g) **Seventh District**
San Juan de Limay (Headquarters).

2. Hereafter the District Combat Patrols will be designated as follows:

(a) First District — First Combat Patrol.
(b) Second District — Second Combat Patrol.

(c) Third District — Third Combat Patrol.
(d) Fourth District — Fourth Combat Patrol.
(e) Fifth District — Fifth Combat Patrol.
(f) Sixth District — Sixth Combat Patrol.
(g) Seventh District — Seventh Combat Patrol.

3. The above designations will hereafter be employed in dispatches and official correspondence.

OFFICIAL: /s/ H. W. BOND,
Area Adjutant.

/s/ THOS. P. CHEATHAM,
Major Guardia Nacional,
Commanding Northern Area.

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL AREA
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA.
14 May, 1931.

AREA ORDER)
NO. 2–1931)

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL IN THE CENTRAL AREA.

1. ORGANIZATION.

For tactical, administrative and police purposes the Central Area is divided into the following Departments and Districts, each under the command of the senior officer stationed therein:

DEPARTMENT OF JINOTEGA (Commanded by the Area Commander)

District No. 1. JINOTEGA.
District No. 2. SAN-RAFAEL, YALI, LA CONCORDIA.
District No. 3. EMBOCADEROS.
District No. 4. CORINTO FINCA, SAJONIA.
District No. 5. LAS CAMELIAS, FUNDADORA, ARANJUEZ.

DEPARTMENT OF MATAGALPA.

District No. 1. MATAGALPA, SAN RAMON, SAN DIONICIO.

District No. 2. DARIO, TERRABONA.
District No. 3. MUY MUY, LA PINEDA, ESQUIPULAS, MATIGUAS.

District No. 4. CONSUELO.
District No. 5. ALGOVIA, BUENA VISTA, LAS LAJAS.
District No. 6. NAVARRO, LA ISLA, CUATRO ESQUINAS.
District No. 7. SAN ISIDRO, SEBACO.

Each Department, District and post will include the adjoining and surrounding territory.

2. DUTIES OF DEPARTMENT, DISTRICT AND POST COMMANDERS.

Department, District and post commanders are responsible for discipline, administration, tactical efficiency, protection of lives and property and the preservation of law and order within the limits of their respective commands.

Department Commanders will inspect each post in their respective departments at least once during each quarter.

District Commanders will inspect each post in their respective districts at least once a month.

Proper reports will be made of these inspections.

All District and Post Commanders will operate frequent rural police patrols, reconnoiter and become familiar with all roads and trails in the vicinity of their respective headquarters, particularly those that are to neighboring guardia stations.

District Commanders, for temporary operations, are authorized to combine all or part of the forces in their districts as situation may require.

ORGANIZATION CENTRAL AREA – –

3. COMBAT PATROL POSTS.

YALI, SAN RAFAEL, EMBOCADEROS, CORINTO FINCA, NAVARRO, CONSUELO, and MUY MUY are designated as combat patrol posts, and in addition to the duties specified in paragraph two, will be prepared to clear strong combat patrols to any part of the Central Area either for independent action or to participate in combined operations under the direction of the Area Commander.

4. POLICE OF COLON VALLEY.

The posts of La CONCORDIA and SAN ISIDRO are especially charged with the police of the COLON VALLEY and will cooperate with each other and with patrols from the Department of Esteli, Northern Area, for that purpose.

5. COMPANY "M".

Company "M" will operate under orders from the Area Commander.

6. AREA RESERVE.

Company "D" JINOTEGA, and part of the Eighth Company stationed at MATAGALPA will constitute the Area reserve. They will carry the casualties of their respective Departments, perform municipal and rural police duties, furnish administrative patrols and each will be prepared to furnish one mounted patrol to quickly reinforce any part of the Central Area.

7. OBJECTIVE.

The main objective of all guardia forces in the Central Area is the suppression of banditry. Armed bandits will be attacked whereever found, relentlessly pursued wherever they may go and no effort spared to effect their complete destruction.

To this end it shall be the duty of all posts and guardia forces of the Central Area to act aggressively at all times, to cooperate with each other and with the guardia of adjoining areas, to march immediately to the assistance of any post or patrol that may be engaging combat and to keep neighboring posts as well as Department and Area Headquarters informed of the military situation.

/s/ JULIAN C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional De Nicaragua
Commanding Central Area.

Copies to: All posts in Central Area.
Headquarters, Managua.
Department of Esteli.
F I L E.

HEADQUARTERS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

Weekly Summary of Intelligence, Week ending 25 April, 1932.
Location of Bandit Groups:

Group estimated at 150, well armed and having at least 2 automatic weapons, reported to have been under jefes Pedron Altamirano, Juan Altamirano and Transito Sequeira, were engaged by Lieut. Castillo and San Rafael Patrol at Santa Barbara (113–325) Kenyon Map, on 19 April. Group driven from strong position and scattered. From later information it is doubted that Pedron Altamirano was with this group.

Group of 100, jefe unknown, reported at El Salto de Dantanli (128–242) Kenyon Map, on 20 April.

Group of 200 well armed, 1 Lewis Machine Gun, 1 BAR, and 2 TSMG, jefe thought to have been Colindres engaged by Lieutenant Covington and Jalapa patrol at Las Puertas (210–390) Nueva Segovia Map, at 1130 on 21 April. Four Guardia killed, bandit casualties unknown. Bandits driven off and patrol evacuated dead from scene of engagement. Lieutenant Johnson continued to pick up trail of bandits and Lieutenants Brunton, Covington and Whitehead (MC) returned toward Apali with the four Guardia dead. At 1500 this patrol attacked by the same bandit group, the three officers, three guardia were killed, and three guardia wounded. Lieutenant Johnson's patrol gained contact with bandits at 1530 a short distance west of scene of second contact and drove bandits to west. Guardia lost 1 BAR, three automatic pistols, six rifles and one grenade discharger in the first and second engagements.

A group of about 50 including the deserters from Kisalaya, under ex-sergeant Sebastian Jimenez, leader of the Kisalaya mutiny, attacked Kisalaya at 0300, 21 April. Four bandits including Jimenez were killed, Guardia casualties two wounded including Lieutenant Gaitan, commanding the post.

A group of 30, jefe Conception Chavarria, on Managua–Matagalpa road at Chaguitillo (108–214) Kenyon Map, held up and robbed some autos, on night of 21 April.

A group of 25, jefe Marcial Ribera, west of Harmonia (125–223) Kenyon Map, demanded contributions from nearby Hacienda, on 20 April.

A group, number not reported, jefe Manuel Irias, reported operating on Rio Seguia near Chontales border, on 21 April.

A group of 70, jefe Juan Altamirano at Sacastli (102–234) Kenyon Map, in contact with San Rafael patrol at 1520 on 23 April. Same patrol gained contact again with this group at Loma del Naccia at 0950, 24 April. Captured 12 horses and 12 hand grenades.

A group of 100, jefes Salgado and Fulgencio Hernandez, attacked by Lieutenant Hamas and patrol in main camp east of Cerro Guambuco at 1530, 23 April. Engagement lasted 25 minutes when bandits scattered. Guardia patrol remained in bandit camp for the night.

Bandits attacked at 1800 and again at 0530, 23 April. Bandits used automatic weapons and dynamite bombs. Three bandits killed and evidence of many wounded. Two rifles, more than 300 rounds of ammunition, some supplies and equipment lost by the guardia in the engagements of 21 April, and some correspondence captured. One Guardia wounded.

Jose Leon Diaz and 150 left Constancia area April 20 to join Pedron Altamirano at Las Naranjas. (Central Area).

GENERAL INFORMATION

There has been no appreciable activity of the bandits in the Western Departments during the past week. Small groups have been reported from time to time but they have been very wary and seem to have confined their activities to spreading false reports, demanding contributions and in general keeping this section of the country in a state of uncertainty. Propaganda has been active, however, and the temper of that section of the country seems to be in a state where most anything may happen.

The severe repulses sustained by the bandits at Kisalaya is believed to have effectively discouraged bandit operations on the lower Coco River for the present. The Heavy Browning Machine Gun was taken from Kisalaya at the time of the mutiny, was recovered by Lieutenant Gaitan near Prensa.

Reports have been received from many sources that the bandits are planning to launch a widespread offensive in May in commemoration of the death of Miguel Angel Ortez. Ortez was killed in the attack on Palacaguina on the 14th of May, 1931. The reports of the time of this offensive vary from the 5th to the 15th of May. In the issue of El Excelsior, Mexican newspaper, for Saturday, 23 April, Zepeda, Sandino's agent in Mexico City, stated that a big offensive was scheduled for 5 May. A report from Costa Rico gives it as 6 May. Reports from various parts of Nicaragua are 12 to 15 May. Some accounts state that this movement is to be general over the whole of Nicaragua, and others that it is to be confined to the Segovias. Dr. Sepeda in a recent press release that has received wide publicity, states that a supervised election in Nicaragua will not be allowed by Sandino and that to that end Sandino will increase his activities from now on. He states that if the elections are held under American supervision that Sandino will overthrow the government elected under this supervision as soon as the marines are withdrawn.

The Alcalde of Jinotega has sent a telegram to the President that within his jurisdiction he is unable to get any one to serve as jefes de canton, as all are afraid of the bandits, and that the only ones who have any security in such appointments are those appointed by the bandits themselves. A report has been received that Pedro Irias is now acting as Secretary to Pedron. Irias is said to be strong in the confidence of Sandino and it is expected that his acting as Pedron's secretary will tend to bring Pedron into closer support of Sandino. It is also reported that during this month some 60 recruits have been secured by Sandino from Nueva Segovia, mainly in the vicinity of Quilali.

It is further reported that Sandino has moved, or is about to move, into Chipote again; that he has greatly augmented his forces and that as they now have a good supply of arms and ammunition there is much enthusiasm among the ranks for the forthcoming offensive in May in honor of the first anniversary of the death of Ortez.

ESTIMATE:

Since the last estimate was made on the number of automatic weapons in the hands of the bandits, reliable information has been received that they have secured some new automatic weapons through Honduras, part coming from Choluteca and the others from Danli. The number of these weapons or the type has not been ascertained. It is estimated that at the present time they have not less than twenty serviceable automatic weapons, of which at least 6 are BAR's and 10 Thompson sub-machine guns.

The activities of the past week are undoubtedly the beginnings of more active and aggressive operations on the part of the bandits. There may be a short lull for a few days but it cannot be expected to last long. It cannot be too strongly repeated that the existing situation calls for the utmost vigilance. Particularly in small stations is the need for alertness to be impressed. The number of administrative patrols should be reduced to a minimum and made as strong as the circumstances will permit.

/s/ LeROY P. HUNT,
Colonel, G.N. GN–2–3.

Translated by:
1st Lt. Edward J. Trumble,
U. S. Marine Corps.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Delivered to:

THE HONORABLE NATIONAL CONGRESS — 1932.

HONORABLE NATIONAL CONGRESS:

As always, rendering homage to the Constitution and the Legislative Body of the State, I come to give you information of the political and administrative activities in Nicaragua during the year of 1932, which is rapidly fading and drawing to a close.

As you well know, this was the year of elections of the Supreme Authorities of the Republic. Under the direction of Admiral Woodward, named as President of the Electoral Mission by President Hoover, and with the help of all the officials of the Republic, the elections passed tranquil and honest; notwithstanding the permanent and persistent threat of banditry. The Sacasa–Espinosa ticket has triumphed with a majority or more than twenty-two thousand votes, and as members of the Legislative Body many citizens now take seats in Congress at the side of their colleagues of former years.

The fact is not unknown to you that since 1928 up to the present time, true representatives of Nicaraguan public opinion have been seated in this august chamber. You may rest assured that, in the history of Nicaraguan independence, it is the first presidential term during which such a pleasing and patriotic state of affairs is being realized.

All of us as Nicaraguans know that the friendly government of the United States of America has taken an honorable part in this. We realize equally well that the armed intervention of that Nation came to our land because of the disgrace of our internal wars. It would have been for Nicaragua the most transcendental passage of her history if this representation of the true and unmistakable wish of the people might have been realized under own auspicies and through our own efforts. But fate did not desire it thus. By the help of a distant hand we had to realize this event which promises to yield such fruitful results, if we follow with good faith the pathway to which free elections have led us; that is to say, if we continue to respect the wish of the people in coming elections.

Because of the fact that the Nation at last has cancelled the international compromise contracted to cure anarchy in Nicaragua, the Government of the United States of America had decreed that its armed forces are to leave us. In the first days of January we no longer shall see Marines in Nicaragua.

Will they be days of Jubilee, or of profound sorrow?

Shall we have learned to maintain peace among brothers?

The answer in all its intensive scope rests with the people of Nicaragua, with the Supreme Authorities who take office today, and with those who will take office on the first of January 1933; with the Guardia Nacional, another American product, charged with insuring peace in Nicaragua, and with the political parties.

Other words concerning the Guardia Nacional are not amiss. It has been most costly for the country. We must maintain it notwithstanding the obligation of devising the necessary economies, strengthening it with education, loyalty, honor and sacred respect for national goodwill. You should realize that a similar organization cannot be formed in four or five years, and that the habits acquired during youth do not change in a decade. They need the patient and undenied help of the schools, and the truly cultural, not the impassioned and partisan, voice of the press.

The Guardia Nacional is a noble organization. Its progress depends on us. Another theme worthy of mention to you includes the works completed by my Government. During this month the railroads of San Juan del Sur and El Sauce are to be inaugurated, 100 kilometers of railway in all, which shows the effort that the Executive Power has devoted to public works, to the well-being of all.

The canal which unites the Escondido River, that is to say, Bluefields with Laguna de Perlas, has not been opened formally because of lack of time, but it is completed, and interior commerce has been established between the two cities.

The highway from El Sauce to Achuapa has been advanced 15 kilometers, in the direction of Ocotal, with facilities for placing rails along its stretch and continuing the railroad to Nueva Segovia one of the projects which no doubt will be found in the program of my illustrious successor, Dr. Juan B. Sacasa.

I have spoken of the other highways in my previous messages.

We are able to feel the resurrection of the Capital, following its destruction by the earthquake. The sale of cement and zinc (galvanized iron roofing) at principal and cost has been a great aid to the citizens in the construction of many buildings. The Government has been able to reconstruct the Presidential Palace, to equip two large wards in the General Hospital as a shelter for the needy, and to construct an orphan asylum with a capacity for two hundred children, which will be opened formally on Christmas Day of this year.

I am able to say without boasting that although my Government has not given freedom from the debt at hand, its new works, in addition to those destroyed by the earthquake, are in the plain view of all.

If all of us would show our love for our Country in this manner, Nicaragua would be one of the richest and most prosperous nations in the world.

Public Instruction, curtailed by the earthquake on March 31, 1931, in the second year of my Government, is being reestablished and is enlightening the minds of the children again. Many beneficient laws might be passed in order to increase the education that the country needs in its march toward the future.

Hygiene has been treated with careful attention. The Department of Charity and Hygiene is a work of this Administration. The Institute of Serums and Vaccines, one of the best in Central America, has been built and will be completely equipped before the end of this month.

It is not easy to visualize the effort that all these works have required in the midst of the economic crisis, natural disasters and banditry. But it is most certain, with results as testimony, that the money of the Nation has been well employed. If some error has been committed, it is a proof of the fact that the hand of man is not infallible;

that we have no more than one element, the human, with which to struggle, and that our imperfection is self-evident, since the beginning of time.

I have spoken of banditry, this is a sorrowful disgrace for our country. I am overcome with grief and sadness on seeing and knowing that at times even representatives of the people regard the existing tragedy with admiration, fathers of families who tomorrow will not know how to explain to their sons why they profess the practices of communism, and not doctrines which will keep them from the road to ruin.

The bandits of the Segovias preach that property is an ill; and they have devastated properties, destroyed lives and wiped out the wealth of the rich zone of the North.

No; property is not an ill, but rather a great good and right. It encourages life in all parts. Not even the savage who by dint of hard labor and patience has constructed a hut, or aggaigned a cave in which to live, can look with indifferences upon the arrival of another savage who may kill him and make off with the worldly good of his dwelling; much less, should the civilized man tolerate the destruction of all that he has created by the sweat of his brow.

Sandinism is less harmful in its practices than in the influence which it exerts among the illiterate and even among the educated people. The idea spreads because of a worldly blind love for that which is contrary to custom and which lacks the noble instincts of work.

As I see it, Honorable Members of the National Congress, as the United Powers of the Republic we must exert ourselves against that gangrene which blinds and exhausts and destroys our brothers of the Segovias.

I conclude by stating that my Government has known how to maintain and cultivate friendly relations with our brothers of Central America and the other friendly nations.

This very day, that though unfortunately a civil war is upheaving Honduras, my Government is complying with its duties as a good neighbor and in accordance with its obligations as agreed upon in the Pacts of Washington.

I have concluded. I beg you to believe that my greatest desire today lies in the success of your efforts.

J. M. MONCADA.

Managua,
Nationa District,
Nicaragua,
15 December, 1932.

YOUR EXCELLENCY MR. PRESIDENT ELECT:

Full of joy, because of the far reaching effect which this solemn act has for the peace of our Country, the welfare and honor of the Republic and its Institutions, and the tranquil and democratic change of Government, I return to the people of Nicaragua the power invested in me by the popular election of 1928; and in accordance with a constitutional precept I place in your hands the insignia of the Presidency, to which you have been called by the same popular vote in November 1932, which already has crossed the threshold of the past and is entering that of the future.

Satisfied because of the work realized and the completion of my duties, happy on handing over to you the Republic in a state of peace, the vandalic outbraks that still exist can cause no alarm through their contemptible smallness, it is my honor to wish you a most prosperous term of Government and to extend my best wishes for the welfare of the Nation, the maintenance of its sovereignty and independence, and your personal welfare. It is my sincere and ardent desire that your steps as President glide along the constitutional pathway and receive the generous applause of your fellow-citizens.

/s/ J. M. MONCADA.

THE

OFFICIAL LIST

OF

CONTACTS

OF THE

GUARDIA NACIONAL

DE

NICARAGUA



DIVISION OF OPERATIONS
and
INTELLIGENCE
GN-2 - GN-3



HEADQUARTERS
GUARDIA NACIONAL
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

The motive which actuated the publication of this Book of Contacts was three fold: In the first instance it is intended as a tribute to the officers and men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who, in some instances gave so freely of their lives and who struggled through the hardships of combat and the trail, not with complaint but with a cheerfulness in keeping with the best traditions of the profession of arms; secondly it is intended to be of historical value. We believe that in recent years no similar military organization has had such continuous fighting and arduous field service and it is fitting that its deeds be recorded. In the last instance the book will be of use from an administrative standpoint in that the files may be completed.

The data for the booklet was extracted under the direction of Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt, GN ,GN–2, GN–3, from the Operations Files of the Guardia Nacional. Errors may be found and omissions may occur, but the book represents our best efforts considering available time and data.

The inception of the idea for this booklet originated with Lieutenant Emil M. Krieger, GN, and the compiling of the data, the printing, the designing, publishing and distribution thereof are entirely due to his efforts. I wish to give him full credit for his initiative and untiring work in this connection.

C. B. MATTHEWS,
Major General, G.N.
Jefe Director.

GN–2, GN–3 SECTION,
HEADQUARTERS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NIC.

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1. The following list of contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua are quoted from the Official Contact Files of this section:

#1: 16 JULY 1927

Contact at **OCOTAL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

The combined Marine — Guardia garrison stationed at Ocotal commanded by Captain G. D. Hatfield, USMC, (Captain G. C. Darnall, GN. Commanding Guardia troops) was attacked by a superior number of bandits, well-armed with rifles, machine guns and bombs. This was the first engagement in which the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua participated. The battle lasted for about 14 hours during which time the small garrison was in a siege. With the assistance of Marine Corps combat planes, the bandits were finally routed.

Known casualties: USMC: 1 killed. GN: 3 wounded.
1 wounded.

Bandits: Estimated 50 killed and wounded.

#2: 18 AUGUST 1927

Contact at **MURRA,** Nicaragua. C.A. ((NA)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant T. Bruce, GN, operating in the vicinity of Murra, engaged with bandit groups twice on the road from Murra to Jicaro and successfully put the bandits to flight. The bandits used bombs and rifles in both cases.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 2 killed and several wounded.

#3: 19 SEPTEMBER 1927

Contact at **TELPANECA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

The combined Marine — Guardia garrison stationed at Telpanica, commanded by Lieutenant H. S. Keimling, GN. was attacked by a superior force of bandits that were well armed with machine guns, rifles and bombs. After four hours of severe fighting the bandits fled.

Known casualties: USMC: 2 killed. GN: 1 wounded.

Bandits: 50 killed and several seriously wounded.

#4: 21 SEPTEMBER 1927

Contact at **TELPANECA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

No further data on file.

#5: 9 OCTOBER 1927

Contact at **ZAPOTILLAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (241–373)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant O'Shea, USMC (Captain J. B. O'Neil GN, (MC) commanding Guardia troops) engaged with a force of bandits which greatly outnumbered the patrol. Bandits employed Machine-guns, rifles and bombs. Contact lasted for approximately two and one-half hours.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: 4 killed.
Bandits: 50 killed and several wounded.

#6: 26–27 OCTOBER 1927

Contact at **ANTONIO LOPEZ RANCH, near QUILALI,** Nicaragua, C.A.

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. C. Chappell, USMC, operating from Quilali, engaged with a superior number of bandits. The patrol at once took up a defensive position until reinforced by the second combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant M. J. Gould, USMC, (Lieutenant R. E. Hogaboom, GN. commanding Guardia troops). With the assistance of the Marine Aircraft Squadrons, the bandits were completely routed. Bandits were well armed with machine-guns and rifles.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.
Bandits: 20 killed by patrols.
Casualties inflicted by plane bombing unknown.

#7: 28 OCTOBER 1927

Contact at **ANTONIO LOPEZ RANCH near QUILALI,** Nicaragua, C.A.

No further data on file.

#8: 1 NOVEMBER 1927

Contact at **ESPINO,** Nicaragua, C.A., near **JICARO.**

The combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C. J. Chappell, USMC, while enroute from Jicarito to Jicaro, was attacked by a bandit force far superior in size. Engagement lasted for about thirty-five minutes in which time the patrol succeeded in routing the bandits from their ambush position. Later as the patrol neared Jicaro, a bandit outpost was discovered and attacked by the patrol. Bandits fled after a few minutes of fighting.

Known casualties: USMC: 1 wounded. GN: 2 killed.
Bandits: 60 killed and several wounded.

#9: 1 NOVEMBER 1927

Contact at **CARBONAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (214–375)

No further data on file.

#10: 10 NOVEMBER 1927

Contact at **SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA,** Nicaragua, C.A.

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. H. Satterfield, GN. discovered a bandit outpost which was attacked and all bandits thereat killed. The main bandit camp was aroused by the firing and engaged with the patrol but later fled with several wounded. Bandits were well armed with rifles and bombs.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#11: 21 NOVEMBER 1927

Contact at **SAN FRANCISCO,** Nicaragua. N.E. of **TELPANECA.**

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. H. Satterfield, GN, encountered a mounted bandit detachment, 6 miles N.E. of Telpaneca. The patrol attacked and dispersed the bandits.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#12: 25 NOVEMBER 1927

Contact at **LAGUNA COLORADO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (195–405)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant H. S. Keimling, GN, operating close to the Honduran Border, was attacked by a bandit group. Patrol returned the fire and drove bandits across the border. A large quantity of foodstuffs, animals, ammunition and arms were captured and destroyed.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#13: 5 DECEMBER 1927

Contact at **SAN PEDRO RANCH,** Nicaragua, C.A. (218–378)

A small combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Sergeant F. C. Smith, USMC, (Cabo Largaespada #157 in command of Guardia), was attacked by a bandit force which greatly outnumbered the patrol. The engagement lasted one hour and a half. Bandits well armed with rifles and bombs.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: 1 killed.
Bandits: 30 killed.

#14: 6 DECEMBER 1927

Contact at **EL PORTERO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (215–372)

A Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant W. S. Brown, USMC, attacked and successfully dispersed a bandit group at El Portero, N.E. of Telpaneca. Arms, ammunition and miscellaneous articles captured.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#15: 10 DECEMBER 1927

Contact at **CORRAL FALSO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (145–353)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H. S. Keimling, GN, located and attacked a bandit force at Corral Falso, west of Somoto, inflicting heavy losses and completely routing the group. Arms, ammunition and provisions were captured and destroyed.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 6 killed.
3 wounded.

#16: 11 DECEMBER 1927

Contact at **COJE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (201–365)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant J. H. Satterfield, GN, attacked a bandit camp of about 30 men; succeeded in routing them and capturing arms and ammunition.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 5 killed.
3 wounded.

#17: 17 DECEMBER 1927

Contact at **PORTILLO MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (184–378)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Captain L. P. Crommiller, GN, engaged with and dispersed a bandit group at Portillo Mountain, 6 miles west of Mosonte, N.S.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.

#18: 26 DECEMBER 1927

Contact at **SABANA GRANDE near JICARO,** Nicaragua, C.A.

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H. Boyle, GN, encountered a bandit group at Sabana Grande, near Jicaro; succeeded in killing one and capturing five. The guardia suffered no casualties.

#19: 30 DECEMBER 1927

Contact at **GUANCASTILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (223–375)

A Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M. Richal, USMC, (Lieutenant T. Bruce, GN, commanding Guardia troops) engaged with and dispersed a bandit group at Guanacastillo, north of San Juan.

Known casualties: USMC: 1 wounded. GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#20: 30 DECEMBER 1927

Contact at **QUILALI,** Nicaragua, C.A.

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Captain R Livingston, USMC, (Lieutenant J. Hemphill, GN, commanding Guardia troops), engaged with a bandit force of about 400, well armed and equipped. The patrol was successful in driving the bandits from the field after having inflicted severe casualties upon the latter.

Known casualties: USMC: 4 killed.
22 wounded; including Captain Livingston.

GN: 2 killed; including Lieutenant Hemphill.

Bandits: Unknown.

#21: 1 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **LAS CRUCES near QUILALI,** Nicaragua, C.A.

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M. Richal, USMC, (Lieutenant T. Bruce, GN, commanding Guardia troops) engaged with a superior force of bandits that were well armed and equipped; fighting lasted 1 hour after which the bandits were dispersed. Lieutenant Thomas G. Bruce, commanding the Guardia troops, was killed by the first volley of enemy fire. Lieutenant M. Richal, USMC, commanding the patrol was seriously wounded shortly thereafter.

Known casualties: USMC: 4 wounded. GN: 1 killed. Lieutenant Bruce.

Bandits: 50 killed. Number of wounded not known.

#22: 7 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **MAL PASO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NS)

A small guardia patrol commanded by Captain Crommiller, GN, was fired on by a bandit group and after a short firefight the bandits fled.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#23: 8 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **CUJE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (201–365)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. H. Satterfield, GN, engaged with and dispersed a bandit group at Cuje. A large quantity of provisions and arms were captured and destroyed by the patrol.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#24: 8 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **SOMOTILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (128–302)

Two Marines and eight loyal Guardia, commanded by Lieutenant P. Payne, GN, were attacked by 30 bandits, among whom were nine disloyal guardia that mutinied from the Somotillo garrison. Disorder prevailed for about 24 hours after which time the garrison succeeded in driving off the attackers and establishing order in the small town.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 4 killed (including GN Mutineers)
3 wounded.

#25: 14 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **SANTA ROSA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (214–334)

A small Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, attacked and dispersed a group of bandits at Santa Rosa. Patrol captured arms, ammunition, provisions and bandit papers.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.
2 wounded.

#26: 21 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **PLANO GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (235–367)

Captain R. W. Peard, USMC, commanding a Marine — Guardia patrol, had contact with a bandit group at Plano Grande. (See contact #27.)

#27: 21 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (235–367)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Captain R. W. Peard, USMC, engaged with bandit groups five times enroute from San Albino Gold Mine to Buena Vista, via Las Cruces, and return. A large quantity of bandit material was captured, including arms and ammunition.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 6 killed.
4 wounded.

#28: 21 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **LAS CRUCES MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua. (235–367)

(See contact #27.)

#29: 21 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **BUENA VISTA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (235–367)

(See contact #27.)

#30: 21 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **LA QUEBRADA MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (near Jicaro).

Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, and 2 enlisted Guardia attacked and routed an enemy signal station at La Quebrada Mountain.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (Lt. McDonald)

Bandits: Unknown.

#31: 22 JANUARY 1928

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (235–367)

(See contact #27.)

#32: 8 FEBRUARY 1928

Contact at **CALPULES,** Nicaraguan, C.A. (132–378)

Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant O. B. Daudy, GN, had contact with a group of bandits at Calpules. No further data on file.

#33: 11 FEBRUARY 1928

Contact at **SAN FRANCISCO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (?)

No further data on file.

#34: 18 FEBRUARY 1928

Contact at **LAS MANOS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (191–409)

Guardia patrol under command of Lieutenant J. L. Blanchard, GN, had contact with a group of bandits at Las Manos. No further data on file.

#35: 20 FEBRUARY 1928

Contact at **SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA,** Nicaragua. (225–369)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Walraven, USMC, (Lieutenant D. McDonald, commanding Guardia troops) routed a bandit force from an ambush position and succeeded in driving the bandits off in a short time.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 3 killed.
5 wounded.

#36: 23 FEBRUARY 1928

Contact at **OCOTAL—TELPANECA TRAIL,** Nicaragua, C.A.

Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. E. Wells, GN, had contact with group of armed bandits on Ocotal—Telpaneca Trail. No further data on file.

#37: 27 FEBRUARY 1928

Contact at **SANTO DOMINGO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (?)

No further data on file.

#38: 28 FEBRUARY 1928

Contact at **PORTAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (218–367)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant M. E. Smith, GN, engaged with and dispersed a bandit force at Portal. Four pack animals, dynamite and bombs were captured.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 4 killed.

#39: 29 FEBRUARY 1928

Contact at **INLALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (152–348)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. P. Crommiller, GN, engaged with and routed a large bandit force at Inali.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#40: 25 MARCH 1928

Contact at **EL SILENCIO MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–363).

A guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, attacked and dispersed a bandit group on El Silencio Mountain, about 12 miles west of San Jaun. Leader of the group killed. Three pack animals and a quantity of provisions were captured.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#41: 15 APRIL 1928

Contact at **PATIO GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (?)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. E. Crommiller had contact at Patio Grande. No further information on file.

#42: 2 MAY 1928

Contact at **SANTA TERESA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (?)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant A. Miranda, GN, had contact with a group of bandits at Santa Teresa. No further information on file.

#43: 13 MAY 1928

Contact at **CONGOHOES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (238–300)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant S. E. Ridderhoff, USMC, (Lieutenant C. A. Davis, GN, commanding Guardia Troops) had contact with a group of bandits in the vicinity of Murra. Lieutenant Davis with reconnaissance patrol, operating from main patrol, detected bandits in vicinity and drove bandits from their position.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 2 wounded.

#44: 13 MAY 1928

Contact at **LA FLOR,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Captain R. S. Hunter, USMC, (Cadet Ollie Blackburn, GN, commanding Guardia Troops) was attacked by a large bandit group who were lying in ambush. This engagement lasted about 1 hour. Captain Hunter. commanding the column, was seriously wounded and died a few days later. Bandits were well armed with machine-guns and rifles.

Known casualties: USMC: 1 killed. GN: None.
Captain Hunter.

Bandits: 4 killed.

#45: 29 MAY 1928

Contact at **OJO DE AGUA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Carazo).

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Cadet C. L. Levonski, GN, engaged with a bandit force twice the size of the patrol and after a firefight of about 20 minutes the bandits fled. A large quantity of arms, ammunition and supplies were captured.

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed
3 captured.

#46: 30 MAY 1928

Contact at **SAN DIEGO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (?)

Contact had by Cadet C. L. Levonski, GN. No further information on file.

#47: 26 JULY 1928

Contact at **LA TRINIDAD,** Nicaragua, C.A. (215–288)

Contact had by Lieutenant J. G. Keller, GN. No further data on file.

#48: 20 NOVEMBER 1928

Contact at **EL CHIPON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (260–380)

Contact had by Lieutenant C. A. Davis, GN. No further data on file.

#49: 10 JANUARY 1929

Contact at **GUANACASTILLA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (223–375)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C. A. Davis, GN, was ambushed and attacked by a bandit force of about 100 well armed with machine guns, rifles and bombs. The patrol was successful in driving out the bandits after severe fighting.

Known casualties: GN: 2 killed.
4 wounded.

Bandits: 7 killed.

#50: 19 FEBRUARY 1929

Contact at **SAN ANTONIO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R. F. Harris, GN, engaged with and dispersed a bandit group after a short firefight of about 20 minutes. The bandits were well armed with machine guns, rifles and bombs. Lt. H. N. Hunter, GN, 2d in command.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded. (including Lieutenant Harris.

Bandits: Unknown.

#51: 9 MARCH 1929

Contact at **SAN ISIDRO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (208–283)

A guardia patrol commanded by Cadet Norman L. Merritt, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at San Isidro, Department of Matagalpa. Bandit casualties unknown.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.

Bandits: Unknown.

#52: 28 APRIL 1929

Contact at **SAN ISIDRO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (208–283)

The Guardia garrison at San Isidro, Department of Matagalpa, was attacked by a group of bandits at 7:45 P.M. Due to the constant vigilance and quick wittedness of the garrison stationed there, the Guardia, under command of a Non-commissioned officer, quickly mobilized for action and drove the bandits off without casualties on the part of the Guardia.

Known casulties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#53: 3 MAY 1929

Contact at **THIJIO MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant John Hamas had contact with a bandit group at Thijio Mountain, Coco Village, N.S. Bandits fled after a few minutes of fighting.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 2 wounded.

#54: 31 MAY 1929

Contact at **ALGOVIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (270–295)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. Ryan, GN, had contact with a group of about 150 bandits at the Finca Algovia, Dept. of Matagalpa. Fight lasted about 30 minutes when bandits dispersed. Patrol pursued; regained contact and recaptured a large quantity of loot taken from the Finca. Patrol also captured rifles, ammunition, bombs and dynamite. Horses and mules.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 5 killed.

#55: 5 JUNE 1929

Contact at **AGUACATE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (211–345)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E. U. Hakala, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Aguacate. Fighting lasted for about 10 minutes. Patrol captured a rifle, ammunition, bombs and machettes.

#56: 6 JUNE 1929

Contact at **LAS UVAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E. U. Hakala, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Uvas. Fight lasted for about thirty minutes when bandits fled in all directions. Patrol captured mules, saddles, US hand grenades, and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#57: 4 JULY 1929

Contact at **CUA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. L. Neel, GN, Lieutenant W. H. Williamson, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Cua. The bandits were hidding in a corn field when Guardia point was fired on. Patrol immediately took up skirmish position and swept field with rifle and machine gun fire. Fight lasted for one hour and forty minutes when bandits fled. Patrol captured large amount of food supplies, arms, ammunition and equipment.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded including Lieutenant W. H. Williamson.

Bandits: 15 killed.

#58: 13 AUGUST 1929

Contact at **JICARO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (229–386)

At about 1:30 A.M., three groups of bandits attacked the town of Jicaro, Nueva Segovia. Captain H. Stent, GN, and two other GN officers with the rest of the garrison of 21 men were the sole defenders of the town when the attack took place. The alertness of a sentry on outpost duty contributed greatly in helping the Guardia prepare for the attack. The alarm was sounded and the attacking group were swept with rifle and machine gun fire. Guardia pursued the fleeing group for several hours but further contact could not be gained.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#59: 21 AUGUST 1929

Contact at **LA PITA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Occhionero, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Pita. Fight lasted 20 minutes when bandits fled.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#60: 22 AUGUST 1929

Contact at **EL NARANJO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (88–249)

Combined Guardia patrols under Lieutenants M. Hardin and T. Farrar had contact with a group of armed bandits at El Naranjo, Dept of Chinandega. Bandits employed rifles, pistols and machine-guns. Fight lasted for about an hour.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#61: 29 AUGUST 1929

Contact at **LA CABULLAS MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E. U. Hakala, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at La Cabullas Mountain, Dept. of Nueva Segovia. Contact lasted for thirty minutes, when bandits fled. Patrol followed in pursuit but further contact could not be gained.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Two killed.

#62: 29 AUGUST 1929

Contact at **QUEZALGUAQUE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (130–244)

A Guardia patrol under command of First Sergeant Jose Madriz, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Quezalguaque, Department of Leon. First Sergeant Madriz was killed by first burst of bandit fire. Two bandits were captured.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed (Sgt. Madriz).
Bandits: 2 captured.

#63: 31 AUGUST 1929

Contact at **MUYUCA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (226–391)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E. D. Villegas, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Muyuca, Dept. of Nueva Segovia. Bandit positions were rushed and group fled leaving blood trails behind. Lieut. P. C. Stanley, GN, 2nd in command.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (Lieutenant Villegas)
Bandits: Unknown.

#64: 12 OCTOBER 1929

Contact at **LA CONCORDIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–322)
The small Guardia Garrison at La Concordia, Dept. of Jinotega, was attacked by a group of armed bandits at 8:50 P.M. Guardia swept surroundings vicinity of cuartel with machine gun fire and drove the bandits back. Bandits put up a weak fight and fled. No casualties on either side.

#65: 13 OCTOBER 1929

Contact at **BABILONIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E. Marcos and his patrol of 21 men had contact with a group of armed bandits at Babilonia, Department of Jinotega.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#66: 16 OCTOBER 1929

Contact at **PASO REAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (249–326)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F. L. Kurchov, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Paso Real. Bandits fled leaving blood trails.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#67: 28 OCTOBER 1929

Contact at **SAN GERONIMO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H. A. Makus, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at San Geronimo. Patrol captured 1 rifle, a quantity of ammunition, cartridge belts and other bandit equipment.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#68: 31 OCTOBER 1929

Contact at **LAS MERCEDES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (228–405)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W. F. Krebs, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Mercedes Hacienda. Patrol captured one machine-gun, 3 rifles, ammunition, cartridge belts and other bandit equipment.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#69: 2 DECEMBER 1929

Contact at **SANTA ROSA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (148–215)

A Guardia patrol under command of Lieutenant L. C. Meeks, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Rosa, Dept. of Leon. Patrol captured 1 pistol, 1 rifle, 3 shotguns, machettes and cutachas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#70: 11 DECEMBER 1929

Contact at **SABANA GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R. F. Harris, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Sabana Grande.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#71: 16 DECEMBER 1929:

Contact at **HUERTAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A patrol of six enlisted Guardias had contact with a group of armed bandits at Huertas, Nueva Segovia.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 captured.

#72: 17 DECEMBER 1929:

Contact at **ASCENCION CASTELLON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A patrol of enlisted Guardias had contact with a group of armed bandits at Hacienda Ascencion Castellon near Piedra Grande.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#73: 26 DECEMBER 1929:

Contact at **RIO GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M. Alexander, GN, had a contact with a group of bandits at Rio Grande, Nueva Segovia.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 3 captured.

#74: 4 JANUARY 1930:

Contact at **VALLE DE LAS EAPATAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (157–257)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant L.C. Meeks, GH, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Valle de las Zapatas, Patrol captured 1 pistol, cutachas and machetes.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 5 captured.

#75: 11 JANUARY 1930:

Contact at **LOS BANOS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.W. Ferguson, GN, Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Los Banos, Nueva Segovia. Patrol captured large amount of foodstuffs, stores, arms, ammunition and equipment.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#76: 12 JANUARY 1930

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant Urig, GN, and Guardia patrol from Quilali had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Cruces. Fight lasted 15 minutes.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
3 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#77: 14 JANUARY 1930

Contact at **LAS PERALTAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (170–379)

A Guardia patrol under command of Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits between Las Peraltas and Perpchillos, Nueva Segovia. Patrol captured four animals and saddles.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 wounded.
1 captured.

#78: 26 JANUARY 1930

Contact at **COLON,** Nicaragua. C.A. (230–318)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, had contact with a group of bandits at Colon.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 captured.

#79: 26 JANUARY 1930

Contact at **BIJIGUAL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (212–357)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.A. Makus, GN, had contact with a group of bandits under Padilla about one half mile from Bijigual.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#80: 27 JANUARY 1930

Contact at **TRUJILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.J. Elliott, GN, had contact with a group of bandits near Trujillo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
3 wounded.
11 captured.

#81: 3 FEBRUARY 1930

Contact at **SANTA MARIA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (193–403)

The small garrison of Guardia at Santa Maria, Nueva Segovia, was attacked by a group of bandits, shortly after mid-night. Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#82: 9 FEBRUARY 1930

Contact at **QUILALI,** Nicaragua. C.A. (246–365)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. Sabater, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits about 20 miles southwest of Quilali.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#83: 11 FEBRUARY 1930

Contact at **GUAPINOL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (176–285)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.J. Cunningham, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits about 3 miles southeast of Guapinol. Patrol captured 1 pistol, 12 machettes and various articles of Marine Corps property—Guardia property. Three bandit camps were destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
2 wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#84: 16 FEBRUARY 1930

Contact at **LA VIRGEN,** Nicaragua. C.A. (116–272)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.B. Puller, GN, and a Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.J. Rittman, GN, had contact with a group of bandits about three miles north of San Antonio on the trail to La Virgen. Lt. E. Marcos GN with Captain Puller's patrol.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#85: 17 FEBRUARY 1930

Contact at **EMBOCADERO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (252–331)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Chenoweth, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits about 2 miles northeast of Embocaderos. Patrol captured ammunition and miscellaneous articles of loot.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#86: 18 FEBRUARY 1930

Contact at **LOS CEDROS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Chenoweth, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Los Cedros, Dept. of Jinotega. Patrol captured ammunition and clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#87: 4 MARCH 1930

Contact at **TAMARINDO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, and Lieutenant Castillo GN, with his patrol had contact at Tamarindo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#88: 14 MARCH 1930

Contact at **YALI,** Nicaragua. C.A. (232–336)

A Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits about a half a mile outside of Yali. Lieutenants F. Anderton and G.M. Manning in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#89: 20 MARCH 1930

Contact at **MONTECHRISTO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Chenoweth, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits about one mile north of Monte Christo. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#90: 23 MARCH 1930

Contact at **BUENA VISTA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia Patrol commanded by Lieutenant F. Anderton, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits near Buena Vista, Department of Jinotega. Patrol captured animals, saddles, food stores and correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#91: 23 MARCH 1930

Contact at **BUENA VISTA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Chenoweth, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Buena Vista, on trail to La Rica. Patrol captured 1 rifle, ammunition and bombs. Lieutenant W.A. Lee second in command.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.
5 wounded.

#92: 30 MARCH 1930

Contact at **SANTA RITA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant N. Hussa, GN, had contact with a group of bandits north of Santa Rita.
No known bandit casualties.
No guardia casualties.

#93: 31 MARCH 1930

Contact at **COCO RIVER,** (?) Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant N. Hussa, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits north of the Coco River. (?)

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#94: 1 APRIL 1930

Contact at **YALI,** Nicaragua. C.A. (232–336)

A large group of bandits attacked the small guardia garrison at Yali at about 2:30 A.M. Bandits were driven off. Lieutenant F. Anderton in command.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
1 wounded.
Bandits: 3 killed.
4 wounded.

#95: 3 APRIL 1930

Contact at **YALI—CONCORDIA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Pilcher, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits on the Yali—Concordia Road. Bandits were armed with machine-guns and rifles. Lieutenant Montenegro.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#96: 5 APRIL 1930

Contact at **EL CARMEN,** Nicaragua. C.A. (Rivas)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Wilson, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at the Hacienda El Carmen, Department of Rivas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.
3 wounded.

#97: 16 APRIL 1930

Contact at **SAN FRANCISCO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (Chinandega)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.J. Christy, GN, had contact with a group of bandits near San Francisco. Patrol captured 1 rifle.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
2 captured.

#98: 22 APRIL 1930

Contact at **LAS CRUCES—LAS VUELTAS,** Nicaragua. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits on the Las Cruces—Las Vueltas trail.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#99: 22 APRIL 1930

Contact at **SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (225–368)

The Guardia garrison at San Juan was attacked by a group of armed bandits at about 8:10 P.M. Post was commanded by Lieutenant T. Stevenson.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#100: 24 APRIL 1930

Contact at **SAN FRANCISCO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (Chinandega)

Major Spotts, GN, and his patrol of one officer and 10 enlisted had contact about 5 leagues north of San Francisco at Pico Jicote with a group of 60 armed bandits. Lieutenant M. Hardin second in command.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#101: 5 MAY 1930

Contact at **NARANJO,** Nicaragua, C. A. (123—305)

Lieutenant Christy, GN, and his patrol of 9 enlisted and Lieutenant McDonald, GN, with his patrol were ambushed about two miles southwest of Naranjo by a group of about forty bandits. Patrols again ambushed when returning to station. No casualties.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#102: 7 MAY 1930

Contact at **BARRIAL HILL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant Livermore, GN, and his patrol were ambushed by a group of about 100 bandits at Barrial Hill, Nueva Segovia.

Known casualties: GN: 4 killed.
2 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#103: 8 MAY 1930

Contact at **AMUCAYAN,** Nicaragua. C.A. (199–369)

Lieutenant Bateman, GN, and his patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits north of Amucayan along the Coco river. Patrol captured 19 animals, 19 saddles, 1 USMC pack saddle, 2 rifles, 1 pistol, 4 cutting weapons, 2 bombs, 11 sticks of dynamite and various other articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#104: 10 MAY 1930

Contact at **AGUACATE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

Captain G.A. Williams, GN, Captain J.D. O'Leary, GN, with a patrol of 15 enlisted had contact with a group of bandits at Aguacate. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 1 revolver, 2 dynamite bombs, hat-bands and flags.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#105: 13 MAY 1930

Contact at **MIRAFLOR,** Nicaragua. C.A. (224–332)

Lieutenant Smith, GN, and his patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at La Laguna de Miraflor, Jinotega. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 1 shotgun, 2 pistols and ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 6 killed.

#106: 26 MAY 1930

Contact at **SANTA CRUZ,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

Cabo Molina, #1203 GN, and his patrol of 4 rasos had contact with small group of bandits between Santa Cruz and Mount Espinal. Wounded Jeremias Blandon and Fidell Selles and captured them.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#107: 29 MAY 1930

Contact at **EL RODEO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (274–287)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, surprised small group of armed bandits near El Rodeo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#108: 29 MAY 1930

Contact at **TULA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Castillo, GN, had contact on Tule Mountain with a group of about 20 armed bandits. Patrol destroyed large house of bandits and various quantities of clothing and provisions. Captured 1 cutacha, correspondence, clothing, chicha and quantity of provisions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 wounded.

#109: 1 JUNE 1930

Contact at **ESPERANZA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Castillo, GN, had contact with small group of bandits near Esperanza. Captured 1 pistol, and 3 cutachas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

#110: 4 JUNE 1930

Contact at **SAN ANTONIO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (112–245)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.B. Puller, GN, ambushed small group of bandits about 1000 yards north of San Antonio. Leader of bandits killed. Captured 1 rifle, 154 cartridges, and 1 revolver.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#111: 5 JUNE 1930

Contact at **RIO GRANDE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (205–355)

Captain R. Fagan, GN, Lieutenant H.A. Makus, GN, 3 enlisted USMC, and 14 enlisted GN had contact at Rio Grande with a group of 40 or 50 bandits. Patrol captured 3 mules fully equipped, 1 horse, blankets and clothing. Miscellaneous articles. Bandit camp destroyed.

Known casualties: USMC: None.
GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#112: 6 JUNE 1930

Contact at **TAMARINDO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

Captain R. Fagan, GN, Lieutenant H.A. Makus, GN, 3 enlisted USMC, and 14 enlisted GN, had contact with a group of about 100 armed bandits in Tamarindo.

Known casualties: USMC: None.
GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#113: 6 JUNE 1930

Contact at **LOS CEDROS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (121–319)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, one officer and 35 men had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Los Cedros in the Department of Jinotega. Seven bandits killed including the Jefe, Marcial Rivera and the segundo jefe, Asencion Rodriguez. Patrol captured 1 Kraig Rifle, 1 ConCon rifle, 2 hand grenades, 14 dynamite bombs, 1 revolver, 100 foot fuse, detonators, 5 sticks dynamite, 56 cartridges Krag, 17 cartridges ConCon 10 cutachas, 5 saddles, clothing, food and correspondence. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 7 killed.

#114: 7 JUNE 1930

Contact at **MANCALLAN,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Cobb, GN, had contact with a group of about 50 armed bandits in Mancallan in the Department of Esteli. Captured Candelario Cardoza, jefe of the group. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 3 cutachas, 3 bombs, 50 rounds Krag ammunition, 9 animals, 8 saddles, 8 bridles, 8 saddle blakets, 10 raincoats, 4 pairs new shoes, 4 red and black hat-bands, 800 lbs. of beans, 3 sacks of rice, 50 lbs. cheese, 93 tortillas and various articles of clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.
7 wounded.

#115: 9 JUNE 1930

Contact at **CARADON FINCA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (202–179)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Roberts, GN, had a contact with a group of about 20 bandits at Cardon Finca on the San Rafael—Sapote trail. Patrol captured 1 pistol, 1 dynamite bomb, 15 rounds ammunition, 10 blankets, 30 odd pieces of clothing, etc.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#116: 10 JUNE 1930

Contact at **LA VUELTA ROBLES,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

Lieutenant T.R. Stuart, GN, 1 officer and 11 enlisted had a contact in the northwest end of Valle de la Vuelta Robles with a group of about 30 armed bandits. Lieutenant Montenegro, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#117: 11 JUNE 1930

Contact at **ARANJUEZ,** Nicaragua. C.A. (250–300)

A Patrol of enlisted Guardia had contact with small group of armed bandits in Aranjuez, Department of Matagalpa. The leader of the bandits, Silvino Herrera, was killed. One other bandit wounded and chased over a 100 foot cliff. Patrol captured 1 pistol and 1 dagger.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed. 1 wounded.

#118: 14 JUNE 1930

Contact at **LA TROZA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (LEON)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Raso F. Rivera, #3440, GN, had a contact with a group of about 25 amed bandits near La Troza. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun and 1 cutacha.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#119: 15 JUNE 1930

Contact at **ZAPOTE MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

Lieutenant T.R. Stuart, GN, one officer and 11 men had a contact with a group of 40 armed bandits at Zapote Mountain. Patrol captured 1 rifle, some dozen pieces of clothing and bedding. Lieutenant Montenegro, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#120: 19 JUNE 1930

Contact at **SAN MARCOS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.R. Pilcher, GN, had a contact with a group of about 50 armed bandits about two miles northeast of San Marcos. Destroyed quantities of salt, coffee and meat.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#121: 19 JUNE 1930

Contact at **YUCCA PUCCA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E.L. Russell, GN, had a contact with about 150 armed bandits on Yucca Pucca Mountain in the Department of Jinotega.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#122: 24 JUNE 1930

Contact at **LOS JILGUEROS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Cabo M. Guillen, GN, had a contact with a small group of bandits in Los Jilgueros. Patrol captured 1 automatic rifle, 1 native made rifle, 1 shot-gun, 1 pistol, 1 shirt, 3 cutachas, 1 military cutacha, 1 US canteen ,3 raincoats, 2 pairs trousers and 7 hats.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
1 wounded.

#123: 28 JUNE 1930

Contact at **OJOCHE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (237–360)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain J.P. Schwerin, GN, had a short contact with a group of bandits at Ojoche in the Department of Nueva Segovia.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
2 wounded including Captain Schwerin.
Bandits: Unknown.

#124: 28 JUNE 1930

Contact at **CEDRALE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain R.A. Anderson, GN, had a contact on the trail to San Juan about midway between Ojoche and Cedrales with a group of about 50 armed bandits. Patrol captured a bandit flag, hats with red bands, knives and machetes and 1 dynamite bomb.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
Bandits: Unknown.

#125: 30 JUNE 1930

contact at **SOMOTO MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua. C.A. (168–345)

A Guardia Patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Castillo, GN, had a contact with deserter bandits from Salgado's group at Zapote, near Somoto Mountain. Patrol captured 1 revolver and ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#126: 5 JULY 1930

Contact at **EL RODEO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (274–287)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, had a contact with a group of about 75 armed bandits at the finca of Senor Rodriguez, near the mountain of Moropotente. Patrol captured 1 bandit, 26 saddle animals, 1 bugle, many blanket rolls, about 200 rounds of ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 12 killed.
12 wounded.

#127: 8 JULY 1930

Contact at **LA SULTANA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

Captain R.D. McAfee, GN, 1 officer and 20 enlisted had a contact at La Sultana in the Department of Jinotega with a group of about 50 armed bandits. Patrol captured small quantity of food. Lieutenant E.M. Martin, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#128: 9 JULY 1930

Contact at **LAS MESAS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant J.A. Burns, GN, one officer and 19 enlisted had a contact with a group of about 25 armed bandits at the bend of the Las Vueltas—Suscallon trail about three-fourths of a mile from the Guali River near Las Mesas. Patrol captured 3 horses, 1 mule, 3 saddles and 2 bridles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#129: 10 JULY 1930

Contact at **PASMATA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (249–340)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E.F. Carlson had a contact with a group of about 40 armed bandits near Pasmata. Patrol captured 2 horses, 2 saddles, 1 rifle, 2 dynamite bombs, 1 hand grenade, 15 dynamite sticks, 7 blankets, 5 hats, 2 raincoats, clothing, food stuffs and many other miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
7 wounded.

#130: 15 JULY 1930

Contact at **ZAPOTE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.J. Levonski, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits operating in the Zapote area. Patrol captured 2 cutting weapons and 1 muzzle loading rifle.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

#131: 22 JULY 1930

Contact at **MANCOTAL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (247–332)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, three officers and 46 enlisted had a contact with a group of bandits at Dominico Mountain, (Mancotal) in the Depatrment of Jinotega. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 4 shot-guns, 1 revolver, 2 cutachas, 31 cartridges, 1 horse, 1 mule and a large quantity of supplies. 3 officers were: Lieutenants Lee, Ashbrook, and Lill (MC).

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#132: 22 JULY 1930

Contact at **SANTA FE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Gutierrez, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at the finca of San Miguel of Rio Grande in the vicinity of Santa Fe. One bandit captured.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 captured.

#133: 23 JULY 1930

Contact at **SAN FRANCISCO, CHINANDEGA,** Nicaragua. C.A.

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sgt. Arbelles, #447, GN, had a contact with a group of bandits about nine miles east of San Francisco. Patrol captured 3 horses, 2 raincoats, 1 flash-light, 1 saddle and 1 Guardia hat.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#134: 25 JULY 1930

Contact at **LAS PALMAS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant T.M. Stephenson. GN, had a contact near Las Palmas in the Department of Nueva Segovia with a small group of bandits. Patrol captured 1 shot-gun and some powder.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.
3 captured.

#135: 25 JULY 1930

Contact at **GUAPINOL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, three officers and 45 enlisted had a contact with small group of bandits at Venado Mountain near Guapinol Mountain. Patrol wounded and captured Captain Saber Manzanares, a sub-jefe of Sandino. One bandit camp destroyed Other three officers were Lieutenants Lee, Ashbrook and Lill (MC).

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded and captured.

#136: 27 JULY 1930

Contact at **SAN JERONIMO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, had a contact with a small group of bandits at the Hacienda of San Jeronimo near Corinto Finca. Patrol captured 7 horses and mules, 7 saddles, 2 cutachas and a quantity of clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 captured.

#137: 28 JULY 1930

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

Captain Kelly, GN, Lieutenant Freeman, GN, one other officer and a patrol of 30 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits at the top of Guale Mountain near Las Cruces.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded. (Lieutenant Freeman was fatally wounded in this contact and died later.)
Bandits: Unknown.

#138: 30 JULY 1930

Contact at **SEBOYAL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

Captain G.L. Maynard, GN, 2 officers and 25 enlisted had a contact with small group of bandits at Seboyal.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#139: 5 AUGUST 1930

Contact at **PALO BLANCO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (192–371)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant B. Navarrete, GN, had a contact with a group of about twenty armed bandits near Palo Blanco.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.
2 captured.

#140: 6 AUGUST 1930

Contact at **NANCE DULCE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (180–304)

Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, one officer and twenty-five enlisted had a contact that lasted two hours with a group of about 45 armed bandits at Nance Dulce. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 2 shot-guns, ammunition, saddles, bedding and powder.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 12 killed.
12 wounded.

#141: 15 AUGUST 1930

Contact at **LOS CARBONALES,** Nicaragua. C.A. (153–389)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Cobb, GN, had a contact with a group of about 20 armed bandits at Los Carbonales. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, 3 cutachas, 3 raincoats and a quantity of clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
4 wounded.

#142: 18 AUGUST 1930

Contact at **VENCEDORA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (253–328)
Lieutenant A. Graves, GN, two officers and twenty-two enlisted and 1 civilian guide had contact two miles east of Vencedora and three miles south of San Antonio, with a group of about 80 armed bandits. Other officers were Lieutenants Ashbrook and Lill (MC).

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
2 wounded.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#143: 18 AUGUST 1930

Contact at **VENCEDORA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (253–238)
Captain R.D. McAfee, GN, one officer and twenty one enlisted had a contact with a group of 30 armed bandits near Vencedora. Lieutenant Delgadillo, second in command.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#144: 18 AUGUST 1930

Contact at **VALLE DE OCOTAL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (LEON)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant L. Meeks, GN, had a contact with a bandit group near the Valle de Ocotal. Patrol captured one horse.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#145: 19 AUGUST 1930:

Contact at **MALACATE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)
Captain L. B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W. L. Lee, GN, Lieutenant Barillas, GN, and thirty-four enlisted had a contact with a group of about 70 bandits near Malacate in the Department of Jinotega. Patrol captured 52 horses and mules, 44 saddles with equipment, 2 rifles, 10 rounds ammunition, 13 cutachas and machetes, dynamite, clothing, shoes, cloth, spurs, cooking utensils, hammocks, foodstuffs, etc. Destroyed about four tons of corn.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#146: 20 AUGUST 1930:

Contact at **GUAPINOL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)
Captain G. F. Good, GN, Lieutenant J. A. Burns, GN, Lieutenant Caceres (n) GN, and 40 enlisted had a contact with a group of bandits on the northern side of Guapinol Mountain. Patrol captured 6 rifles, 3 shotguns, 2 pistols, 248 rounds ammunition, 4 boxes dynamite caps, 4 cutachas, 1 mule and saddle, clothing valued at $400.00.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#147: 28 AUGUST 1930:

Contact at **SAN RAFAEL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. E. Power, GN, had a contact with a group of about 35 armed bandits on the Sabana Grande trail that leads into San Rafael. Patrol captured 6 machetes, and four food puches.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#148: 28 AUGUST 1930:

Contact at **RODEO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Major L. P. Hunt, GN, Captain W. W. Davies, GN, Lieutenant J. M. Broderick, GN, one enlisted Marine and 14 enlisted Guardia had a contact with a group fo armed bandits at Rodeo in the Department of Nueva Segovia. Patrol captured 11 animals, 11 saddles and one cutacha.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
2 wounded.

#149: 29 AUGUST 1930:

Contact at **LAS LOMAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (236–127)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant N. E. McGhee, GN, had a contact with a group of 35 bandits near Las Lomas. Patrol captured 3 rifles, 1 shot-gun, 10 sticks dynamite, clothing and documents.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 captured.

#150: 1 SEPTEMBER 1930:

Contact at **SABANA GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Lieutenant E. J. Rittman, GN, one officer and twenty enlisted Guardias had a contact with a group of about 40 armed bandits about half-way between La Concordia and Sabana Grande. Lieut. F. C. Hall, 2d in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#151: 2 SEPTEMBER 1930:

Contact at **LA CANA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Leon)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Castillo, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Cana. Patrol captured 1 pistol and two cutachas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#152: 8 SEPTEMBER 1930:

Contact at **LA CONCEPCION,** Nicaragua, C.A. (219–178)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C. B. Stearns, GN, had a contact with a group of bandits at La Concepcion, six miles out toward Sebaco on main road. Patrol captured 1 Springfield rifle, 1 full Lewis drum and other miscellaneous items.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#153: 8 SEPTEMBER 1930:

Contact at **LA CONCEPCION,** Nicaragua, C.A. (219–178)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, had a contact with a group of bandits at La Concepcion. Patrol captured twenty-eight rounds of ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#154: 8 SEPTEMBER 1930

Contact at **OLOGALPA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

Captain W.P. Kelley, GN, two officers and thirty enlisted, had contact with a group of bandits in the vicinity of Ologalpa. Patrol captured blanket rolls, 6 pistol cartridges, a quantity of bombs and fuse cord. House destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

#155: 11 SEPTEMBER 1930

Contact at **POTREROS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, two officers and 32 enlisted had a contact with a group of armed bandits at a camp near Potreros. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 2 shot-guns, 50 rounds ammunition, 2 horses and 13 cutachas. Other officers were Lieutenants A. Graves and W.E. McGhee. GN.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#156: 13 SEPTEMBER 1930

Contact at **BARYAL—BALSAMO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (219–373)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, had a contact with about 20 bandits in the vicinity of Baryal—Balsamo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#157: 13 SEPTEMBER 1930

Contact at **TELPANECA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (205–368)

Lieutenant C.J. Levonski, GN, two enlisted USMC ,and ten enlisted Guardias had a contact with a group of armed bandits at camp of Reyes Lopez located near Telpaneca. Destroyed camp.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#158: 19 SEPTEMBER 1930

Contact at **NARANJO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

Lieutenant A. Graves, GN, one officer and 15 enlisted had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Naranjo. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 1 pistol, 1 cutacha and 20 rounds of ammunition. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#159: 20 SEPTEMBER 1930

Contact at **EL ACHIOTE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (324–234)

Major L.P. Hunt, GN, and his patrol of four officers and forty-five enlisted had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Achiote in the Department of Nueva Segovia. Patrol captured 1 shot-gun and 2 cutachas. Other officers were Major W. Croka, GN, Lieutenants G.C. Smith, GN, J.M. Cobb, GN, and H.F.A. Long, (MC) GN.

Known casualties: GN: 1 guardia slightly wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#160: 20 SEPTEMBER 1930

Contact at **NARANJO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

Lieutenant R. White, GN, his patrol of one officer and ten enlisted had a contact with a group of bandits near Naranjo. Patrol captured two animals. Lieutenant Pennington, GN, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#161: 1 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **EL SALTO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (229–324)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.M. Calvert, GN. had contact with a group of armed bandits at El Salto. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, 2 machetes, 7 rounds of ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#162: 2 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **BOCA DE CUA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (274–369)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain R.G. Hunt, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Boca de Cua.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 10 killed.

#163: 4 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **CHIPOTE MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain W.W. Davies, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Chipote Mountain. Patrol captured 1 revolver, cutachas and machetes, Sandino flag, fuses and detonators.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#164: 16 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **EL CHAGUITE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Chaguite.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#165: 19 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **SANTULE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santule.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#166: 19 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **SAN VICENTE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Cobb, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Vicente. Patrol captured 2 rifles, ammunition and supplies.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#167: 23 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **CORNETA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (231–294)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant M. Guillen, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Corneta. Patrol captured 4 rifles, 53 rounds of ammunition and 2 cutachas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#168: 26 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **EL SALTO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain A. Pefley, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at El Salto. Patrol captured 3 horses and bandit supplies. Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#169: 27 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **SANTA CLARA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Caceres, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Clara.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#170: 30 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **LAS VEGAS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (241–340)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Vegas. Patrol captured 2 pistols and bomb detonators.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
2 wounded.

#171: 31 OCTOBER 1930

Contact at **CIUDAD ANTIGUA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (205–378)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Colonel R.L. Denig, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Ciudad Antigua, other officers who participated in contact were Major L.P. Hunt, GN, Lieutenants S.P. Buechlein (MC) GN, and L. Torres, GN, (n).

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#172: 3 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **PORTAL.** Nicaragua. C.A. (218–369)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain H. Pefley, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Portal, between Telpaneca and San Juan de Telpaneca. Other officers who participated in contact were Lieutenants E.L. Livermore, GN, and M. Gomez, GN, (n).

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
5 wounded.

#173: 5 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **MATIGUAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (302–286)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant Bustamante, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Matiguas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
3 wounded.

#174: 10 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **GUAPOTAL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (289–302)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R. White, GN, and Lieutenant Paul Kerns, GN, had contact with a group of bandits at Guapotal. Lieutenant White died from wounds received in contact.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#175: 11 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **LAS MERCEDES,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant Dias, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Mercedes.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#176: 11 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **CLOCOTON,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Corporal Oviedo, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Clocotan. Patrol captured 1 horse, one saddle and pistol.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#177: 19 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **TELICA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (133–246)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.W. Stevens, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Telica.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.
2 wounded.

#178: 19 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **SANTA ISABEL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.B. Puller, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Isabel. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#179: 23 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **EL GOLFO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (234–375)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Gomez, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits between El Golfo and Zapotillal. Patrol destroyed 3 bandit houses.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#180: 23 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **EL SAUCE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.M. McCorkle, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Sauce. Patrol captured 4 bombs, 2 sticks of dynamite, 50 detonators, clothing and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#181: 25 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **LA PAVONA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. B. Puller, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at point halfway between La Pavona and Guapotal. Patrol destroyed bandit camp and captured bombs, food, clothing and correspondence. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
3 wounded.

#182: 27 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **QUILALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant E.C. Ross, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at Quilali.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#183: 30 NOVEMBER 1930

Contact at **LA RICA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (245–349)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.E. Powers, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Rica. Patrol captured 10 animals, clothing, food, salt and tobacco.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#184: 2 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (225–369)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.H. Coffman, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Juan del Telpaneca.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#185: 11 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **SAN LUCAS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (Chontales)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Corporal Urbina, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Lucas. Patrol captured 3 pistols, 2 cutachas and a cargo of contraband tobacco.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#186: 12 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **VENCEDORA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (253–328)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Vencedora. Lieutenant P. Gale, GN, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#187: 15 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **SAN ANTONIO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Antonio. Other officers: Lieutenants P. Gale, GN, and T.R. Stuart, GN.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#188: 16 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **LA CONSTANCIA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (265–296)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at La Constancia.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#189: 20 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **EMBOCADEROS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (252–331)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Embocaderos. Other officers, Lieutenants P. Gale, GN, and T.R. Stuart, GN.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#190: 23 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (225–368)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Juan de Telpaneca.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#191: 28 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **EL SALTO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Salto.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#192: 29 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **SISLE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (243–224)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant T.R. Stuart, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Sisle. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 30 rounds of ammunition, 1 bomb, 6 cutachas, food and clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 6 killed.
5 wounded.

#193: 31 DECEMBER 1930

Contact at **QUILALI,** Nicaragua. C.A. (243–365)

The Guardia cuartel at Quilali was attacked by a large bandit group on the night of 30 December, 1930. The garrison was commanded by Lieutenant J.H. Coffman, GN, and Lieutenant R.H.A. Forsyth, (MC), GN, at the time of the attack.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#194: 1 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **CERRO DEL BONETE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant B. Navarrete, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cerro del Bonete. Patrol captured 5 animals with saddles, 2 rifles, ammunition, raincoats, rifle grenade.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#195: 1 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **ZAPOTILLAL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (241–373)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain W.P. Kelly ,GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Zapotillal. Patrol destroyed one bandit camp.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#196: 1 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **ZAPOTILLAL** #2, Nicaragua. C.A. (241–373)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.H. Satterfield, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Zapotillal. Patrol destroyed three bandit camps.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#197: 2 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **CHAGUITILLO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.F. Pulver, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Chaguitillo. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, 2000 lbs. cheese, 45 rounds of ammunition and 2 mules with saddles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#198: 2 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **CHIPOTE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (248–379)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.L. Levonski, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Chipote.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#199: 3 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **NARANJO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant O.E. Pennington, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Naranjo. Patrol captured 1 cutacha.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#200: 4 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **LICOROY,** Nicaragua. C.A. (211–289)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Licoroy.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
4 wounded.

#201: 5 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **LOS CEDROS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (121–319–

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain W.C. Bales, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Los Cedros. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 11 hats. Lieutenant C. Clark, GN, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 wounded.

#202: 6 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **SANTANA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santana. Patrol captured 1 pistol, 2 cutachas, food and clothing. Bandit camp destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.

#203: 12 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **LOS PLANOS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Los Planos. Bandit camp and food destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#204: 12 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **BALSAMO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Balsamo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#205: 19 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **PALACAGUINA,** Nicatagua. C.A. (200–254)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Palacaguina.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#206: 19 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **SOMOTO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (167–356)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.H. McGorkle, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Somoto.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 wounded.

#207: 19 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **SOMOTO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (167–356)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Somoto.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#208: 23 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **OLOGALPA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.H. Satterfield, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Ologalpa.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.
3 wounded.

#209: 26 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **SANTA ROSA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Rosa. Bandit camp destroyed by patrol.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#210: 26 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **LA GRORIA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (166–238)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Barillas, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Gloria. Bandit camp destroyed by patrol.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#211: 26 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **EL GALLO,** EASTERN AREA, Nicaragua. (422–320)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant L. Curcey, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Gallo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#212: 30 JANUARY 1931

Contact at **LA LAGUNA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol of six enlisted had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Laguna. The patrol captured 2 pistols.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#213: 5 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **SAN GERONIMO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.H. Clark, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Geronimo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
10 wounded.

#214: 6 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **SAN ANTONIO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Antonio. The patrol captured 1 saddle and ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#215: 6 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **LA GUAYABA,** Nicaragua. C.A. (177–354)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Guayaba.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
1 wounded.

#216: 8 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **PIEDRAS DE AMOLAR,** Nicaragua. C.A. (132–375)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.R. Pattison, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Piedras de Amolar. Patrol captured 1 rifle and 2 cutachas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#217: 16 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **EL TULE,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Tule. Patrol captured 1 rifle, and 6 cutachas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 wounded.

#218: 20 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **LOWER BARYAL,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.H. Satterfield, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Lower Baryal.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#219: 20 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **PATASTE AND SAVANAS,** Nicaragua. C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.H. McGorkle, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Pataste.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded.
Bandits: 11 killed.

#220: 24 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **SOMOTO MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua. C.A. (168–345)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.H. McGorkle, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Somoto Mountain.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#221: 25 FEBRUARY 1931

Contact at **COYOLITO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.G. Alexander, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Coyolito. Patrol captured 1 pistol and ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#222: 1 MARCH 1931

Contact at **DARAILI,** Nicaragua. C.A. (216–347)

A Guardia patrol of five enlisted had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Daraili.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.
20 wounded.

#223: 3 MARCH 1931

Contact at **DUCUELITO,** Nicarauga. C.A. (201–348)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Ducuelito. Patrol captured 3 rifles, 1 bomb, 1 cutacha, 5 animals and 3 saddles. Also 400 rounds of ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.
10 wounded.

#224: 3 MARCH 1931

Contact at **DUCUELITO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (201–348)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Ducuelito. Patrol captured 4 animals, 2 saddles and 200 pounds of coffee.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#225: 4 MARCH 1931

Contact at **CUSMAJE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (203–360)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.O. Brauer, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cusmaje. Patrol captured 2 rifles.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#226: 8 MARCH 1931

Contact at **PORTILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CHONTALES)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant A.W. Kessler, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Portillo.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#227: 8 MARCH 1931

Contact at **LIMON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.O. Brauer, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Limon.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#228: 21 MARCH 1931

Contact at **LA LUNA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant B. Klein, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Luna. Patrol captured 1 pistol, 1 bomb, 1 cutacha.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

#229: 22 MARCH 1931

Contact at **RIO NEGRO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (305–249)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E. Matamoros, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Rio Negro.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#230: 23 MARCH 1931

Contact at **CHAGUITE GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant B. Klein, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Chaguite Grande. Patrol captured 2 bombs and 2 cutachas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#231: 24 MARCH 1931

Contact at **ALTA GRACIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (283–132)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain W.P. Kelley, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Alta Gracia.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
3 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#232: 1 APRIL 1931

Contact at **SAN RAFAEL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by an N.C.O., had contact with a group of armed bandits at San Rafael.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#233: 7 APRIL 1931

Contact at **LAS CANAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant P.H. McGorkle, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Canas. Patrol captured a quantity of pistol ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#234: 9 APRIL 1931

Contact at **CEDERALES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain A.N. Fricke, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cederales. Patrol captured 4 horses, 2 mules, 1 bull, 3 dynamite bombs, food, detonators and 3 machetes. Lieutenant E.J. Rittman, second in command.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#235: 11 APRIL 1931

Contact at **LOGTOWN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (491–468)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain H. Pefley, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Logtown.
Known casualties: GN: Captain Pefley and 1 guardia killed.
Bandits: Unknown.

#236: 12 APRIL 1931

Contact at **MOSS FARM,** Nicaragua, C.A. (492–463)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.R. Darrah, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Moss Farm.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#237: 13 APRIL 1931

Contact at **CUYUTIGNY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (485–473)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain U.C. Wood, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cuyutigny. Patrol destroyed a bandit supply train. Lieutenant T. Simmer (MC) GN, other officer with patrol.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 8 killed.
2 wounded.

#238: 14 APRIL 1931

Contact at **AMUCAYAN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (199–369)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant Altamirano, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Amucayan. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 2 machetes and food.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#239: 16 APRIL 1931

Contact at **NEW VANCE TRACT,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.R. Darrah, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at New Vance Tract. Patrol captured various articles of plunder.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#240: 16 APRIL 1931

Contact at **RIO ABAJO**, Nicaragua, C.A. (194-338)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C. Rodriguez, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Rio Abajo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#241: 19 APRIL 1931

Contact at **CERRO GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (181–337)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cerro Grande. Patrol captured 5 machetes, hat bands and food.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#242: 23 APRIL 1931

Contact at **LECUS RIVER,** Nicaragua, C.A. (501–474)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain O.A. Inman, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Lecus River.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.
3 wounded.

#243: 27 APRIL 1931

Contact at **AGUACATE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Aguacate. Patrol captured 11 animals and blankets.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#244: 28 APRIL 1931

Contact at **LAS CUCHILLAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (255–330)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Cuchillas. Patrol captured 2 bombs, hats, clothing, flashlights and hat-bands.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
10 wounded.

#245: 2 MAY 1931

Contact at **LA PINEDA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Pineda.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#246: 10 MAY 1931

Contact at **YALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (232–336)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain A.H. Fricke, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Yali.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#247: 10 MAY 1931

Contact at **CUA RIVER,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.B. Puller, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cua River. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 2 cutachas, and ammunition. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, second in command.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#248: 13 MAY 1931

Contact at **LAGARTILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.H. Bell, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Lagartillo.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#249: 13 MAY 1931

Contact at **EL SALTO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (229–324)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.D. Hutchcroft, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Salto.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 6 killed.

#250: 13 MAY 1931

Contact at **JOCOTILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain J.C. McQueen, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Jocotillo.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#251: 13 MAY 1931

Contact at **EL PAJARITO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Pajarito. Patrol captured 1 pistol, and ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#252: 15 MAY 1931

Contact at **PALACAGUINA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (200–354)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.O. Brauer, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits which attacked Palacaguina.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#253: 15 MAY 1931

Contact at **PALACAGUINA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (200–354)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Palacaguina. Patrol captured 1 rifle, 2 bombs, 1 mule and ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#254: 16 MAY 1931

Contact at **CUJE MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (201–365)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R.A. Trosper, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cuje Mine. Patrol captured 2 cutachas.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#255: 16 MAY 1931

Contact at **CUJE MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (201–365)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.O. Brauer, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cuje Mine. Patrol captured 1 bomb and miscellaneous bandit articles. Lieutenant H.A. Kipp, GN, second in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#256: 25 MAY 1931

Contact at **LA COLMENA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Colmena. Patrol captured 1 rifle, and 3 ponchos.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
8 wounded.

#257: 9 JUNE 1931

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (239–367)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.C. Ross, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Cruces.

Known casualties: GN: 3 wounded including Lieutenant Ross.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#258: 14 JUNE 1931

Contact at **CUJE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (201–365)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cuje. Patrol captured 1 revolver, cutachas and a quantity of ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#259: 15 JUNE 1931

Contact at **EMBOCADEROS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (252–331)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. Powers, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Embocaderos.

Known casualties: GN: 3 killed including Captain Powers and Lieutenant McGhee.
Bandits: 7 killed.

#260: 29 JUNE 1931

Contact at **TAMARINDO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.N. Munoz, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Tamarindo. Patrol captured 2 bombs, 3 cutachas, correspondence, food and clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#261: 1 JULY 1931

Contact at **LIMAY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (188–291)
Captain J.C. McQueen, GN, Lieutenant J.R. Bell, GN, and Guardia stationed at Limay, repulsed a bandit attack on the town.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 2 killed.
11 wounded.

#262: 1 JULY 1931

Contact at **LIMAY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (188–291)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Limay.
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#263: 9 JULY 1931

Contact at **GUAYUCALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (215–355)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.H. Clark, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Guayucali. Patrol captured 1 revolver and miscellaneous bandit articles.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
1 wounded.

#264: 17 JULY 1931

Contact at **KISALAYA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (473–503)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain O.A. Inman, GN, Lieutenant T.M. Stephenson, GN, Lieutenant J. Montenegro, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Kisalaya.
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 3 wounded.

#265: 19 JULY 1931

Contact at **SANTO DOMINGO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Chontales)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Corporal Castillo, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santo Domingo.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#266: 19 JULY 1931

Contact at **RAMA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (449–198)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F. Rewie, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Rama.
Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
2 wounded.
Bandits: 2 killed.
2 wounded.

#267: 20 JULY 1931

Contact at **REAL DE LA CRUZ,** Nicaragua, C.A. (205–272)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.J. Elliott, GN, and Lieutenant E.H. Schmierer, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Real de la Cruz. Patrol captured 2 animals and 1 rifle.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#268: 20 JULY 1930

Contact at **ZAPISCAN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.J. Elliott, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Zapiscan. Patrol captured 2 aparejos and ammunition, 1 rifle, and 2 animals.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 8 wounded.

#269: 22 JULY 1931

Contact at **SANTA ROSA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Zavala, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Rosa. Patrol captured 1 pistol.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#270: 23 JULY 1931

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. Leon)

Lieutenants W.W. Stevens and Castillo, GN, with patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Cruces.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#271: 25 JULY 1931

Contact at **PAVONA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA-)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.F. Bryson, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Pavona.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
Bandits: Unknown.

#272: 26 JULY 1931

Contact at **SACKLIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)

Lieutenants C.J. Levonski and T.M. Stevenson, GN, with Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at Sacklin.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#273: 28 JULY 1931

Contact at **CHAMASTE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (341–359)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Chamaste. Patrol captured 4 shot-guns, shells, cartridges and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 wounded.

#274: 30 JULY 1931

Contact at **TOTOGALPA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (188–368)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Totogalpa. Patrol captured 25 cow-hides, hat bands and miscellaneous bandit articles. Also destroyed bandit camp.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#275: 14 AUGUST 1931

Contact at **LAS CUCHILLAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (255–330)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain A.R. Bourne, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Cuchillas. The Patrol captured 1 rifle, and various articles of clothing. Other officers in patrol were Lieutenants O.C. Ledbetter, GN, W.F. Pulver, and R.A. Thompson, GN.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#276: 23 AUGUST 1931

Contat at **LA MUTA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (192–361)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R.A. Trosper, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Muta.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#277: 26 AUGUST 1931

Contact at **BUENA VISTA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Buena Vista. Patrol captured 6 machetes, correspondence and red and black neckerchiefs.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.
2 killed.

#278: 29 AUGUST 1931

Contact at **CHAMASTE**, #2, Nicaragua, C.A. (341–359)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.K. Frisbie, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Chamaste. Patrol captured 1 S&W pistol .38, 3 Lewis Drums, 3 BAR magazines, 1 Krag rifle, 8 dynamite sticks, 10 yards of fuse, 3 dry bombs, 210 rounds of ammunition, 1 bugle, 2 bayonets, 5 haversacks, bandit guard book, bandit correspondence, flags, insignia and clothing. Other officers were Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
2 wounded.

#279: 3 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **ACOYAPA**, Nicaragua, C.A. (240–168)

A Guardia patrol had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Acoyapa. Patrol captured 2 pistols, 1 Krag rifle and 2 shotguns.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#280: 19 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **JICARITO**, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R.E. Vogel, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Jicarito.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#281: 22 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **SIERRO BOLSON**, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Sierro Bolson. Patrol captured 2 Krag rifles, 2 shot-guns, 8 cutachas and ammunition. Patrol in command of Sgt. Tapia, GN.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#282: 23 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **ASARYAL**, Jinotega, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M. A. Cramer, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Asaryal.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#283: 25 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **LAS NUBES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Nubes. Patrol captured 3 rifles, ammunition, dynamite, 2 cargo mules, 9 flashlights, 12 raincoats, 35 salbeques, 34 hats, 1 guitar, 6 pr shoes, 4 pr putees, 18 blankets, 9 towels, 1 clock, 20 pr trousers, 24 shirts, 400 cigars and 500 cigarettes, medicines, machetes, cutachas, belts, womens apparel, rubber sacks, cloth, candles, cartons of matches and innumerable other articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.
20 wounded.

#284: 25 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **SAN LUIS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. B. Hancock, GH, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Luis.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#285: 25 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **SAN DIEGO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.B. Hancock, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Diego. Partol captured 1 rifle and miscellaneous bandit articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#286: 25 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **SAN LUIS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R.A. Trosper, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Luis.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 wounded.

#287: 27 SEPTEMBER 1931

Contact at **SANTO TOMAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant L.A. Kalman, GN, had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santo Tomas. Patrol captured 1 rifle, cutachas. Destroyed a bandit camp.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.
2 captured.

#288: 3 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **NARANJA,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(158–333)(2d Brig. Spl.)

Captain G.A. Williams, GN, and Somoto Guardia patrol had contact with a bandit group of 40, believed to have been under jefe Juan Gregorio Colindres, near Naranja. The bandits employed rifles, revolvers and dynamite bombs. Guardia captured 4 rifles, 10 bombs, 12 dynamite sticks, 132 rounds ammunition, 7 cutachas, 1 rifle grenade discharger, rifle grenade carrier, 3 saddles, 2 horses, 12 blankets, 9 ponchos and large amount of miscellaneous articles of loot. Bandits fled in easterly direction.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
3 wounded.

#289: 6 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **MALETA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (200–333)(2d Brig. Spl)

Captain J.O. Brauer, GN, and Palacaguina Guardia patrol had a contact with a small group of bandits in Maleta near Limon. Engagement lasted a very short time. Bandits fled leaving behind miscellaneous articles of clothing including red-black hat bands.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#290: 9 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **CERRO DEL MOJON,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(232–322)(2d Brig. Spl.)

Lieutenant Matamoros, GN, and La Concordia Guardia patrol had a contact with a group of armed bandits near Cerro del Mojon. Contact lasted about two minutes.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 2 wounded.

#291: 12 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **(NORTH OF STO DOMINGO)**

(180–368) Nueva Segovia Map.

A Guardia patrol under charge of a Non-commissioned Officer had contact with a group of armed bandits north of Sto. Domingo. Jefe unknown. The patrol was fired upon and returned the fire killing one. Bandit camp destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.

#292: 12 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **LA MUTA,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(194–357)(Nueva Segovia Map)

Lieutenant C.A. Brown, GN, and Yalaguina Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Felicito Prado at La Muta. Contact took place in very heavy underbrush. The Guardia captured cutachas, machetes, blankets, hammock, tobacco, hat bands, clothing, rope, other miscellaneous articles and destroyed a bandit camp.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#293: 13 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **ZAPOTE MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(168–347)(Nueva Segovia Map)

Captain G.A. Williams, GN, and Somoto Guardia patrol returned to Somoto on October 14. Reports having picked up bandit tracks in the morning of October 13 near Zapote Mountain and followed same to point 169–346 (Nueva Segovia Map) where newly constructed camp was located and destroyed. The bandits were apparently warned of approach of the patrol and fled, leaving behind various articles of food and clothing. Followed tracks to southeast and at 1.00 PM sighted a large group across deep ravine near point 172–345 (Nueva Segovia Map) fleeing to south. Followed group to point 169–343 (Nueva Segovia Map) where part of group, apparently to facilitate escape of main group, formed a firing line some two hundred yards long on small hills, and opened fire on patrol at range of about three thousand yards as latter approached across open valley. Due to long range, fire was not returned by patrol until within about four hundred yards when bandits prepared to abandon position. Bandits fled to hills on flanks which were bombed with rifle grenades. The patrol pursued the main group towards point 175–341 (Nueva Segovia Map) firing at small groups of stragglers at long range. Darkness overtook the patrol at the last named location and shortly afterwards the bandits split into small groups proceeding across country in various directions but mostly south. The natives claim the group numbered over one hundred, but, from views of columns from considerable distance, the patrol leader believes the number to have been approximately eighty, three-fourths armed with rifles or revolvers, no machine guns, and carrying a large red flag. The jefes were recognized as Santos Benavides, Daniel Rios and a Colonel Morales. The patrol pursued to point of exhaustion but due to nature of the country and rapid flight of the bandits, close contact could not be gained with main group before darkness made possible their escape. During more than five hours pursuit the bandits abandoned various articles, including bayonets, cutachas, flashlights, food and clothing. On the morning of October 14th the patrol, was unable to pick up definite tracks or information other than vague report that the group was thought to be proceeding towards Colorado (179–334) (Nueva Segovia Map).

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#294: 14 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **BIG FALLS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (114–309)(Pefely Map)

Lieutenant C. Rodriguez, GN, Lieutenant J.L. McClung, GN, and Guardia patrol from Bluefields (5th Regt. Map 28-KK.4) had contact with bandits at Big Falls.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.
7 wounded.

#295: 18 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **LA MUTA,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(192–358)(Nueva Segovia Map)

Lieutenant G.K. Burt, GN, and Totogalpa (178–354) Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under a minor jefe, Catalino Vargas, in the vicinity of point 192–358 (Nueva Segovia Map) near La Muta. The bandits were armed with rifles, shot-guns, pistols and cutachas. The Guardia captured several hats with red and black bands. Destroyed a bandit camp. Guardia patrol pursued bandits after the engagement but were unable to regain contact.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#296: 22 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **LIMON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (200–353)(2d Brig. Spl.)

Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, and Palacaguina Guardia patrol located and destroyed a small bandit camp near Limon. Camp consisted of two shacks occupied by five or six bandits, armed with two shot-guns and three pistols, under a minor jefe, Rosendo Munoz. The patrol killed one bandit, identified as Quintero Cupertino. Captured 1 cutacha, 2 machetes, 3 hat bands, 1 flashlight, 1 powder horn, detonators for shot-gun shells, 1 bag with medicines, small quantity of rifle and pistol ammunition, lead balls for shot-guns, a Juez de Mesta commission signed by Ortez and Salgado, also miscellaneous articles such as soap, mochillas (knapsacks) and scabbards. No Guardia casualties.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#297: 23 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (227–365)(2d Brig. Spl)

Captain G.K. Frisbie, Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol had contact with a bandit group armed, under jefe Roque Vargas near Las Cruces. Group was armed mostly with cutachas and pistols. Captured 1 pistol, bandit letter and other miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.
Wounded several.

#298: 24 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **LA MUTA,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(194–357)(Nueva Segovia Map)
Lieutenant C.A. Brown, GN, and Yalaguina Guardia patrol had contact with a small group of bandits, jefe unknown, near La Muta. Patrol destroyed two small bandit camps. Captured 8 rounds of Krag ammunition, 1 cutacha, 1 cartridge belt, 1 raincoat, several blankets and articles of clothing including shoes. Also a commission of Felicito Prado as Captain, signed by Sandino.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#299: 24 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **LAIMUS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (141–352)(Pefley Map)
Lieutenant E.J. Suprenaut, GN, and Kisalaya Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits number estimated at 100 and armed with rifles and two sub-Thompson Guns, on the outskirts of Laimus.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Killed several.

#300: 27 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **CUYUTINGNI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (152–337)(Pefley Map)
Lieutenant F. Gaitan, GN, and Puerto Cabezas Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits estimated as 50 under jefe Chavarria at Cuyutingni.
Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
Bandits: 7 killed.

#301: 27 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **SAULALLA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (24.3-B.4 5th Reg. Map)
Lieutenant T.M. Stephenson, GN, and Kisalaya Guardia patrol had a contact at Saulalla with a large armed group of bandits, leader reported to be Altamirano.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#302: 30 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **LA QUINTECA,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(43.7–24.8 Mc Donald Map)
Lieutenant J.M. Stanko, GN, and Condega Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Umanzor at La Quinteca. Bandit casualties 1 killed and several wounded. Patrol captured 1 pistol cal. .38, 1 poncho, red and black hat bands, 5 pair of shoes, 8 horses and 4 saddles. Dead bandit buried at place of contact. Bandits armed with rifles and pistols.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#303: 31 OCTOBER 1931

Contact at **SAN BENITO,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(299–373)(Nueva Segovia Map)

Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, Lieutenant Whitford, GN, and San Juan de Telpaneca Guardia patrol had contact with an armed group of bandits at San Benito, jefe unknown.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

#304: 1 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **LATUNA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (177–342 2d Brig. Spl.)

Lieutenant C.A. Brown, GN, and Yalaguina Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under jefe Felicito Prado, number unknown, in vicinity of a point on trail between Palacaguina and Yalaguina about one and one half mile north of Latuna at 2:00 AM. No Guardia casualties. Captured 1 pistol, 1 shot-gun, 2 cutachas, red and black hat bands, 2 hammocks, 3 blankets and large bundle of stolen articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#305: 2 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **SANTA ROSA,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(189–274 2d Brig. Spl.)

Lieutenant H.D. Hutchcroft, GN, and El Sauce Guardia patrol had contact with a group of bandits, estimated as 100, fully clad in khaki clothing, under jefes Juan Morales and Jose Leon Diaz and possibly Salgado. Contact lasted one half hour. The guardia lost three rifles and a small quantity of ammunition. Late reports state that one jefe was shot through the stomach and has probably died, another jefe has a broken arm from bullet wounds and that several bandits were wounded.

Known casualties: GN: 3 killed.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#306: 9 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **TRINIDAD,** Nicaragua, C.A. (204–286 2d Brig. Spl.)

Lieutenant Zavala and La Trinidad Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Jose Leon Diaz at a point west of Trinidad. No results.

Known casualties:GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#307: 11 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **CANAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (158–352 2d Brig. Spl.)

Captain G.A. Williams, GN, and Somoto Guardia patrol had a contact with a group of bandits armed, under jefe Segundo Alfaro near Canas. Bandits scattered in all directions. Located and destroyed a well hidden and well fortified bandit camp with long and rock firing positions and two machine gun emplacements covering approaches to camp.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#308: 11 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **MILIGROS,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(242–384 Nueva Segovia Map)

Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, and Jicaro guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, near Miligros. Patrol captured 2 prisoners, 1 bomb, 3 sticks dynamite and correspondence. Destroyed a bandit camp and supplies.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#309: 15 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(222–358 2d Brig. Spl.)

A Group of approximately fifty bandits, jefe unknown, attacked the town of San Juan de Telpaneca. The attack lasted fifteen minutes when the bandits were driven off. Cuartel was commanded by Lieutenant E.N. Munoz, Lieutenant F.M. Wysaski, GN, Lieutenant L. Witford, GN.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#310: 16 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **QUILALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (235–358 2d Brig. Spl.)
A Group of bandits, jefe unknown, and estimated at one hundred attacked the town of Quilali. Firing lasted nearly an hour when bandits were driven off. Cuartel was commanded by Captain G.K. Frisbie, GN, and Lieutenant W.C. Smith, GN.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#311: 20 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **OJOCHE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (217–351 2d Brig. Spl.)
Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, and San Juan de Telpaneca Guardia patrol attacked a bandit camp between Ojoche and El Silencio. Patrol destroyed camp and captured 2 bombs, 3 sticks of dynamite, 5 detonators, 10 rounds of ammunition, fuses, red and black hat bands and correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
2 wounded.

#312: 22 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **CHICHIGALPA,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(113–250 2d Brig. Spl)
Two groups thought to be under Colindres and Umanzor attacked the town of Chichigalpa on the Railroad, on the night of November 22-23. Bandit strength unknown but estimated at least 100. Lieutenant H.E. Dumas, GN, with four enlisted guardia and 23 volunteer civilians had cleared Chinandega via train for Posoltega to investigate report of presence of bandits at that point. Upon arrival near R.R. Station at Chichigalpa, Dumas was informed of the presence of bandits in the town by the two guardia stationed there. Dumas detrained and while approaching station his patrol was fired upon. This started a running fight which covered a good share of the town and lasted about 30 minutes. Bandits were finally driven from town after robbing some stores and individuals. 13 prisoners were captured. Four rifles were missing from the Guardia Cuartel. One Municipal Guardia was wounded.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.
13 captured.

#313: 22 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **HATO GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (237–200)
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.H. Krieger, GN, had contact with a group of bandits north of Zambrano near Hato Grande. Jefe unknown. Patrol captured 1 pistol, cutachas and ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 wounded.
4 captured.

#314: 25 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **MAYOCUNDA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (150–280 2d Brig. Spl)
Lieutenant C. Hennrich, GN, and Guardia patrol with civicos had contact with a group of armed bandits near Mayocunda, jefe believed to be Colindres. Bandits operated from Three sides. Contact lasted forty minutes. Jamming of Browning and Thompson guns compelled patrol to break off contact. No Guardia casualties.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#315: 26 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **ESCARBADERO,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(179–357)(Nueva Segovia Map)

Lieutenant Montenegro, GN, and Totogalpa Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at Escarbadero. Jefe believed to be Umanzor.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Wounded several.

#316: 26 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **CICERA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Villa Nueva)

Captain S.B. Griffin, GN, Lieutenant L. Henderson, GN, and Guardia patrol of El Sauce were attacked by group of armed bandits estimated at 300 at Cicera, near Villa Nueva. Fight lasted one and one half hours. Bandits had machine guns and were aggressive. Guardia could not pursue the bandits due to shortage of ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 5 killed.
Wounded several.

#317: 28 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **SAN PABLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (148–290 2d Brig. Spl.)

Lieutenant Barillas, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Colindres at San Pablo.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded.
Bandits: 8 killed. (Not)
20 wounded. (Verified)

#318: 28 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **LAS POZAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (7.3–H.2 5th Regt. Map)

Lieutenant R.A. Thompson, GN, six enlisted Guardias and Twenty civicos had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Pozas. Contact lasted 25 minutes. Four animals captured with saddles, 1 drum carrier for TSMG, 1 rifle 30-30 and 1 pistol.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#319: 28 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **OLOMEGA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (132–267 2d Brig. Plt.)

Lieutenant Lopez, GN, and patrol of Guardias and auxiliaries had contact with a group of armed bandits between Olomega and Las Grietas. Captured 5 mules.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#320: 29 NOVEMBER 1931

Contact at **EL CUADRO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (154–258 2d Brig, Spl.)

Lieutenant G.E. Gardner, GN, with 10 Guardias and 53 auxiliaries had contact with a group of armed bandits at El Cuadro, near Las Zapatas. Bandits estimated at 80. Jefe unknown.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded (auxiliaries)
Bandits: 3 wounded.

#321: 2 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **EL MOJADO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (near La Rota)

Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, and patrol of Guardias and auxiliaries had contact with a group of about thirty armed bandits believed to be part of Morales' group at El Mojado, five miles northwest of La Rota. Group fled to the northwest.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Several wounded.

#322: 5 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **REGADILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(915–GG.5 5th Regt. Map)

Captain G.K. Frisbie, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with group of between 40 and 60 thought to be under Colindres and Morales near Regadillo. Bandits were armed and fled, patrol pursued them for two leagues and attacked group. Captured one rifle, animals and clothing. Further pursuit was impracticable due to darkness. Bandits retreated to some point northeast of Limay.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#323: 6 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **KISALAYA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Eastern Area)

Lieutenant T.M. Stephenson, GN, and Kisalaya Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at one mile south of Kisalaya.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#324: 14 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **GRECIA MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Limay)

Lieutenant Zamora, GN, and Limay patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits, under jefe Julian Gutierrez at a point about half-way between Limay and Grecia Mine. Patrol captured 1 shot-gun, 2 bombs, 2 cutachas, numerous hat-bands, supplies and numerous miscellaneous articles. Bandits were pursued by patrol and also by patrol under Lieutenant Livermore. Further contact, however, could not be gained as bandits scattered in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
3 wounded.

#325: 16 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **TERRO GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(193–365 NS Map)

Lieutenant M. Berueffy, GN, and Totogalpa Guardia patrol had contact with bandit group, jefe Cosme Gutierrez near Terrero Grande. Patrol captured few rounds of ammunition, 45 caliber and 30 caliber Krag. Destroyed camp.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#326: 16 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **LA PODRILLA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (222–370 NS Map)

Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol and civicos had contact at La Podrilla with a group of armed bandits estimated at fifty, jefe unknown. Bandits were armed with one Sub-Thompson machine gun, 20 rifles and the balance cutachas. Contact lasted 35 minutes. Bandits retreated toward point (230–380 NS Map). Patrol captured hats, cutachas and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (civico)
Bandits: 2 killed.
Wounded several.

#327: 18 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **SANTA TERESA,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(Near La Constancia)

Lieutenant W.F. Bryson, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Teresa in the Valley of La Constancia. Destroyed large camp capable of holding three hundred and believed to be main camp of Estrada. Contact was had with small garrison guarding camp. Captured pictures, correspondence, cutachas and some ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#328: 19 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **MONTE RICO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (245–393 NS Map)

Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, and San Juan Guardia patrol and civicos (combined San Juan and Apali patrol) had contact with a group of armed bandits under Sebastian Montenegro near Monte Rico. Jefe Sebastian Montenegro killed. Captured 1 pistol, 4 cutachas, and miscellaneous articles including important correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Wounded several.

#329: 20 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **SAN ALBINO MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A.

(238–384 NS Map)

Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits north of San Albino Mine. Bandits dispersed into heavy underbrush. Captured one bandit suspect.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.
Captured 1.

#330: 22 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **SAN ISIDRO,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(Department of Matagalpa)

A bandit group estimated at 200 or more, jefes Jorge Altamirano, Colonel Sandoval, Colonel Padilla, Colonel Herrera and Major Salinas, attacked the Cuartel at San Isidro, Department of Matagalpa at 1630 from all sides. The Cuartel was defended by Lieutenant H.J. Elliott, GN, and seventeen guardias. The fight lasted until 1915, when the bandits withdrew to the northward. Bandits were armed with 2 Sub-Thompson, 1 BAR or Lewis, rifles, pistols, and dynamite bombs. They were well supplied with ammunition. Bandits left in direction of San Lorenzo and Colon Valley. Four Guardia patrol in pursuit.

Known casualties: GN: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

Bandits: 5 killed.
18 wounded.

#331: 22 DECEMBER 1931

Contact at **SAN ISIDOR,** Nicaragua, C.A. (208–283)

Lieutenant C.W. Johnson, GN, with La Trinidad Guardia patrol of of 11 enlisted and 3 civicos had a contact with the group of bandits under Jorge Altamirano, which had attacked San Isidro earlier in day, about one mile north San Isidro. Fight lasted about 10 minutes. Bandits scattered in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#332: **26 DECEMBER 1931**

Contact at **CHIPOTE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (254–378 NS Map)

Captain G.K. Frisbe, GN, and Guardia patrol of 30 enlisted from Quilali ambushed a group of armed bandits at a point three leagues east of Quilali. The patrol leader believes the wounded bandit was either Pedron Altamirano or Julian Gutierrez. Patrol gained information, confirmed by captured correspondence signed by Sandino dated Dec 24, indicating Sandino and Colindres cleared above point at daylight Dec 25 in the direction of Jinotega. Same patrol located and destroyed six deserted bandit camps which gave evidence of having been used by Sandino at various times near Chipon. Captured three good animals, small amount of ammunition, correspondence, and a seal.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

#333: **28 DECEMBER 1931**

Contact at **CHIPOTE AREA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenants J. Hamas, GN, and Lieutenant E. Munoz, GN, and combined patrol from Jicaro and San Juan (NA) had two contacts, one on Dec 28 and one Dec 29 with outposts of Sandino's main camp northeast of Chipote area. Marcelino Castellano was killed and Rafael Altamirano was wounded, he is a staff officer of Sandino and a relative of Pedro Altamirano. Captured watch, panels, bombs, important correspondence and many miscellaneous articles. Patrols forced outposts of Sandino's main camp to retreat. Reported Sandino himself with well armed bodyguard, fled to the southeast toward Cua Area.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 3 killed.
Wounded several.

#334: **30 DECEMBER 1931**

Contact at **GUADALUPE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Mayocunda)

Captain E.J. Trumble, GN, and patrol of cadets and Auxiliares from Villa Nueva had contact with Juan Morales and his group of armed bandits at Guadalupe, eight miles southeast of Mayocunda at 1500 on December 30. Patrol killed six animals. Six dead bandits counted including two colonels. Jefe Juan Morales seriously wounded and natives report he died following day. Captured arms, ammunition and correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 6 killed. (estimated 11)
15 wounded (estimated)

#335: 4 JANUARY 1932

Contact at **GUALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (221–376 NS Map)

Lieutenant C. Rodriguez, GN, and (NA) Guardia patrol from Jicaro had contact at 0930 at Guali, with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown. The fight lasted ten minutes. Reliable agent reported two killed and several wounded. Patrol captured detonators, cutachas, hats, correspondence and miscellaneous articles. Bandits employed one Sub-Thompson Machine Gun, rifles, and revolvers.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 known wounded.

#336: 7 JANUARY 1932

Contact at **PANTASMA VALLEY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Captain A.C. Small, GN, and San Rafael (CA) Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits in Pantasma Valley. Exact place unknown.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#337: 9 JANUARY 1932

Contact at **PANTASMA VALLEY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Captain A.C. Small, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits in Pantasma Valley, exact place ununknown.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 wounded.

#338: 18 JANUARY 1932:

Contact at **BROWNS CAMP,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(27.6–D.2 6th Reg. Map)

Lieutenant C.J. Levonski, GN, and Guardia patrol of 20 enlisted from Puerto Cabezas had contact with group of 100 bandits, jefe unknown at Browns camp.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#339: 19 JANUARY 1932

Contact at **AMERICA,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(42.8–25.6 Esteli Map)

1st Sgt Ayala and Guardia patrol from Condega (NA) had two contacts with group of armed bandits estimated at 150 and dressed in khaki and wearing Guardia hat cords and insignia, under Salgado Morales and Benavides near America. Lieutenant Clark and patrol of 20 enlisted arrived in time to participate in contact with same group. Captured 1 Krag rifle, 1 pistol, dynamite bombs and correspondence. Bandits retreated in northwesterly direction from America.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed (jefe)
8 wounded.

#340: 1 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **NEPTUNE MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)
Civicos of Neptune Mine had contact with a group of bandits in vicinity of Neptune Mine. Civicos captured two shot-guns. Group evidently under Gonzalez, Rivera and Castro.
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (civico)
Bandits: 4 killed.

#341: 1 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **EL CORAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (213–385 NS Map)
Sergeant Acevedo, GN, and patrol of Guardias from Jicaro (NA) had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Bernabe Espinales at El Coras.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.
1 captured.

#342: 2 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **VICINITY OF NEPTUNE MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)
Lieutenant E.T. Grey, GN, and Guardia patrol made contact with an armed bandit group in vicinity of Neptune Mine at 1 PM.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#343: 2 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **NEPTUNE MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)
Lieutenant E.T. Gray, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits in the vicinity of Neptune Mine at 3 PM. Captured four arms and ammunition. Destroyed large quantity of loot. This group evidently under Gonzales, Rivera and Castro. Patrol returned to Neptune Mine on 3 February due to lack of ammunition.
Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.
Wounded unknown.

#344: 2 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **BLANDON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (138–248 Kenyon Map)
Lieutenants M.A. Cramer, GN, and C.T. Brannon, GN, and Guardia patrol of 28 enlisted had two contacts with bandit group of 100 under Daniel Hernandez and Juan Martinez. First contact lasted two and one half hours from 0600 to 0900 when bandits retired scene of contact at Asayran, northeast of Blandon, crossing of Tuma River. Second contact at point (138–252) Kenyon Map, with probably same group, occurred at 1430 and lasted thirty minutes when bandits withdrew.
Known casualties: GN: 2 killed.
2 wounded (Including Lieutenant Brannon who was slightly wounded in face.
Bandits: 4 dead.

#345: 4 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **EL TULE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Captain A.C. Small, GN, and San Rafael (CA) Guardia patrol returned Yali, had contact at El Tule with group of armed bandits estimated at 25. Jefe unknown.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#346: 5 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **LOS ANGELES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Lieutenants M.A. Cramer, GN, and C.T. Brannon, GN, with 30 enlisted Guardias returned from combat mission. In contact with bandit group between Los Angeles and Pavona. Jefe Perfeto Gutirrez, group estimated at forty. Contact lasted fifteen minutes.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#347: 7 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **SANTA ISABELLA,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(140–247 Kenyon Map-)

Lieutenant O.E. Pennington, GN, and Guardia patrol from Navarro had contact with bandit group in vicinity of Blandon, near Santa Isabella. Contact lasted 15 minutes. Destroyed four bandit camps in immediate vicinity of contact. Captured 1 rifle, several articles of clothing and cutachas. Destroyed quantity of food stuffs.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#348: 8 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **CARRETERA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Lieutenant O.E. Pennington, GN, and Navarro Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits estimated at 40 at Carretera at 2 PM. Contat lasted 20 minutes. Jefe unknown.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

#349: 14 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **SAN ANTONIO,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(138–257 Kenyon Map)

Captain J.P. Schwerin, GN, Lieutenant C.F. Brannon, GN, and Guardia patrol from Corinto Finca had contact with group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, near San Antonio. Fight lasted 25 minutes. Bandits dispersed and fled.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
Bandits: Wounded several.

#350: 19 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **OJOCHE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Northern area patrol had contact with group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, in El Silencio Area near Ojoche. Fight lasted about five minutes. Captured 1 shot-gun, 1 cutacha, 2 dynamite bombs and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#351: 22 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **OBREGON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Chinandega)

Lieutenant C. Cuadra (MC) and Chinandega patrol of 5 Guardias, 6 Municipal Police and 5 auxiliaries had contact near Obregon, about 7 miles south of Chinandega at 1730, with group of about thirty armed bandits, jefe unknown. Fight lasted 5 minutes, when bandits fled in three directions. 1st Sgt Chavarria and another Guardia patrol took up the pursuit.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded

#352: 24 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **CARACOL,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(812–H.7 5th Reg. Spl.)

Lieutenant C.H. Clark, GN, and Guardia patrol from Daraili had contact with large bandit group thought to be under Salgado and Umanzor, near Caracol, between Villa Nueva and Limay. Fight lasted two hours when bandits were dispersed, fleeing in all diretions with main group heading northwest. Guardia patrols from El Sauce and Limay took up the pursuit.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
4 wounded.
Bandits: 8 killed.
Wounded several.

#353: 25 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **CRING CRING,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(21.8–BB.6 5th Reg. Spl.)

Lieutenant E.J. Suprenant, GN, and Guardia patrol from Kisalaya (EA) had contact with a group of armed bandits at Cring Cring.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

Patrol captured 15 pitpans, 2 shot-guns, ammunition, correspondence, equipment and large amount of loot, previously taken by the bandits from the Louisana Commissary.

#354: 28 FEBRUARY 1932

Contact at **NACASCOLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (183–298 2d Brig. Spl.)

Lieutenants Mendoza and Zavala, both GN, and patrol of 21 enlisted Guardias from Esteli (EA) had contact with group of 250 reported under Colindres, Salgado and Umanzor at 1100, at Nispero, near Nacascolo. Fight lasted one half hour. Bandits used Brownings, Thompsons and rifle grenades.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
Wounded several

#355: 2 MARCH 1932

Contact at **PENA BLANCA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (275–333 2d Brig. Spl)

Guardia combat patrol from Navarro commanded by Lieutenants O.E. Pennington, GN, S.M. Ragsdale, GN, and O.J. Gumaelious, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Pena Blanca. Patrol destroyed bandit camp and quantity of supplies.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#356: 3 MARCH 1931

Contact at **LLANO LARGO,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(218–304 2d Brig. Spl.)

Guardia combat patrol from La Concordia had contact at Llano Largo with a group of armed bandits, jefe believed to be Valdivia. Patrol destroyed bandit samp and supplies.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.

#357: 6 MARCH 1932

Contact at **EL JICARAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (184–268 2d Brig. Spl.)

Lieutenant S.D. Atha, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Salgado, Socrates Sandino, Estrada and Salinas on mountain overlooking El Jicaral. Bandits estimated at 200. Fight lasted about two hours when bandits dispersed. Had second contact at long range two hours later which lasted fifteen minutes. Main group of bandits retreated towards the southwest.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#358: 11 MARCH 1932

Contact at **SAN BENITO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–372 NS Map)

Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol had contact at 2000 with bandit group. Jefe Filiberto Reyes at San Benito. Guardia surrounded bandit camp and attacked. Captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, 112 rounds of ammunition, cutachas and quantity of Sandino correspondence and propaganda pamphlets.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 8 killed.
Several wounded.

#359: 12 MARCH 1932

Contact at **RICO MONTANA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (211–405 NS Map)

Lieutenant Zamora, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits estimated at fifty under Colindres and Jose Leon Diaz at Rico Montana. Fight lasted 10 minutes, when bandits scattered across border into Honduras. Many blood trails were found.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#360: 13 MARCH 1932

Contact at **VALLE DE LAS ZAPATAS,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(8.0–EE.9 5th Reg.)(Special Map——)

Lieutenant Lopez, GN, and patrol of Guardias from Department of Leon had contact with bandit group under Umanzor at El Chote, six leagues northeast of Valle de las Zapatas. Fight lasted 40 minutes when bandits were routed and they dispersed in all directions. Blood trails were found. Captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, 2 Thompson drums, 2 magazines, 9 bombs, 5 grenades, 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition, 1 pair of field glasses, 2 pistols and many other miscellaneous articles. It is belief of patrol leader that Umanzor was wounded during the fight.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.
Wounded unknown.

#361: 20 MARCH 1932

Contact at **COYOLITO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (6.9–GG.9,5 Reg. Spl.)

Sergeant Samuel Acosta, GN, with a patrol of Guardias and several civicos from San Francisco de Guanijiquilapa had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Teodulo Molina at Coyolito. Captured 1 shot-gun. Bandits were dispersed in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#362: 24 MARCH 1932

Contact at **CHILAMATAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Limay)

Sgt. Palma, GN, and patrol of Guardias from Limay had contact with a group of armed bandits at Chilamatal in the Rio Negro District. 4 leagues northwest of Limay. Bandits armed with rifles and shot-guns. Fight lasted 10 minutes after which bandits fled in all directions. Group thought to be part of Julian Gutierrez.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#363: 25 MARCH 1932

Contact at **EL ROBLE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (8.3–G.3 5th Reg. Spl)

Lieutenant C.A. Brown, GN, and Potaste Guardia patrol and two civicos had contact at El Roble with a group of armed bandits under Captain Indalecio Ruiz.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed. (Including jefe Ruiz)
Wounded several.

#364: 31 MARCH 1932

Contact at **CHACARAS GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(Near Cinco Pinos)

Lieutenant L.A. Kalman, GN, and Guardia patrol from Somotillo had contact with a group of armed bandits estimated at fifty under Umanzor at Chacaras Grande, one league northwest of Cinco Pinos. Lieutenant Kalman and patrol took up trail and caught bandits. Fight lasted 20 minutes when bandits dispersed. Bandits were armed with two Sub-Thompsons, 30 rifles and pistols.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#365: 1 APRIL 1932

Contact at **LAS NIEVES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Pena Blanca)

Captain R.L. Griffin, GN, and Company "M" had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Nieves, about two leagues North of Pena Blanca. Jefe thought to be Tomas Pineda. One Guardia Officer slightly wounded.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (officer)
Bandits: Unknown.

#366: 3 APRIL 1932

Contact at **SAN JUAN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Enlisted hunting party of 4 men from San Juan had contact with a group of armed bandits about one half league out of town. Later information states this group to be a band of robbers.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#367: 5 APRIL 1932

Contact at **VILLA NUEVA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (145–301)

Bandit group of between 150 and 200 attacked the Guardia Cuartel at Villa Nueva, garrisoned, at the time, by Lieutenant Centeno, GN, 9 enlisted and about 5 civicos. The attack started at 0100 and lasted until 0430 when the bandits withdrew to the north. Bandits used machine guns, rifles and hand bombs. Bandits were aggressive, and some hand to hand fighting occurred. Indications of bandits killed and wounded.

Known casualties: GN: 5 wounded (2 Guardia and 3 civicos)
Bandits: Unknown.

#368: 8 APRIL 1932

Contact at **LA CONSTANCIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Captain A.C. Small, GN, Lieutenant G.D. Snyder, GN, and patrol of 30 enlisted had contact with a group of approximately 40 armed bandits in La Constancia Area. Jefe unknown. Bandits were routed. Group apparently part of a bandit outpost.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
Wounded several.

#369: 11 APRIL 1932

Contact at **APANAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Lieutenants G.F. Haubensack, GN, and D.R. Downey, GN, with patrol of Guardias had contact with a group of armed bandits jefe unknown at Apanas, 5 miles north of Jinotega. Bandits scattered in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#370: 11 APRIL 1932

Contact at **TUMA RIVER,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(357–877 Jinot. Matag. Map)

Lieutenant O.C. Ledbetter, GN, and Lieutenant O.J. Gumaelious, GN with a Guardia patrol had contact with an armed group of bandits about 2 leagues east of Rufino Lopez' Crossing, on the Tuma River. Large quantity of food supplies captured and destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
2 wounded.

#371: 12 APRIL 1932

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (241–370 2d Brig Spl.)

Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits north of Las Cruces. Large amount of blood found at scene of contact. Contact lasted five minutes.

Known casualties: GN: Civilian Guide killed.
Bandits: Unknown.

#372: 15 APRIL 1932

Contact at **SAN JUAN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant F.O. Beans, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Heriberto Reyes about 2 leagues from San Juan on the Quilali trail. Contact lasted fifteen minutes.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#373: 19 APRIL 1932

Contact at **SANTA BARBARA,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(113–235 Kenyon Map)

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, (n) and Guardia patrol from San Rafael had contact with a group of armed bandits estimated at 150 reported under Pedron and Juan Altamirano and Transito Sequeira at Santa Barbara. Contact lasted one and one half hours. Bandits were driven from a fortified positon on a hill and dispersed in all directions. They used two or more automatic weapons throughout the fight. Captured six horses, saddles, and bridles, one pistol and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#374: 21 APRIL 1932

Contact at **LAS PUERTAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (210–390 NS Map)

Lieutenant L.T. Covington, GN, and Jalapa Guardia patrol of 11 enlisted had contact near Las Puertas with a group of 200 well armed bandits, jefe unknown. Fighting very intense. Bandit casualties unknown but indications of many killed and wounded.

Known casualties: GN: 4 killed.
Bandits: Unknown.

#375: 21 APRIL 1932

Contact at **LAS PUERTAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Apali)

Lieutenant L.C. Brunton, GN, Lieutenant L.T. Covington, GN, and Lieutenant F.M. Whitehead, GN, with Apali Guardia patrol and remainder of Jalapa patrol had contact with same group as above southwest of Las Puertas toward Apali. The fighting again was very intense. Indications of many killed and wounded bandits.

Known casualties: GN: 6 killed (Including Lieutenants Brunton (Covington and Whitehead)
Bandits: Unknown.

#376: 21 APRIL 1932

Contact at **SAN FERNANDO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant C.W. Johnson, GN, and Lieutenant Zamora, GN, with Apali patrol had the third contact with the same group at 1530 at a point short distance west of scene of second contact. Bandits were driven to the west toward San Fernando carrying many dead and wounded.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#377: 21 APRIL 1932

Contact at **KISALAYA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)

The Guardia deserters from Kisalaya together with about 30 bandits attacked the cuartel at Kisalaya at 0300. Bandits and deserters were driven off after severe fighting. Ex-Sergeant Sebastian Jimenez, the leader of the deserters was found among the dead. Lieutenant F.Gaitan, GN, in command.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded (Including Lieutenant Gaitan)
Bandits: 4 dead.

#378: 23 APRIL 1932

Contact at **SACASTE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (102–235 Kenyon Map)

Lieutenants G.R. Weeks, GN, and C.L. Ashbrook, GN, and Guardia patrol from San Rafael had contact with group of seventy under Juan Altamirano at Sacaste. Fight lasted ten minutes.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#379: 23 APRIL 1932

Contact at **GUAMBUCO MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(10.9-E 8th Reg Map)

Lieutenants J. Hamas, GN, J.A. Burns, GN, D.H. Wallace, GN, and Guiterrez, GN, and combined (NA) Guardia patrol of 40 enlisted had contact with Carlos Salgado and Fulgencio Hernandez and group of 100, at 1530, at their main camp near Guanbuco Mountain. Bandits employed automatic weapons, rifles and bombs. Fighting lasted for twenty five minutes when bandits scattered. Patrol captured 1 Krag Rifle, 300 rounds Springfield and Krag ammunition, 1 mule saddle, provisions of Covington pack train, part of clothes and equipment of Lieutenants Covington and Whitehead, 1000 arrobas of corn, 1 beef, 20 sticks of dynamite, 3 dynamite bombs, bandit correspondence. The patrol occupied the camp. At 1800 the bandits attacked the camp and attempted to drive Guardia from it with grenades and rifle fire Bandits were driven off after ten minutes of fighting. About 0530 on the 24th, the bandits again attempted to take the camp and after fifteen minutes of fighting were again driven off and scattered in all directions. One more rifle and several rounds of ammunition were captured.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 3 killed.
Wounded several.

#380: 24 APRIL 1932

Contact at **LOMA DEL NANCIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Colon Valley)

Lieutenants G.R. Weeks, GN, and C.L. Ashbrook, GN, and same Central Area patrol from San Rafael had second contact with same group at 0950 at Loma del Nancia. Fight lasted 15 minutes. Captured 12 horses, 12 saddles, 12 handgrenades and Guardia clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#381: 24 APRIL 1932

Contact at **EL HORNO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Matagalpa)

Enlisted patrol of four men from Algovia had contact lasting two minutes with Alfredo Rizo and Small bandit group near El Horno at 1100. Guardia captured two mules, saddles and equipment and two civil prisoners who confessed being members of Rizo's group on other occasion.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 captured.

#382: 26 APRIL 1932

Contact at **NORTHEAST OF OCOTAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenants J. Hamas, GN, J.A. Burns, GN, R.E. Voge. GN, F. Cadrera, GN, L. Gutierrez, GN, and Guardia patrol of 45 enlisted had contact northeast of Ocotal, Nueva Segovia, near the frontier, which lasted for three hours, contact began at 4:00 PM 26 April. Patrol discovered and attacked what is thought to be main camp of Sandino. Sandino thought to be present during the fight, also ex-sergeant Garcia and ex-corporal Cornejo who deserted from Quilali. Camp consisted of about thirty-five shacks, some of them large. Bandits were estimated at two hundred and fifty and formed firing line six hundred yards in length, Guardia occupied bandit defensive positions which were of logs and rocks about one hundred and fifty yards from bandit positions and well prepared, bandits evidently did not have time to occupy these positions and retired across ravine over which firing line took place. Bandits tried to flank patrol but Lieutenant Vogel on right flank with 2 Thompsons and 2 BARs counter-attacked and drove them off; bandits scattered in all directions. Bandits employed at least 8 automatic weapons, rifles, pistols, rifle grenades and bombs. Lieutenants Burns and Guiterrez held left flank. Lieutenant Hamas in command. Captured bandit correspondence, 6 rifles, several drums of Thompson with ammunition. Upon arrival of Guardia patrol bandits had everything packed up, evidently intending to move camp therefore most of their supplies and equipment taken with them in their flight. They retreated to westward across border into Honduras. Guardia patrol combed all trails north and west but could not regain contact. Camp completely destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (slightly)
Bandits: 10 killed (Including Florencia Silva) (Chief Judge of Sandino)
Wounded several.

#383: 1 MAY 1932

Contact at **LACUYA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (215–377)

Lieutenant J.A. Burns, GN, and Lieutenant Guiterrez, GN, with Northern Area patrol of 35 Guardias had contact with group of 60 bandits under Heriberto Reyes at Lacuya. Fight lasted 25 minutes. Bandits used 2 automatic weapons and rifle grenades. They were driven from their camp and fled to the south. Contact could not be regained. Bandit camp was destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded (slightly)
Bandits: 1 killed.
4 wounded.

#384: 5 MAY 1932

Contact at **COLON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–318)

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and Guardia patrol of 12 enlisted from La Concordia had contact with group of 30 bandits under Juan Altamirano and Jesus Valdivia near Colon. Fight lasted 30 minutes. Captured 1 pistol, small quantity of rifle and pistol ammunition, 3 animals.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Wounded several.

#385: 8 MAY 1932

Contact at **MULAGROS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (242–386)

Lieutenants M.M. Mahoney, GN, J. Hamas, GN, Zamora, GN, and Aleman, GN, and Northern Area patrol of 36 enlisted had contact with bandit group under Sinforoso Gonzalez at Mulagros. Fight lasted 15 minutes. Bandits scattered in all directions. Camp was destroyed. Captured large quantity food supplies and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 4 killed(Including Sebastian Caceres)
(Chief of Police for Sandino)
Several wounded.

#386: 8 MAY 1932

Contact at **PAMALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (252–362)

Lieutenants V. Mays, GN, and Guiterrez, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol of 20 enlisted had contact with bandit group at 1900 in the vicinity of Pamali. Guardia attacked bandit camp. Bandits dispersed in all directions unable to pursue due to darkness. Captured large quantity of food, small quantity of ammunition and correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Several wounded.

#387: 11 MAY 1932

Contact at **CHAMASTE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (239–363)

Lieutenants V. Hays, GN, and J. Bernheim, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with bandit group at 1700 near Chamaste. Captured and destroyed quantity of food, tobacco, clothing, bombs and miscellaneous articles. Camps destroyed in both contacts. Reports of above contacts received.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.
1 wounded.

#388: 13 MAY 1932

Contact at **BRAMADERO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–322)

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and La Concordia, (CA) Guardia patrol had two contacts, one at 0900 and other at 1300, with same group of armed bandits, group of 60, jefes thought to be Salgado and Socrates Sandino, in the vicinity of Bramadero, 3 leagues southeast of La Concordia. First fight lasted one hour, second one five minutes. Captured 17 animals, small amount of ammunition and correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#389: 17 MAY 1932

Contact at **SISIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)

Lieutenants M.D. Hutchcroft, GN, and F. Gaitan, GN, and Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted had contact with bandit group estimated at 50, jefe unknown, at Sisin. Captured one disc Thompson, 2 Magazines, BAR. Bandit group thought to include Guardia Mutineers from Kisalaya.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (Lt. Hutchcroft who received bullet wound in thigh.)

#390: 17 MAY 1932

Contact at **SANTO DOMINGO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Chontales)

Lieutenant Tercerim GN, with roving patrol of 8 enlisted made surprise attack on bandit camp at San Jose, in the mountains north of Santo Domingo at 1800. Bandits completely surprised and fled, leaving bloody trails indicating dead and wounded bandits. Group was about fifteen under Jefe Policarpo Fonseca. Following articles were captured: 2 rifles, 2 shot-guns, 2 cutachas, medicines, 15 animals, 10 saddles, miscellaneous clothing, flash and carbide lights, 6 sticks of dynamite, ponchos, raincoats, powder, precussion caps and numerous articles of clothing and equipment.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#391: 18 MAY 1932

Contact at **ACHUAPA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Leon)

Captain G.K. Frisbie, GN, Lieutenants C.G. Hughes, GN, and Lieutenant Chavarria, GN, and combat patrol from Limay had contact with a small group of armed bandits east of Achaupa at 1:00 PM.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#392: 21 MAY 1932

Contact at **NEPTUNE MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)

Lieutenant E.T. Gray, GN, with fifteen combined Guardia and Civico patrol had contact with Pedron Altamirano and group of about 150 at 1430. Contact lasted one hour near Neptune Mine. Captured four animals with saddles. Bandits well armed with automatic weapons.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#393: 23 MAY 1932

Contact at **NEPTUNE MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)

Lieutenant E.T. Gray, GN, and combined Guardia and civico patrol of 20 men had contact lasting thirty minutes one mile west of Neptune Mine with large bandit group under Pedron Altamirano which had been threatening Guardia post at that place. Fighting very tense. Upon return of patrol to Neptune Mine, cuartel was attacked by another group from north but attack repulsed. Planes by bombing dispersed bandits and broke up further attack.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 17 killed.

#394: 26 MAY 1932

Contact at **CHILAMATAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (233–306)

Lieutenants Navarrete, GN, and Perez, GN, with Matagalpa Guardia patrol had contact with bandit group, jefe unknown, at Chilamatal, half-league south of Santa Barbara. Bandits dispersed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#395: 26 MAY 1932

Contact at **ACHUAPA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Leon)

Lieutenant J. F. Atwell, GN, and Lieutenant Jarquin, GN, and patrol of 18 from Achuapa had contact with group estimated at 50, jefe unknown, at 1000, one league south of Achuapa on road to El Sauce. Bandits were surprised preparing an ambush. Firing lasted 20 minutes.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#396: 27 MAY 1932

Contact at **DARAILI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (224–334)

Lieutenant Sandino, GN, and patrol of 8 enlisted and 1 civico had contact with a group of armed bandits. Jefe Olivas, south of Daraili at point above mentioned. Fight lasted half hour when bandits scattered in all directions. Guardia captured 1 pistol, small amount of ammunition, hat bands, food and other miscellaneous articles. Camp destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#397: 27 MAY 1932

Contact at **NEPTUNE MINE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (EA)

Lieutenant L.C. Curcey, GN, and Wauni Guardia patrol of 19 enlisted and 6 civicos had contact with rear guard of Pedron Altamirano group under Irias at 1640, about four hours west of Neptune Mine on Limon trail. Fight lasted 25 minutes. Bandits were driven off leaving considerable amount of loot including cattle and miscellaneous articles behind, major portion of which was returned to the owners.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#398: 29 MAY 1932

Contact at **APALILI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (245–275)

Lieutenant Prado, GN, and Matagalpa patrol of 10 enlisted had contact with Juan Altamirano and group of 40 at Apalili, vicinity of Rincon Largo at 0700. Fight lasted fifteen minutes when bandits dispersed. Captured 1 pistol, two riding animals and miscellaneous articles. Bandits were armed with two Thompsons.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Wounded several.

#399: 29 MAY 1932

Contact at **LA ARMONIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Matagalpa)

Lieutenant H.J. Elliot, GN, and Fundadora Guardia patrol had contact at La Armonia, north of Matagalpa with a group of armed bandits, jefe Ramiro Lopez.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#400: 2 JUNE 1932

Contact at **ACHUAPA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (168–305)

Lieutenant Sanchez, GN, and Achuapa Guardia patrol had contact at 0700 with group of 25 bandits, jefe unknown, on main trail one and a half leagues toward El Sauce from Achuapa. Captured one rifle. Bandits scattered in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Wounded several.

#401: 2 JUNE 1932

Contact at **NORTHWEST OF JALAPA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, and Jalapa Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits of about 40 under Quintero, during night. Guardia made a surprise attack on the bandit camp. Guardia captured three rifles, two pistols, six BAR. clips, one Thompson clip, 211 rounds Springfield ammunition, quantity of assorted ammunition, one flag, two horses, two cows, and many miscellaneous articles of loot which had been stolen from the natives in the vicinity of Jalapa.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Killed unknown.
Several wounded (including ex-sgt Garcia who deserted from Quilali.)

#402: 4 JUNE 1932

Contact at **LA CONCORDIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–322)

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and La Concordia Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted had contact at 1000 west of La Concordia with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown. Fighting lasted 20 minutes. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, small quantity of ammunition and 6 animals.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#403: 5 JUNE 1932

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (236–365)

Lieutenants V. Hays, GN, and Guiterrez, GN, with San Juan Guardia patrol attacked a bandit camp at Las Cruces. Jefe of group was Sixto Acuna, a 1st Lieutenant of Sandino's forces. Captured large amount of food and clothing. Camp was destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 5 killed.
7 wounded.

#404: 6 JUNE 1932

Contact at **YALI MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (224–332)

Lieutenant C.H. Snyder, GN, and Celedon, GN, with Yali patrol had two contacts with bandit groups, jefes unknown, on west ridge of Yali mountain. Guardia captured 2 pistols, 1 bomb, cutachas, small amount of ammunition and miscellaneous articles. Bandits were dispersed.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 3 killed.

#405: 12 JUNE 1932

Contact at **GUANACASTILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (223–374)

Lieutenant M.M. Mahoney, GN, and Cuadra, GN, and Apali Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Heriberto Reyes and Roque Vargas near Guanacastillo. Bandits were dispersed after 10 minutes fight. Patrol pursued for five miles but could not regain contact. Destroyed bandit camp and captured 1 rifle, quantity of ammunition, dynamite bombs, 8 blanket rolls, cutachas and quantity of food.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: Unknown.

#406: 14 JUNE 1932

Contact at **LIMAY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (188–318)

Sergeant Chavarria, GN, and Limay Guardia patrol attacked small group of armed bandits, thought to be part of Umanzor's group at 3 leagues west of Limay.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#407: 15 JUNE 1932

Contact at **SAN RAMON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (256–289)

Lieutenant W.D. Martin, GN, and Buena Vista patrol had contact with group of armed bandits, jefe Alfredo Rizo northeast of San Ramon. Guardia captured 2 rifles, 2 pistols, 2 shot-guns, 5 animals and quantity of clothing. Bandits were dispersed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
4 wounded.

#408: 17 JUNE 1932

Contact at **SAMULALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (255–277)

Sergeant Sevilla, GN, and Guardia patrol from Las Lajas had contact with small bandit group near Samulali. Bandits were dispersed.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#409: 20 JUNE 1932

Contact at **CHAGUITE GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(Near Jinotega)

Lieutenant Guiterrez, GN, and Guardia patrol from Jinotega had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown at 0600, in Chaguite Grande, two leagues from Jinotega. Guardia captured 1 revolver, small quantity of ammunition and some clothing. Bandits were dispersed.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.

Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#410: 23 JUNE 1932

Contact at **CONSUELO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (282–308)

Lieutenant O.J. Gumaelious, GN, Lieutenants Monte, GN, and Uriza, GN, and Consuelo Guardia patrol had contact with Pedron Altamirano and large bandit group due north of Consuelo near the Tuma River in vicinity of point (282–308). Guardia captured 3 rifles, and small quantity of bombs and ammunition. Bandits were driven off and scattered.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#411: 25 JUNE 1932

Contact at **PIEDRA LUNA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (280–301)

Lieutenant Uriza, GN, and Consuelo Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at Piedra Luna. Bandits finally withdrew and headed northward in direction of Maximo Rivas.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#412: 27 JUNE 1932

Contact at **SAN JUAN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (232–367)

Lieutenant J. Hays, GN, and San Juan Guardia patrol attacked bandit camp, jefe unknown, east of San Juan in vicinity of point (232–367). Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, 3 dynamite bombs, cutachas and some correspondence. Bandits scattered.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (Lt Hays slight cutacha wound in knee.)
Bandits: 5 killed.

#413: 27 JUNE 1932

Contact at **NORTHEAST OF JICARO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (233–393)

Lieutenant Montenegro, GN, and Jalapa Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Sinforoso Gonzalez at northeast of Jicaro. Fight lasted only 5 minutes when bandits scattered. Pursuit was made but no further contact could be made due to darkness.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#414: 28 JUNE 1932

Contact at **QUILALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (246–366)

Lieutenant Guiterrez, GN, and Quilali patrol attacked bandit camp of Ezequiel Zamora Zeledon, secretary to Sandino at point northeast of Quilali. Guardia captured 1 pistol, 120 detonators, quantity of dynamite and much valuable correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 6 killed. (including jefe Zeledon)
8 wounded.

#415: 2 JULY 1932

Contact at **CEBOYAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–318)

Lieutenant C.L. Ashbrook, GN, and Yali patrol had short contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown in Ceboyal in vicinity of Colon at 1200. Bandits scattered in all directions. Guardia captured 1 animal with saddle and small amount of miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#416: 5 JULY 1932

Contact at **VACARRO FARM,** Nicaragua, C.A. (496–362)

Lieutenant Padilla, GN, and patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under jefe Simon Gonzalez at Vacarro Farm. Mandador cook of Vacarro killed and commissary looted.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
1 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#417: 6 JULY 1932

Contact at **LECUS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (501–475)

Lieutenants R.L. Peterson, GN, O. Kemp, GN, and Munoz, GN, with Guardia patrol had contact with group of armed bandits under Simon Gonzalez, which had looted Vacarro Farm Commissary previous day at one league east of Lecus. Contact lasted 1 hour, a running fight. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, 1 pistol, 3 rifle grenades and recovered $200 worth of loot stolen from commissary. Dead bandit believed to be a sub-jefe of Gonzalez. Another guardia patrol went in pursuit.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
3 wounded.

#418: 7 JULY 1932

Contact at **GUANACASTILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (222–375)

Lieutenants M.M. Mahoney, GN, Cuadra, GN, and Guiterrez, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol had contact with Colindres and Reyes group estimated between 150 and 200 bandits at 1850, near Guanacastillo. Signs of many bandits killed and wounded. Guardia captured several rifles, small quantity of ammunition, cutachas, hats and miscellaneous articles. Bandits retreated toward Quilali. Contact lasted 45 minutes.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#419: 14 JULY 1932

Contact at **PAVONA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (237–345)

Lieutenants Sandino, GN, and Lopez, GN, and Northern Area patrol were attacked by bandit group estimated from 200 to 280, jefes Salgado and Robleto, at 0700 near Pavona. Contact lasted for an hour and a half. Fighting was very intense. Guardia finally rushed bandit positions and routed them, dispersing them in all directions. Bandits employed dynamite bombs, rifle grenades, 4 Thompson sub-machine guns and many rifles. Guardia captured three rifles, six animals, correspondence and rifle grenades. Dead bandits were all dressed in khaki breeches and shirts with canvas and leather leggins.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. (Lieutenant Lopez)
Bandits: 12 killed (Including jefe Robleto)
Several wounded.

#420: 15 JULY 1932

Contact at **TULAR,** Nicaragua, C.A. (203–327)

Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, and Condega Guardia patrol of 20 enlisted had contact with large bandit group, jefes Olivas and Padilla near Tular. Fight lasted 20 minutes when bandit position was attacked and they fled in all directions. Bandits employed automatic weapons, rifle grenades, rifles, pistols and dynamite bombs. Guardia captured 1 rifle, small quantity of ammunition, 25 animals, 15 saddles, correspondence, clothing and hats.

Known casualties: GN: 3 wounded.
Bandits: 2 killed.
6 wounded.

#421: 17 JULY 1932

Contact at **PAN AMERICA,** Nicaragua, A.C. (457–322)

Lieutenant W.J. Stone, GN, and E. Gallo patrol of Guardias had contact with a group of 40, jefes Irias and Mairena near Pan America. Large amount of loot, previously captured by the bandits from one of the stores on the Rio Grande was recovered.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#422: 17 JULY 1932

Contact at **LAS SANDILLAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (214–310)

Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, and Jalapa patrol of 26 enlisted had contact with bandit group, jefe unknown, near Las Sandillas, at 0330. Contact lasted 7 minutes. Guardia captured food, blankets, several head of cattle and some clothing. Contact was a surprise attack on the bandit camp. Bandits fled across Honduran border.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#423: 18 JULY 1932

Contact at **QUIOTACO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (214–411)

Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, and Jalapa patrol of 26 had contact with bandit group of 40, jefe believed to be Quintero, near Quiotaco at 1000. Contact lasted 17 minutes. Contact was a surprise attack on bandits lying in an ambush position waiting for Ragsdale's patrol Bandits fled across Honduran border.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 wounded.

#424: 22 JULY 1932

Contact at **CACAO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (173–288)

El Sauce patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, size and jefe unknown, at Cacao. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 2 saddles, 5 hats, cutachas and food.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#425: 25 JULY 1932

Contact at **SANTA CRUZ,** Nicaragua, C.A. (201–302)

Lieutenants C.C. Hughes, GN, T.M. Lynch, GN, Silva, GN, and Saravia, GN, and Esteli Guardia patrol had a 15 minute contact with Perfecto Chavarria and group at 1600 near Santa Cruz. Bandits used automatic weapons, bombs and rifles. Guardia captured 2 shot-guns. Bandits scattered in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
Several wounded.

#426: 25 JULY 1932

Contact at **DATANLI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (248–302)

Lieutenant Barillas, GN, and Fundadora Guardia patrol had contact near Datanli, NW of Fundadora with group of armed bandits, jefe unknown. Captured 2 shot-guns. Bandits scattered in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#427: 26 JULY 1932

Contact at **LOS ACHOTES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (237–345)

Lieutenants C.D. Snyder, GN, and Lieutenant L.S. Wriston, GN, and Yali Guardia patrol had contact at 1100 with bandit group under Colindres and Umanzor estimated at over 200, near Los Achotes, vicinity of Pavona. Fight lasted over half an hour and was very intense. Bandits were in entrenched position and employed 6 automatic weapons, bombs, rifle grenades, rifles and pistols. Guardia patrol forced to retire due to shortage of ammunition. Bandits remained in their position.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
3 wounded.
Bandits: Unknown.

#428: 28 JULY 1932

Contact at **ALTA GRACIAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Near 223–359)

Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, and Telpaneca Guardia patrol had two contacts with same group of armed bandits, jefe Enrique Melgara, in vicinity of Alta Gracia. Guardia attacked bandit camp and drove bandits out, capturing hats, several bombs, cutachas and miscellaneous articles. Guardia patrol took up the pursuit and regained contact later in the day in another camp. Attacked second camp and put bandits to flight in all directions. Captured 1 shot-gun, 2 guitars 6 cutachas, 1 bull and large quantity of miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
1 wounded.

#429: 29 JULY 1932

Contact at **EL HORNO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (237–302)

Lieutenant Guiterrez, GN, and Jinotega Guardia patrol of 9 enlisted escorting two officers of the Electoral Mission from Jinotega to Matagalpa were fired on by armed group of bandits with rifles and pistols near El Horno. Patrol returned fire.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#430: 29 JULY 1932

Contact at **LA TRINIDAD,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant C.G. Hughes, GN, and Silva, GN, and Esteli Guardia patrol cleared Esteli and had contact with group of armed bandits dressed in khaki, size and jefe unknown, on the edge of town on main road to La Trinidad at 0130. Patrol chased the bandits and regained contact about one mile out of town. Contacts lasted about fifteen minutes. Bandits used automatic weapons, bombs and rifles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#431: 31 JULY 1932

Contact at **CANOAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (234–357)

Lieutenants J.M. Broderick, GN, and Montenegro, GN,and, Condega Guardia patrol had contact with bandit group of 60 to 80 on Coco River, near Canoas, at 1000. Bandits were preparing ambush position at river crossing when surprised by Guardia patrol. Guardia captured 1 boat, few dynamite bombs and small amount of ammunition. Guardia patrol crossed river and found and destroyed large camp in El Silencio area at point 234–362. Patrol then proceeded south and found and destroyed another camp at 230–341.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
1 wounded.

#432: 31 JULY 1932

Contact at **LOMA AZUL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (243–339)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, and Corinto Finca Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown at 1000 north of Loma Azul. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, three blankets and some clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#433: 2 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **CAMPAMENTO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (185–294)

Lieutenant Zavala, GN, and Jarquin, GN, and Sanchez, GN, and combined Leon, El Sauce Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown at 1400 near Campamento. Patrol attacked bandit camp. Camp was destroyed after bandits were dispersed in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#434: 2 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **TERRERO GRANDE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, and Totogalpa Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, at 1000 in vicinity of Totogalpa near Terrero Grande. Bandits fled.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown

#435: 2 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **SANTA ROSA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (243–382)

Lieutenants H.E. Kipp, GN, and Gutierrez, GN, with Jicaro Guardia patrol had contact with an armed group of bandits under Roque Vargas near Santa Rosa about 1600. Bandits fled toward Chipote. Guardia captured food, clothing and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#436: 12 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **PANTASMA VALLEY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (260–350)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, and Company "M" patrol, CA., had contact with two bandit groups in Pantasma Valley.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Several wounded.

#437: 13 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **PANTASMA VALLEY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (260–350–)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant N.A. Lee, GN, and Company "M" patrol CA., attacked bandit camp in Pantasma Valley, vicinity of 260–350 at 1340. Captured rifles, ammunition, food, supplies and miscellaneous articles and much correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
Several wounded.

#438: 13 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **PANTASMA VALLEY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (260–350)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, and Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, with Company "M" patrol CA., attacked second bandit camp of Salgado consisting of 32 shacks, in Pantasma Valley at 1530 near 260–350. Captured arms, ammunition, cattle, food supplies and correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#439: 14 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **LOS PANALES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (233–361)

Captain F.C. Biebush, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at 0700, near Los Panales, jefe unknown.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#440: 16 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **PANATASMA VALLEY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (260–350)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company "M" patrol CA., had contact with a group of armed bandits in Pantasma Valley.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#441: 17 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **ANOGODA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (221–299)

Lieutenant B.M. Bunn, GN, and San Isidro Guardia patrol had contact with Juan Altamirano group, size unknown, at 1500 near Anogoda. Contact lasted forty minutes. Bandits used two automatic weapons. Guardia captured quantity of miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
Several wounded.

#442: 18 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **OSOMORA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Captain O.A. Inman, GN, and Navarro patrol, Central Area, had contact with bandit group at Osomora at 0720; later in day while crossing the Tuma River had second contact with group of about 40, jefe unknown. One civilian Guide wounded.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#443: 19 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **SANTO DOMINGO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (352–208)

Enlisted Guardia patrol with Civicos from Santo Tomas and San Pedro, Dept. of Chontales, had contact with bandit group which raided Pueblo Viejo at point three leagues southeast of Santo Domingo. Bandits were scattered. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 revolver and practically all of loot taken from Pueblo Viejo.

Known casualties: GN: 1 Civico wounded.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#444: 19 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **SANTA FE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (243–334)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company "M" patrol CA., had contact with bandit group of 80, jefe Juan Altamirano, 1 league south of Santa Fe at 0900. Bandits scattered in all directions after 5 minute fight.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#445: 20 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **MURRA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (239–397)

Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted and one civico had contact with group of bandits under Roque Vargas, west of Murra.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#446: 20 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **SANTO DOMINGO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (352–208)

Lieutenant Tercero, GN, and Chontales Guardia patrol had contact with same group with which contact was had on the 19th near same locality. Patrol captured 1 horse and small amount of ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#447: 25 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **LAS CRUCES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (251–332)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company "M" patrol CA., had contact with group of 75 at Mountain pass at 251–332 near Las Cruces, jefe unknown. Bandits were defending the pass but Guardia patrol forced its way through.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#448: 26 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **LA TRINIDAD,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenants M.M. Mahoney, GN, and Silva, GN, with Esteli Guardia patrol had contact with group of about 40 armed bandits, jefe Tomas Blandon at a point between Esteli and La Trinidad. Contact consisted of running fight lasting over two hours when bandits were scattered in all directions. Guardia captured correspondence, 6 animals with saddles, hats, cutachas and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed (Including Tomas Blandon)
Several wounded.

#449: 27 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **SAJONIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (244–318)

Lieutenant Policarpo Gutierrez, GN, and Corinto Finca Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted had contact with a group of 50 armed bandits between Sajonia and the Tuma River at 1500. Fight lasted 30 minutes.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#450: 29 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **MANCOTAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (247–332)

Lieutenant G.R. Weeks, GN, and Lieutenant N.M. Grieco, GN, and Corinto Finca Guardia patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with bandit group, jefe Rosa Irias, near Mancotal. Fight lasted 5 minutes. Bandits scattered in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.
1 wounded.

#451: 31 AUGUST 1932

Contact at **CERRO BLANCO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

Lieutenants V. Hays and J .Montenegro, GN, had contact with a group of armed bandits at Cerro Blanco. Fight lasted five minutes. Guardia attacked two bandit camps. Large amount of loot captured, including foodstuffs.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#452: 2 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **LIMON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (206–362)

Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, and Telpaneca Guardia patrol had contact with group of 30 near a point south of Limon, jefe Santiago Munoz. Bandits were surprised making camp and immediately fled in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 wounded.

#453: 5 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **NA ANJA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (235–318)

Captain Max D. Smith, GN, Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with bandit group, jefe Juan Altamirano, in vicinity of Namanja at 0800. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, small amount of ammunition and quantity of clothing and supplies.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
Several wounded.

#454: 7 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **AYOTE MOUNTAIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (180–408)

Lieutenants F.M. Wysaski, GN, and Monterrey, GN, and Northern Area patrol had contact with a group of 100 armed bandits, jefe Colindres on Ayote Mountain at 0900. Fight lasted half hour. Bandits had large fortified camp on mountain. Patrol was unable to dislodge bandits from their position.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#455: 8 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **ACHUAPA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (178–314)

Lieutenants G.C. Reid, GN, and Jarquin, GN, with Achuapa patrol had contact with bandit group of 40, jefe unknown near Northeast of Achuapa. Contact was running fight lasting half hour. Bandits scattered in all directions. Guardia captured 1 animal, blankets and clothing.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.

#456: 10 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **GUAPINOL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (190–360)

Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, and Totogalpa Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown at Guapinol. Fight lasted 20 minutes when bandits scattered.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#457: 11 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **PINO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (198–325)

Lieutenants M.M. Mahoney, GN, Silva, GN, and Esteli Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, estimated at 80, jefe unknown, lasting 40 minutes near Pino. Guardia surprised bandits in camp and attacked, scattering them in all directions. Guardia captured 3 rifles, 3 shotguns, 20 riding animals, 2 pack animals, cutachas, bombs, clothing and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 10 killed.
Several wounded.

#458: 12 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **CENICERO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (162–278)

Lieutenant J.F. Atwell, GN, and Lieutenant Artola, GN, and El Sauce Guardia patrol had contact lasting one hour and ten minutes with group of armed bandits estimated at 180, jefes reported as Umanzor, Morales, Valdivia and Trujillo at 1350 near vicinity of Cenicero. Bandits were aggressive and used 4 automatic weapons, rifles and hand grenades and rifles. They were well supplied with ammunition. After contact bandits withdrew to the northeast. Guardia captured 3 animals and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#459: 12 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **PASO REAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (249–325)

Lieutenants N.M. Grieco, GN, and D.R. Downey, GN, and Corinto Finca Guardia patrol of 35 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits in the vicinity of Paso Real. Owing to darkness patrol was unable to take up effective pursuit.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#460: 13 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **GUASACA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (268–317),

Captain O.A. Inman, GN, and Navarro Guardia patrol had two contacts with a group of armed bandits, jefe Tomas Pineda in vicinity of Guasaca. First contact Guardia captured 1 pistol, saddle and important correspondence.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed(Including Jefe Tomas Pineda)
3 wounded.

#461: 14 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **SAN RAMON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (156–301)

Lieutenants L.A. Kalman, GN, and Artola, GN, and El Sauce Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted and 9 civicos had three contacts between 1030 and 1140, lasting over one hour, with bandit group of 200, jefes thought to be Salgado and Umanzor, midway between El Sauce and Villa Nueva, near San Ramon. Bandits were very aggressive and attacked Guardia on two occasions from three different sides. Bandits were well armed and equipped and had good supply of ammunition. They used at least four automatic weapons. Bandit attacks repulsed and they were forced to withdraw northward.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded.
Bandits: 8 killed.
10 wounded.

#462: 17 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **NARANJA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (165–340)

Lieutenant B.G. Sinkule, GN, and Somoto Guardia patrol of 18 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits of 100 to 150, jefes believed to be Colindres, Irias and Blandon at 0400, near Naranja. Bandits were driven from their ambush position and took position on some nearby hills. At daylight Sinkules' patrol reenforced by Lieutenants Hammond, GN, and Monterrey, GN, and Condega patrol of 30 enlisted and one civico attacked bandits in their new position and after a sharp fight put them to rout and scattered them to the southeast. Guardia captured 28 riding animals with saddles, 2 rifles, 57 rounds ammunition 4 BAR Magazines, spare parts for BAR, hats clothing, cutachas, haversacks, pair of field glasses, foodstuffs and miscellaneous articles.Bandits expended large amount of ammunition.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed.
1 wounded.
Bandits: 4 killed.
Several wounded.

#463: 22 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **SANTA FE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (243–334)

Lieutenant J.W. Krawie, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol, Central Area, had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, near Santa Fe. Fight lasted ten minutes. Guardia captured 6 riding animals and two pack mules.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#464: 26 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **AGUA CARTA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (292–377)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company "M" patrol from Jinotega had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown at Agua Carta.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#465: 26 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **AGUA CARTA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (291–379)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company "M" patrol from Jinotega had contact at Agua Carta with a group of armed bandits estimated at 150, jefe unknown. Bandits used 7 automatic weapons, rifles and hand grenades and expended much ammunition. Fight lasted over half hour.

Known casualties: GN: 2 killed.
3 wounded (Including Lieut. Lee, wounded in right arm and head.)
Bandits: 16 killed.

#466: 27 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **ROBLES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (245–310)

Lieutenants N.M. Gireco, GN, and Perez, GN, and Jinotega Guardia patrol of 19 enlisted had contact with a group of 40 armed bandits, jefe Daniel Hernandez in the vicinity of Robles at 1730. Fight lasted twenty minutes. Bandits scattered and contact could not be regained due to darkness.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#467: 30 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **SAN ANTONIO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (262–329)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company "M" patrol from Jinotega had contact with group of 80 armed bandits jefe unknown near San Antonio.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 8 killed.

#468: 30 SEPTEMBER 1932

Contact at **PASO REAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (249–326)

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company "M" patrol from Jinotega had contact with group of 40 bandits, jefe unknown at Paso Real.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.

#469: 5 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **RILLITO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (197–358)

Lieutenant J.M. Stanko, GN, and Palacaguina Guardia patrol of 6 enlisted had contact with a group of 15 bandits who had stolen animals from Guardia potrero at 2250, at a point near Rillito. Guardia recaptured 11 animals, 1 shot-gun and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#470: 9 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **LA TRAMPA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (257–313)

Lieutenant W.D. Martin, GN, and Navarro Guardia patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits, size and jefe unknown, about three leagues from Navarro on trail to Corinto Finca, vicinity of La Trampa. Guardia captured 2 rifles and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#471: 11 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **MATAGALPA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Sergeant Velasquez, GN, and Matagalpa Guardia patrol of four enlisted and four auxiliares had contact with an armed group of bandits, jefe Alfredo Rizo, near Matagalpa. Bandits were scattered Guardia captured 1 revolver and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#472: 14 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **TOMATOYA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Lieutenant J.W. Krawie, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol of 12 enlisted had contact with a group of bandits jefe Transito Sequeira in vicinity of Tomatoya, Dept. of Matagalpa. Bandits dispersed in all directions.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#473: 14 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **JINOTEGA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

1st Sgt. Leiva, GN, with Jinotega Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Ramiro Lopez, on the outskirts of Jinotega. Pursuit hampered by darkness.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#474: 17 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **TRAPICHON,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Chinandega)

Lieutenant H.E. Dumas, GN, and Guardia patrol of seven enlisted from San Antonio had contact with a group of armed bandits at Trapichon. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 2 shot-guns, 13 animals, clothing and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
1 wounded.

#475: 19 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **BELLA VISTA,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(NE of CHICHIGALPA)

Sergeant Miguel Bolanos, GN, and Chichigalpa Guardia patrol of 10 other enlisted had contact with a group of 15 armed bandits, jefe unknown, near Bella Vista at 1030. Running fight of 20 minutes when remainder of group fled into Telica mountains where trail was lost. Guardia captured 3 rifles, 1 revolver and 10 horses with saddles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 3 killed.
Several wounded.

#476: 20 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **COLON VALLEY,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted had contact with group of 20, part of Juan Altimarano group, in Colon Valley. Guardia captured miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#477: 25 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **SOMOTILLO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (131–213)

Lieutenants G.G. Reid, GN, J.F. Atwell, GN, W. Frisch, GN, Sanchez, GN, and Artola, GN, with combined El Sauce and Somotillo Guardia patrol of 50 had contact with bandit group of 300, jefes Colindres, Salgado, Jose Leon Diaz, Peralta and Quintero at 1330 near point north of Somotillo. The fight lasted two hours and ten minutes and the bandits were very aggressive. Guardia captured first bandit position and successfully held it against several counter-attacks. Bandits used at least five automatic weapons, and many bombs. Guardia captured 7 horses with saddles, 1 rifle, 2 pistols, bombs, food, clothing and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded (Including Lieut. Sanchez)
Bandits: 7 killed.
Several wounded.

#478: 25 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **VALLE DE SAN BENITO,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(Near 114–250)

Lieutenant Sotomayor, GN, and Chichigalpa Guardia patrol of 20 enlisted had contact with mounted group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, in Valle de San Benito, north of Chichigalpa. Fight lasted twenty minutes. Guardia captured 5 horses, 3 horses killed in contact.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#479: 28 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **LA PELONA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (128–264)

Lieutenants Blanco, GN, Sotomayor, GN, and combined Chichigalpa Guardia patrol, auxiliares and civicos totalling 38 men had contact with well armed bandit group estimated to be at least 200, jefe Umanzor at La Pelona. Fighting was very intense and lasted for three hours (7 AM to 10 AM) until Guardia ammunition was expended. Guardia patrol was ambushed and surrounded during most of fighting. Bandits expended tremendous amount of ammunition and it is believed Umanzor's group will be immobilized for some time.

Known casualties: GN: 9 killed.
5 wounded.
Bandits: 12 killed.
30 wounded.

#480: 28 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **JINOTEGA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A patrol of 6 auxiliares from Jinotega had contact with bandit group of 40, jefes Gadea and Herrera at 0930 near El Porvenir, two leagues east of Jinotega. Fight lasted 30 minutes. Auxiliares captured 2 pistols and miscellaneous articles. Bandits were dispersed and fled.

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed (Auxiliares)
1 wounded (Auxiliares)
Bandits: 3 killed (Including jefe Herrera)
4 wounded (Including Gadea)

#481: 28 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **PANTASMA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (244–332)

Captain M.D. Smith, GN, and Lieutenants A.E. Buckner, GN, and Cuadra, GN, and Central Area Guardia patrol of 29 enlisted had contact at Pantasma with group of armed bandits, jefe Filiberto Gomez. Guardia captured 8 horses, 9 mules, 8 cattle, 5 saddles and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#482: 29 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **NARANJO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (232–298)

Lieutenant Montes, GN, and San Isidro Guardia patrol of twelve enlisted had contact near Naranjo with a group of armed bandits of 18, jefes Marcial Rivera and Gonzalez.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#483: 31 OCTOBER 1932

Contact at **LA TRONCA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (280–317)

Patrol of Guardia Civicos had two five minute contacts with a poorly armed bandit group, jefe Perez at La Tronca. Patrol captured food supplies and miscellaneous articles. Destroyed bandit camps.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#484: 1 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **LA PLAZUELA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (211–360)

Lieutenants J.M. Stanko, GN, and Cuadra, GN, and combined Ocotal and Palacaguina patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with large bandit group, jefes Salgado, Benavides, Calderon and Chavarria at 1120 north La Plazuela. Bandits well armed and used automatic weapons and bombs but were finally dispersed northward toward Coco River. Guardia captured 2 shot-guns, small amount of ammunition, assorted clothing, large amount of food supplies and miscellaneous articles. Two bandit camps destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 4 killed.
Several wounded.

#485: 2 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **JICARO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NA)

A large bandit group estimated at 150, jefes reported as Salgado Heriberto Reyes, Sinforoso Gonzalez, Roque Vargas, and ex-sgt. Garcia, attacked the town of Jicaro at 2100. The bandits attacked with four groups simultaneously from all sides. Fighting lasted until 2320 when bandits were forced out of town. Jicaro was garrisoned at the time by Lieutenant Keller, M.J., GN, one more officer and 26 enlisted with ten civicos. Bandits used 3 Thompsons, 1 BAR and large amount of dynamite bombs. Reyes, Vargas and Garcia were recognized by people of Jicaro. One store looted.

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded slightly (Lieut. Bernheim)
Bandits: 4 killed.
Several wounded.

#486: 2 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **LA CONCORDIA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

A large bandit group estimated at 150, jefe reported to be Padilla, attacked the town of La Concordia during night. Fight lasted over one hour when bandits were driven from town. Cuartel was garrisoned by Lieutenant Gallardo, GN, 12 enlisted and 4 civicos. People of town apparently not molested.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#487: 3 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **EL SALTO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (228–324)

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and La Concordia Guardia patrol had contact with same group that attacked La Concordia the night before, at 1100 near El Salto. Bandits driven off. Guardia captured some Browning STMG magazines.

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded.
Bandits: 2 killed.
Several wounded.

#488: 3 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **BIAGUAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (232–344)

Lieutenants C.D. Snyder, GN, and Gutierrez, GN, and Yali Guardia patrol of 20 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits at Biagual.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#489: 3 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **MOKARIN,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Lower Rio Coco)
Cabo Blandon, GN, and Cabo Gracias patrol of 10 enlisted had contact with a group of 60 armed bandits, jefe unknown, at Mokarin, fighting lasted 1 hour. Guardia captured several boats, baggage, loot and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#490: 3 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **SAN RAFAEL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Bandits fired into town of San Rafael from neighboring hills during night. The Guardia answered with automatic fire upon bandit positions and drove them therefrom. No damage done to town. Captain A.C. Small, GN, in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#491: 5 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **SANTO DOMINGO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (214–371)

Lieutenant V. Hayes, GN, and Northern Area patrol of 15 enlisted and 4 civicos had contact with bandit group of 90, jefe unknown, at Santo Domingo. Guardia rushed bandit position and drove them southward. Took up pursuit and regained contact an hour later when bandits were scattered in all directions. Bandits employed two automatic weapons, rifles and dynamite bombs and vivaed Sandino and other jefe.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.
4 wounded.

#492: 6 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **CARBONAL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (217–372)

Lieutenant V. Hays, GN, with Northern Area patrol of 14 enlisted and 4 civicos had contact near Carbonal with bandit group of 35, jefe unknown. Bandits were scattered in all directions. Contact could not be regained.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#493: 6 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **SAN RAFAEL,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Bandits fired into town of San Rafael from neighboring hills during the night. The Guardia answered with automatic weapons upon bandit positions and drove them therefrom. No damage done to town. Captain A.C. Small, GN, in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#494: 6 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **YALI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (CA)

Bandit group, jefe unknown, entered the town of Yali about 2100 and attacked Guardia Cuartel. After considerable firing, bandits were driven out of town by Guardia. No damage done to town. Lieutenant C.D. Snyder, GN, in command.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#495: 6 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **AMORT,** Nicaragua, C.A. (258–304)

Patrol of Civicos had contact with small bandit group, jefe unknown, near Amort.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#496: 7 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **YAGUATICA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–304)

Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Jinotega Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown near Yaguatica at 1120. Bandits dispersed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 wounded.

#497: 11 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **SANTA BARBARA,** Nicaragua, C.A. (233–304)

A patrol of 11 Auxiliares from Jinotega had contact with a bandit group of 25, jefe Jose Chavarria near Santa Barbara. Auxiliares captured 1 pistol, 4 bombs and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#498: 13 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **POTREROS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (189–283)

Lieutenant B.M. Bunn, GN, and Central Area Guardia patrol had contact near Potreros with a bandit group, jefe unknown.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

#499: 18 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **LAS LAJAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (230–276)

Lieutenant A.E. Buckner, GN, and Combined Guardia and Civico patrol from Central Area had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Perfecto Chavarria, at Las Lajas. Fighting lasted 9 minutes. Body of Chavarria identified by several civicos who had known him for several years. Guardia captured 2 animals, correspondence, 1 pistol and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed (Jefe Chavarria)

#500: 19 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **YANKI,** Nicaragua, C.A. (224–326)

Auxiliares patrol of 40 and 2 Guardias from Jinotega had contact with bandit group of 30, jefes Gilberto Gonzalez and Transito Sequeira, vicinity of Yanki. Contact lasted 20 minutes. Patrol destroyed bandit camp and captured 1 pistol, small amount of ammunition and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Several wounded.

#501: 24 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **CINCO PINOC,** Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. Chinandega)

Lieutenant J.Hamas, GN, G, Reid, GN, and Jarquin, GN, with El Sauce patrol of 50 had contact with group of bandits near Cinco Pinos. Jefe of group believed to be Dr Arturo Vega. Guardia captured correspondence and miscellaneous articles.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 5 killed.

#502: 25 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **ESTANZUE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (197–299)

Lieutenant Silva, GN, and Esteli Guardia patrol of 20 enlisted had contact with bandit group of 25, jefe Filiberto Blandon at Estanzue. Fight lasted 10 minutes.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.
Several wounded.

#503: 26 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **EL LLANO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (218–312)

Lieutenant R.C. Haralson, GN, and La Concordia Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at El Llano. Guardia captured seven animals.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 1 killed.

#504: 27 NOVEMBER 1932

Contact at **EMBOCADERO,** Nicaragua, C.A. (252–332)

Patrol of 25 Auxiliares, led by Juan Pineda had contact with a bandit group of 40, jefe Emilio Blandon, near Embocadero. Fight lasted 15 minutes. Guardia captured 10 animals and miscellaneous articles of loot.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 2 killed.

#505: 8 DECEMBER 1932

Contact at **PARAISIC,** Nicaragua, C.A. (234–304)

Lieutenant Barnes, GN, and Fundadora Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Alberto Gadea in the vicinity of Paraiso. Contact lasted 30 minutes when bandits fled. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, 2 pistols, correspondence and medicines.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.
5 captured.

#506: 11 DECEMBER 1932

Contact near **MATIGUAS,** Nicaragua, C.A. (302–286)

Sergeant P. Garcia, GN, and Matiguas patrol had contact with group of armed bandits near Matiguas. Jefe of group Timote Gonzalez.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 4 killed.
2 wounded.

#507: 20 DECEMBER 1932

Contact at **ZAPOTILLO,** Nicaragua. C.A. (240–375)

Lieutenants Zepada and Umana, GN, with patrol from Quilali attacked and destroyed a bandit camp near Zapotillo.

Known casualties: GN: None.

Bandits: 1 killed.

#508: 26 DECEMBER 1932

Contact at **PUNTA DE RIELES,** Nicaragua, C.A. (169–288)

Captain Puller, Lieutenants Lee, Bunn, Pulver, Hays, Stevens, Snyder, Lynch, Buitrago and Quintanilla with Guardia patrol of sixty from Managua had contact at Punta de Rieles with armed bandit group of 250, jefes Umanzor and Santos Benavides. Fighting was intense and lasted over one hour. Bandits ambushed the train upon which Captain Puller's patrol was proceeding to El Sauce. Bandits were put to route and fled in disorder to the west. Guardia captured 63 riding animals with saddles, 8 Krag rifles, 1 pistol, 700 rounds of ammunition and many miscellaneous articles. Bandits had concentrated in vicinity El Sauce in attempt to break up inauguration ceremony of new Leon—El Sauce railroad but their plans were frustrated.

Known casualties: GN: 3 killed.
3 wounded.
Several railroad workmen killed and several wounded.
Bandits: 30 killed.
Many wounded.

#509: 26 DECEMBER 1932

Contact at **VALLE ACHIOTE,** Nicaragua, C.A. (NS)

Lieutenants Solis, Ruiz and Fuentes with combined Guardia patrols from Telpaneca and San Juan had contact with bandit group, jefe unknown, at Valle Achiote. Guardia captured correspondence and food supplies. Bandit camp destroyed.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: 2 killed.

#510: 31 DECEMBER 1932

Contact at **CERRO LAS TABLAS,** Nicaragua, C.A.
(NE of Trinidad)

Lieutenants Silba and Valle, GN, with La Trinidad Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Juan Altamirano at Cerro Las Tablas. Fighting lasted two hours, until dark. Guardia captured 40 animals, ammunition, correspondence and miscellaneous articles of loot.

Known casualties: GN: None.
Bandits: Unknown.

RECAPITULATION:

Number of contacts:	510
Guardia killed*:	75
Guardia wounded*:	122
Guardia captured*:	0

*(Including Marine personnel serving in the Guardia Nacional).

Bandits killed:	1,115
Bandits wounded:	526
Bandits captured:	76
Rifles captured:	187
Rifle Grenade Dischargers captured:	1
Shot-guns captured:	63
Pistols captured:	107
Dynamite bombs captured:	127
Dynamite, (sticks):	116
Ammunition, (rounds):	4,096
Cutachas and machetes:	272
Animals (horses & mules):	620
Bandit camps destroyed:	102

NOTE: **In addition to the above known number of dead and wounded bandits, many traces of others, either killed or wounded, were found at the scene of contact but no estimate of these has been made. In addition to the above the Guardia captured various articles of plunder.**

IN MEMORIAM

SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHNNIE F. HEMPHILL,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(FIRST SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN ACTION

30 DECEMBER 1927 QUILALI, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT JAMES O. YOUNG,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY

18 APRIL 1930 JICARO, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT THOMAS G. BRUCE,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(FIRST SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN ACTION

1 JANUARY 1928 SAPOTILLAL, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT NORMAN G. FREEMAN,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION

2 AUGUST 1930 JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT ROBERT W. LEAKE,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

ACCIDENTALLY KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY

30 AUGUST 1929 OCOTAL, NICARAGUA

FIRST LIEUTENANT RUSSELL WHITE,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION

10 NOVEMBER 1930 CACAO, NICARAGUA

FIRST LIEUTENANT LEWIS E. TROGLER,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(CORPORAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY

6 OCTOBER 1929 TELPANECA, NICARAGUA

CAPTAIN LEO HEALEY,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

DIED OF DISEASE INCIDENT TO SERVICE

17 FEBRUARY 1931 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

CAPTAIN EDWARD SELBY,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

ACCIDENTALLY KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY

9 MARCH 1930 PASO REAL, NICARAGUA

MAJOR HUGO F. A. BASKE, (MC)
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, (MC) U.S.N.)

KILLED DURING MANAGUA EARTHQUAKE

31 MARCH 1931 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

CAPTAIN VERYL H. DARTT,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY

18 APRIL 1930 JICARO, NICARAGUA

FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES F. DICKEY,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(CHIEF QUARTERMASTER CLERK, U. S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED DURING MANAGUA EARTHQUAKE

31 MARCH 1931 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

RD 1033-I

IN MEMORIAM

SECOND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM H. PIGG,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY

4 APRIL 1931 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

FIRST LIEUTENANT CHARLES J. LEVONSKI,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY

4 APRIL 1932 KISALAYA, NICARAGUA

CAPTAIN HARLAN PEFLEY,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(CAPTAIN, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN ACTION

11 APRIL 1931 LOGTOWN, NICARAGUA

FIRST LIEUTENANT LAURENCE C. BRUNTON
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SECOND LIEUTENANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN ACTION

21 APRIL 1932 APALI, NICARAGUA

CAPTAIN LESTER E. POWER,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN ACTION

15 JUNE 1931 EMBOCADEROS, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT LAURIN T. COVINGTON
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(CORPORAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN ACTION

21 APRIL 1932 APALI, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM E. MCGEE,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

KILLED IN ACTION

15 JUNE 1931 EMBOCADEROS, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT FINIS H. WHITEHEAD, (MC)
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(PHARMACIST'S MATE FIRST CLASS, U.S.N.)

KILLED IN ACTION

21 APRIL 1932 APALI, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT LUIS A. RAMIREZ,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

DROWNED DURING FIELD OPERATIONS

1 JULY 1931 SOMOTILLO, NICARAGUA

SECOND LIEUTENANT EDWARD H. SCHMIERER
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(GUNNERY SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

ASSASSINATED BY NATIVE OFFICER,
LINE OF DUTY

30 JUNE 1932 SAN ISIDRO, NICARAGUA

CAPTAIN ALBERT R. BOURNE,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

DROWNED DURING FIELD OPERATIONS

19 SEPTEMBER 1931 NAVARRO, NICARAGUA

PAX
VOBISCUM

IN MEMORIAM

CHAPTER IV

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL AREA
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA

26 May, 1931.

AREA ORDER)
NO. 3–1931)

Subject: AUTHORITY AND DUTIES OF GUARDIA NACIONAL AS NATIONAL MILITARY AND POLICE FORCE IN CENTRAL AREA UNDER MARTIAL LAW.

1. MISSIONS:

The primary mission of the Guardia Nacional in the Central Area is the suppression of banditry. Its secondary mission is that of a National Police Force charged with the enforcement of the Civil laws of the country.

2. MARTIAL LAW:

Martial law is in effect in the Central Area. It suspends the Constitutional civil rights of inhabitants and places in the hands of the Guardia all the authority necessary to carry out its missions.

3. SUPPRESSION OF BANDITRY:

The operations for the suppression of banditry vary from picking up local bad men, murderers, robbers, etc., who operate singly or in small groups, to those approximating organized warfare against well armed groups of bandits. For these operations the authority granted under martial law may be invoked, bandits, bandit suspects and anyone giving assistance to bandits may be placed under arrest, guides may be impressed, food stuffs and animals may be commandeered, property camps and dwellings in use by bandits may be destroyed and any measures taken that will injure the cause of the bandits and lead to their defeat, or discourage and cause members of bandit groups to forsake banditry and return to peaceful occupations. These powers should be exercised with great discretion.

4. TREATMENT OF RURAL INHABITANTS:

Practically all the rural inhabitants of this area, particularily those living near the unsettled sections are subject to bandit attacks and depredations, which it is impossible for the Guardia to completely prevent. Many of these inhabitants, no matter where their real sympathies may lie are compelled, for fear of their lives, to maintain a friendly attitude toward the bandits. Every effort will be made to assure them of the friendliness of the Guardia toward all peacable citizens and to extend such protection as will enable them to carry on peaceful occupations without molestation, and to accumulate property without fear of robbery. No effort will be spared to demonstrate the advantages of law and order and to secure their cooperation. In no case will their property be taken without proper compensation and even then care must be exercised to see that they are left with sufficient quantities of food for their needs, and that their breeding stocks of fowls and livestock are not depleted.

Their houses will in no case be burned or their property destroyed because of assistance they may have been compelled to give bandits or because of failure to give information to the Guardia. Only such private property will be destroyed as is known to belong to bandits or to be for their use.

DUTIES OF GUARDIA NACIONAL IN CENTRAL AREA (Cont). AREA ORDER NO. 3–1931.

5. POLICE DUTIES:

In the performance of its duties as a National Police Force, the Guardia **will not** exercise the arbitrary authority permitted under Martial Law. The civil rights of all citizens will be respected and preserved. All criminals arrested will be turned over to Civil Courts in accordance with the law.

Guardia will not be used for the ejection of squatters, the enforcement of labor contracts, etc., unless such action is lawfully directed by the Civil Courts of the country.

The Guardia will cooperate with civil authorities of Nicaragua and enforce the laws impartially and equitably.

Every effort will be made to gain the respect, confidence and friendship of the peaceful, law abiding inhabitants of the country.

/s/JULIAN C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,
Commanding, Central Area.

A–40
TPC/jab

HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN AREA, GUARDIA NACIONAL,
OCOTAL, NICARAGUA,
14 June, 1932.

AREA ORDER NO. 27 — 1932:

Subject: HOUSE BURNING.

1. Permanently constructed buildings will not be burned by Guardia Patrols. The mere fact that a dwelling house or other permanent building is being or has been temporarily used by a bandit patrol or group when passing through a section is not sufficient justification for the burning of the building or buildings.

2. A distinction must be drawn between a building of permanent construction that may be or may have been used by a bandit group when passing through a section and a temporary or permanent camp built by the bandits for the purpose of using it as an operating base.

3. This order does not apply to permanent or temporary bandit camps constructed by them; it does apply to the destruction of permanently constructed buildings which may have been temporarily used by a bandit group when passing through a section.

4. In all cases of doubt the buildings will not be destroyed.

/s/THOS. P. CHEATHAM,
Major, Guardia Nacional,
Commanding Northern Area.

OFFICIAL:
JOHN A. BURNS,
Second Lieut. G.N.

Dist: JD Man; Dept. Esteli; All Stations, N.A.; FILE

CHAPTER XVIII

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS

For application of 1932 Electoral Law
National Board of Elections

1 September, 1932.

1.

CHAPTER XVIII.

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Leg. Div. Elec. Mis.
REW/ASP, 8/29/32

NATIONAL BOARD OF ELECTIONS
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

1 September, 1932.

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS.

1. The National Board of Elections, on Thursday, 1 September, 1932, resolved that, in appropriate cases, the following instructions shall be adhered to during the Electoral Period of 1932, extending from 7 September 1932 to 6 November 1932, both dates inclusive, and for such period thereafter as may be necessary in the conduct of a free and fair election:

AMNESTY

(a) Amnesty Decrees now in effect provide as follows: "The President of the Republic, considering that Headquarters, Guardia Nacional, has advised the Ministry of Gobernacion that one Catalino Olivas, who was a Jefe of a bandit group under the orders of Miguel Angel Ortez, voluntarily presented himself to the Guardia Nacional garrison in Palacaguina on the 12th of this month together with arms which he carried, manifesting a firm desire to abandon banditry and devote himself to peaceful and honorable pursuits; and, that under such circumstances, it is necessary to take measures to guarantee his life and his rights as a citizen. Considering that similar measures must be taken with other individuals who have participated in banditry and who present themselves to the authorities under the same circumstances and, as a stimulus to their decision to reunite with society in order to enjoy their rights as citizens. Therefore, in conformity with arts. 111 inc. 7 CN. and 113 inc. 1st. of the Regulations of the Executive Power: DECREES: 1st.—To grant full amnesty to Sr. Catalino Olivas for whatever offense he may have committed during the time he was operating with the bandits. 2nd.—The same favor will be extended to those individuals who, under the same circumstances, present themselves to the constituted authority in whatever place manifesting their intention to abandon banditry and dedicate themselves to a life of peaceful and honorable work. 3rd—The authorities will keep strict watch over Sr. Olivas and others who may avail themselves of the pardon conceded in this decree in order to be assured that they are faithfully living up to their promises as the Executive can suspend said amnesty when proof is furnished that those benefiting by it are violating the agreement." (Presidential Decree of 21 August 1931.) "The Senate and Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Nicaragua, DECREE: Art. 1. Full and unconditional amnesty for all persons who have been suspected or sentenced for political crimes. This Law does not apply to persons who have been punished because their activities or cooperation with bandits or Sandino have been proven. Art. 2. The authorities of the Republic shall proceed to carry out this Decree insofar as the application thereof concerns them." (Congressional Decree, effective from 4 February 1932.)

"The Senate and Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Nicaragua DECREE: Art. 1. Full and unconditional amnesty is hereby granted to all Nicaraguans now under banishment. Art.2 The Government shall provide the funds for repatriation to whoever requests same, the said funds to be taken from any item available." (Congressional Decree, effective from July 20, 1932.)

(b) In order that a bandit may enjoy the benefits of the foregoing Decree of 21 August 1931, his status must be formally declared as within the provisions thereof by competent executive authority, after investigation of the facts.

ARREST.

(a) Attention is directed to the following provision of Art. 181, section 5, of the Penal Code:
"Public employees who, during the electoral period and in violation of law, perpetrate impressment into service, or order the arrest of any qualified citizen, except in the case of flagrante delito or when a legal order of arrest has been issued for a crime carrying a heavy sentence and from which no release under bond may be granted (shall have committed an offense against the right of suffrage)." (See "Flagrante delito," "Infraganti," "Auto de Prision," and "Voting" herein.)

(b) For offenses against the Electoral Law, see articles 12, 7(b), 5(a), 39, 56, 55, 73, 74, and 82(b) of the 1932 Electoral Law.

(c) For offenses against the right of suffrage see articles 181 to 187, inclusive, of the Criminal Code.

AUTO DE PRISION.

(a) In any case where the right to register and/or vote is challenged on account of an alleged outstanding auto de prision, the Electoral Directorio, subject to review, shall permit the elector to register or vote provisionally and, at the earliest practicable moment, shall proceed as follows:

(1) Check the challenge against the list of names provided by the Departmental Board of Elections to determine if the name of the applicant elector is in fact listed thereon;

(2) Communicate with the District Judge having jurisdiction of the case requesting proof that the elector concerned is in fact laboring under an outstanding auto de prision, said proof to include a certified copy of the auto de prision issued, and a complete statement by the said judge as to why the case has not been disposed of in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, Title IX thereof, as well as in accordance with the instructions issued by the Supreme Court of Justice on 18 August 1932;

(3) In the event that there has been undue delay in the hearing and disposition of the case, the Electoral Directorio to so advise the District Judge, affording him an opportunity to either conclude or revoke the auto de prision, inviting his attention to article 611, Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows:

"All judicial functionaries that intervene in criminal cases and retard their proceedings by not executing or causing them to be executed in the time established by law without a reasonable motive, shall be irremissibly punished by the Superior Tribunals as criminals of retardation in the administration of justice."

(4) In any case where the District Judge unreasonably fails to properly dispose of the auto de prision in question, the Electoral Directorio will make full report of the circumstances to the Departmental Board of Elections for further transmittal to the Supreme Court of Justice via the National Board of Elections and, subject to review, will proceed as follows:

1. Every judicial dispensation or declaration that ground exists for instituting action which, in the judgement of the Electoral Directorio, subject to the review mentioned in articles 20, section (b), and 24, section (b), of the 1932 Electoral Law, may be made with the malicious purpose of hindering a citizen in the exercise of his rights to register or to vote, shall not be considered sufficient to deprive him of such rights in accordance with article 20, section 1, of the Constitution. (See Article 5(d) of the 1932 Electoral Law. But in all other cases:

2. If the auto de prision is more than from 28 to 42 days old in any case, depending upon the distances of witnesses and other evidence from the place of trial (at the rate of one day more than 28 for each six leagues), and if the defendant is in no way responsible for the undue delay, to declare that, for electoral purposes and without prejudice to renewal, said auto de prision has lapsed due to judicial default, and to allow the elector to register and/or vote;

3. But, if the auto de prision is less than from 28 to 42 days old in such cases as aforesaid, to make a careful study of the circumstances under which it was issued and, if ther is adequate proof that said auto was issued for malicious or political reasons and without valid legal grounds, to declare said auto to be null and void on account of fraud, and allow the elector to register and/or vote; and

4. In any case where the auto de prision is entirely valid to sustain the challenge and bar the elector from registering and/or voting as appropriate, except that, if the challenge is made at the time of registration and the time limit for a valid auto, as heretofore set forth, will expire before the date of voting, to allow the elector to register provisionally, his right to vote to be determined at the appropriate time.

(b) The Supreme Court of Justice has issued instructions to the local and district courts to afford the electoral agencies full cooperation, and to provide same with such information as may be requested by them.

BANDITS.

(a) Principals and accessories who are engaged in the criminal undertakings of "banditry" have been declared to be outlaws. Those against whom valid and outstanding autos de prision are in existence are not entitled to vote. (See "Auto de Prision" herein). Neither are those who have been declared by competent authority (Supreme Court or District Court having jurisdiction of the person) to be "notorious characters." Those who have been lawfully placed under arrest, or

who have been confined serving sentence or pending trial, are not entitled to personally appear at the polling place to cast their respective votes if the exigencies of the situation do not permit of same. (See "Voting" and "Security Detachments".)

(b) In general, bandits are in the same status as other criminals charged with treason, murder, arson, rape, robbery, et cetera. (But see "Amnesty" herein).

COMPLAINTS.

(a) The procedure of submitting complaints which shall be accorded official recognition by the electoral agencies is as follows:

(1) Initially, any given complaint must be presented to the Electoral Directorio having jurisdiction within the Canton where the complaint arises and the decision of said Directorio shall be final unless an appeal is taken to higher authority in the following manner;

(2) A complaint, which is appealed from the decision of an Electoral Directorio, or concerning which said Directorio did not have jurisdiction, may be presented to the Departmental Board of Elections through the Departmental Governing Body of the party concerned or the highest departmental agency of the organization or group concerned, and the decision of said Departmental Board shall be final unless appeal is taken to higher authority in the following manner;

(3) A complaint, which is appealed from the decision of a Departmental Board of Elections, or concerning which said Board did not have jurisdiction, may be presented to the National Board of Elections through the National Governing Body of the party concerned or the highest national agency of the organization or group concerned, and the decision of said National Board shall be final.

(b) Every effort, consistent with electoral liberty and justice, shall be made to discourage frivolous and captious complaints, and unwarranted appeals.

DOMICILE.

(a) With regard to the provisions of articles 4 and 32(a) of the 1932 Electoral Law the following explanation of the synonimous terms "domicile" and "legal residence" will serve as a guide in the application thereof:

(1) The domicile of origin of a legitimate child is that of its father and continues with its father until the child is of legal age, or is lawfully married, or the father dies, after which the child's domicile is with its mother terminating as previously indicated.

(2) The domicile of origin of an illigitimate child is with its mother until terminated as set forth above unless said child is adopted by its father.

(3) There are several other variations as the foregoing which need not be considered here.

(4) The domicile of origin having been established by the parents of the person concerned cannot be changed except by the deliberate act of said person. It begins with the place where his parents lived with the intention of staying there permanently. When the parent ceases to control the domicile of the individual concerned, the latter may change it. To do so, he must actually leave the place of former residence and establish his actual residence in a new place with the simultaneous intention of permanently abandoning the old residence and permanently adopting the new. Hence, there must be (a) actual presence in the new place of residence; (b) actual intention never to return to the old place of residence; and (c) actual intention to permanently remain in the new place of residence. If all these coincide, it is said that the person has changed his former domicile. If they do not coincide, the old domicile obtains.

(5) In the cases of nomads, tramps, and itinerant travelers, their acts and intentions are so incongruous that it is assumed that they have their domicile "where they happen to be at any particular time." Having abandoned their domiciles of origin and having no fixed idea of where they will permanently settle down, it is impossible to attribute any other domicile to them than that where they happen to be. But these cases must be distinguished from those where employment takes laborers or others temporarily away from their homes. Unless there is clear and unmistakable intention to abandon the old residence and to take up the new permanently, combined with physical presence in the new, there is no change of domicile.

(6) Under the 1932 Electoral Law, even though such change of domicile does occur, the person concerned cannot vote in his new domicile unless said change was accomplished at least one month prior to the first day of registration, that is, by 18 August 1932. Otherwise, the individual concerned must register and vote in his former cantonal domicile. But care must be exercised that mere presence in the canton one month prior to the first registration day is not taken as proving change of domicile. Such is not the case. There must always be presence, intention to abandon the old domicile, and intention to permanently live in the new place before the latter becomes the legal residence or domicile of the person concerned, thereby displacing the old legal residence or domicile. This, combined with the fact that the change was made at least one month prior to the first date of registration, authorizes registration in the new cantonal residence.

FINGER DIPPING.

(a) As a matter of administrative necessity, and in accordance with established precedent in the conduct of free and fair elections in Nicaragua, electors who appear at the electoral mesas on the day of the elections will be marked for identification during the remainder of that day by the use of the stain provided therefor in the following manner:

(1) At the time a ballot is issued to said elector, and before he leaves the issuing table to mark said ballot, he shall be required by the Electoral Directorio to dip his right forefinger in said stain, thereby distinctly marking said finger for purposes of subsequent

identification; if said elector complies therewith, he shall be allowed to receive a ballot and to vote thereon; if said elector fails or refuses to comply therewith, he shall not be allowed to receive a ballot and to vote thereon unless and until he does comply therewith; and

(2) In every case in which an elector is challenged as to his right to vote, and said challenge is sustained by the Electoral Directorio, he shall be required to dip his left forefinger in said stain, thereby distinctly marking said finger for purposes of subsequent identification ; and

(3) Every elector who makes application to vote shall be carefully examined by the Electoral Directorio to determine whether or not he bears the foregoing marks of identification before further action is taken upon his application.

FLAGRANTE DELITO.

(a) In connection with the provisions of article 181, section 5, Penal Code, wherein the term "flagrante delito" appears, the following definition thereof shall be recognized:

"FLAGRANTE DELITO. An offense committed publicly and whose perpetrator has been seen by many witnesses while he was committing same."

(b) The foregoing term must be distinguished from the similar term "infraganti," for which the following definition shall be recognized:

"INFRAGANTI. To catch a person infraganti is to surprise (discover) him in the very act; that is, at the place and at the moment the offense is being committed."

With regard to this latter term, article 85, Code of Criminal Procedure, provides as follows:

"An infraganti offender shall be understood to be a person who has been found in the very act of committing a crime or who is pursued by public clamor as the principal or accomplice of the crime or who is surprised (discovered) with the arms, instruments, effects or papers leading to the presumption that he is said principal or accomplice. But he shall not be held to be infraganti if 24 hours have elapsed since the commission of the offense."

Thus, the term "infraganti" is included within "flagrante delito."

(c) In applying the provisions of article 181, section 5, Penal Code, the following interpretation thereof shall be recognized:

"The aforesaid provision of the law shall be understood to prohibit public employees from **ordering** the arrest of qualified citizens during the electoral period, except in those cases where the alleged crime was publicly committed within the direct and conscious knowledge of many witnesses, or when a legal order of arrest has been issued for a crime carrying a heavy sentence and from which no release under bond may be granted (meaning penalty for said crime is more than correctional, i.e. prescribed for offenses alleged in Book II of the Penal Code). It does not prohibit public employees, or others, from **making arrests** of qualified citizens who are discovered in the act of committing a crime by the person making the arrest as above set forth with regard to "infraganti."

Neither does it forbid public employees ordering the arrest of persons who are not qualified citizens. The term "many witnesses" shall be construed and applied in accordance with the circumstances connected with each individual case, said number always being sufficient if it is more than a few, relatively speaking." (See "Arrest" and "Voting" herein).

FRANKING PRIVILEGES.

(a) The following have the privilege of the telephonic, telegraphic, and postal frank:

(1) Members of the United States Electoral Mission to Nicaragua.

(2) Members and Secretaries of the National and Departmental Boards of Elections;

(3) Presidents of Electoral Directorios; and

(4) Members of the National and Departmental Governing Bodies of those political parties, groups, and organizations which are recognized by the National Board of Elections.

(b) All regular Nicaraguan newspapers and periodicals, their authorized newspapermen and accredited correspondents enjoy the privileges of the frank on an equal basis as set forth in the regulations and instructions pertaining to the postal service and the telegraph service of the Republic.

GUARDIA NACIONAL.

(a) Attention is invited to the following provisions of the 1932 Electoral Law:

"Art. 20(g). The President of the National Board of Elections, in cooperation with the President of the Republic, shall have authority to command the services of the Guardia Nacional and to give that force such orders as he may deem necessary and appropriate to insure a free and impartial election."

"Art. 56. The Commanding Officer of the Guardia Nacional shall cause to be assigned to each mesa a sufficient force of Guardia Nacional to preserve order. During the hours of voting and counting of ballots said guard shall be subject to the commands of the Chairman of the Directorio. The forming of groups and meetings in the vicinity of the electoral mesa is hereby prohibited, but this order will not be taken as a reason for interfering with the business or affairs of any citizen who is peacefully attending thereto."

(b) In view of the foregoing, the Chairmen of Departmental Boards of Elections are hereby delegated the power vested in the President of the National Board of Elections to command the services of the Guardia Nacional stationed in the Department concerned and to give those detachments such orders as they may deem necessary and appropriate to insure a free and impartial election. This power will only be exercised in extreme and urgent cases of which said Chairman shall be the sole judge, and in any such case, prompt report of the circumstances shall be transmitted to the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional through the President of the National Board of Elections. (See "Security Detachments" herein.)

(c) In such cases as it is impracticable to assign a sufficient force of Guardia Nacional for the preservation of order at an electoral mesa, the provisions contained in article 56, first sentence, above, shall stand suspended. (See "Police" herein.)

JUDICIAL COOPERATION.

(a) Under date of 18 August 1932, the National Board of Elections was advised by the Supreme Court of Justice that it had issued instructions to the local and district criminal courts which, aside from specific instructions relative to criminal procedure, cautioned said courts to expedite trials, to be discreet in the issuance of warrants of arrest and detention, to make prompt report of the status and disposition of criminal cases, and to provide the Chairmen of Departmental Boards of Elections and of Electoral Directorios with the information which they may request with regard to the autos de prision or proceedings pending in the court concerned.

(b) Instances of failure on the part of the judiciary to cooperate with the electoral agencies shall be promptly reported by the agency having cognizance of such failure to the next higher electoral authority.

LA GACETA.

(a) La Gaceta being the official organ of publication of matters which require publication by the Government of Nicaragua is also the official means of publishing matters of public concern which are acted upon by the National Board of Elections.

NOMINATIONS BY THIRD PARTIES.

(a) In this connection, attention is directed to the following:

"WHEREAS

First, the electoral law now in force authorizes the nomination of deputy by petition within a district provided that a number of signatures of qualified citizens domiciled in said district equivalent to at least ten per cent of the total number of votes cast in that district at the last presidential election are obtained, and provided further that said signatures are of persons who can read and write, and provided further that said petition is otherwise prepared and submitted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the law; and

Second, the Electoral Law now in force authorizes the nomination of senator by petition within a department provided that a number of signatures of qualified citizens domiciled in said department equivalent to at least ten per cent of the total number of votes cast in that department at the last presidential election are obtained, and provided further that said signatures are of persons who can read and write, and provided further that said petiton is otherwise prepared and submitted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the law; and

Third, the electoral law now in force authorizes the nomination of President and Vice-President by petition within the Republic provided that a number of signatures of qualified citizens domiciled in said Republic equivalent to at least ten per cent of the total

number of votes cast in the Republic at the last presidential election are obtained, and provided further that said signatures are of persons who can read and write, and provided further that said petition is otherwise prepared and submitted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the law; and

Fourth, the fact that a political party, group, or organization successfully nominates a deputy by petition, as aforesaid, does not permit of placing the names of candidates for senator, and President and Vice-President, as otherwise nominated by a national political party or by petition, in the column and under the caption of said party, group, or organization which has nominated a candidate for deputy as aforesaid on the official ballot of that district; and

Fifth, the fact that a political party, group, or organization successfully nominates a senator by petition, as aforesaid, does not permit of placing the names of candidates for deputy, and President and Vice-President, as otherwise nominated by a district or national party or by petition, in the column and under the caption of said party, group, or organization which has nominated a candidate for senator as aforesaid on the official ballot of that department; and

Sixth, the fact that a political party, group or organization successfully nominates candidates for President and Vice-President by petition, as aforesaid, does not permit of placing the names of candidates for deputy and senator, as otherwise nominated, by a district or department party or by petition, respectively, in the column and under the caption of said party, group, or organization which has nominated candidates for President and Vice-President as aforesaid on the official ballot of the Republic; and

Seventh, the electors who desire to vote for a deputy, nominated as aforesaid, cannot be deprived of their right to vote for the senator and President and Vice-President of their choice; and

Eighth, the electors who desire to vote for a senator, nominated as aforesaid, cannot be deprived of their right to vote for the deputy and President and Vice-President of their choice; and

Ninth, the electors who desire to vote for the candidates for President and Vice-President, nominated as aforesaid, cannot be deprived of their right to vote for the deputy and senator of their choice; and

Tenth, the electoral law now in force authorizes the modification of the form of the official ballots in such cases to permit of same carrying the names of the lawfully nominated candidates for the several offices of Supreme Authorities, as aforesaid, whereby the electors may express their choice of candidates for each of the offices named thereon; and

Eleventh, the resolution contained in the twenty-fourth paragraph of the minutes of the third session of the National Board of Elections, held on 13 August 1932 is not in conformity with the foregoing; be it

RESOLVED,

First, that in a district where there are one or more duly nominated candidates for deputy, by petition as well as by the national parties, the official ballot used therein shall carry the names of candidates for President and Vice-President, senator, and deputy in the columns and under the captions of the national parties or of the political party, group, or organization, which have duly nominated said candidates, and shall also carry the name of the candidate for deputy who has been lawfully nominated by petition within the district, even though this may require the placing of more than one mark on the ballot by the elector in expressing his choice of candidates for the several offices named on said ballot; and

Second, that in a department where there are one or more duly nominated candidates for senator, by petition as well as by the national parties, the official ballot used therein shall carry the names of candidates for President and Vice-President, senator and deputy in the columns and under the captions of the national parties or of the political party, group, or organization, which have duly nominated said candidates, and shall also carry the name of the candidate for senator who has been lawfully nominated by petition within the department, even though this may require the placing of more than one mark on the ballot by the elector in expressing his choice of candidates for the several offices named on said ballots; and

Third, that in the Republic when there are one or more duly nominated candidates for President and Vice-President, by petition or by the national parties, the official ballot used therein shall carry the names of candidates for President and Vice-President, Senator, and deputy in the columns and under the captions of the national parties or of the political party, group, or organization, which have duly nominated said candidates and shall also carry the names of candidates for President and Vice-President who have been lawfully nominated by petition within said Republic, even though this may require the placing of more than one mark on the ballot by the elector in expressing his choice of candidates for the several offices named no said ballot; and

Fourth, that whenever the political party, group or organization which lawfully nominates one or more candidates for any office named on the official ballot fails to duly nominate candidates for one or more of the other offices named thereon, the column of said ballot under the name and caption of said party, group, or organization, shall be blank as to the offices for which no nomination has been made, as aforesaid; and

Fifth, that the resolution contained in the twenty-fourth paragraph of the minutes of the third session of the National Board of Elections, held on 13 August, 1932, is hereby revoked."

(b) The foregoing resolution, adopted by the National Board of Elections at its fourth regular meeting, held on 26 August 1932, contemplates that, in special cases, ballots of the type shown below will be used in the forthcoming election:

Sample Ballot No. 1:

OFFICIAL BALLOT

Department of.....District of.....Republic of Nicaragua.

PARTY	PARTY	PARTY
(EMBLEM) Candidate for President Name:	(EMBLEM)	(EMBLEM)
Candidate for Vice-President Name:		

PARTY	PARTY	
(EMBLEM) Candidate for Senator Name:	(EMBLEM)	
Candidate for Deputy Name:		

NOTICE TO VOTERS

With regard to candidates for President and Vice-President, to vote for the Party of your choice make an "X" within the corresponding circle on the upper portion of the ballot.

With regard to the candidates for Senator and Deputy, to vote for the Party of your choice make an "X" within the corresponding circle on the lower portion of the ballot.

Make no other marks on the ballot. If an error is made, exchange the ballot for a new one.

Sample Ballot No. 2:

OFFICIAL BALLOT

Department of.....District of.....Republic of Nicaragua.

PARTY	PARTY	PARTY
(EMBLEM) Candidate for President Name:		(EMBLEM)
Candidate for Vice-President Name:		
Candidate for Senator Name:		

PARTY	PARTY	PARTY
(EMBLEM) Candidate for Deputy Name:	(EMBLEM)	(EMBLEM)

NOTICE TO VOTERS

With regard to candidates for President, Vice-President, and Senator, to vote for the Party of your choice make an "X" within the corresponding circle on the upper portion of the ballot.

With regard to candidates for Deputy, to vote for the Party of your choice make an "X" within the corresponding circle on the lower portion of the ballot.

Make no other marks on the ballot. If an error is made, exchange the ballot for a new one.

(c) The forms of ballots set forth herein, and in the 1932 Electoral Law, are subject to further variation in order that they may enable the voter to record his choice of candidates for the offices named thereon. (Also see "Nominations, "Transmittal of," "Petitions," and "Voting" herein.)

NOMINATIONS, TRANSMITTAL OF

(a) All nominations of candidates for the offices of Supreme Authorities, as made by the national political parties, shall be transmitted to the National Board of Elections through and by the National Governing Body of the party concerned, as recognized by said Board. In all such cases, these nominations shall be certified as official by the President and Secretary of said National Governing Body, and the seal of said body shall be affixed thereto. All nominations of candidates for the office of Supreme Authorities which are made by petition shall be transmitted to the National Board of Elections through and by the highest agency of the political party, group, or organization corresponding to the Governing Body of a national political party. (Also see "Nominations by Third Parties," "Petitions," and "Voting" herein.)

OATHS OF OFFICE.

(a) The Electoral Plan provides that:

> "This Personnel List is prepared with the understanding that American personnel will not be required to perform any function, either as Chairmen or Supervisors, nor for protective purposes, in areas other than the immediate vicinity of the mesas in the column "Mesas under American Chairmen'. It is further understood that American Electoral Personnel will not be sent into the areas comprising the 'Mesas under Nicaraguans' for purposes of inspection, investigation or any other purpose."

(b) During the 1932 Electoral Period, many of the presidents of Electoral Directorios, or Supplemental Electoral Directorios, if any, will be Nicaraguan citizens. Some of these officials may reside in Cantons distantly removed from the seat of the Departmental Board of Elections. In any case where the Chairman of the Departmental Board of Elections considers it inadvisable to administer the oath of office to the President of an Electoral Directorio, as prescribed by article 26, section (b) of the 1932 Electoral Law, said oath shall be administered by the local or district civil judge who may be most available. The latter will administer said oath to the Directorio President upon presentation by the latter of competent proof of his nomination and appointment by proper authority, and a request by the Chairman of the Departmental Board of Elections that said oath

be administered by the Local or district civil judge. (Also see "Security Detachments" herein).

PASSPORTS AND IDENTITY DOCUMENTS.

Consistent with the reasonable preservation of their personal safety, the travel by law-abiding persons within and between various parts of the Republic during the electoral period of 1932 shall not be unduly interrupted or obstructed. Where necessary, the prompt issuance of passports and/or identity documents by those charged with that duty is essential.

PETITIONS.

(a) The following is an approved form of petition for the use of political parties, groups, or organizations who seek to nominate one or more candidates for the offices of Supreme Authorities:

PETITION

.....PARTY (EMBLEM)

CANTON OF....., DISTRICT OF.....

DEPARTMENT OF.....

I, the undersigned, hereby respectfully petition that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1932 Electoral Law of Nicaragua, the National Board of Elections include the name(s) of .....), (.....), (.....), and (.....) on the official ballot(s) as the candidate(s) for the office(s) of....., (.....), (.....), and (.....), (respectively), in the forthcoming national election of 1932 for Supreme Authorities of the Republic of Nicaragua.

Signature of Petitioner	Name in Type or hand-printed	Permanent Address of Petitioner	Signature and Seal of Notary Public
1.	.....	.....	.....
2.	.....	.....	.....
3.	.....	.....	.....

(Et cetera for signatures)

(b) It is not obligatory that the foregoing form be followed, provided that the relevant provisions of the law are complied with. However, it is desirable that, for uniformity and convenience, said form be followed as a general rule.

(c) Particular care must be exercised in all cases that no signatures of petitioners other than those domiciled in a single canton at the time of signing shall appear on one sheet of the petition. The cantonal boundaries in effect for the 1930 elections shall prevail until 6 September 1932, and shall govern in the cases of petitions until that date.

(d) One of the following methods of checking the validity of signatures on petitions shall be adopted:

(1) By checking the signature on said petition of persons domiciled in a particular canton against preexisting registration books of said canton, provided that the questions of the domicile of the petitioner or his ability to read and write are not in dispute;

(2) By members of the Electoral Directorio personally interviewing each petitioner of the canton whose name appears on said petition, thereby determining the authenticity of each signature, the domicile of the petitioner, and his ability to read and write; or

(3) By a combination of both of the foregoing methods were practicable and necessary.

(4) In general, the checking of positions shall be accomplished by means of centralized control and decentralized execution. That is ,the petitions shall first be submitted to the National Board of Elections. If they are such as to warrant further action, they will be transmitted to the several Departmental Boards of Elections concerned for the checking of signatures. These latter Boards will distribute the petitions to the various Electoral Directorio of the cantons wherein signatures have been obtained thereon for direct check of the authenticity of said signatures, the domiciles of the petitioners whose names appear on same, and their ability to read and write. After this check has been completed, the Directorio will forward the petition, with its report relative thereto, to the Departmental Board of Elections. This latter Board, after accumulating and reviewing all the petitions and reports transmitted to it by the Electoral Directorios of the Department will forward same, with its report, to the National Board of Elections for final action thereon. (Also see "Nominations by Third Parties," and "Nominations, Transmittal of" herein.)

POLICE.

(a) The activities of all Jueces de Mesta, Jefes de Canton, Hacienda Guards, and all other civil police forces not under the jurisdiction of the Guardia Nacional, will stand suspended and their forces temporarily disarmed and demobilized for the duration of the electoral period.

(b) The Guardia Nacional will assume all the police functions of the Republic, during the electoral period, including those ordinarily performed by the forces named above when such is absolutely necessary.

(c) The supervision and control of liquor depositories and distilleries, and the manufacture, possession, transportation, sale, and distribution of distilled liquors will be under the Guardia Nacional from and after 1 September 1932 to and including the date of the national election. (Also see "Guardia Nacional" and "Security Detachments" herein.)

POLITICAL PRISONERS.

(a) Complaints concerning the arrest and detention of alleged political prisoners will be forwarded to the National Board of Elections via official channels in accordance with the instructions hereinbefore prescribed. (See "Complaints" and "Amnesty" herein).

PUBLIC MOTOR VEHICLES.

(a) The use and operation of public motor vehicles will be restricted to official government business during the electoral period of 1932. Hence, they may not be used for purposes of political propaganda. The Guardia Nacional will enforce the foregoing by impounding public motor vehicles used or operated in violation of these instructions, making prompt report to the President of the National Board of Elections for further instructions. (Also see "Guardia Nacional," "Police," and "Security Detachments" herein.)

RAILROAD PASSES.

(a) The rules of the Ferrocarral del Pacifico de Nicaragua governing the issuance of passes for use on trains, cars, or boats of that company, provide in part as follows:

"Art. VI. Sec. 2 of the original railroad concession. The transportation of the Republic's troops, war materials and goods, the transportation of engineers, agents and commissioners in the public service, the transportation of telegraph messages and, in general, any and all the services for the Republic shall be attended to by the Company at half the schedule rate in each case. Sec. 3. All official correspondence and printed matter of the Republic and all employees of the Post Office Department, while actually engaged in the service, shall be transported free of charge. Sec. 4. Free passes over the Company's railways shall be allowed to the President of the Republic, the cabinet officers, the Nicaraguan diplomatic corps assigned to foreign posts, and also to District Governors, Judges of First Instance, Collectors of Revenues and Customs, and Port Commanders of the Departments traversed by the railways. Sec. 5. The Company shall have the right to issue passes to its own officers, directors and employees and to other persons traveling for it in connection with its business."

(b) In line with the foregoing, the following persons possess free or government-paid passes on the said railroad:

President of the Republic; Vice-President of the Republic; Private Secretary to the President; all cabinet ministers and subministers; all Jefes Politicos; 48 Senators and 84 Deputies (including principals and alternates); the Collector General and Assistant Collector General of Customs; the Commandant of the Port of Corinto; the President and Secretary of the Mixed Claims Commission and the Assistant to the President thereof; 7 magistrates of the Supreme Court and the Secretaries thereof; 6 Judges of the District Courts; Director and Sub-Director of Communications; one engineer and one Secretary of the Communications Department; Director of the Agricultural School; Engineer of the Agricultural School; Secretary of Sanitation in Granada; the Fiscal of Hacienda; a Prophylactic Doctor; the Jefe of the Presidential Guard and three officers thereof; the Chief Clerk of the Senate; the Chief Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies; two Inspectors of Hygiene; and railroad employees.

(c) The misuse of railroad and steamship passes for purposes of political propaganda will be reported in the manner hereinbefore prescribed. (See "Complaints" herein.)

ROAD TAX LAW.

(a) The enforcement of the Road Tax Law, and the regulations pertaining thereto, is suspended during the electoral period of 1932.

SECURITY DETACHMENTS.

(a) The following order, issued by the Commanding General, 2d Brigade Marines, on 26 August, 1932, is quoted for information and compliance:

"1. During the forthcoming Electoral period, which extends from 7 September, 1932, to 6 November, 1932, both dates inclusive, Security Detachments composed of personnel of the 2d Marine Brigade will be placed on duty with certain electoral personnel of the United States Electoral Mission to Nicaragua at places other than in Managua.

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS WILL GOVERN:

(A) OPERATIONS.

Troops assigned to the security force have no offensive mission in connection with the suppression of banditry nor will they exercise any police functions except in emergency, or in the absence of the forces of the Guardia Nacional. These functions remain normally with the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. Marines assigned to security duty will not leave the limits of the town to which assigned except in emergency and under orders of the senior Marine officer present. If attacked they will defend themselves and the town in accordance with a plan formulated in cooperation with the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

Detachments of security troops proceeding to and from Managua or traveling for any purpose will exercise extreme vigilance. They will travel in units of sufficient strength to insure their own security and every care and precaution will be taken to avoid contacts with armed bandits. In case of attack they will defend themselves, but in no case will the pursuit be taken up except to insure safe passage for the detail. In cases of extreme emergency, the senior Marine officer present will assume command.

(B) THE TASKS OF EACH OF SAID SECURITY DETACHMENTS SHALL BE:

1. To protect the personnel of the United States on duty with the U. S. Electoral Mission, at and in the immediate vicinity of the places where said Security Detachments are stationed;

2. To aid and assist the local detachments of the Guardia Nacional in safeguarding electoral property and records and in preserving order at, and in the immediate vicinity of, the polling places which are under the direct supervision of personnel of the United States on duty with the U. S. Electoral Mission at those places where said Security Detachments are stationed;

3. In extreme emergency only to relieve the local detachments of the Guardia Nacional from their duties of furnishing local security at, and in the immediate vicinity of, the places where said Security Detachments are stationed when said Guardia Nacional Detachments are employed on duty beyond the limits thereof and, during said periods, to perform all necessary and essential defensive functions of the said Guardia Nacional for and on behalf of electoral purposes;

4. To otherwise aid and assist the local detachments of the Guardia Nacional in the exercise of their police functions at, and in the immediate vicinity of, the places where said Security Detachments are stationed, when said detachments of the Guardia Nacional are present thereat; only in such emergencies as are directly connected with matters of electoral concern which are beyond the control of the said detachments of the Guardia Nacional.

(C) THE PURPOSES OF THE FOREGOING TASKS, HEREBY ASSIGNED SAID SECURITY DETACHMENTS ARE:

(1) To guarantee the safety of United States personnel on duty with the U. S. Electoral Mission at, and in the immediate vicinity of, the places where said Security Detachments are stationed;

(2) To cooperate with the Guardia Nacional stationed in that vicinity in the protection and security of Electoral personnel and records; and

(3) To assist the U. S. Electoral Mission to Nicaragua in its efforts to guarantee, protect and defend the liberty of suffrage to the citizens of Nicaragua, and to insure a free and fair election of Supreme Authorities, without fraud or violence.

2. To the ends set forth above, the Security Detachments shall cooperate with the agencies of the U. S. Electoral Mission, the National Board of Elections, and the Guardia Nacional located or stationed at, and in the immediate vicinity of, the places where said Security Detachments are stationed. In any case of dispute or disagreement with regard to the meaning or application of the foregoing provisions hereof, or as to the methods or measures to be adopted and pursued for the carrying out of same, the decision of the senior United States Marine or Naval officer present shall be conclusive and final." (Also see "Guardia Nacional" and "Oaths of Office.")

SUPPLEMENTAL MESA DIRECTORIOS.

(a) In such cases as necessity may require, and pursuant to instructions from proper authority, Supplemental Mesa Directorios may be installed within the established Cantons for the reception of votes. These Supplemental Mesa Directorios shall be organized and governed in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Law of 1932 and such other special instructions as may be issued by competent authority in any given case. However, their operations shall be understood to be purely administrative and subject to the supervision and review of the Electoral Directorio of the Canton.

TELEGRAPHS, TELEPHONES, AND POST OFFICES.

(a) It is essential that, in the conduct of the forthcoming elections, the communications services of the Republic be efficiently and impartially administered. The special instructions issued by the Executive Power relative thereto must be enforced at all times.

(b) On 6 November 1932, all telegraph offices shall remain open until their closing is authorized by the Chairman of the Departmental Board of Elections having jurisdiction thereof. (Also see "Franking Privileges" herein.)

VOTING.

(a) The following is a summary of the relevant provisions of existing law relative to the exercise of the right to vote in the Republic of Nicaragua:

"PERSONS WHO MAY AND WHO MAY NOT REGISTER AND VOTE.

1. As a general proposition, all **qualified** citizens of Nicaragua may register and vote in the Canton where they were domiciled at least one month before the first day of registration. (See articles 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Constitution of Nicaragua, and the 1932 Electoral Law, articles 4 and 32a.) The National Board of Elections has declared that 18 September 1932 shall be the first day of registration. (See La Gaceta of 3 August 1932.) The following are native citizens of Nicaragua:

(1) Those born in Nicaragua of Nicaraguan parents or domiciled foreigners, and

(2) The children of a Nicaraguan father or mother born abroad if they should adopt the Nicaraguan citizenship. (See Constitution of Nicaragua, article 8.)

The following are naturalized citizens of Nicaragua:

(1) Native citizens of other Central American Republics who, residing in Nicaragua, declare before a competent authority their desire of becoming Nicaraguan citizens.

(2) Any foreign woman married to a Nicaraguan citizen.

(3) All Spanish Americans who have a year's residence in the country and all other foreigners having two years' residence, provided they declare before the proper authorities their desire to become naturalized, and

(4) Those who obtain naturalization papers in accordance with the law. (See Constitution of Nicaragua, article 9.)

The following lose their Nicaraguan citizenship:

(1) Those who, without residing in Nicaratua, voluntarily become naturalized in a foreign country, outside of Central America. Nevertheless, these will regain their citizenship upon reestablishing their residence in Nicaragua at such time as this may take place.

(2) Nicaraguan women married to foreigners if, by the laws of their husbands' countries, they acquire their nationality but if, upon becoming widows, they should lose their husbands' nationality, they regain their Nicaraguan citizenship. (See Constitution of Nicaragua, article 10.)

The following are **qualified** Nicaraguan citizens possessing the right of suffrage, unless said right is suspended or forfeited as hereinafter set forth:

(1) Male Nicaraguans of 21 or more years of age, or

(2) Male Nicaraguans of 18 or more years of age, provided they are married, or

(3) Male Nicaraguans of 18 or more years of age, provided they know how to read and write. (See Constitution of Nicaragua, articles 18 and 19, and the 1932 Electoral Law, article 2.)

But any male Nicaraguan who, on the date of the regular registrations, does not have the age that this law requires for the right to vote, but who will fulfill that requirement on or before the date of the next election of the Supreme Authorities, shall have the rignt to be registered if he fulfills all the other conditions and requirements imposed by the Constitution and by the present law; but he shall not vote until he completes the age that this law requires. (See 1932 Electoral Law, article 2.)

2. The following persons may **not** register and vote in the forthcoming elections of 1932:

(1) Persons who are not citizens of Nicaragua as aforesaid;

(2) Citizens of Nicaragua who do not fulfill the conditions and possess the qualifications required by the Constitution and by the present Electoral Law. (See the 1932 Electoral Law, article 1.) This provision suspends the right to register and vote in the cases set forth below:

(a) As to those against whom a warrant is sworn, or against whom charges are preferred, which call for prosecution (this being established by proof of the existence of a lawfully issued outstanding auto de prision which has not lapsed through negligence of the prosecuting officials or court having jurisdiction thereof);

(b) As to those, during their term of sentence who have been deprived of their civil rights temporarily through trial and conviction;

(c) As to those sentenced to be imprisoned for a long term, so long as they are not reinstated to their former status. The fines and penalties which result from the provisions of the 1932 Electoral Law are of the grade of a correctional penalty. (See the 1932 Electoral Law, article 12a). Thus, the rights of citizenship are lost if a penalty which is more than correctional is imposed, unless rehabilitation is granted. Penalties which are more than correctional are those which may be imposed for the crimes set forth in Book II of the Penal Code, whereas those which are merely correctional relate to the crimes set forth in Book III of said Code. (See articles 48 and 562 of the Codigo Penal.) Rehabilitation, by which persons imprisoned for a long term may be reinstated in their former status, may be granted by the National Congress, but same shall not be requested prior to one year after the completion of imprisonment and the complete indemnification of the injured party, if any, and said rehabilitation shall not be given twice to the same person. (See articles 516 and 518 and 521 of the Codigo de Instruccion Criminal). However, a decree of amnesty completely extinguishes the penalty imposed and all of its effects. (See article 115(3) of the Codigo Penal). By the Amnesty Decree set forth in paragraph (a) under "AMNESTY," herein, dull and unconditional amnesty was granted all persons who have been suspected or sentenced for political crimes, but this decree does **not** apply to persons who **have been** punished because their activities or cooperation with bandits or Sandino have been proven.

(d) As to those who are mentally unfit;

(e) As to those who are fraudulent debtors;

(f) As to those who are notorious characters, meaning individuals who are well known outlaws, bandits, and criminals;

(g) As to those who are ungrateful to their parents and who unjustly desert their wives and legitimate children; and

(h) As to those who, without license from the Legislative Power, are in the employ of foreign governments other than Central American Governments;

(i) Provided that, as to (d), (e), (f), and (g) above, previous legitimate proof of the grounds set forth therein is essential. (See Constitution of Nicaragua, article 20);

(j) As to those who have been convicted of election crimes, for a period of five years following their conviction thereof;

(k) As to those who are soldiers and sailors of the Government in active service at the time of the election, however, those who have entered the service during the three months preceding the date of the election will be granted permission to go to vote in the canton where registered; and

(l) As to those who are members of the Guardia Nacional.

(m) Provided that, every judicial dispensation or declaration that ground exists for instituting action which, in the judgement of the Electoral Directorio, subject to the review mentioned in articles 20(b) and 24(b) of the 1932 Electoral Law, may be made with the malicious purpose of hindering a citizen in the exercise of his rights to register or to vote, shall not be considered sufficient to deprive him of such rights in accordance with article 20, clause 1, of the Constitution of Nicaragua; and

(n) Provided that, the only reasons upon which a challenge may be based are (1) that the voter is not the person whose name appears on the register, (2) that he has voted before in the same election, or (3) that he has become disqualified to vote since the date twelve days prior to the election, in all cases where previous registration has been accepted. (See the 1932 Electoral Law, articles 5 and 72); and

(3) Citizens of Nicaragua who are unable to register and vote for one of the reasons set forth below, although otherwise qualified under the law:

(a) Who refuse to take the prescribed oath when objected to (See article 72(c) of the 1932 Electoral Law);

(b) Who are not personally present in their respective cantonal domiciles on the dates set for registration and voting, or who fail to personally appear before the Cantonal Directorio of their respective cantonal domiciles (See the Constitution of Nicaragua, articles 21 and 22);

(c) Who are lawfully apprehended and placed under arrest pending trial or disposition of their respective cases, or who are serving sentence lawfully imposed, and the exigencies of the situation do not warrant the police or other authorities having cognizance thereof taking such action as will enable the voter to personally appear at the polling place to register or vote (See the Constitution of Nicaragua, article 111, clauses 1, 2, 4, 5, 23, 31 and 33, article 112, and 127); and

(d) Provided that, during the electoral period of 1932, arrests are restricted to conformity with the Electoral Law and the provisions of Articles 181 to 187 inclusive of the Codigo Penal. (Also see "Amnesty," "Arrest," "Auto de Prision," "Bandits," "Domicile," "Finger Dipping," "Flagrante Delito," "Nominations by Third Parties," "Nominations, transmittal of," and "Supplemental Mesa Directorios" herein.)

2. These Instructions shall be furnished all Electoral Directorios, Departmental Boards of Elections, National Governing Bodies of the two principal parties, the highest agency of the political parties, groups, or organizations submitting nominations by petition which are accepted by the National Board of Elections, the Guardia Nacional, the 2d Brigade Marines, the Minister of Gobernacion, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the personnel of the U. S. Electoral Mission.

By order of the National Board of Elections.

ROBERT BLAKE,
Secretary.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA,

27 July, 1932

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION)
NO. 2.....1932)

Subject: PLEBISCITE OF LIBERAL PARTY, 31 JULY AND 7 AUGUST, 1932.

1. A plebiscite has been ordered by the Liberal Party for the purpose of electing party officials and will be held on Sunday 31 July in the Departments of Managua, Leon, Chinandega, Masaya, Carazo, Granada, Rivas and Matagalpa, and on Sunday August 7, in the Departments of Esteli, Jinotega, Nueva Segovia, Bluefields and Chontales.

2. Department Commanders will take special police measures to insure public order on the day the plebiscite is held. No liberty will be granted to members of the Guardia in any town or village where the voting is going on.

3. Department Commanders will take particular pains to impress on all officers and men serving under them the necessity of preserving the strictest neutrality in this election. Care will be taken to avoid arrests on the day of elections and the preceding day, that may be prompted by political machinations.

4. In connection with the foregoing, it is to be remembered that all police functions are under Guardia control and the activities of civicos, municipal police, all special or other police are subject to the same strict control as the regular guardia.

5. Area and Department Commanders will acknowledge receipt of this dispatch.

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR-GENERAL C.B. MATTHEWS, G.N.,

/s/ JULIAN C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ W.L. BALES,
Captain, G.N.
Law Officer.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA,
27 August, 1932

CIRCULAR LETTER)
NO. 23_____1932.)

To: Area and Department Commanders,
Guardia Nacional.

1. The following letter received from the Minister of Gobernacion is quoted for your information and compliance:
"With instructions from his Exc. the President of the Republic in order that they will be complied with I quote the following:
Managua, N. D. – 26 August, 1932.—To the Minister of Gobernacion.—For your information and that you make it known to the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional, I have the pleasure of quoting the following circulars that I have sent to the Director General de Rentas, Administradores de Rentas, Jefes de Centros Distilatorios, Depositos y Sub-Depositos de Tobaco y Aguardiente y Agencias Fiscales, which read:

1st—From 10:00 A.M., of the 1st of September, 1932, the contents of each deposit of Aguardiente of the Republic, including those of the distillarios, will be inventories by its respective chief and an officer of the Guardia Nacional, and each one of said establishments will be immediately controlled by the Department Commander of the Guardia Nacional in every place where they may be situated, also the manufacture, selling, possession, transportation and distribution of alcoholic liquors.

2nd—From mid-day of the 15th of September until mid-day of 7 November, the transportation, selling, distribution or possession of Aguardiente is prohibited, except in the cases where the interested party has obtained a written permission from the Local Chief of the Guardia Nacional in charge.

3rd—The transport, giving, and selling of alcholic distilled liquors are forbidden from 12:00 o'clock noon of said day until 12:00 o'clock noon of the day following the day of inscriptions or election.

4th—All cases will be governed by the special laws that the Local Chief in charge of the deposits will have on hand.

5th—Ample faculties and authorities conferred herewith to the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to prescribe all the laws pertinent to the case.

6th—The liquors used in violation of the law, will be confiscated and returned on the 10th of November. The violators of these laws in addition to the foregoing punishment will be subject to the penalties established by the Penal Code Article 183, and will be punished in accord with Article 186, of said code.—Acknowledge receipt.—C. ARGUELLO V., Ministro de Hacienda.

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18 August, 1932—With the instructions from the President of the Republic, I quote the following for your information:

1st—From 8 September to 6 November, 1932, both dates inclusive, the Inspectores de Hacienda and Resguardos de Hacienda of the Republic, are suspended. The Guardia Nacional will assume the functions of said Inspectors and Resguardos de Hacienda.

2nd—The arms in possession of the Resguardos de Hacienda of the Republic will be deposited with the Guardia Nacional during the electoral period.—Acknowledge receipt.—G. AGUELLO V., Ministero de Hacienda.

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26 August 1932.—As a correction to my circular dated 18 August, I inform you that the transport, giving and sales of alcoholic distilled liquors is prohibited from 12:00 o'clock noon of the day preceding each of the days of inscription until 12:00 o'clock noon of the day following the day of inscription. The same will apply to the day of elections.

"Acknowledge receipt.—G. ARGUELLO V.—Ministero de Hacienda."

I am very truly yours,

/s/ Antonio Flores Vega,
Minister of Gobernacion.

2. Area and Department Commanders will take the necessary measures to carry into execution the above quoted orders.

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR-GENERAL C.B. MATTHEWS, G.N.

/s/ J.C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ Thos. P. Cheatham,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional.
Law Officer.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

2 August, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL:

From: The Jefe Director.
To: All Area and Department Commanders.

Subject: Plebiscite of Liberal Party, 31 July and 7 August, 1932, Information re.

Reference: (a) Letter of Instructions Number 2–1932.

1. Area and Department commanders will compile and submit to this office as soon as practicable the following information relative to the plebiscite held on 31 July and 7 August, 1932, as announced in reference (a):

(a) Number or designation of each mesa or voting place.

(b) Names of officials and number of votes cast at each voting place.

(c) Any irregularities believed to have occurred with detailed reasons for such beliefs.

2. If the plebiscite was orderly and with no irregularities such facts will be definitely set forth in the report submitted.

/s/ J.C. SMITH,
By direction.

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HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

12 September, 1932

SPECIAL ORDER #33)
1932) PART—I.

Subject: Electoral Mission of the Guardia Nacional.

Reference: (a) Letter of Instructions for the application of 1932. Electoral Law issued by the National Board of Elections under date of 1 September, 1932.

(b) Circular Letter No. 23, dated 27 August, 1932.

Inclosures: (1) Copy of reference (a).

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

1. There is herewith enclosed a copy of the "Letter of Instructions for the application of 1932 Electoral" issued by the National Board of Elections under date of 1 September, 1932. This letter of Instructions is hereby incorporated in and made a part of this present order.

2. All officers of the Guardia Nacional are directed to give this Letter of Instructions careful study. Particular attention will be given to the following sections:

Amnesty; Arrest; Bandits; Complaints; Flagrante Delito; Guardia Nacional; Judicial Corporation; Passports and Identity Documents; Police; Political Prisoners; Public Motor Vehicles; Railroad Passes; Road Tax Law; Security Detachments; Telegraphs; Telephones and Post Offices; and Voting.

3. All officers of the Guardia Nacional are directed to give their full cooperation and assistance to the National Board of Elections and its Agencies in taking all measures necessary to the holding of a fair, just and impartial election.

4. All Area and Department Commanders are Directed to cooperate with the Chairmen of Departmental Boards of Election in every practicable way within the limits of the military strength of their respective commands to the end that a free, just and impartial election may be held.

5. All Area and Department Commanders are directed to take the necessary measures to carry into execution those parts of the enclosed Letter of Instructions which are applicable to the Guardia Nacional.

6. Area and Department Commanders will communicate with the Chairman of the Departmental Board of Elections in their respective Areas and Departments the information included in their weekly Election Reports and the nature and contents of any political propaganda that may be circulated during the electoral period.

7. Each Station, Department and Area Headquarters will keep a separate file of orders and instructions covering the Electoral Mission of the Guardia Nacional. All officers will be required to keep themselves informed of the contents of this file.

8. The Guardia Nacional will exercise control over aguardiente in accordance with reference (b) (Circular Letter No. 23, dated August 27, 1932) which is hereby incorporated in and made a part of this order.

9. Officers of the Guardia Nacional will assure all prospective voters that the approaching registration and election in Nicaragua will be free, just and impartial and that the votes as made will be fairly counted. They will disseminate the information that the voters will be insured the free right of suffrage and that they will not be molested on the way to the polls, or after leaving the polls. In other words attempt to convince the voters that methods of intimidation or interference will not be tolerated and that they may vote as they desire and not according to the will or wishes of some politicians.

10. The following resolution adopted by the National Board of Election in its Seventh Session held on 8 September, 1932, is quoted for information and dissemination to the inhabitants of all Areas and Departments:
"IT IS RESOLVED:—that the following instructions be forwarded to the secretary of all Consejos Departmentals.
"As it appears that recently there has been an erroneous interpretation on the part of newspapers regarding the status of the persons who have given their signatures and have signed petitions for independent candidates for the forth coming elections, and to the end of clearing this point, the following is published to govern all interested parties:
"In accordance with the Constitution of Nicaragua and the Electoral Law (1932) now in force, any voter fully qualified, **can** vote for the party or parties of his own preference even though he may have signed a petition in favor of an independent candidate.
"This notice will be placed in a conspicuous (visible) place in all of the polling (places) booths, on all of the days of inscription as well as on the day of election, the 6th of November, 1932."

11. Voters will be informed that they are at full liberty to vote for any recognized candidate regardless of any petition they may have signed.

12. Area and Department Commanders will aid the National Board of Elections and its Agencies in the circulation of pre-election information that may be here-in-after communicated to them for promulgation to the general public.

13. Area and Department Commanders will submit a weekly report during the Electoral period to these headquarters covering the following information:

(a) Information as to political leaders.
(b) Movements of political leaders.
(c) Political meetings of any kind.
(d) Ways and means used to prevent registration, intimidate voters, or to prevent the opposite party from functioning.

(e) During the week in which election is held to report ways and means taken to prevent voting, intimidate voters or to prevent the opposite from functioning at the polls.

(f) Any other pertinent information bearing on the possible outcome of the election.

(g) Miscellaneous—including the reporting officers' comments, recommendations and opinions.

14. Area and Department Commanders will submit copies of all political propaganda circulated in their respective Areas and Departments to these Headquarters.

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR-GENERAL C.B. MATTHEWS,G.N.

/s/ J.C. SMITH,
Colonel, G.N.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ Thos. P. Cheatham,
Colonel G.N. Law Officer.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

13 September, 1932.

SPECIAL ORDER #33)
1932) PART II

Subject: Electoral Mission of the Guardia Nacional.

Reference: (a) Letter of Instructions for the application of the 1932 Electoral Law issued by the National Board of Elections under date of 1 September, 1932.

AMENDMENT TO REFERENCE (a).

1. The following resolution of the National Board of Elections, amending paragraph (b) under heading Guardia Nacional on Pages 16, 19 and 21 of reference (a) is published for the information and compliance of the Guardia Nacional:

"WHEREAS:

"The contents of paragraph (b), under the subject "**Guardia Nacional,**" as contained in the "Letter of Instructions" adopted by the National Board of Elections at its fifth session on 1 September, 1932, appear to require further amplification and extension in order to clearly establish the electoral mission of the Guardia Nacional, and to fix responsibility for the exercise of command under certain circumstances during the electoral period; be it

"RESOLVED:

"That the aforesaid paragraph (b) is hereby amended to provide as follows, and that said amendment shall be furnished all persons and officers in possession of one or more copies of the said "Letter of Instructions" for their information and guidance:

"(b) In view of the foregoing, the Guardia Nacional shall, under the direction of the Jefe Director thereof, cooperate in every way with the National Board of Elections to insure a free and fair election of Supreme Authorities of the Republic of Nicaragua during the current electoral period of 1932. It shall, upon the request of the respective Chairman of the Departmental Boards of Elections, assign the necessary personnel to guard and preserve order at each electoral mesa as far as the available personnel of the Guardia Nacional make this possible.

"The paramount duty of both the U.S. Electoral Mission and the Guardia Nacional on the days of the registrations and election shall be the preservation of a free and fair election. For the accomplishment of this purpose, Guardia Commanders shall comply to the fullest extent with all requests of the Chairman of the Departmental Boards of Elections, and shall utilize all regular Guardia, Auxiliares, and Municipal Police under their control for this purpose.

"The Guardia Nacional shall retain its responsibility for the security of lives and property, and shall use every resource at its disposal to prevent bandits and armed forces in revolt against the existing government of the Republic of Nicaragua from intimidating peaceful, lawabiding inhabitants and interfering with the exercise of the right of qualified electors to register and vote.

"In any case of general rioting, attack by bandits, or other grave and immediate emergency threatening the successful accomplishment of the purpose of the U.S. Electoral Mission, or the lives of personnel engaged in the supervision of the aforesaid election or in the guarding and maintaining of law and order at the electoral mesas, the senior line officer of the Navy or Marine Corps present shall immediately assume command of all forces, including those of both the Guardia Nacional and the U. S. Electoral Mission, and take such steps as are necessary to meet the military situation. In all such cases, **the officer assuming command,** as herein set forth, and all of the foregoing personnel thereby engaged in the maintenance of law and order, shall pass, **for this purpose, under the command of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional.** Prompt reports of all disorders and emergencies, as described above, shall be transmitted to the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional and the President of the National Board of Elections."

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR MAJOR-GENERAL
C.B. MATTHEWS, G.N.

/s/ J.C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ THOS. P. CHEATHAM,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional.
Law Officer.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

11 October, 1932.

SPECIAL ORDER) PART III
NO. – 33 – 1932)

Subject: Electoral Mission of the Guardia Nacional.

References: (a) See "First Part."
(b) See "Second Part."
(c) First supplement to reference (a) issued by the National Board of Elections under date of 7 October, 1932.
(d) Letter, Chairman, U. S. Electoral Mission to Nicaragua, dated 8 October, 1932, to the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional.

Inclosure: (1) Copy of reference (c), herewith.

16. There is inclosed herewith a copy of the First Supplement to reference (a) issued by the National Board of Elections under date of 1 September, 1932. This supplement to reference (a) is hereby incorporated in and made a part of this present order.

17. All officers of the Guardia Nacional are directed to give this supplement to reference (a) careful study. Particular attention will be given the following sections thereof:

ARREST
ELECTORAL PERIOD
GUARDIA NACIONAL

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTION DAY:

18. The following extract from reference (d) is quoted:

"In view of past experience, numerous complaints may be expected to arise on election day in the remote mesas presided over by Nicaraguans, some of which it will be necessary to investigate later. It appears desirable, therefore, that as many mesas as possible should be under the eye of an intelligent witness whose testimony may be relied upon.

"To require all Guardia officers to interest themselves in this matter is subject to the objection that it will give rise to criticism of political activity or interest on the part of the Guardia Nacional. It does appear practicable, however, and if so will be of valuable assistance, to have the American Officers of the Guardia Nacional, whose duties require them to be near a mesa presided over by a Nicaraguan president, observe closely the procedure and specially any conflict or irregularity with a view to testifying in the case if required. They, must, of course, avoid injecting themselves into the argument, if any, or assuming any responsibility, except in the case of obvious fraud or disorder. While it is not desired to restrict or hamper the movements

of any officer of the Guardia on Election day, it does appear desirable to have the American Officers in the Guardia Nacional render this additional service to such degree as their paramount duty will permit."

19. Area and Department Commanders will issue the necessary instructions to comply with the policy outlined in the preceding paragraph relative to the employment of American Officers of the Guardia Nacional assigned to their Areas and Departments on Election Day. American Officers assigned to such duty will be required to make a careful study of the preceding paragraph and to comply with the spirit of the instructions contained therein.

20. Nicaraguan Officers of the Guardia Nacional will be employed on Election Day in so far as practicable in such capacities as will obviate charges of political activity or interest on their part in the elections.

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR-GENERAL C.B. MATTHEWS, G.N.

/s/ J. C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ THOS. P. CHEATHAM,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional.
Law Officer.

HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.
20 September, 1932.

ELECTION MEMORANDUM #1

SUBJECT: Sale of Beer during Electoral Period.

1. For the information of Area and Department Commanders the following messages are quoted:

QUESTION: (a) "25 CHINANDEGA DOES CIRCULAR LETTER NUMBER TWO THREE FORBID SALE OF BEER ON INSCRIPTION DAYS QUESTION 10419."

ANSWER: (b) "16 LAW YOUR 25 DASH 10419 SALE OF BEER AUTHORIZED UNLESS DEPARTMENT COMMANDER CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL UNDER LOCAL SITUATION TO PRESERVATION OF ORDER TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS THEREON 15319."

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR GENERAL C.B. MATTHEWS, G.N.

/s/ J. C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ THOS. P. CHEATHAM,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional,
Law Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.
11 October, 1932.

ELECTION MEMORANDM #2.

SUBJECT: Guardia Nacional Cooperation with Electoral Mission.

1. The following letter is quoted for the information of the Guardia Nacional.

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UNITED STATES ELECTORAL MISSION TO NICARAGUA.
Managua, Nicaragua,
10 October, 1932.

Major General Calvin B. Matthews,
Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional,
Managua, Nicaragua.

My dear General Matthews:

In reviewing the work of the U. S. Electoral Mission to date, I take this opportunity of expressing to you, your staff, and the officers and men of the Guardia Nacional, my hearty appreciation of your excellent cooperation with the Mission under my charge in its preparation for the climax of our work here in Nicaragua, —— Election Day, 6 November, 1932.

I am, my Dear General Matthews,
Sincerely yours,

/s/ C. H. WOODWARD,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chairman, U. S. Electoral
Mission to Nicaragua.

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BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR MAJOR GENERAL
C. B. MATTHEWS, G.N.

/s/ J. C. SMITH,
Colonel Guardia Nacional,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ THOS. P. CHEATHAM,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional.
Law Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS,
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA,
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.
19 October, 1932.

ELECTION MEMORANDUM #3:

SUBJECT: Firing of Fire crackers, etc.

1. For the information of the Area and Department Commanders the following Decree is quoted:

"No. 234-EL Presidente De La Republica,

CONSIDERANDO:

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR MAJOR GENERAL
C. B. MATTHEWS, G. N.

/s/ J. C. SMITH,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional.
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ THOS. P. CHEATHAM,
Colonel, Guardia Nacional,
Law Officer.

Managua, Nicaragua,
November 5, 1932.

My dear Doctor Sacasa:

Supplementing my letter of the third instant concerning a plan for transferring the Guardia Nacional to complete Nicaraguan control, I desire to confirm my complete accord with the suggestion that the following paragraph be added to the proposed draft agreement set forth on page 4 of my letter in reference:

> The Commanding General of the Republic, in agreement with the Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional, shall select the personnel of the Estado Mayor from officers of whatever grade or grades they deem appropriate.

It is my understanding that the Estado Mayor shall be selected from the officers of the Guardia without altering the non-partisan character of each grade, and shall embrance only those serving as the heads of Bureaus at the Headquarters of the Guardia who, at the present time, consist of the Chief of Staff, the Intelligence and Operations Officer, the Quartermaster, the Paymaster, and the Law Officer. It is also my understanding that the selections thus made of officers of the Estado Mayor may be freely made without taking into consideration the previous political affiliation or antecedents of the officers so selected.

I am, my dear Doctor Sacasa,

Very sincerely yours,

Matthew E. Hanna
American Minister.

His Excellency
Doctor Juan Bautista Sacasa,
Candidate for President,
of the Liberal Party,
Managua.

(Identical letter sent to General Emiliano Chamorro)

Enclosure No. 3, despatch No. 959, dated November 7, 1932, from the American Legation Managua.

TRANSLATION:

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA

The undersigned candidates to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the Republic of Nicaragua, of the two parties, Liberal and Conservative, completely convinced that the peace of Nicaragua is a permanent necessity, to which all good patriots are obligated mutually agree to maintain the non-partisan quality of the Guardia Nacional; and in the same manner they obligate themselves, for the good of Nicaragua, to respect and sustain the constituted Government which shall result from the elections of November 6, 1933, during the presidential period from January 1, 1933, to December 31, 1936; and in effect agree to the following:

1. The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be the sole armed force of the Government of the Republic. Any increase made in the Government's armed forces, to meet an emergency or for any other purpose, shall constitute an integral part of the Guardia Nacional.

2. The non-partisan character of the Guardia Nacional shall be strictly maintained in the enlisted personnel, the cadets of the Military Academy, and in each grade of commissioned officers, except the grade of Jefe Director, and all vacancies shall be filled so as to maintain this non-partisan character.

3. The Commanding General of the Republic, in agreement with the Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional, shall select the personnel of the Ratado Mayor from officers of whatever grade or grades they deem appropriate.

4. Political considerations in conflict with the non-partisan character of the Guardia shall be wholly eliminated from all decisions affecting the promotion and dismissal of commissioned officers, cadets, and enlisted men, the selections to fill vacancies in the commissioned and enlisted strength, the discipline and command, and from all other decisions in connection with the administration of the Guardia.

In witness whereof, and in the presence of His Excellency Matthew E. Hanna, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America in Nicaragua, we sign five identical copies in the city of Managua, Nacional District, on the fifth day of November, 1932.

(signed) ADOLFO DIAZ
Candidate to the Presidency of the Conservative Party.

(signed) JUAN B. SACASA
Candidate to the Presidency of the Liberal Nacionalist Party.

(signed) EMILIANO CHAMORRO
Candidate to the Vice-Presidency of the Conservative Party.

(signed) ROD. ESPINOSA R.
Candidate to the Vice-Presidency of the Liberal Nacionalist Party.

Before me

(signed) MATTHEW E. HANNA
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of American in Nicaragua.

Seal of the American Legation, Managua.

CHAPTER XX

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Op–138–PS–14 Sept 32
(SG)EF49/kk

WASHINGTON, D.C. Sept 16, 1932.

Confidential.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander Special Service Squadron.

Subject: Evacuation from Nicaragua.

Reference:
(a) Opnav 0006 1000 August.
(b) Comsperon 0011 1605 August.
(c) Comsperon Letter EF49/A16–3(0865), undated.
(d) Opnav 0018 1400 August.
(e) Opnav 3818 1500 August.
(f) Comsperon letter EF49/A16–3(0920) 2 September.

1. Present plans contemplate that the command of the Guardia Nacional will be turned over to Nicaraguan authority as soon as possible after the inauguration of the new President on 1 January, and not later than 2 January, and that all personnel of the Naval Service will be withdrawn from Nicaragua as soon thereafter as practicable.

2. The following naval vessels are scheduled to visit Corinto on the dates indicated and are available to the limit of their capacities for transportation of personnel and material from the West Coast of Nicaragua.

Vega	30 September	to West	Coast
Sirius	1 October	" East	"
Patoka	15 October	" East	"
Vega	28 November	" East	"
Nitro	28 November	" West	"
Sirius	22 December	" West	"
Henderson	29 November	" East	"
Henderson *	29 December	" East	"
Antares*	24 December	" West	"

The vessels marked with an asterisk may be delayed at Corinto on those visits in connection with the final evacuation while the other vessels ordinarily spend but one day there.

3. The following general outline of the plan for the evacuation from Nicaragua, insofar as it has been formulated to date, is summarized herein to insure a common understanding by all concerned:

Guardia relief.

(a) Nicaraguans who will succeed Americans in the Guardia to be selected and placed in training at the earliest practicable date.
(b) American personnel in the Guardia to be relieved by Nicaraguans at the latest practicable date, prior to the final turnover, which will enable them to be evacuated from Nicaragua with the Second Brigade.

Troops.

(c) Personnel in excess of allowance and requirements to be evacuated from Nicaragua prior to 1 January.

(d) All remaining personnel of the naval service to be evacuated from Nicaragua as soon as practicable after the turn-over to the Guardia; those from the West Coast to the East and West Coasts of the United States via the Henderson and Antares respectively; and those from the East Coast to the Canal Zone via a vessel of the Special Service Squadron, and to report to the Commandant Fifteenth Naval District for temporary duty awaiting orders to new stations.

Aircraft.

(e) Aircraft to be evacuated from Nicaragua as soon as practicable after the turn-over of the Guardia; all of them to the United States, in case the expected permission is obtained for flight within Mexican jurisdiction; the short radius planes otherwise to the Canal Zone.

Dependents.

(f) All dependents from the West Coast of Nicaragua to leave via the HENDERSON due in Corinto 29 November.

(g) All dependents from the East Coast of Nicaragua to be evacuated by commercial transportation not later than 1 December.

Material.

(h) All possible freight to be shipped to the United States in Naval vessels visiting Corinto during the months preceding final evacuation.

(i) Final freight to be loaded in the SIRUS, HENDERSON and ANTARES prior to 2 January.

(j) Property which it is impracticable or uneconomical to evacuate to be disposed of locally by sale or abandonment, as may specifically be authorized in each case by proper authority.

4. This general plan is subject to modification in detail as may be found necessary or desirable by those responsible for its execution. Any changes so made should be communicated without delay to all concerned.

/s/ W. V. PRATT.

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,
SECOND BRIGADE, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

29 October, 1932.

Memorandum for: General Matthews,
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

1. As a matter to be discussed with Admiral Smith next week, why not, as other outlying districts, turn over the Guardia in Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields to native control prior to January 2, 1933?

2. In bringing American personnel to Managua by December 15th, is it your intention to bring in only those in outlying stations? or also include those along the railroad?

3. If you intend to leave the American personnel along the railroad, I would appreciate you advising me what method of relief for such personnel is contemplated.

4. In this connection, I should think that such places as Leon, Chinandega and Corinto could well be kept going with increased American personnel up to the last evacuation train. This would facilitate the protection of the railroad.

5. As to the providing for extra personnel in Managua, when withdrawing from outlying stations, I believe we will have sufficient space in Campo de Marte without using the Electoral Mission Camp, which I prefer to see cleaned up before departure.

6. Please let me have also your ideas and general plans for relief of American personnel by native personnel and the details regarding the evacuation of American personnel.

7. I would be pleased to have your ideas on this by the early part of the week.

/s/ R. C. BERKELEY.

3–CBM
jcs–wsl.HEADQUARTERS NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD
DETACHMENT, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.
1 November, 1932.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, Second Marine Brigade, Managua, Nicaragua.

Subject: Plan for concentration of American personnel of the Guardia prior to evacuation.

Reference: (a) Your memorandum dated 29 October, 1932.

1. Based entirely on the present situation which of course is subject to change at any moment, the general plan for the evacuation of the American personnel in the Nicaraguan National Guard is as follows:

(1) To evacuate the Departments of Nueva Segovia and Esteli by plane on D-2, D-1 and D day, the personnel to be concentrated at Ocotal, Apali and Esteli for this purpose.

(2) To concentrate the personnel of the Department of Jinotega at Jinotega on D-2, move to Matagalpa D-1; to concentrate the personnel of the Department of Matagalpa at Matagalpa by D-1; personnel of both departments to proceed to Managua by truck on D day.

(3) To concentrate personnel of the Departments of Rivas and Chontales at Rivas and Juigalpa respectively, all to proceed to Granada on D day; personnel of the Department of Granada-Masaya to concentrate in Granada; all to proceed to Managua by train when ordered.

(4) Personnel of the Northern part of the Department of Leon to concentrate at El Sauce on D-1 and proceed from point of rails by train to Leon; personnel of the Department of Chinandega to concentrate at Chinandega, Corinto and Chichigalpa; personnel of both departments to remain in railroad towns until date of final evacuation, then to join the last detachment of troops proceeding from Managua to Corinto on date of evacuation. To reinforce, should the situation demand, the troops stationed in the towns at sensitive points on the railroad between Managua and Corinto prior to day of evacuation.

(5) To concentrate the personnel of the Department of Managua and Carazo in Managua when ordered between D day and day set for evacuation.

(6) To concentrate the personnel on the East Coast at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on D day for evacuation by ships of the Special Service Squadron on the date of the final evacuation of the East Coast.

(7) D day can not be set at the present time, but may differ for the different departments.

2. The approximate number to be concentrated in Managua in addition to those now present is forty officers and seventy enlisted men.

3. It is understood that this is only a general plan based on the present military and political situation in the country. The political situation will of course change in the meantime and the military situation cannot be foreseen at the present time. Hence many modifications are probable and a complete change of plan is possible before the date of evacuation.

/s/C. B. MATTHEWS.

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3–JCS–fam.

HEADQUARTERS NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD
DETACHMENT, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

16 November, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: All Area and Department Commanders.

Subject: Evacuation, concentration for.

1. The following tentative plan has been made for the concentration of the American personnel of the Nicaraguan National Guard on D day prior to the final evacuation of all naval personnel from Nicaragua:

(1) To evacuate to Managua the Departments of Nueva Segovia and Esteli by plane on D-2, D-1 and D day, the personnel to be concentrated at the following points: Ocotal, Apali and Esteli.

(2) To concentrate the personnel of the Departments of Jinotega at Jinotega on D-2, move to Matagalpa on D-1; to concentrate the personnel of the Department of Matagalpa at Matagalpa by D-1; personnel of both departments to proceed by truck to Managua on D day.

(3) To concentrate the personnel of the Departments of Rivas and Chontales at Rivas and Juigalpa, respectively, all to proceed to Granada on D day; personnel of the Department of Granada & Masaya to concentrate in Granada on D day; all to proceed to Managua by train when ordered.

(4) To concentrate the personnel of the northern part of Leon at El Sauce on D-1 and proceed from point of rails by train to Leon personnel of the Department of Chinandega to concentrate at Chinandega, Corinto and Chichigalpa on D day; personnel of both departments to remain in railroad towns until date of final evacuation, then to join the last detachment of troops proceeding from Managua to Corinto on date of evacuation. To reinforce, should the situation demand, the troops stationed in the towns at sensitive points on the railroad between Managua and Corinto prior to date of evacuation.

(5) To concentrate the personnel of the Department of Managua and Carazo in Managua when ordered between D day and date set for evacuation.

(6) To concentrate the personnel on the East Coast at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on D day, for evacuation by ships of the Special Service Squadron on the date of final evacuation of the East Coast.

(7) The present tentative date for D day is December 15, 1932, but may differ for the different departments.

2. Should it be found that in the opinion of Area or Department Commanders modification of this plan is necessary in any Area or Department, Area or Department Commanders will notify these Headquarters immediately.

/s/ J. C. SMITH,
By direction.

3–JCS–wsl.

HEADQUARTERS NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD
DETACHMENT, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.

3 December, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: All Area and Department Commanders.

Subject: Concentration of Marine Corps and Navy personnel for evacuation.

1. The Marine Corps and Navy personnel now on duty with the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment will be concentrated for evacuation on or about 15 December, 1932. Personnel located in the Western Departments will be concentrated in the railroad town. The personnel on the East Coast will be concentrated at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields.

2. A. NORTHERN AREA.

(1) The personnel in the Northern Area will be concentrated in Apali, Ocotal and Esteli in time to be evacuated by plane to Managua: from Apali, 13 December; from Ocotal 14 & 15 December; from Esteli 15 December. The Commanding Officer of the Area will inform Guardia Headquarters by dispatch the number of men and the weight of arms and equipment to be evacuated from each locality.

B. CENTRAL AREA.

(1) **Department of Jinotega.**

Personnel in the Department of Jinotega will be concentrated at Jinotega by 13 December; will proceed to Matagalpa 14 December.

(2) **Department of Matagalpa.**

Personnel in the Department of Matagalpa will be concentrated in Matagalpa by 14 December.

(3) Personnel from both departments will proceed by truck to Managua 15 December.

C. **DEPARTMENT OF LEON.**

(1) The personnel of the northern part of the Department of Leon will be concentrated at El Sauce on 15 December and will proceed from point of rails by train to Leon 17 December.

(2) All personnel of the department will remain in Leon until date of final evacuation.

D. **DEPARTMENT OF CHINANDEGA.**

(1) The personnel of the Department of Chinandega will be concentrated at Chichigalpa, Chinandega and Corinto on 15 December; will remain in those towns until date of final evacuation.

E. **DEPARTMENT OF CHONTALES.**

(1) The personnel of the Department of Chontales will be concentrated at Juigalpa on 15 December; will proceed to Granada on 17 December and remain there until further orders.

F. **DEPARTMENT OF RIVAS.**

(1) The personnel of the Department of Rivas will be concentrated at Rivas on 15 December; will then proceed by boat to Granada on 22 December and remain there until further orders.

G. **DEPARTMENT OF MANAGUA & CARAZO.**

(1) The personnel of the Department of Managua & Carazo will be concentrated at Managua when ordered between 15 December and the date of final evacuation.

H. **DEPARTMENT OF GRANADA & MASAYA.**

(1) The personnel of the Department of Granada & Masaya will be concentrated at Granada and Masaya on 15 December; remain until further orders.

I. **EASTERN AREA.**

(1) The personnel of the East Coast will be concentrated at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields by 15 December; and will remain there until evacuation by ships of the Special Service Squadron.

3. All heavy baggage will be forwarded to concentration points prior to 13 December in conformity with Special Order No. 52–1932.

X. A. Extraordinary precautions will be taken for the defense of aviation fields and the protection of personnel during the movement of troops required by this order.

B. Command will pass to Nicaraguan officers in posts, districts, departments and areas on the respective dates of their evacuation by American officers.

/s/ J. C. SMITH,
By direction.

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